Bangladesh

1. Shrimps cultivation has been found to have an impact on the socio-economic and the environment through many studies conducted all over the world. Studies in India showed shrimp cultivation to cost nearly two times the annual earnings of those regions. Moreover the process of shrimp cultivation leads to contamination of fresh water which negatively impact healthy water and reduces the coastal lines which makes coastal regions more prone to hurricanes and tornadoes. 2.

The shrimp industry benefits three to four million “mostly poor” Bangladeshis while providing livelihood directly numbering some 11, 50,000 people. In 2007-2008, a total of 2, 23,095 Metric ton shrimp produced in Bangladesh that contributes 19,567. 90 core taka in the GNP. There is ample demand in the international markets for shrimp and Bangladesh is blessed with an environment friendly for shrimp production. So obviously, the shrimp industry has a huge potential for Bangladesh.

Through various studies it were also found that shrimp industry did increase the income levels of the people and help them to enjoy a better standard of living. 3. Shrimps cultivation in also observed to have impacts of the social structure which leads to increased migration, social conflict and degradation of health. Moreover, it also cause impact on the bio-diversity, mangrove forest, soil and marine species, salinity, degradation of land and de-stabilization of coastal ecosystems. Bangladesh has been predominantly an agricultural based nation.

Degradation of agricultural land will directly affect the food security and livestock of many people. Moreover as Bangladesh is a riverine nation saline waters for shrimp ponds can seep to all the other river bodies and contaminate the waters. 4. Shrimp Industry usually have a limited life-p of about 10 years observed in Bangladesh, Thailand and India. Shrimp farms located in Sunderbands, Khulna, Bhola, Bagerhaat and Barisal also encounter such short life-p. 5. Bangladesh shrimp cultivators mostly us extensive to super-intensive shrimp farming techniques.

These methods are very harsh and have serious crippling effects on the bio-diversity and the mangrove coastlines. Of about 35% of the world’s mangrove forests have been cleared due to this. 6. Unregulated shrimp farming and improper land zoning legislations have led to social uses such as land grabbing, improper land use and impairment for other fisheries cultivations. Shrimp cultivation have also seen uneven wealth distribution which eventually lead to further societal disputes.

Small-scale fish farming in Bangladesh Introduction For many people in Bangladesh small-scale fish farming is an important opportunity to generate income and is a significant nutritional source providing protein-rich food all year round. It comprises of a range of options that can be adapted to suit the needs and capacity of people living in rural Bangladesh. The two approaches commonly implemented on a small scale are: • Local pond fish farming Open water fish farming in lakes, rivers, dams and reservoirs The benefit to low-income farmers is that they are able to invest in fish cultivation when there is sufficient income, which will then be able to generate additional income and food when other sources of income are limited. Much of Bangladesh is flooded annually during the monsoon season as water flows into the country through the Ganga (Ganges), Brahmaputra and Meghna rivers. This provides an extensive range of habitats for wild and cultivated fish species.

Fish catches are highest after the monsoon rains when supplies of other foods, such as rice, are low. With so much water, fishing plays a vital role in the economy of rural villages. Fish farming options Capital intensive One of the main trends in fish culture over recent years has been towards capital-intensive, high-input high-yield systems, which can dramatically improve the rate of production if operated in ideal conditions. The development of practical hatching techniques has vastly improved fish cultivation and allowed careful breeding and selection of desired species to take place.

Although these techniques were introduced to Bangladesh some years ago, it has taken time for them to become established. Commercially produced fish have become a significant proportion of the total fish supply. But intensive cultivation methods increase the cost of fish production beyond the reach of poorer farmers. Consequently, alternative low-cost approaches have been promoted by NGOs working in the country. Fish farming for the poor

An enormous variety of water bodies, including rivers, irrigation canals, flood plains, beels (large depressions), ox bow lakes and ponds are dispersed throughout Bangladesh offering considerable potential for fish cultivation, but a general lack of capital, access to resources and knowledge means that many farmers are unable to provide all the commercial inputs required for intensive production methods. An alternative low-cost approach is more appropriate for many people, relying on existing water bodies and natural vegetation and household waste, supplemented with animal protein in the form of snails and homemade supplements for fish feed.

Many NGOs are adopting strategies to minimise the inherent riskiness of fish culture by undertaking research into low-input systems, low-cost technology, fast growing species and alternative management practices. Pond culture Site selection is an important factor in the success of a fish farm but the ideal site is usually not available to poorer families. Site location will be dependent on a number of factors: • The fish species being raised. • Soil quality, which affects water quality and productivity. • An adequate supply of water. • Land ownership. Marketplace and market conditions. • Fish food and other inputs available to the farmer. • Groups adjacent to water. • More than 1 metre water retention capacity for at least 6 months of the year. • Pollution free. Ideally, the fishpond should be 0. 5 to 1. 0 metres at the shallow end and sloping to 1. 5 to 2 . 0 metres at the drain end. Drain vales, baffle boards or tilt-over standpipes should be incorporated into the design. It should be possible to drain the pond within three days. The edges of the pond should have a slope of 2:1 or 3:1 on all sides.

If possible the pond should be located to take advantage of the effect of the wind on the surface of the pond to mix the water; although locations that are too windy can cause erosion of dykes. If the site is very windy the long side of the pond should be at right angles to the prevailing wind. Hedges and trees can be used to protect the pond. In practice, existing ponds and pools are abundant in Bangladesh, often located near to farmers’ homes. Small-scale fish cultivation is mainly a secondary occupation for farmers. These ponds tend to be small (less than 0. 5 acres) and do not have any water drain facility. They are commonly referred to as fishponds but are in fact “borrow pits”, where earth has been removed for building. Fish breading is just one of the activities that the ponds are used for. Other uses may include domestic water use, washing, irrigation or duck keeping. Ponds are occasionally integrated into paddy fields as additional ditches. Consequently, the ponds have many limitations for producing fish. In managing the ponds there are many potential problems to be considered, including: • Broken pond banks; check the pond walls on a regular basis. An irregular water supply, too much water in the monsoon season and too little in the summer. • Predators; check the pond for signs of snake and rat holes. The Boal fish is a particular menace that eats smaller fish. • Grazing animals can damage the pond banks and should be kept out of the way. • Silting or a build up of organic matter; check the bottom of the pond and scoop silt out when required. Mud on the bottom of the ponds can be agitated with a rope to release harmful gasses. • Leakage; check the inlet and outlet on a regular basis. Fish diseases; check the fish on a regular basis. • Poor water quality; lime can be added to improve the water quality. Open water fish farming Open water fish farming is particularly suited to Bangladesh with its many water sources. Cages or pens are used to separate an area of larger water bodies for fish cultivation. The selected water source should be of good quality with low turbidity. Dams and reservoirs primarily exist to store water but as a secondary function these bodies of water can be stocked with fingerlings or fry and the fish can be harvested later on using nets.

In river locations a slow current is necessary and there should be little disturbance from water traffic. The disadvantages are: • Fish farmers have little control of the water, as they do not own the dam or reservoir. • Water cannot be drained, as the main function of the resource is to provide water. • There are likely to be more predators of the fish in the water. • It is not possible to feed or fertilize the water, as occurs in more intensive fish farming, so there is a reliance on naturally occurring fish food. There is a potential risk from disease but stock held in small-scale cages scattered around villages will probably be less vulnerable than stock held in more concentrated and centralized commercial systems. • The risk from theft and vandalism is a serious problem in some places. This is especially real for the poorest people who are perceived as easy victims. • A significant expansion of cage culture activities in some villages could lead to local depletion of snail or other foods, to the detriment of ducks and other domestic and wild animals. • Multiple ownership of ponds can be a major drawback to the effective use of such resources.

Consensus over access to the water for the poor has to be developed. Figure 2: Bilkish Begum and Hamida Begum working with fish cages (Photo credit: Practical Action / Zul) Fish cages Cages are used as a form of farming in their own right within flowing or large bodies of water and can also be used in small pond fish culture to protect fingerlings in the initial stages of development. Small cages with a capacity of one cubic metre are suitable for fingerling protection. The cage can hold up to 300 fish at a time. People grow fish in their local ponds using a simple fish cage known locally as a “hapa”.

A few young fish are put into each “hapa”, which acts as their home, floating just below the surface of the pond. Cage construction Cages can be made using a few cheap materials. Bamboo poles form an outer frame that is covered in netting; inside is a “nursery” section for the younger, more delicate fish; and floats are added at the corners. A cage is a very simple means of restraining fish in one place and it can be easily made using local materials. Cage design must incorporate certain physical properties, including the ability to hold fish securely but also to be within the financial means of the cage operators.

The cages presently used are small in size, measuring between 1 and 2m3, inexpensive and simple to construct. Farmers use both fixed and floating cages. In general, fixed cages are installed in water where the depth is relatively low and bamboo poles can be fixed into the riverbed or substrate. Floating cages do not have this limitation and can be used in deep water. Floating cages tend to be easier to manage but when selecting the type and design the following points should be considered: • Ability • Input availability • Natural disaster • Type of water body Water depth • Water current • Water retention period over one year • Social problem • Cage management Fixed cages Fixed cages are very easy to construct and only require a small amount of capital investment. The materials needed to make fixed cages are netting with an 8mm mesh size, bamboo, rope, twine and sinker. Routine management is difficult for these cages and storms, strong currents, tidal surges and flooding may cause damage if precautionary measures are not taken. Fixed cages are difficult to move from one place to another during water fluctuation.

A top cover is usually provided on cages to reduce the risk of fish escaping, especially in areas prone to flash floods where water levels rise very quickly. A small opening is kept at one edge or in the middle of the top covering for feeding purposes. A feeding platform made of fine mesh is placed on the bottom of each cage to minimise food loss. To fix the cage, four bamboo poles are fixed in the substrate and the four top and bottom corners of the cage are tied to the bamboo poles with nylon rope, allowing the cage netting to stretch.

To minimise installation cost and to reduce daily management labour, cages are sometimes fixed in rows with a narrow space between the adjacent cages. Floating cages The size of the cage is usually 1m3. A top net is always used to minimise escapees because the cage is only a few centimetres above the water surface. The top of the cage is on hinges that can be opened to allow feeding, the checking of fish, the removal of waste and harvesting. A layer of fine mesh net is placed along the bottom of the cage and 10 centimetres up each side which reduces food loss.

However, where water has a high turbidity, the use of fine mesh is not recommended as it clogs up the mesh and causes structural stress on the cage frame. In these areas, feeding trays should be used instead of fine mesh. Buoyancy is achieved by using four plastic floats (buoys) which are tied to the four horizontal frames, approximately 10 centimetres from the top of the cage. Bamboo frame cage To make a 1m3 bamboo cage, twelve one metre long bamboo sticks (about 2cm in diameter) are required and fixed into the holes of the angles, one angle for each corner, giving a box shape. Advantages and disadvantages of fixed and floating cages | |Fixed cages |Floating cages | |Advantages | |Cost per unit is small |Water volume remains constant even with a fluctuation in the water | |Not damaged by storms |level | |Easy age management |Cage can be installed in deep water | |Cage bags spread properly in the water |Floating cage with box type frame gives adequate space inside | |Easy to construct | |In tidal water bodies the effective cage depth is greater | |Disadvantages | |Water depth inside cage varies with the fluctuation of the water |Cost per unit is higher than fixed cages | |level |Algae deposits on cage net affect the water exchange | |Vulnerable to tidal surge and storm |Cage management i. e. cleaning, moving and sampling are not easy | |Cage cannot be installed in all types of water bodies |Due to water flow sometimes the cage bag does not spread properly | |Prone to crab cutting |Easy to steal fish by lifting the cage | |Poorer fish growth and higher mortality rate |During flooding may wash away | Cage management

Care of cages – cleaning of aquatic weeds nearby, removal of water hyacinth, cleaning of waste feeds from cages, cleaning of deposited silts from cage, removal of dead fishes, checking cage frames, floats, ties, anchors, feeding trays etc. , cage shifting, considering the water level, checking water pollution and guarding. Care of net – Algae attachment should be cleaned at regular basis to ensure water exchange, net holes must be checked properly and need quick repairing when necessary. Care of fish – profitability depends on proper attention to the fish growth, regular, adequate and quality feeding is important. Fish health and disease should be monitored during feeding and sampling.

The fish must be fed daily using aquatic weed or a mixture of rice bran, oil cakes, kitchen waste, chopped snails or cow dung. Minimising risk of cage culture • Appropriate cage design can help minimise failure. • The use of more than one cage per household greatly reduces the risk of an individual losing all fish. • Placing many cages together in clusters also reduces the risk of poaching. • Individual farmers can form groups that can guard the fish and therefore considerably reduce potential poaching threats. Fish types Fish is an important part of the diet for the people in Bangladesh providing protein calcium, fatty acids and vitamins.

Traditionally, a variety of local species were used in ponds, mainly carp, caught from the wild as spawn (fertilised eggs or small fish). One of the main drawbacks of this source of supply is that along with the desired fish species come many undesirable ones Most of the species currently used in the cages in Bangladesh are exotics. However, for decades these fish have bred naturally and distributed themselves throughout the flood plains and the delta. Common fish types The selection a suitable fish species will depend on various biological and economic factors, such as; • Market price • Growth rate • Ability to reproduce simple culture of young fish Match of fish and available fish feed • Water temperature is an important criteria in assessing which fish species is suitable. The main types of cultivated fish are Carp, Tilapia and Catfish. Other fish suitable to cultivation are eel, tawes, mullet, snakeskin, and rohu. Some fish are more suitable to pond conditions than others, some fish will not adapt the confined conditions while others such as the indigenous Koi (Anabas testidunous) have been found to thrive in cages. Small indigenous species In addition to the main cultivated species there are many indigenous breeds of fish that play an important role in the nutrition of the population.

These fish are classed as small indigenous species although not all fish within this classification are particularly small. Of the 260 species of fresh water fish found locally, over 140 species are classified as Small Indigenous Species (SIS) and account for over 80% of the total catch, consumed by the poorer section, as preferred species. The term SIS would seem to be a recent re interpretation of the Bangla word chotmach (literally small fish) as opposed to Boromach (literally large fish). Common fish within the small indigenous species category include: Figure 3: Bilkish with prepared food for her fish (Photo credit: Practical Action / Zul) • Small catfish • Knifefishes Snakeheads • Needlefishes • Minnows, Rasboras, and bards • Loaches • Anchovies and sardines • Spiny eels • Climbing perch • Gobies • Mud Perches • Glassfishes • Fresh water prawns Small, low-value fish are particularly important for the extremely poor after the rice harvest when the demand for their labour declines. Feeding the fish With the non-intensive approach it is possible to feed fish on nothing more than scraps and waste, duck weed, oil cake, kitchen waste, rice bran and snails which will provide all the nutrition required. Some low-cost feeds are bought in by the households, typically rice bran and oilcake, but these costs are minimal.

Occasionally, the diet may be supplemented with commercially available compound feeds. In most cases a mixture of diets is offered, according to their availability and needs of the fish. Fish harvesting and marketing Growth is rapid in the warm climate of Bangladesh and the fish attain marketable size within 3-9 months, providing farmers with a rapid return on their investment and labour. Fingerling production culture cycle is between 1 and 2 months. Cage nursery producers can sell fingerlings to the pond farmers and ox-bow lake operators. Fish for food culture cycle is between 4 and 6 months. Fish food producers consume the cage fish as well as selling them in the market.

Figure 4: A group of landless women discussing finances in Madaripur (Photo credit: Practical Action / Neil Cooper) Profitability depends on many factors including the type of water body and culture, cage construction materials, the choice of fish species, fingerling size and price, stocking density, feed price, availability of protein rich feed, culture duration, cage management, harvesting and marketing. Another concern relates to economies of scale. Almost all enterprises are subject to economies of scale, and cage culture is no exception. The labour of looking after one small cage is far greater per kilogram of product than that for looking after a large one.

The cost of the cage per kilogram of production will also be higher for a small cage versus a large cage. However, co-operative use of labour can be used to realise economies of scale in relation to labour, and this is already done in many villages. The third concern, related to the second, is comparative advantage. A significant proportion of the fish is intended to be sold for cash rather than consumed by the farmer and his family. In the medium term, an important question is whether small-scale producers in villages are well placed to compete – either with larger commercial producers, or producers from elsewhere. If they are not, and if competition increases, then prices – and returns – will steadily decline.

In practice there is strong local demand for fish throughout the country, and small-scale producers are well placed to serve widely-dispersed rural markets. Secondly, the use of surplus off-season and/or family labour is itself a comparative advantage. Thirdly, in those systems which use local food resources, such as natural foods and kitchen wastes, feed costs are relatively low compared with those for commercial producers. Small-scale fish producers should therefore be able to survive competition in much the same way as village-scale poultry producers have survived, and even to some extent benefit from the increasing number of intensive poultry operations. References and further reading • Small-scale Freshwater Fish Farming by van Ear et al.

Agromisa 1996 • Cage and Pen Fish Farming: Carrying Capacity Models and Environmental Impact FAO Fisheries Technicla Paper 225, 1984 • Food, Livelihoods and Freshwater Ecology: The Significance of Small Indigenous Fish Species, ITDG Bangladesh, 1999 For further information, please contact: Practical Action The Schumacher Centre for Technology and Development Bourton-on-Dunsmore Warwickshire CV23 9QZ United Kingdom Tel: + 44 (0)1926 634400 Fax: + 44 (0)1926 634401 E-mail infoserv@proacticalaction. org. uk Website: www. practicalaction. org Practical Action Bangladesh G. P. O. Box 3881 Dhaka 1000 Bangladesh Tel: + 880 – (0)2 – 8111934, 9110060, 9123671 Fax: + 880 – (0)2 – 8113134 E-mail: bangladesh@practicalaction. org. bd

Social Structure of Bangladesh Introduction Bangladesh officially the People’s Republic of Bangladesh is a country in South Asia. The name Bangladesh means “Country of Bengal” in the official Bengali language. The borders of present-day Bangladesh were established with the partition of Bengal and India in 1947, when the region became the eastern wing of the newly-formed Pakistan. However, it was separated from the western wing by 1,600 kilometres (1,000 mi) across India.

Political and linguistic discrimination as well as economic neglect led to popular agitations against West Pakistan, which led to the war for independence in 1971 and the establishment of Bangladesh, with the help of India. In 2000, Bangladesh was estimated to be one of the ten most highly populated countries with an estimated population of just under 130 million. Nowadays it scored above 140 Million. This makes the population density of about 875 people per sq km (2,267 people per sq mi) higher than other countries.

Almost 90 percent of this population lives in the rural areas and 80 percent of our population are still depends on agriculture for a livelihood. With the successful lowering of total fertility and growth rates over the past few years, the crude birth rate stands at 22. 4 per 1000 persons, with a total fertility rate 3. 0 per women. The rural birth rate was estimated to be 36. 3 birth per 1000 persons according to the 1985 census. On the other hand, the crude death rate stands at 8. 2 per 1000 persons with the rural death rate found to be 12. 9 per 1000 persons. Also the child death rate is 70 per 1000 live births in the rural areas.

Most of the population is young with about 60 percent under the age of 25, with only about 3 percent over the age of 65 (life expectancy is 61 years). Twenty percent of the population was deemed to be urban in 1998, making Bangladesh’s population predominantly rural. |National symbols of Bangladesh | |Anthem |Amar Shonar Bangla | |Animal |Royal Bengal Tiger | |Bird |Oriental Magpie Robin | |Fish |Hilsa | |Flower |White Water Lily | |Fruit |Jackfruit | Sport |Kabadi | Although urbanization is proceeding rapidly, agriculture employs about two-thirds of the labor force and accounts for 35 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP), remains Bangladesh’s primary sector. Bangladesh has predominantly remained rural and agrarian. Since more than 50 percent of the population, which has increased, depends on agriculture for sustenance and employment; peasant economy is the main mode of production in Bangladesh. The village is the peasant’s world and to understand the village community one must study the peasantry and their relationship with the nation at large.

Being a citizen of this country, one simply cannot ignore the prevalent poverty and unemployment in the rural sector and the consequential rise in the number of unemployment in the urban areas as well. Villages play a very important role for Bangladesh. Without these villages economic development of this country is not possible. This paper will clearly indicate the rural life, society and social class, culture, education, occupation, religion, economic and political institutions, beliefs, and the way of living in Bangladesh. Social Composition The Main and Basic stratification between the rich landlords and the poor farmers.

Here the class system is based on money and prestige, which is highly flexible. None has the fixed class here. All can have mobility to any direction if he or she manages to get that. Those who have enough Land they are more respected. Beside this Rural people of Bangladesh are stratified by other reasons related to their religion- Society in village is not strictly stratified; rather, it is open, fluid, and diffused, without a solid social organization and social structure. Social class distinctions are mostly functional and there is considerable mobility among classes.

Even the structure of the Hindu caste system in Bangladesh is relatively loose because most Hindus belonged to the lower castes. Ostensibly, egalitarian principles of Islam were the basis of social organization. Unlike in other regions of South Asia, the Hindu caste- based social system had a very limited effect on Bangladeshi Muslim social culture. Fairly permeable classes based on wealth and political influence existed both in the cities and in the villages. Traditional Muslim class distinctions had little importance in Bangladesh.

The proscription against marriage between individuals of high-born and low-born families, once an indicator of the social gap between the two groups, had long ago disappeared; most matrimonial alliances were based on wealth and power and not on the ties of family distinction, and the same condition belongs to the village. Although Hindu society is formally stratified into caste categories, caste did not figure prominently in the Bangladeshi Hindu community. About 75 percent of the Hindus in Bangladesh belonged to the lower castes, notably namasudras (lesser cultivators), and the remainder belonged primarily to outcaste or untouchable groups.

Some members of higher castes belonged to the middle or professional class, but there was no Hindu upper class. With the increasing participation of the Hindus in nontraditional professional mobility, the castes were able to interact in wider political and socioeconomic arenas, which caused some erosion of caste consciousness. Although there is no mobility between Hindu castes, caste distinctions did not play as important a role in Bangladesh as in they did in the Hindu-dominated Indian state of West Bengal.

Bangladeshi Hindus seemed to have become part of the mainstream culture without surrendering their religious and cultural distinctions. Culture Language and Literature More than 95 percent of the people of Bangladesh speak Bengali which is one of the earliest modem languages of the subcontinent. It originates from the eastern Prakrit group of the Indo- Aryan family of languages. Early Bengali, in its lyrical form, originated in the 7th century. Its mediaeval period underlined a steady upsurge of poesy having strong devotional and romantic overtones.

Since the early decades of this century, modem Bengali literature swept into the mainstream of world culture through the works of such geniuses as Michael Madhusudan Dutt, Rabindranath Tagore and the rebel poet Kazi Nazrul Islam while poet Jasimuddin’s austere lyrical anecdotes depicting rural life with its joys and sorrows, romance and patrol kept alive the link with the toiling masses. With this heritage to draw inspiration from, contemporary Bengali literature of Bangladesh has been throbbing with the creative impulses of a new generation of poets, novelists, playwrights and essayists.

Many of their works have earned fame beyond the frontiers of the country. Music [pic] The rich tradition of music of Bangladesh can be divided into three distinct categories -classical, folk and modern. The tradition of classical music, whether vocal or instrumental, is rooted in the ancient history of this subcontinent. It has been cultivated with great patience and passion by devoted musicians over the centuries. Internationally known sarod players Ustad Alauddiri Khan and Ustad Ayet Ali Khan hail from the soil of this country. Folk music, nurtured through the ages by village bards. s the most popular and timeless form of music in Bangladesh. Rich in devotional mysticism and love ores, folk music exudes authentic flavor and charm of the soil. The most well- known forms are bhatia1i, baul, marfati, murshidi, bhaoaiya and gombhira. Some of the greatest exponents of our mystic and devotional songs were Lalan Fakir, Hasan Raja and Abbasuddin Ahmed. Dances Dancing in Bangladesh draws freely from the sub continental classical forms as well as the folk, tribal, ballet and Middle Eastern strains. Of the tribal dances, particularly popular are Manipuri and Santhal.

The Bulbul Academy of Fine Arts (BAFA), set up in Dacca in the early fifties, played a pioneering role in the promotion of dances in the country. A number of other cultural organizations have helped in popularizing the art. No cultura1 evening in this country is complete without a dance number. The cinema has also popularized dancing. With the recent creation of the Academy of Performing Arts in Dacca dancing in Bangladesh is expected to gain further impetus. Jatra (Folk Drama) is another vital chapter of Bengali culture. It depicts mythological episodes of love and tragedy.

Legendary plays of heroism are also popular, particularly in the rural areas. In near past jatra was the biggest entertainment means for the rural Bangalees and in that sense for 80% of the population since the same percentage of the population lived in rural Bangladesh. Now-a-days jatra has been placed in the back seat in the entertainment era. Gradually western culture is occupying the place of traditional culture like Jatra. Different types of Drama are also popular in this society. Bangladesh Religion [pic] [pic] Islam, the state religion, is the faith of 88 percent of the population, almost all of whom adhere to the Sunni branch.

Hindus make up most of the remainder, and the country has small communities of Buddhists, Christians and animists. Bangladesh is one of the largest Muslim countries in the world. Most Bangladeshi Muslims are Sunnis, but there is a small Shia community. Among religious festivals of Muslims Eidul Fitr, Eidul Azha, Eiday Miladunnabi, Muharram etc. are prominent. The contention that Bengali Muslims are all descended from lower-caste Hindus who were converted to Islam is incorrect; a substantial proportion are descendants of the Muslims who reached the subcontinent from elsewhere.

Hinduism is professed by about 12 percent of the population. Durga Puja, Saraswati Puja, Kali Puja etc. are Hindu festivals. Hindus in Bangladesh are almost evenly distributed in all regions, with concentrations in Khulna, Jessore, Dinajpur, Faridpur, and Barisal. Biharis, who are not ethnic Bangalees, are Urdu-speaking Muslim refugees from Bihar and other parts of northern India. They numbered about 1 million in 1971 but now had decreased to around 600,000. They once dominated the upper levels of the society. They sided with Pakistan during the 1971 war.

Hundreds of thousands of Biharis were repatriated to Pakistan after the war. Tribal race constitutes less than 1 percent of the total population. They live in the Chittagong Hills and in the regions of Mymensingh, Sylhet, and Rajshahi. The majority of the tribal population live in rural areas. They differ in their social organization, marriage customs, birth and death rites, food, and other social customs from the people of the rest of the country. They speak Tibeto-Burman languages. In the mid-1980s, the percentage distribution of tribal population by religion was Hindu 24, Buddhist 44, Christian 13, and others 19.

Major tribes are the Chakmas, Maghs (or Marmas), Tipras, Murangs, Kukis and Santals. The tribes tend to intermingle and could be distinguished from one another more by differences in their dialect, dress, and customs than by tribal cohesion. Only the Chakmas and Marmas display formal tribal organization. They are of mixed origin but reflect more Bengali influence than any other tribe. Unlike the other tribes, the Chakmas and Marmas generally live in the highland valleys. Most Chakmas are Buddhists, but some practice Hinduism or Animism. Economic Institution

Many industries in Bangladesh are still primitive by modern standards. Despite continuous domestic and international efforts to improve economic and demographic prospects, Bangladesh remains a developing nation. Jute was once the economic engine of the country. Its share of the world export market peaked in the Second World War and the late 1940s at 80% and even in the early 1970s accounted for 70% of its export earnings. However, polypropylene products began to substitute for jute products worldwide and the jute industry started to decline. Bangladesh grows very significant quantities of rice(chal), tea (Cha) and mustard.

More than three quarters of Bangladesh’s export earnings come from the garment industry, which began attracting foreign investors in the 1980s due to cheap labour and low conversion cost. In 2002, the industry exported US$5 billion worth of products. The industry now employs more than 3 million workers, 90% of whom are women. A large part of foreign currency earnings also comes from the remittances sent by expatriates living in other countries. One significant contributor to the development of the economy has been the widespread propagation of microcredit by Muhammad Yunus (awarded the Nobel peace prize in 2006) through the Grameen Bank.

By the late 1990s, Grameen Bank had 2. 3 million members, along with 2. 5 million members of other similar organizations. In order to enhance economic growth, the government set up several export processing zones to attract foreign investment. These are managed by the Bangladesh Export Processing Zone Authority. AGRICULTURE [pic] Bangladesh is one of the poorest countries in the world with an annual per capita income of US$160. The agricultural sector provides the principal livelihood of the people in the country and is the main blood vessel of the national economy.

According to statistics in 1990-1991, agriculture accounts for 46% of the gross domestic product (GDP) and 59% of total employment. Agricultural productivity (yield per acre) is extremely low though, and Bangladesh continues to be a food-deficit country. The average annual deficit ranges between 1. 5 million and 2. 5 million tons. To achieve self-sustained agricultural growth, several policies have been formulated. Keeping these policies in mind, agricultural management policies have been devised, and interventions have been made. However, these have not necessarily yielded the anticipated results.

In Bangladesh, the vast majorities of people are landless and work as agricultural laborers (66% of the rural population are landless, agricultural laborers, according to the latest statistics). Although they are the single largest portion of the total population, they are the poorest, most deprived, helpless and neglected. Presently 45% of agricultural laborers have no work at all, and those who do get work have no job security or reliable income; there is no period of employment specified no fixed wage. Most of the time they are poorly paid. They are not registered and do not have any trade union rights, no chance of bargaining.

Agricultural laborers in Bangladesh also have no basic human rights. A huge percentage of them are inadequate or no housing, no educational opportunities and no rationing facility. Administrative and social oppression upon the land laborers is a common phenomenon. In addition to these concerns, Bangladesh is now facing various types of socio-economic and political problems. Among these, the most difficult, complicated and probably the most important issue is the agrarian question. One of the fundamental features of the economic backwardness of the agrarian question is very relevant for Bangladesh like any other poor country of Asia.

If the agrarian question is addressed properly, the path of national economic development can be found. Land, no doubt, constitutes the most significant basis of sociopolitical power and the common factor of production for the overwhelming majority of the people. Today in Bangladesh the land problem remains as the main social problem: it is the main problem affecting the greatest number of people. Ownership of the land, its possession and cultivation, has sociopolitical overtones and economic implications, both simultaneously and mutually reacting around and reinforcing each other.

Thus, an approach to locate the problems relating to land and their solution has to be, of necessity, comprehensive, multidimensional and dynamic. As the agricultural sector in Bangladesh has already experienced, these problems, and very recently the path and methods of alternative agriculture, are being talked about. This alternative thinking is often called “regenerative,” “sustainable,” “ecological,” “organic” or “natural agriculture,” which are more or less based on the following principles: ? Ensure as much or more productivity as chemical agriculture; ?

Do not disturb the natural environment; ? Ensure sustainability; ? Put less dependence on external inputs. Beside Agriculture there are several jobs that are done by rural people of our country now a days. Few jobs are related to Agriculture, These jobs are: ? Rearing Cattle, Goat, Sheep. ? Poultry Business ? Dairy business ? Fishery Related Jobs ? Village Teacher ? Quack Doctor ? Kamar [Black Smith] ? Kumar [Pot Maker] ? Swarnakaar [Gold Smith] ? Sweeper ? Tanti [Weaver] Political institution [pic]

The People’s Republic of Bangladesh is a unitary, independent and sovereign republic comprising three basic organs the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary. The President is the Head of State and is elected by the members of Parliament. The President acts in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister and the supreme command of the Armed Forces rests with him. The executive power of the Republic is exercised by or on the advice of the Prime Minister who commands the support of the majority members of Parliament and is appointed by the President.

Other Ministers, State Ministers and Deputy Ministers are appointed by the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister nominates the cabinet members from among Parliament members and one-tenths of the total members are from outside of the Parliament. The cabinet is collectively accountable to the Parliament. The Government is unitary in structure and parliamentary in form. Conclusion Finally we can conclude that Village Life is full of Loving Caring and Belonging. We can find here Peace Happiness chance to meet with our relatives smell and feel our culture and Tradition.

That’s why every year thousands of people run for the Village leaving their Urban Life in their Religious Occasions. Living in urban Life but we have to depend on this village people for food and other product which they produce in the fields. Lastly we can say that every people of our country have to visit their Village simultaneously so that the people and their Generation will always attach with the village Life and Village Culture. And If the Young Generation will Plan to Recover or develop our Village Life than We think that Bangladesh will see Prosperity very soon.

Read also:

In Bangladesh, Bata started its operation in 1962. The company is one of the largest tax-paying corporate bodies contributing Tk. 1. 2 billion (the year 2009) which represents approximately 70% of tax paid by the entire footwear sector of Bangladesh. Bata is the largest retail organization in terms of its number of outlets around the country.

Currently Bata Shoe Company (Bangladesh) Limited operates two manufacturing facilities – one in Tongi and the other in Dhamrai. With a production capacity of 110,000 pairs of shoes daily, the company also has a modern tannery facility with an output of 5 million square feet of leather annually. Annual shoe sales currently stand at slightly more than 30 million pairs with a turnover for the year 2009 of Tk 5 billion.

Acknowledgment

At the inception of preparing this term paper, I would like to express gratitude to the Almighty Allah for special blessing in completing it.

There is an English proverb “Two head are better than one. ” So, no one can obtain a noble objective alone. This term paper is an accumulation of many people’s endeavors. For this, I am indebted to a number of people who helped me to prepare this and for their kind advice, suggestions, directions, and cooperation and proper guidelines for this. Our heartfelt thanks go to Dr. Md. Morshed Hasan Khan, Associate Professor, for providing us the opportunity and for his appropriate suggestions, moral support and invaluable co-operation from time to time in completing the term paper especially in the last one week.

Executive summary

Bata started its journey in Bangladesh in 1962. So Bata Shoe Company (Bangladesh) Ltd. is operating in our country for the last 50 years. Bata is the largest shoe manufacturing and marketing company in Bangladesh. In 2011, it sells 8. 5 billion pairs of shoes with an annual turnover of Tk. 5 billion. Bata Shoe Company (Bangladesh) Ltd. has strived towards one goal – customer satisfaction. With the vision of building a worldwide family of satisfied customers and dedicated workers the legacy of Tomas Bata continues strong and unabated to this day – the tradition is safe.

As the largest shoe manufacturing and marketing company in Bangladesh, Bata follows several individuals and coordinated strategies in marketing, pricing, distribution, inventory that helps them to be the leader in the market and to increase sales and growth. The most important strategies are discussed in this term paper. Here their both the positive and negative sides are discussed thoroughly. Bata is performing CSR activities in many ways to be a good citizen of the country. Some recommendations are given after evaluating the overall activities of Bata Shoe Company (Bangladesh) Ltd.

Financial reporting framework in Bangladesh Legal framework The Companies Act of 1994 provides basic requirements for financial reporting by all companies in Bangladesh. It is silent about either Bangladesh Financial Reporting Standards (BFRS/BAS) or International Financial Reporting Standards (IASs/IFRSs). o Listed companies. The Securities and Exchange Commission of Bangladesh regulates financial reporting by listed companies.

SER 1987 requires compliance with IASs/IFRSs as adopted in Bangladesh (these are known as Bangladesh Financial Reporting Standards and include Bangladesh Accounting Standards). o Banks. The Bank Company Act of 1991 mandates reporting formats and disclosures based on BAS 30, which is similar to IAS 30. The Act is silent about other BAS/BFRS, and compliance with BAS/BFRS by banks is mixed. o Insurance companies. The Insurance Act 1938 does not mandate compliance with BAS/BFRS. In practice, insurance companies often do not follow BAS/BFRS. o Other companies.

Neither the law nor the by-laws of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Bangladesh mandates compliance with BAS/BFRS by unlisted companies. Actual compliance varies widely and the ICAB has published the Bangladesh Financial Reporting Standard for Small and Medium-sized Entities (BFRS for SMEs) (see below). Bangladesh Financial Reporting Standards (BFRS) The Financial Reporting Standards prescribed by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Bangladesh (ICAB) are known as Bangladesh Financial Reporting Standards (BFRS, including Bangaldesh Accounting Standards, BAS).

BFRS and are closely modelled on International Accounting Standards and International Financial Reporting Standards issued by the International Accounting Standards Board. BFRS developed by the ICAB were originally based on older International Accounting Standards (IASs) – generally those developed by the IASC rather than the improved IASs and new IFRSs developed by the IASB. In more recent times, the ICAB has adopted the updated IASB standards as BFRS.

The Technical and Research Committee, a standing committee of the ICAB, is responsible for reviewing on a regular basis, the latest national and international pronouncements and standards on accounting, auditing and allied matters, and recommend the same for adoption to the Council, after carrying out a technical review for adoptability and acceptability in the Bangladeshi context. The Council is responsible for approving and adopting the Standards, Interpretations and related documents.

As at July 2012, a version of all IFRS (and IAS) issued by the IASB had been adopted as BFRS by the ICAB, with the following exceptions: o IAS 29 Financial Reporting in Hyperinflationary Economies – this has not been adopted as it is considered impracticable in the Bangladeshi context o IFRS 9 Financial Instruments. Adopted BAS/BFRS are legally enforceable for listed companies under the SEC Rules. They are not mandatory or enforceable through the ICAB by-laws. The auditor’s report and basis of presentation note refer to conformity with international accounting standards applicable in Bangladesh.

Small and medium-sized entities In June 2011, the ICAB published the Bangladesh Financial Reporting Standard for Small and Medium-sized Entities (BFRS for SMEs), which is based on the IFRS for SMEs. Section 31 on hyperinflation is not reproduced in the BFRS for SMEs as, consistent with the non-adoption of IAS 29,  the ICAB considers that presently it is not practicable in the Bangladeshi context. For eligible entities, the BFRS for SMEs is applicable to annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 2013, which earlier adoption permitted.

On 26 March, 1971 the independence of Bangladesh was declared and the Liberation War began. The people of then-East Pakistan took part in this war to liberate Bangladesh from the oppression of military leaders of Pakistan. Independence for Bangladesh was gained through a nine-month civil war against the Pakistani Army, which resulted in the loss of about 3 million lives. [2] The Mukti Bahini (Bengali “freedom fighters”), with military support from India, defeated the Pakistani Army on 16 December in the same year, which is celebrated as Victory Day. Bangladesh and Pakistan

The creation of Pakistan contained the germs of discord between “West Pakistanis” and Bangalis. Initially, the population of East Bengal supported the creation of Pakistan, that is, the partition of the Indian subcontinent into two constituent parts following the withdrawal and departure of the British. The Bengali support for the creation of Pakistan was a result of the transformation of the Bangalis in British occupied India. During the British rule in the Indian subcontinent, the dominant section of the Muslim upper class had two components, the zamindars (landlords) and the ulema (clergy).

A few words about these “landlords” is absolutely necessary. The British consolidated their rule in Bengal by instituting the zamindars. The zamindari and-holding system gave the land-owners the right to crop share and revenue collection from the cultivators in the land entitled to them by the British. In return these land-owners would provide an annual entitlement charge to the colonial authorities. The Muslim League represented these “men of property and influence. In order to counter the Indian Congress’ support among the nationalist Muslim communities as well as serve as a counter-weight to Indian nationalism, the Muslim League advanced the notion of “two-nation theory. ” The communal separatists devised the “two-nation theory. ” This “theory” claimed that the Muslims and the Hindus in the subcontinent constituted two different and irreconcilable nationalities. This “theory” did not explain how in spite of vast class, linguistic, ethnic, social, and cultural differences, Muslims in the subcontinent constituted one nation, other than that the Muslim constitute a nified nation on a basis of “divine sanction. ” The idea of a distinct state for the Indian Muslims was first proposed by Muhammed Iqbal; his scheme, which did not include Bengal, was confined to setting up a separate state for Indian Muslims in the North-West of the subcontinent. The name Pakistan was coined by Chaudhuri Rahmat Ali along with a group of students in Cambridge. Pakistan was an acronym that stood for Punjab, Afgania (Pathan), Kashmir, Sind, and istan, which is Persian for country. Hence, Rahmat Ali’s scheme too failed to include the “lesser breed” of Bangali Muslims.

The demand for Pakistan was originally dismissed as a naive scheme. It was initially viewed as nothing more than a bargaining tool for the leaders of the Indian Muslims. Despite the incorporation of the demand for Pakistan into its program, the Muslim League failed to mobilize grass-root Muslim support for itself. This fact is reflected in the Muslim League inability to attain a majority among Indian Muslims prior to the election of 1946. In its struggle for independence from the British, the Indian National Congress had utilized the religious sentiment of Muslims towards the Turkish Sultanate under the Caliphate title.

The Muslims supported Turkey which had entered the First World War on the German side against the British. The Indian nationalist leaders built up the Khalifat movement against the British. However, the Khalifat movement died its natural death when Kamal Atuatur, the reformist dictator, abolished the nominal position of Caliphate in 1924. The Indian Congress’ strength among Indian Muslims never quite reached the level that it had during the Khalifat movement. Subsequently, the Muslim League gained and exerted influence on the Muslim anti-colonialist movement.

It was Jinnah, earlier hailed as “the ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity,” who led the demand for Pakistan under the slogan of “Divide and Quit. ” This demand was the political expression embodying the national aspirations of Muslim landlords, rising business men, civil servants, mullahs (priests), and religious pirs (saints). The demand for an independent state for Indian Muslims became a living force among the Muslim masses because of its appeal to Indian Muslims that they would have separate development free from what was described as Hindu domination and exploitation, with an opportunity for economic prosperity.

On March 23, 1940, the Muslim League adopted the Lahore Resolution, moved by Fazlul Huq of Bengal, which called for political independence by creating two states for Muslims. It stated: “the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North-Western and Eastern Zones of India should be grouped to constitute ‘Indian States’ in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign. ” The Lahore Resolution, which later came to be widely discussed and debated, was effectively by-passed by the Delhi Resolution.

Moved by H. S. Suhrawardy of Bengal and adopted in the Muslim League Legislators’ Convention on April 9, 1946, it stated: “any formula devised by the British Government for transferring power from the British to the people of India… will not contribute to the solution of the Indian problem [unless]… the Zones comprising Bengal and Assam in the North-East, and the Punjab, the NWFP, Sind and Baluchistan in the North-West of India… be constituted into one sovereign independent state and… implement the establishment of Pakistan… wo separate constitution-making bodies be set up for Pakistan and Hindustan” (emphasis added). Pakistan, as it came into being, was the paradigm of an artificial state. This newly independent state was a geographical anomaly; it was separated into two parts by approximately 1,600 kilometers of Indian territory. The Western part consisted of the provinces of Sind, Baluchistan, North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), and a divided section of the Punjab, while the Eastern part consisted solely of East Bengal. The socio-cultural diversity between the two wings of Pakistan was enormous.

In fact, this diversity was extended even to the very basis, the ideological pretext, that is, the religion of the people, which was to serve as the unifying force in this country; Islam was understood, interpreted, and exercised in different ways in these two separate wings. The history of Islam in “West Pakistan” and East Bengal was completely dissimilar. In spite of having established Pakistan on the basis of the “two-nation theory,” a section of the high command of the Muslim League still retained the idea of establishing a secular parliamentary state.

The contradiction in the position was clearly spelt out in Jinnah’s inaugural address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on August 11, 1947. He declared: “Any idea of a United India could have never worked and… would have led us to a terrific disaster… we should begin to work in that spirit and in course of time all these angularities of the majority and minority communities—the Hindu community and the Muslim community—because even as regards Muslims you have Pathans, Punjabis, Shias, Sunnis and so on and among the Hindus you have Brahmins, Vashnavas, Khatris, also Bengalees, Madrasis, and so on—will vanish… his [difference] has been the biggest hindrance on the way of India to attain her freedom and independence and but for this we would have been a free people long ago… you are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other places of worship in this state of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed—that has nothing to do with the business of the State. We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State… ou will find that in course of time, Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Hindus and Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State” (emphasis added). The theoretical confusion and the opportunistic nature of Pakistan’s ruling elite is clear in Jinnah’s inaugural speech. The Pakistani ruling-class, having established the state of Pakistan on the basis of the “two-nation theory,” could not find the ideological justification for establishing a secular state.

The mullahs and the right-wing elements in the Muslim League wanted Pakistan to be a state with “pan-Islamic ideals” since Pakistan, they claimed, was not merely a state for Indian Muslims but also a “Muslim State. ” The mullahs and their allies argued that since Pakistani was established to be a state for the Muslims in India, the state structure and its laws should be based upon the precepts laid in the medieval religious laws. Yet, the liberal bourgeois component of the Pakistani ruling class wanted to establish a secular state that functioned on the basis of civic laws.

If, indeed, religion had nothing to do with “the business of the State,” then why carve a separate state for Indian Muslims? The Pakistani ruling elite were confronted with the dilemma of over-riding their own claim that Pakistan was to be an Islamic state for Indian Muslims. The liberal bourgeoisie could not justify advancing secularism in Pakistan since the state was established on the basis that Muslims in India constitute not just a distinct religious community, but a separate nation.

That the Indian Muslims did not constitute one homogenous nationality became apparent in the confrontation of nationalities in the state of Pakistan and the eventual secession of East Bengal from Pakistan. The secession of East Bengal demonstrated that the claims of national unity based upon religious conceptions could not prevent the disintegration of the state of Pakistan. The crisis of the pakistani ruling elite An Analyis of the of Poisition of the Bangalis Under Pakistani Rule in the 1950s The Muslim League, the first ruling party of Pakistan, lacked a mass base.

The Muslim League came into power in Pakistan after having succeeded in dividing the subcontinent into two, following the departure of British. The central government of the state of Pakistan was set up in the Western wing of the state primarily because most of the upper class of “Musalman” aristocrats migrated to the western wing. The fundamental difficulties facing the Pakistani ruling class were: one, to construct a viable polity, and two, to integrate the various nationalities into this bizarre state, separated into two wings.

Throughout the history of Pakistan, the province of East Bengal had a greater population than all the other provinces of Pakistan combined, as the following table shows: Povince Population in millions 1951 1961 1971 East Bengal 41. 9 50. 8 70 West Pakistan 33. 7 42. 9 60 The central state apparatus, the military and the civil service, was dominated by the Muslim immigrants from North India and by the Punjabis. The North Indian Muslims were involved in the British administration in Delhi. Hence, they dominated the civilian administration in Pakistan.

The Punjab had served as the garrison of the British Indian Army. Hence, the Punjabis dominated the military in Pakistan. The Muslim League decided to make Urdu the sole state language of Pakistan, although only 3 per cent of the population of Pakistan spoke Urdu and over 56 per cent spoke Bangla. Since Urdu was the language of the dominant class in Pakistan and hence the language of upper echelons of the Muslim League leadership, the ruling party decided that Urdu was to be the sole state language of Pakistan.

The explanation provided by the Pakistani ruling elite was that, since Urdu had more similarity with Arabic and Persian, it was a more “Islamic” language and since Bangla was derived from pre-existing Indian languages, primarily Sanskrit, it was a “Hindu” language. The Pakistani ruling elite’s language proposal did not meet any organized and serious challenge in the Western wing because the languages of West Pakistanis had an affinity in nature, structure, and vocabulary with Urdu. However, for Bangalis, Urdu was an alien and unrelated language. Thus, the Bangali intelligentsia and political leadership proposed that both Urdu and

Bangla be declared as the state languages. On March 11, 1948 a province-wide strike was held to protest the central government’s chauvinist policy of rejecting the language of the majority of the people as unfit to be a state language. Student demonstrations took place all across East Bengal. In his first trip to East Bengal on March 21, 1948 at Dhaka (then Dacca) the Governor-General “Quaid-I-Azam” (literally, the Great Leader) Jinnah declared (in English! ): “Let me make it clear to you that the State Language of Pakistan is going to be Urdu and no other language.

Anyone who tries to mislead you is really the enemy of Pakistan… so far as the State Language is concerned Pakistan’s language shall be Urdu. ” The Bangalis did not accept Jinnah’s claim and continued their resistance to the imposition of Urdu language. Subsequent attempts by the Pakistani rulers to replace Bangla script, first with Arabic scripts, and later with Roman scripts, failed due to the public outcry and popular mobilization led by the students and the intellectuals, supported by the middle class and by some sections of the workers and the peasants.

The protests on the language issue culminated on February 21, 1952, when police fired on a student demonstration and killed several students and bystanders. Politically, the killings led to the formation of the United Front. The killings also led to the emergence of a new literary and cultural tradition of protests and secularism among the Bangali bourgeoisie. The cultural tradition that arose was “sigh of oppressed” against Pakistani elite’s use of religious nationalism. We cannot underestimate the importance of this event in emergence of the Bangali nationalism.

The Bangalis viewed the Pakistani elite’s attempt to impose Urdu as the state language as a design to prevent them from full participation in the state rule. Hence, the death of students while protesting the language policy became an event to rally public support for the Bangali cause. This day was, and still is, celebrated by Bangalis as Eukushey February (martyr’s day on February 21). Indeed, this event has become ingrained in the Bangali national political consciousness. Meanwhile, the economic colonization and the expropriation of wealth of East Bengal by the West Pakistani ruling elite had already begun.

East Bengal was the world’s largest producer of raw jute (a fiber), which was Pakistan’s main foreign exchange earner. The foreign trade statistics in its first decade for Pakistan were as follows: Foreign Trade Figures (millions of rupees) 5 Year Period East Bengal West Pakistan Exports Imports Exports Imports 1947-52 4582 2129 3786 4769 1952-57 3969 2159 3440 5105 While East Bengal was earning a larger share of Pakistan’s exports, West Pakistan had the greater share in imports of consumer goods, industrial machineries, and raw materials. Thus, the embryonic nature of exploitative relation was formulated in early the days of Pakistan.

The inter-wing trade policy was designed to allow the West Pakistani manufacturing sector to dispose its commodities in East Bengal at a price higher than world market. In spite of rhetoric of the “national unity,” the export earnings of East Bengal were being used to finance the development of Karachi, the major commercial city of West Pakistan, and the Punjab, the dominant province of West Pakistan. In financial year 1948-49, the allocation for provincial development expenditure was as the following table indicates: Province Amount Allocated (millions rps) East Bengal 40 Punjab 50 Sind 25 NWFP 5

As the above table shows, the Pakistani ruling elite was interested more in the development of provinces of West Pakistan, though the majority of the country’s population lived in East Bengal. Up to 1951, total expenditure on development projects of Pakistan was 1,126 million Rs. , out of which only 28 million was for East Bengal (1986, 20). The Pakistani ruling elite, instead of remedying inequities that existed between the development of productive forces of the two wings, chose an economic policy that benefited the interests of West Pakistan based manufacturing sector that sold its commodities in East Bengal.

Later, I will examine the intensification of the economic exploitation of East Bengal during the era of the military regime. The growth of dissent in East Bengal An Analysis of the Bangali Quest for Autonomy in First Decade of Pakistani Rule On June 23, 1949 the Awami Muslim League was established. The Awami Muslim League was the first opposition party that came into being in Pakistan. The Awami League was led by Maulana Bhashani, a peasant and religious leader and by Suhrawardy, who at one point had advocated a United Bengal but also supported the Muslim League on some occasions.

The membership of Awami Muslim League consisted of two elements. The first elements were those whose political ideology was not fundamentally different from the Muslim League, but who had concluded that the increasing discrimination against the Bangalis on racial and provincial basis would hinder their access to political power. The second elements were younger and more radical, whose political ideology was different from the Muslim League. They found little worthy of admiring in political ideology of the pan-Islamism and the spirit of “two-nation theory. “

The Awami Muslim League was essentially a provincial party. The political agenda of Awami League emphasized grievances of Bangalis that had developed primarily due to failure of the Pakistani ruling elite to recognize Bangla as a state language. The Awami League called for such policies as (i) abolishing the British-instituted zamindari (landlord) system, (ii) nationalization of key industries, and (iii) utilization of the jute sector for the benefit of the people of the East Bengal. Even in its early days, the League began reflecting the interests of a considerable section of the

Bangali urban bourgeoisie not only of the provincial capital Dhaka but also of the district towns. The League, in October 1955, dropped “Muslim” from its nomenclature in order to attract non-Muslims into its fold. The Basic Principle Committee (BPC) of the National Constitutional Assembly published its report in February, 1950. It called for the reorganization of Pakistan’s provinces into two units: West Pakistan and East Pakistan. The legislature was to have two houses. In the upper house there would be equal numbers of members from the two constituting units, while the lower house would be elected on the basis of population.

Initially, it did not specify the number of seats in the houses. Later, the proposed distribution of seats were as follows: Province Upper House Lower House Total East Bengal 10 165 175 Punjab 10 75 85 NWFP 10 24 34 Sind 10 20 30 Baluchistan 10 16 26 Total 50 300 350 The upper house was to be indirectly elected. The governmental mechanism would be a combination of presidential and parliamentary systems, with a substantial executive power and the choice of selecting the Prime Minister being retained with the President. The BPC called for declaring Urdu as the state language.

The Bangali political leadership was outraged at the proposals of the BPC, particularly the language issue. The Bangalis viewed the proposals as a scheme to perpetuate West Pakistani, or rather Punjabi, political hegemony over the central government. The proposals evoked indignation among Bangalis because their numerical strength would be reduced in a joint session of legislature, which was to settle any disputes. Moreover, the scope of arbitrary use of autocratic power by the President could enable the Pakistani ruling class to secure support for itself and counter any Bangali schemes for changing the status quo.

For Bangali bourgeoisie it was clear that the BPC proposals would further reduce their already limited role in the state. The anti-BPC political maneuvers of Bangali politicians led to the Grand National Convention (GNC). Although some West Pakistani opposition leaders participated, the GNC was primarily an initiative of Bangali bourgeois leadership. According to the GNC proposals, the power of the central government would be limited to foreign policy and defense. The proposals at the GNC called for a unicameral legislature, with seats being distributed among the provinces on the basis of population.

The GNC also proposed that the federal capital be established in Islamabad (West Pakistan) and every other session of the federal parliament be held in Dhaka (East Bengal). These proposals reflected the popular Bangali demand that both Bangla and Urdu should be the state languages of Pakistan. In essence, the GNC proposals were an attempts to ensure the political participation of the Bangalis in the state’s decision making process. The counter-proposals assume that the national interests of the Bangalis could be safeguarded if the Bangalis were able to exercise their due political rights within the framework of a bourgeois democratic polity.

Another response to West Pakistani dominance of the national political scene was the formation of the Youth League in February 1951. Its formation was inspired by the “Rajshahi jail thesis. ” It acted as a counter to state-sponsored ideology of pan-Islamism. They felt that if the central government were to grant East Bengal autonomy, the province would be better off. Since the Youth League had a substantial number of young radicals, the thrust of its propaganda was to show that the Pakistani elite was exploiting East Bengal.

For example, in its manifesto, the League pointed out, quoting Pakistani government statistics, that the Consumer Product Index (CPI) had gone up from 100 in 1939 (base year) to 174 in 1948 and 214 in 1949. Also, the Youth League stressed the secular aspects of Bangali culture, such as the Phaila Baishak (Bangali New Year), and Rabindranath Tagore’s birthday. In addition,it called for an end to all forms of regionalism and communal discrimination. Another reaction to the domination of political power by the West Pakistani ruling elite was the establishment of the United Front, an alliance of political parties.

It was composed of the Awami League, Krishak Sramik Party, Ganatantric Dal and other small parties. Its political platform for the election was based on a 21-point agenda, which emphasized declaring Bangla as one of the state languages of Pakistan. The 21-point demands also included plans for abolishing the land-holding system, ending high interest on agricultural credit extended to farmers by the rural moneyed class, nationalizing the jute industry, providing fair prices to jute cultivators, and implementing cooperative farming.

The United Front’s program also demanded that the relation between East Bengal and West Pakistan be restructured on the basis of full regional autonomy; the program identified three subjects for the central government, namely, defense, foreign affairs, and currency. As confidence building measures, the United Front’s program suggested that Pakistan’s Naval Head Quarters be relocated to East Bengal and that an arms manufacturing factory be built in East Bengal. The provincial election of East Bengal in March 1954 was a big shock for the Pakistani ruling elite.

Basing its campaign on these demands, the United Front won 227 out of 236 of Muslim seats. Even the Communists won 5 seats. The Muslim League, which was the ruling party, won only 10 seats out of 309. This landslide victory revealed how estranged the Bangali masses were because of the failure of the Muslim League to deliver on the promises made during the campaign for Pakistan. The Muslim League, the party of the elite that came to power in Pakistan, promised that once the state of Pakistan came into being, Bangalis would be liberated from foreign exploitation and that national policy would be geared towards their benefit.

The United Front’s campaign had succeeded because it raised the slogan of the Bangalis’ grievances against the central government’s discrimination. On May 30, 1954 the United Front government was dismissed by the central government. The Prime Minister Mohammed Ali explained: “Our sole aim in taking over the administration of the province is to save East Bengal and preserve the integrity of Pakistan. ” In order to “save” East Bengal, Major-General Iskander Mirza was appointed the Governor by the central government.

After a year of political intrigue and bargaining, the provincial assembly was restored and the Governor’s rule ended. By then, a section of the United Front had broken with the Awami League in order to form a ministry in the provincial government. The crisis of Pakistani ruling class in the 1950s An Analysis of the Constitutional Crisis and Political Instability In October 1954, the conflicts between the Governor-General and the Constituent Assembly led the Governor-General to dismiss the Constituent Assembly and proclaim a state of Emergency.

The dissolution of the Constituent Assembly led to a further increase of the bureaucratic power over the state of Pakistan. Earlier, the Governor-General Ghulam Mohammed dismissed Khwaja Nazimuddin and appointed Mohammed Ali Bogra as the Prime Minister of Pakistan. Despite the directive of the Awami League, Suhrawardy joined Bogra’s cabinet as the law minister. Though he himself had been an ardent exponent of provincial autonomy, Suhrawardy supported the One Unit scheme. The One Unit scheme was forced upon the Provincial Assemblies, which elected the Second Constituent Assembly.

On March 23, 1956 Pakistan become a republic with Iskander Mirza as its first President. The creation of the republic did not, however, enable the Pakistani ruling-class either to resolve the “national question” vis-a-vis the Bangalis (as well other nationalities) or to establish political stability by the formation of a secure ruling-class political party. The first republic lasted only till October 1958. Within this brief period, there were four Prime Minister of Pakistan. During that period, the provincial politics in East Bengal was reduced to a farce, with provincial governments changing off and on.

The political formation was made of rapidly changing allegiance at the center of the Muslim League and the Republican Party, and at East Bengal provincial level of the Awami League and the Krishak Sramik Party. In East Bengal, the AL and the KSP battled for governmental positions. The regular shifts of the allegiance of the members of the legislature were promoted because the country’s bourgeois leadership was corrupt and its political leaders desired to promote personal gains. On September 11, 1956 Suhrawardy formed a coalition government that included the Awami League.

On becoming the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Suhrawardy declared that East Bengal has been granted 98 per cent autonomy. However, nothing substantial was done to alter the actual condition of East Bengal. The lack of initiative of their politicians to change the socioeconomic conditions of East Bengal was regarded by the Bangali bourgeoisie as a betrayal of the Bangali cause. Within the Awami League, the central government’s failure to guarantee East Bengal’s regional interests led to the formation of factions, one led by Suhrawardy and the other led by Bhashani.

Suhrawardy supported the design of Pakistan’s elite in joining the US-sponsored military pacts. The differences within the Awami League surfaced at the Kagmari conference of the party because the Leftist formation within the Awami League refused to accept Suhrawardy’s compromises with the Pakistani ruling elite. Bhashani’s rhetoric led him to declare that, unless complete autonomy were granted to East Bengal, then Assalumu Alakikum (Farewell) to Pakistan. Meanwhile, the politics of intrigue at the central government continued; Suhrawardy was forced to resign.

A general election was scheduled for 1959. This election was never to be held. With the proclamation of Martial Law on October 7, 1958, President Mirza abrogated the constitution, dismissed the central and the provincial governments, and banned all political parties. The imposition of martial law abolished what little prospect there was to the establishment a viable bourgeois democratic process in Pakistan. The military stepped into the power because the civilian faction of the ruling-class had been unable to set a political structure that would contain the “national question. The junta used the disparity between East Bengal and West Pakistan, and the instability of the political process to justify its taking over the power. In its first decade of rule, the Pakistani ruling elite would dismiss the grievances of the Bangali national bourgeoisie as a plot to undermine the unity of the “Muslim” state. The ruling elite would charge and accuse that the Bangalis’ call for the decentralization of state power and even their call for the secularization of the state, as being inspired by secessionist elements, foreign agents, or India, the “natural” enemy of Pakistan.

Ethnic and racial discriminations against the Bangalis went along with the limitation of the political rights of the Bangalis. The imposition of martial law served to reduce the numerical strength of the Bangalis that they could use even if an underdeveloped bourgeois democracy were to emerge in Pakistan. For the Bangali bourgeoisie, the failure of civilian rule and subsequent military takeover further limited its role and scope in the political arena because the military was predominantly West Pakistani.

From the perspective of the Bangali bourgeoisie, the military intervention was an attempt to ensure the West Pakistani dominated military’s role in the state structure, particularly because the scheduled general elections would have allowed the Bangalis to exercise their numerical strength to gain political power. Due to the establishment of barricades that prevented their participation, the Bangali bourgeoisie become disillusioned with the concept of the Islamic state of Pakistan.

Their struggle for autonomy intensified as a result of the failure of the newly emergent state of Pakistan to deliver the Bangali bourgeoisie a fair share of power and privileges. The Ayub Khan regime An Analysis of Pakistani Military Dictatorship and the Bangalis The proclamation of martial law led to the dismissal of President Iskander Mirza, when General Ayub Khan took over power and proclaimed himself President of the Republic on October 27, 1958. The military regime justified its actions by claiming that the country was headed towards “national disintegration. The imposition of martial law brought the military faction, which had already a power-base within the West Pakistani dominated system, into the forefront of state rule. The Ayub regime promised a “growth-oriented economy” and political stability. An important aspect of the ideology of the Pakistani state during this period was the slogan of “national unity. ” Following the political agitation and reaction of the Bangalis in the 1950’s, the Pakistani ruling elite had become attentive to the regional disparity and the Bangalis’ dissatisfaction with the status quo.

In spite of the Pakistani elite’s acknowledgment of the existence of disparity, the growth of imbalance and disparity between the wings continued. In effect, although the ruling elite acknowledged the existence of disparity between the two wings, it did nothing substantial to remedy the situation. As the state was the major promoter of economic growth and initiative, the bias in economic development and growth remained in favor of West Pakistan. Due to the relative weakness of Bangali bourgeoisie, the position of the Bangalis deteriorated not only within the Pakistani ruling elite but in comparison with the West Pakistanis too.

After the partition of the subcontinent, the emergence of state-sponsored capitalism in East Bengal was hampered mainly because its jute-producing areas became de-linked from the jute-processing mills of Calcutta in West Bengal. This allowed the penetration of West Pakistani industrial and merchant capital into East Bengal. The change in government did nothing to alter the bias and the racist attitude towards the Bangalis. President of the republic Ayub Khan himself expressed his opinion as follows: they [the Bangalis] have all the inhibitions of down-trodden races and have not yet found it possible to adjust psychologically to the requirements of the new born freedom. Their popular complexes, exclusiveness, suspicion and a sort of defensive aggressiveness probably emerge from… historical background. ” The dictator’s musing on the Bangalis reflected the popular stereotype of the Bangalis held by the West Pakistani ruling elite. Such racist conceptualization was a prerequisite for the ruling elite to culturally oppress the Bangalis.

With the promulgation of the “Basic Democratic” system, the military regime believed it could legitimize its rule. Under the “Basic Democracy” system, the National Assembly was elected by an equal number of 40,000 “Basic Democrats” both in East Bengal and in West Pakistan. The “Basic Democrats” were linked in a series of tiered-system that also elected the President. (Needless to say, there was not anything remotely democratic in the “Basic Democrats” scheme. ) The regime claimed that the British model of bourgeois democracy was unsuitable for an underdeveloped state like Pakistan.

However, the “Basic Democracy” formula was unable to obstruct the development of Bangali nationalism. On June 8, 1962 the military regime lifted martial law after the election of the National Assembly. In effect, the country came under the rule of the “Basic Democrat” system, which served the Ayub Khan dictatorship. This Constitution was opposed not only by the Bangali bourgeoisie but also by the West Pakistani political opposition. The opposition at the national level formed the Combined Opposition Party (COP).

In September 1964, the COP nominated Fatima Jinnah, the sister of M. A. Jinnah, as its candidate for Presidential elections. In the Presidential election, although Fatima Jinnah lost, she did much better in East Bengal, where she received 46. 6 per cent of the votes cast compared to 36. 36 per cent in her favor nation-wide. Her widespread support in East Bengal revealed the Bangali dissatisfaction with the Ayub Khan’s administration. During Ayub Khan’s rule, the Bangali intellectuals and the bourgeoisie became more and more vocal against the economic exploitation.

The Bangali intellectuals made 3 arguments: one, East Bengal had been turned into a market to dump West Pakistani products; two, the foreign trade policy was biased in favor of West Pakistani interests; and three, the ruling elite allocated and distributed resources in favor of West Pakistan. The examination of the political economy of Pakistan reveals the exploitation of East Bengal by West Pakistan. The Awami League, which was championing the quest for autonomy, formulated a 6-point agenda that was accepted as its program.

The program called for (i) a Federation based on the Lahore Resolution, (ii) central government dealt only with defense and foreign affairs, (iii) either two separate currencies for the two wings or same currency for both wings with provision that flight of capital is prevented and each wing maintain separate revenue accounts, (iv) the units be given the authority to levy taxes and to collect revenue, (v) separate foreign exchange accounts for both the wings, and (vi) setting up a para-military force for East Bengal.

Mujibur Rahman presented this program as the magna carta of ending economic and socio-political exploitation. Mujibur Rahman was elected the President of the Awami League and launched a mass campaign in East Bengal to achieve the demands. The military regime took a attitude of confrontation and placed Mujib under detention. The Ayub Khan regime tried to ruin the credibility of Mujibur Rahman and his program by charging that he was involved in a conspiracy along with some junior Bangali military officials to secede from Pakistan and create an independent state in East Bengal with Indian aid.

This case came to be known as the “Agartala Conspiracy Case. ” The Bangalis protested against the fabrication of this case and demanded the unconditional release of Mujib. Mujib used his defense arguments in this case as an instrument to put forward his political program. Since the Bangalis did not believe in the claims of the government, the case cemented the cause of Bangali nationalism with Mujib’s 6-point program. Mujib’s popularity rose due to the charges levied against him; he became a national hero. The charges against Mujib led to a mass uprising in Bengal.

President Ayub was forced to drop the case against Mujib. In order to resolve the crisis, the regime invited the Awami League to participate in the Round Table Conference (RTC) to discuss the political structure of the state and to set the ground work for resolving the national problems. The negotiations with the political parties did not succeed. The masses continued the demonstrations in the streets for a democratic political order and economic justice. The government was unable to end the thrust of popular politics and mass action.

Ayub Khan was forced to resign. On March 25, 1969 he handed over power to the military chief Yayha Khan, allegedly on the grounds that only the military could preserve the state structure. During Ayub Khan’s rule, a centralized political system was established. This system could not channel the aspirations of the Bangali bourgeoisie. It did not provide a mechanism for the Bangali bourgeoisie to enhance its role in the the state’s decision making process. The centralized political system aggravated the call for provincial autonomy.

Due to the failure of the Pakistani military-bureacratic elite to accommodate the demands for provincial autonomy for East Bengal, Bangali nationalist politics became more militant. Although there was an increase in national output and industrial production, the economic disparity between the regions did not diminish but rather increased. With the military in power the prospect of resolving the “national question” in Pakistan was effectively blocked because the state lacked a democratic mechanism that could execute changes in national institutions and policy. The Marginalization of the Bangalis under Pakistani Rule

From 1947 to 1971, when East Bengal was a part of Pakistan, the Bangali bourgeoisie was the smaller shareholder of the Pakistani ruling structure. Its role was much weaker than the West Pakistani sections of the industrial, mercantile, military, and civilian bourgeoisie. As a result, East Bengal was exploited and colonized by the dominant elite of Pakistan. >From the birth of the state, the Bangalis were subject to economic injustice and marginalization. The people’s frustration was expressed in their political struggle for ending military rule and for establishing a democratic order in the state.

The Bangali bourgeois political leadership believed that a representative political structure would allow their economic, social, and political rights to be established. However, because of the structure of power in Pakistan, the plight of the Bangalis worsened. An examination of the economic situation of Pakistan during the period reveals this economic marginalization. The Bangalis as a nationality were not adequately represented in the civilian administration and military high command of the state. These posts were predominantly held by West Pakistanis.

The following tables reveal the distribution of civilian and military posts on the basis of nationalities. Central Government Civil Service (1955) Position East Bengal West Pakistan Secretary 0 19 Joint Secretary 3 38 Deputy Secretary 10 123 Asistant Secretary 38 510 Source: Dawn, Karachi (1955) The lack of Bangali bourgeoisie representation in the central government allowed the center to direct its policy in favor of West Pakistan. The central government’s outlay for national development clearly demonstrates the bias inherent towards West Pakistan.

The following table provides a breakdown of the development expenditure of the two wings. Development Outlay for Pakistan from 1947-48 to 1960-61 Category East Bengal West Pakistan In millions of Rupees Government Investment 1720 4300 Government Loans 184 2240 Aid 76 1010 The center’s development expenditure was concentrated on the further advancing of economic infrastructure of West Pakistan. For example, although water resource management for East Bengal was no less important than for West Pakistan, the central government attached more importance to the Indus Basin Accord with India rather than the question of Farraka dam barrage.

The funding of Indus Basin water project came from the center’s allocation, not West Pakistan’s allocation. Thus, the Bangalis saw that while West Pakistani’s water resources were considered to be the center’s priorities, their water problems were being ignored. The disparity between the per capita income of the people of the two wings continued to increase. The table below demonstrates the increase in the disparity of Per Capita Income between the two wings: The Per Capita Income Distribution in Pakistan (In M Rupees) Year East Bengal West Pakistan Difference 1959-60 269 355 32% 1964-65 285. 5 419 46. % 1968-69 291 473. 4 62. 6% In terms of per capita income while the condition of the masses in West Pakistan was improving, the Bangalis found that the per capita income difference with their Western counterparts was actually increasing. The foreign trade statistics reveal that in the years 1947-67 of unified Pakistan, East Bengal was the major foreign exchange earner while West Pakistan was in foreign trade debt. The table below shows: Foreign Trade Figures 1947-67 (In M Rupees) Position East Bengal West Pakistan Exports 20,982,391 15,704,714 Imports 15,183,796 34,388,211 Balance 5,798,595 -18,683,497

Source: Central Statistical Office (1967). As the table shows, East Bengal exported 57 per cent of Pakistan’s total exports but had only 30 per cent share of the total imports, while West Pakistan exported only 42 per cent of the total exports but its share of total imports was 70 per cent. Whereas East Bengal was a net exporter, West Pakistan was a net importer. The Western wing of the state had a greater share of Pakistan’s imports and used the foreign exchange earned by East Pakistan for its own benefit. Defense outlay for Pakistan was extremely high. From 1950-51 to 1968-69 the defense outlay was Rs. 1,178. 1 million. This constituted approximately 56 per cent of the total government outlay of that period. The anti-Indian rhetoric was used to boost defense expenditure. By levying taxes in East Bengal and spending it on West Pakistan the West Pakistani bourgeoisie benefited from the high defense outlay. The defense expenditure, which was in the forms of wages, contracts, and investments, was primarily in West Pakistan. The apparent rationale for the concentration of military build-up was based upon the claim of the West Pakistani dominated military that “the security of East Bengal lay in the Western wing. The Pakistani military claimed that it would preserve the security of East Bengal with a pre-emptive strike from the Western Wing. During the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War over the Kashmir issue, East Bengal was left defenseless and vulnerable to Indian aggression. The view that that East Bengal security lay in West Pakistann no longer appealed to the Bangalis because the war cut-off East Bengal from West Pakistan and the rest of the world. Thus, the Bangalis learnt that in spite of their contribution to the expensive defense outlay, the central government did not attach much importance to East Bengal’s security.

Their tax contribution towards defense has been diverted solely for the benefit of West Pakistan, not for their security. In essence, as the above arguments show, the fundamental nature of relation between East Bengal and West Pakistan from 1947 to 1971 was one of economic disparity. Because the Bangalis and the West Pakistani ruling elite could not reach a political settlement, this economic question became the main issue of their conflict. The nature of the economic development of Pakistan in 1950’s and 1960’s show that the disparity between the two wings became greater due to the economic policies adopted by the state.

The Awami League used the regional economic disparity of East Bengal to show the need for its political program. The 6-point program of the Awami League was designed to address the Bangali nationalist consciousness regarding the increase of disparity. The Awami League presented its 6-point program as an instrument to end the economic exploitation of East Bengal. Bangali nationalism grew because the Pakistani ruling elite refused to recognize the demands of the Bangalis for political participation in the state and for the economic self-rule of East Bengal.

The crisis climaxed following the 1970 elections, when the Awami League won a truimphant electoral victory because the party reflected the nationalist inspiration of the Bangalis. The failure of the Pakistani ruling elite to meet the demands of the Awami League program led to a political deadlock. The military refused to accept the 6-point program because it would reduce the military budget and dismantle the West Pakistani business interests in East Bengal. In order to prevent the Bangali political leadership from acquiring power, the military junta colluded with the West Pakistani bourgeoisie to crush Bangali nationalism.

The military’s massacre of the Bangalis opened the road to the liberation of East Bengal. The Yayha Khan Regime The Yayha Khan regime did not have a strong base because it came to power following the mass agitation against the Ayub Khan regime. The crisis of Ayub Khan’s dictatorial rule led to the resumption of power by the military. The new regime tried to dispel any notion that it had a long-term objective of remaining in power by positing itself as an intermediary and transitional authority.

The regime announced that it wanted to transfer power to the people’s representative and admitted that East Bengal had been denied a full share in the decision-making process. The regime dissolved the One Unit Scheme, and it promised that elections would be held on the basis of poular franchaise. In order to provide a legal facade, the regime promulgated a “Legal Framework Order” (LFO) for the purpose of Pakistan’s first general elections. According to the Legal Framework Order, the seats of the National Assembly, which was to frame the Constitution, would be distributed in conformity with the population of the provinces.

The distribution of the seats was as follows: PROVINCES Seats East Bengal 169 The Punjab 85 Sind 28 Baluchistan 5 NWFP 19 Tribal Areas 7 Total 313 In spite of some objections to the structure and the mechanism of the proposed transition to democratic rule, the Awami League decided to participate in the elections. The leaders of the Awami League described the forthcoming elections as a “a referendum on the autonomy issue. ” The Awami League argued that, if elected, they would implement the 6-point agenda and, thus, establish the due rights of the Bangalis.

The nationalistic Awami League campaign reflected the mood of the Bangalis who had been long neglected in the political rule of Pakistan. The long campaign period allowed the Awami League to explain the pauperization of East Bengal in terms of the exploitative relation that existed between the two wings. The Bangali bourgeoisie saw this election as an opportunity to exercise the Bangali electoral strength to gain power and reverse their conditions. A Bangali journal captured the tone of the bourgeois intellectuals: “In East Pakistan, for the first time the grip of the power elite stands to be broken.

Their first defeat will demoralize them as much as it will inspire the people of West Pakistan. ” Such analysis assumed that the Bangalis’ struggle for autonomy would spontaneously transform to a common and united struggle of all the nationalities against the Pakistani ruling elite. However, Pakistan did not have a single transnational political organization that could unite the marginalized sections of Pakistani society. Hence, the other nationalities did not join the Bangali struggle. In November 1970, a devastating cyclone struck the coastal areas of East Bengal, killing thousands of people.

However, the central government failed to aid the cyclone-strieken people. The government was severely criticized for treating the Bangalis in a callous manner. Mujib and other Awami League leaders toured the ravaged areas, including the off-shore islands. The political leadership urged the people to use the ballot-box to express their indignation at the treatment they received from the central government. In the election that followed, the Awami League won a triumphant victory. At the East Bengal Assembly elections, the results were as follows: Parties Seats

Awami League 298 Other Parties 5 Independents 7 TOTAL 310 At the National Assembly elections, the Awami emerged as the majority party, as the table shows: Parties Seats Awami League 167 Pakistan People’s Party 88 Other Parties 44 Independents 14 TOTAL 313 The military, bureaucracy, and business, all West Pakistani-dominated, were shocked at the results because they faced the prospect that the central government’s power would be passed away to the Bangalis, if the Awami League were allowed to shape the constitution and form a government.

The results of the election gave the Awami League the possibility of framing the constitution according to its 6-point program. The election put the Pakistani ruling elite in such a position that, if it allowed the democratic process to continue, then it would be unable to stop the Awami League from framing a constitution that would protect the Bangali interests. In West Pakistan, the Pakistan People’s Party, led by Z. A. Bhutto, emerged as the dominant party. Representing the interests of the West Pakistani bourgeoisie, Bhutto announced that the PPP would not allow any constitution to be framed without its consent and participation.

The PPP declared that it would refuse to participate in any National Assembly session, as it was not “prepared to occupy Opposition benches. ” Clearly, Bhutto was not only bargaining for personal position but also preserving West Pakistani hegemony. In this situation, tri-party negotiations and talks began among the Yayha regime, Mujib’s Awami League, and Bhutto’s PPP. The Yayha regime declared that the National Assembly session would be held on March 3, 1971. During the negotiations, the West Pakistani forces refused to accept the 6-point program.

Bhutto colluded with the West Pakistani bourgeoisie and denounced the 6-point program as a secession plan. Although the West Pakistani military regime announced that the National Assembly would hold its session on March 3, 1971, the PPP decided to boycott the session. Bhutto threatened that the Assembly would be turned into a “slaughter house” if its memebrs endorsed a constitution based on the Awami League’s program. While the negotiations with the Awami League were proceeding, the military had decided to attack the Bangalis in order to crush their demands.

The central government transferred army divisions from West Pakistan to East Bengal as part of its preparations. Yayha Khan dissolved the civilian cabinet and appointed a military cabinet. The military designed a plan titled “Operation Searchlight” with the objectives: one, treating the Awami League activities as rebellious; two, arresting the maximum number of political and student leaders and intellectuals; and three, demilitarizing the Bangali troops. The military regime continued the dialogue with Mujib in order to have the time to dispatch more troops into East Bengal.

Although the Awami League was aware of the troop build-up, it continued the dialogue with the military. Its leadership did not predict that the military will strike the populace. The Awami League demanded the withdrawal of the troops and transfer of power to the elected representatives. During this period, there were clashes between the Bangalis and the military stationed in East Bengal, resulting in deaths of many civilians. The radicals within the Awami League and the student organizations called upon the Awami League leadership to declare independence.

On March 7, 1971 Sheik Mujib, in an articulate and carefully phrased speech, asked the Bangalis to prepare for a resistance to the regime but stopped just short of declaring independence. The Awami League set up a non-violent and non-cooperation movement, which proved quite successful. The program adopted measures such as (i) refusal to pay tax, (ii) stoppage of the flight of capital from East wing to the West wing, (iii) observation of hartals (strikes), (iv) hoisting of black flags, (v) access to state-controlled media for the opposition, and (vi) setting up council of action under Awami League leadership.

The directives of the Awami League were extremely successful, and the administrative control of East Bengal effectively passed from the Pakistani authorities to the Awami League. While the military prepared to strike the Bangalis, Yayha Khan flew to Dhaka on March 15, 1971 and gave the impression of renewing the negotiations with the Awami League. Bhutto also participated in the negotiations. The National Assembly session was put off again until March 25. During the talks the Awami League refused to compromise because its electoral victory was based on the support for the autonomy of East Bengal.

The Awami League leaders still thought that negotiations with the military junta could be fruitful. It believed that it could obtain concessions from the military regime and from Bhutto’s Pakistan’s Peoples Party. The Awami League was not prepared for an armed showdown with the Pakistani military. The military dictator and the central government officials left Dhaka without prior notice. Immediately, at 11:00 p. m. on March 25, 1971, troop movements started. In Dhaka and elsewhere in East Bengal, the Pakistan army began an orgy of killings, rape, violence, and looting.

Mujib declared Independence before he was arrested by the military. Other political leaders of the Awami League managed to escape to India, where they set up a provisonal government and organized the armed resistance to the Pakistani army. The Bangali troops, although Pakistani authorities ordered to disarm, resisted the Pakistan army and fought back. Thus, the Bangali National Liberation began its phase of armed struggle. The Birth of Bangladesh After winning the 1970 elections, the Awami League was not in a position to compromise its political program without being regarded as a traitor to the Bangali cause.

Since the Awami League did not compromise, the negotiations with the regime broke down although the talks produced a semblance of agreement. As planned, the Pakistani army launched an attack on the Bangalis without warning, with a view to weaken and demolish Bangali nationalism. The military arrested Sheik Mujib, the leader of the Awami League. He had earlier sent a message declaring independence. The military launched a systematic attack on the Bangali people.

The military shelled the Dhaka University, killing the university teachers and students; the soldiers broke into women’s dormitories and raped the women. They buried the dead in mass graves that were bull-dozed over by the tanks. The military used artillery and heavy machine gun fire to crush the Bangali civilians, the local police, and the Bangali troops. The military set up strongholds in Dhaka and in other parts of East Bengal. The Pakistani soldiers set ablaze working class parts of the shanty towns, markets, houses of political workers, and newspaper offices; and they shot civilians indiscriminantly.

The military specially targeted the Hindu minority in East Bengal because they blamed “Hindu” India and the Hindu community in East Bengal as the master-mind behind Bangali secession plans. The Bangalis tried their best to escape the wrath of the Pakistan army. The crackdown was intended to demolish Bangali nationalism by inflicting cruelty and to prevent the Bangalis from exercising their right to self-determination. A Pakistani officer rationalized the military action thus: “We will kill them [Bangalis]—they have spoken enough—they are traitors, and we are not. We are fighting in the name of God and a united Pakistan. “

After the first morning of military attack on the Bangalis, the leader of West Pakistan’s dominant party, Bhutto, was flown to West Pakistan, where he declared: “Pakistan has been saved by the grace of the Almighty. ” The military attack on the Bangalis transformed the movement for attaining political self-rule into a national struggle of the Bangalis, irrespective of their political affiliation, religious preference, or class background. For the Bangalis, the military attack on the unarmed civilians proved that the West Pakistani ruling elite and the Pakistani army would not seek a negotiated settlement with the Bangali political leadership.

The military attack upon the Bangalis was a campaign to destroy what the Bangalis were poised to achieve if the constitutional process were allowed to function. The Bangalis resisted the military action spontaneously with primitive arms, by building barricades, and by creating obstacles. In some places, particularly in the rural areas, where the military could not reach immediately, the public under the action committees set up by the Awami League proclaimed the formation of liberated zones.

Bangali troops rebelled against the Pakistani army. Widely supported by the populace, the Bangali troops resisted, fought the Pakistan army, and initiated the liberation struggle. Some of the Awami League leaders had gone underground and escaped to India. Major Ziaur Rahman and some Bangali employees of the state Radio escaped and set up a clandestine radio station, in which Major Zia on behalf of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman urged the Bangalis to resist Pakistani rule and repression.

Meanwhile, the elected Bangali members of the National Assembly and the Provincial Assembly gathered in a liberated zone of East Bengal and proclaimed independence of the state of Bangladesh from Pakistan. The Awami League was able to retain control of the main thrust of the movement for the national liberation of Bangladesh. The Awami League established a interim government led by Tajuddin. Tajuddin was extremely efficient and successful in the management of the government in exile. The Bangladesh government in exile established contact with the Indian authorities.

The Awami League established guerrilla training camps and retained control over the guerrilla movement. The Bangladesh government-in-exile launched an international campaign using non-resident Bangalis abroad as the spokespersons for the Bangali cause. Several Bangalis in the Pakistani civil and diplomatic services defected in favor of the government of Bangladesh. The government-in-exile was able to build a reliable bureaucratic machinery in Calcutta, which functioned well for a government outside the parameters of the state.

The Awami League was able to convince the Indian authorities of the need to support the struggle for the national liberation of Bangladesh. The profound international sympathy for the Bangalis was a result of the massacre of the Bangalis and the influx into India of 10 million refugees who escaped from the Pakistani army brutality. In West Bengal, the Indian Bangalis were extremely generous although they themselves possessed few resources. The Bangalis received substantial support from the Indian authorities in the form of guerrilla training, facilities, arms and ammunition to fight the military regime.

The dynamics of the international situation altered with the signing of the Indo-Soviet treaty, which guaranteed the security of India. The government of India recognized Bangladesh on December 6, 1971. With Indians allying with Bangalis in the National Liberation of Bangladesh, the joint forces of Bangladesh and India was able to overcome the Pakistani army easily. The Bangali guerrillas had penetrated into East Bengal and had expert knowledge of the terrain and the activities of the Pakistan army.

The Indian forces possessed superior fire-power and better troops. The Indians cutoff the air links between East Bengal and West Pakistan. The Pakistan army could not receive new supplies or further troop support. With the introduction of Indian forces, the Pakistan army was being defeated in all the battles. Realizing the possibility of total annihilation, the Pakistan army surrendered to the joint command of Bangladesh and Indian forces on December 16, 1971. With the unconditional surrender of the Pakistani army, Bangladesh was finally liberated.

The National Liberation of Bangladesh was the result of the transformation of the political struggle of the Bangali bourgeoisie to attain power into the nat

Term Paper on “Climate Change and Bangladesh” Submitted by 1. Quazi Nizam Uddin, ID-5176 2. Kazi Md. Golam Quddus, ID-5168 MBA(F) 4th Batch , Fall semister-2010 Submitted for Mohammad Jahangir Alam Asst Professor , Jahangir Nagar University & South East University Managerial Economics (ECO-5123) South East University Executive Summary

Bangladesh is frequently cited as one of the most vulnerable countries to climate change because of its disadvantageous geographic location, flat and low-lying topography, high population density, high levels of poverty, reliance of many livelihoods on climate sensitive sectors- particularly agriculture and fisheries and inefficient institutional aspects.

Many of the anticipated adverse affects of climate change, such as sea level rise, higher temperatures, enhanced monsoon precipitation, and an increase in cyclone intensity, will aggravate the existing stresses that already impede development in Bangladesh, particularly by reducing water and food security and damaging essential infrastructure. These impacts could be extremely detrimental to the economy, the environment, national development, and the people of Bangladesh.

Bangladesh has developed some capacity for dealing with the impacts of climate change at the national level, and policy response options have been mobilized that deal with vulnerability reduction to environmental variability in general, and more recently, to climate change in particular. In addition, Bangladesh has for some time been recognized as a particularly vulnerable country by the international community, and has received disaster management and adaptation support in several sectors.

Some reasons for climate changes are increase in CO2 levels, green house effect, industrialization, urbanization, burning fossils fuels, deforestation, population growth etc. Many of the projected impacts of climate change will reinforce the baseline environmental, socio-economic and demographic stresses already faced by Bangladesh. Climate change is likely to result in i. Increased flooding, both in terms of extent and frequency, associated with sea level rise, greater monsoon precipitation and increased glacial melt (ii).

Increased vulnerability to cyclone and storm surges (iii. ) Increased moisture stress during dry periods leading to increased drought (iv. ) Increased salinity intrusion (v. )Greater temperature extremes All kinds of climate change impacts should be accounted for in both design criteria and location. Selected development programs on the need and possibilities to include climate change considerations in their approach and the possible contribution they could have to anticipatory adaptations.

Sometime physical interventions are generally in-effective and costly, whilst requiring maintenance arrangements and coordination of separate initiatives. More promising anticipatory adaptations are changes in behavioral patterns, human practices and international actions. However, these type of adaptations meet serious institutional constraints and consequently should be carefully prepared and, if possible, integrated in existing structures and procedures. The main mechanisms to gradually overcome these constraints are coordination of climate change activities, (integrated) planning and information management.

Capacity building including assisting the creation of a ‘climate change cell’ within the Department of Environment (DOE) to build government capacity for coordination and leadership on climate change issues needed. The cell can coordinates awareness raising, advocacy and mechanisms to promote climate change adaptation and risk reduction in development activities, as well as strengthening existing knowledge and information accessibility on impacts and adaptation to climate change. Introduction As a part of our MBA course program we have to submit a term paper.

As our course teacher selected the topics “Climate Change and Bangladesh”. Accordingly we have to write on this topic. Climate change is a long-term change in the statistical distribution of weather patterns over periods of time that range from decades to millions of years. It may be a change in the average weather conditions or a change in the distribution of weather events with respect to an average, for example, greater or fewer extreme weather events. Climate change may be limited to a specific region, or may occur across the whole Earth.

In recent usage, especially in the context of environmental policy, climate change usually refers to changes in modern climate. It may be qualified as anthropogenic climate change, more generally known as global warming or anthropogenic global warming Bangladesh is frequently cited as one of the most vulnerable countries to climate change because of its disadvantageous geographic location, flat and low-lying topography, high population density, high levels of poverty, reliance of many livelihoods on climate sensitive sectors- particularly agriculture and fisheries and inefficient institutional aspects.

Many of the anticipated adverse affects of climate change, such as sea level rise, higher temperatures, enhanced monsoon precipitation, and an increase in cyclone intensity, will aggravate the existing stresses that already impede development in Bangladesh, particularly by reducing water and food security and damaging essential infrastructure.

These impacts could be extremely detrimental to the economy, the environment, national development, and the people of Bangladesh. Bangladesh is one of the largest deltas in the world, formed by a dense network of the distributaries of the rivers Ganges, Brahmaputra, and the Meghna, and more than 230 major rivers and their tributaries and distributaries. The total land area is 147, 570 sq km and consists mostly of low, flat land. 0 per cent of the land is floodplain, and only in the extreme northwest do elevations exceed 30 meters above mean sea level, making the majority of Bangladesh (with the exception of the highlands) prone to flooding at least part of the year, with the floodplains of the north western, central, south central and north eastern regions subject to regular flooding. Between 30-70 per cent of the country is normally flooded each year. The extent of flooding is exacerbated by the sediment loads brought by the three major Himalayan rivers, coupled with a negligible flow gradient, which increases congestion.

Bangladesh has developed some capacity for dealing with the impacts of climate change at the national level, and policy response options have been mobilized that deal with vulnerability reduction to environmental variability in general, and more recently, to climate change in particular. In addition, Bangladesh has for some time been recognized as a particularly vulnerable country by the international community, and has received disaster management and adaptation support in several sectors. Reasons

The increase in CO2 levels due to emissions from fossil fuel combustion, followed by aerosols (particulate matter in the atmosphere) and cement manufacture. Other factors, including land use, ozone depletion, animal agriculture and deforestation, are also of concern in the roles they play – both separately and in conjunction with other factors – in affecting climate, microclimate, and measures of climate variables. Greenhouse Effect The Earth is surrounded by a layer of gases that act to trap heat. These so-called ‘greenhouse gases’ are necessary to sustain life on Earth.

Like the glass walls of a greenhouse, they let the sun’s rays enter but stop some of the heat from escaping, keeping the planet warm enough to allow life. However, as people cause more greenhouse gases to be released into the atmosphere, the greenhouse effect becomes stronger. More heat is trapped and the Earth’s climate begins to change unnaturally. Greenhouse gases mainly consist of water vapours and carbon dioxide, sulpher dioxide and include other gases like methane and nitrous oxide. Industrialization From the 16th Century and onwards the European nations went to developed industries.

With the inception industrialization, there is more emission, deforestation (for place, fuel and buildings) had occurred. Urbanization With the modern civilization, people went for urbanization in every country. People made houses, offices, factories, schools, hospitals, markets and roads etc by eliminating forests and woods. Burning fossil fuels When fossil fuels like coal, oil and gas are burned, they release greenhouse gases. In 2005, burning fossil fuels sent about 27 billion tones of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere.

People burn fossil fuels to create energy, which is used for many things including • heating homes and buildings • growing, transporting and cooking food • traveling (for example, by car, plane, bus and train) • treating water to make it drinkable, heating it and piping it into homes • manufacturing, using and transporting products, from clothes to fridges, from plastic bags to batteries Deforestation Cutting down forests faster than they are replaced (deforestation) is a major contributor to climate change. It causes 5. 9 billion tones of CO2 per year to be released into the air.

This accounts for 20 per cent of the world’s carbon emissions – more than the entire global transport sector produces. Deforestation makes such a huge contribution to carbon emissions because trees absorb CO2 as they grow. The more trees that are cut down, the fewer there will be left to absorb CO2, leading to it building up in the atmosphere. In addition, the agriculture and industry that replace the forests often cause an extra problem by producing carbon emissions of their own. Population Growth As the world’s population grows, there are more people who need food, livestock and energy.

This increased demand leads to increased emissions. ImpactsLoss on Environment Many of the projected impacts of climate change will reinforce the baseline environmental, socio-economic and demographic stresses already faced by Bangladesh. Climate change is likely to result in i. Increased flooding, both in terms of extent and frequency, associated with sea level rise, greater monsoon precipitation and increased glacial melt ii. Increased vulnerability to cyclone and storm surges iii. Increased moisture stress during dry periods leading to increased drought iv. Increased salinity intrusion v.

Greater temperature extremes Increased flooding Sea level rise is also associated with increased riverine flooding, because it causes more backing up of the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna rivers along the delta. This will result in increased drainage congestion due to higher water levels, which will be exacerbated by other factors associated with climate change such as siltation of estuary branches in line with increased surface runoff, and higher riverbed levels. Higher temperatures will result in increased glacier melt, increasing runoff from the neighboring Himalayas into the Ganges and Brahmaputra rivers.

Increased intensity of cyclone winds and precipitation The IPCC conclude that there is evidence of a 5-10 per cent increase in intensity (wind speed) that would contribute to enhanced storm surges and coastal flooding, and also project a 20 per cent increase in intensity of associated precipitation that would contribute to flooding. Cyclone winds are likely to increase in intensity because of the positive correlation with sea surface temperature. In November 2007, for example, the tropical cyclone Sidr, with a 100 mile long front covering the breadth of the country and with winds up to 240 km per hour, hit Bangladesh.

This was noted to be an unusual occurrence given the intensity and timing of the storm, particularly given that it occurred in the same year as two recurrent floods. Increased moisture stress during dry periods Climate change will exacerbate drought in Bangladesh both in terms of intensity and frequency linked to higher mean temperatures and potentially reduced dry season precipitation. Monsoon rains produce 80% of Bangladesh’s annual precipitation, and when this is reduced, drought is a significant problem; between 1960 and 1991, a total of 19 droughts occurred in

Bangladesh. The Southwest and Northwest regions are particularly susceptible to drought. Greater precipitation extremes associated with climate change also mean less rainfall in the dry season, which will increase water stress on those areas that already experience water shortages, particularly in the winter months. This will be worse for those areas that depend on glacial melt water for their main dry-season water supply, as glaciers recede with rising temperatures. Increased salinity

The availability of freshwater will be reduced by increased salinity intrusion into fresh water sources during the low flow conditions. In the coastal regions this is brought about by sea level rise resulting in saline water intrusion in the estuaries and into the groundwater. The effects are exacerbated by greater evaporation and evapo-transpiration of freshwater as temperatures increase, coupled with a greater demand for fresh water in times of water stress. Greater temperature extremes Climate change is associated with hotter summers and colder winters.

Temperatures in Bangladesh have increased about 1°C in May and 0. 5 °C in November between 1985 and 1998, and further temperature increases are expected. However, although the overall climate is warming, temperature extremes are increasing, and winter temperatures as low as 5°C have been recorded in January 2007, reportedly the lowest in 38 years. ImpactsLoss on Economy Agriculture and fisheries The economy of Bangladesh is based on agriculture, with two thirds of the population engaged in or indirectly relying on agricultural activities.

Agriculture is one of the most sensitive sectors to climate change, particularly changes in temperature, rainfall patterns, and increased likelihood of extreme events such as droughts and floods. Although an increase in CO2 levels could under moderate temperature increases result in an increase in cropping yields, through carbon fertilization, modeling studies suggest that increasing frequency of crop loss due to extreme events, such as droughts and heavy precipitation, may overcome any benefits of moderate temperature increases.

In Bangladesh, the overall impact of climate change on agricultural production will be negative. While inundation to a lesser degree has had a positive impact on production, with perennial floods bringing silt and nutrients increasing the fertility of the soils, prolonged floods have had a detrimental impact on crop yields; in two severe floods, 1974 and 1987, the shortfalls in production were about 0. 8 and 1. 0 Mt respectively. On average during the period 1962-1988, Bangladesh lost about 0. million tones’ of rice annually as a result of floods, which accounts for nearly 30% of the country’s average annual food grain imports Other impacts of climate change such as temperature extremes, drought, and salinity intrusion, are also causing declining crop yields in Bangladesh. Several studies have been conducted in Bangladesh to assess the vulnerability of food grain production to various climate scenarios. One such study2 noted that a 4°C increase in temperature would have a sever impact on food production in Bangladesh, resulting in a 28 per cent reduction for rice and a 68 per cent reduction for wheat.

Temperature and rainfall changes have already affected crop production in many parts of Bangladesh, and the area of arable land has already decreased. The shortening of the winter season is resulting in a decline in production of winter crops, particularly potatoes. The salinity intrusion experienced by the coastal area of Bangladesh is having serious implications for the quality of the soil in areas that were traditionally used for growing rice. Under a moderate climate scenario the decline in yields due to salinity intrusion could be 0. 2 Mt, which increases to 0. 6 Mt under more severe scenarios. Increases in water stress have also affected the production of major crops, again particularly rice, which needs significant amounts of water. The fisheries sector may also be adversely affected by climate change. The fisheries sector contributes to about 3. 5 per cent of the GDP in Bangladesh, and people rely on fish products to make up the majority of daily protein dietary requirements. There are 260 species of fish in Bangladesh, all of which are sensitive to particular salt and freshwater conditions.

The changes in tidal patterns, as well as increasing saline intrusion into the freshwater rivers, associated with climate change, will impact on fish populations, although the extent to which this occurs is still uncertain. The implications of climate change for agriculture and fisheries are extremely significant, not only because of the livelihoods implications for the majority of the population who depend on agricultural outputs and systems, but also because of the threat to Bangladesh’s food security, where projections suggest that by the year 2030 food-grain requirements will be 41. 6 million tones.

To become self sufficient in food grain production by 2030, an additional 14. 64 million tones will be required. Further, about 80 per cent of animal protein intake in Bangladeshi daily diets comes from fish. The population of Bangladesh almost doubled in less than thirty years from 1961, and now stands at over 143 million. According to projections the requirement of food grain in the country will be 42. 8 Mt by 2030. Increase vulnerability to crop production makes this near impossible and with fisheries also vulnerable to climate change, food security in Bangladesh is unlikely to be achieved.

Water resources and hydrology In Bangladesh, the effects of climate change on the surface and groundwater resources will be entirely negative. In terms of flooding, a report by the states that future changes in precipitation in Bangladesh have four distinct implications i. The timing of occurrence of floods may change, with implications for the seasonality of the hydrological cycle ii. Increase precipitation in the Ganges, Brahmaputra and Meghna basins may increase the magnitude, depth and patial extent of floods iii. The timing of peaking in the major rivers may also change, which may in turn change the likelihood of synchronization of flood peaks of major rivers iv. Increased magnitude, depth, extent and duration of floods will bring a dramatic change in land use patterns in Bangladesh. Other changes include increases in evaporation rates, reduction in dry season transboundary flows resulting in an increase in irrigation water requirements, sea level rise that will exacerbate drainage congestion.

Bangladesh also faces frequent flash floods, higher frequency of tropical cyclones, rise in storm surge depths, and slower accretion of coastal lands. Changes to water resources and hydrology will have a major impact on Bangladesh, where people depend on the surface water for fish cultivation, navigation, industrial and other uses, and where the ground water is used for domestic purposes and irrigation. The impacts on agriculture have already been noted. These problems will be further exacerbated by poor water management, both nationally and trans-boundary.

For example, the effect of water diversion upstream on dry season flows and salinity levels on coastal mangroves in Bangladesh was found to be comparable, if not higher, than the impact that might be experienced several decades later as in line with climate change projections. Coastal areas Coastal areas in Bangladesh are on the ‘front line’ of climate change, directly affected by storm surges, drainage congestion, and sea level rise. Most of Bangladesh is less than ten meters above sea level, with almost ten per cent of the country below 1 meter, making it extremely vulnerable to increasing high tides.

With sea levels expected to rise by an average of two to three mm per year during the first part of this century[21], the effects on the coastal areas will be severe, and include erosion, coastal land subsistence, siltation of river estuaries, reduced sedimentation, water logging, and saltwater intrusion. The coastal area of Bangladesh and the Bay of Bengal are located at the tip of the northern Indian Ocean, which is frequently hit by severe cyclonic storms, generating long tidal waves that are aggravated by the shallow bay [5].

Although Bangladesh now has good early warning systems and cyclone shelters have been constructed along much of the coast, infrastructure and livelihoods are still threatened and severely affected, hampering further development of the coastal areas. 30 districts were damaged by clone Sidr for example, with the 11 districts closest to the coast damaged most severely. Coastal areas will also be affected by salinity intrusion. Saltwater from the Bay of Bengal already penetrates 100 kilometres inland during the dry season, and climate change is likely to exacerbate this.

Pressure from an increasing population and rising demand for groundwater further reduces the availability of freshwater supplies for domestic and industrial purposes A quarter of the population lives in the coastal areas, with the majority of the population reliant on or affected by coastal activities. If sea levels rises up to one meter this century, Bangladesh could lose up to 15 per cent of its landmass and up to 30 million Bangladeshis could become climate refugees. In these areas, agriculture, industry, infrastructure, livelihoods, marine resources, forestry and biodiversity, human health, and utility services will all suffer.

Such a scenario could lead to a decline in GDP of between 27 and 57 per cent. Forestry Biodiversity Ecosystems and biodiversity may be at greatest risk of all sectors sensitive to climate change. Bangladesh has a diverse range of forest ecosystems, including savannah, bamboo, freshwater swamp forests and mangroves. The Sundarbans of Bangladesh, a world heritage sight, is the single largest mangrove area in the world, comprising an area of 577,00 ha, and housing one of the richest natural gene pools. A total of 425 species have been identified there, the most notable of which is the Bengal tiger, which is endemic to the area.

Climate change will have a detrimental impact on all of the forest ecosystems in Bangladesh, and the Sundarbans are likely to be the worst affected. Sea level rise may inundate parts of the Sundarbans and ecosystems are threatened by salinization of surface and groundwater. Higher water temperatures, loss of brackish-waters and reduced flows could harm fisheries. Human development has in many cases fragmented or reduced habitat decreased species population and blocked the migration routes of species. The Sundarbans also offer subsistence to around 3. million inhabitants who live within and around the forest boundary. The inundation and intruding salinity are interrupting traditional practices in the Sundarbans. Although there are opportunities for shrimp farming in increased salinisation, shrimp farmers are encouraged to inundate their land with brackish water during times of low salinity, exacerbating damage to the forest cover. Depleting forests are putting further pressure on forest resources such as fuel wood and timber, enhancing the rate of forest depletion. Human Health Climate change affects health directly and indirectly.

The most direct impacts of climate change on human health occur through extreme events, for example the floods in Bangladesh in 2004 caused 800 deaths, while the recent cyclone affected more than 8. 5 million people, causing more than 3,500 deaths. Climate change will also affect the distribution of climate sensitive diseases. Malaria is a frequently cited example, because its prevalence increases in line with the warmer, wetter climates that are anticipated with climate change. Incidences of malaria have increased dramatically in Bangladesh over the last 30 years, and it is now a major public health problem, with 14. million people in Bangladesh classified as high risk for catching the disease. Other diseases such as dysentery, diarrhea, dengue, hypertension associated with heat stress, asthma and skin diseases are also increasing in Bangladesh, particularly during the summer months. While a causative connection between climate change and these diseases is of course difficult to verify, the conditions associated with climate change (in terms of temperature, rainfall, and salinity) and the impacts on water supply, sanitation and food production, generate favorable environments for the incidence and spread of such diseases.

For example, increased flooding as well as drought is resulting in a decline in the availability of clean water, for a country where water-borne diseases are already responsible for 24 per cent of all deaths. Urban areas The risk to human health in tropical developing countries is one of the salient risks of climate change. Drainage congestion and standing water will increase the potential for outbreaks of cholera and other waterborne and diarrheal diseases.

The pressure on the availability and access to safe water, in particular during the dry period, and the increasing reliance on groundwater are an additional threat. Natural disasters threaten people and there belongings. Finally the pressure on agricultural production may result in malnutrition. Cyclone Sidr affected the infrastructure of more than half a million homes, with nearly one million all or particularly destroyed, and more than 10,000 schools all or partially destroyed.

The key sectors affected by floods in Bangladesh’s cities include infrastructure, industry, trade, commerce and utility services, all of which reduce in productivity during and after major flooding, increasing the vulnerability of the urban poor. And the adverse impacts of climate change on rural areas cause increased migration to urban areas in search of non-agricultural employment, putting greater pressure on scarce housing, water, sanitation, and energy services and increasing the number of vulnerable urban poor who are particularly at risk from climate related disasters.

A greater part of this migrated population lives in slums and squatter settlements in the cities. Particularly vulnerable groups The urban poor are therefore especially vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, because of the fragility of the infrastructure of slums and squatter settlements, and the lack of employment security. In the rural areas, those with insecure land tenure, particularly the lower Adivasi castes, and women, are also particularly vulnerable. Women are the main users and carriers of water. As the availability and uality of water declines and resources become scarcer, women will suffer increasing work loads to collect un-salivated water to sustain their families. ResponsesProtection Measures National policy response options There is no comprehensive national policy in Bangladesh that specifically targets climate change risks. However, the Bangladesh government is aware of the importance of climate change, as well as the country’s historical sensitivity to climate variability in general, and there are several policy response options that exist that relate to climate change.

These include indirectly addressing the impacts of climate change through programmes that reduce vulnerability through for example poverty alleviation, employment generation, crop diversification; directly addressing vulnerability to climate variability and extreme events through disaster risk reductions and management schemes; and specifically targeting climate change by mainstreaming climate change into sectoral plans and national policies. A selection of policies that reduce vulnerability to climate variability, and also specifically climate change, will be discussed here.

Vulnerability Reduction In Bangladesh ongoing projects address food insecurity and food production shortfalls by crop diversification and generation of alternative employment opportunities aimed at community development, agricultural development, credit facilities, and infrastructure improvement. Fish and shrimp production for domestic consumption and exports are promoted with special emphasis on rural poverty alleviation and employment generation. All such developmental programmes are important in enhancing the resilience of the poor. Disaster Management and Climate Risk Management

Bangladesh has a Participatory Disaster Management Programme (PDMP) with a focus on disaster management and prevention, and also adaptation to climate change. The focus is on ‘soft’ measures to reduce the impacts of disasters, with an emphasis on preparedness, such as awareness raising of practical ways to reduce disaster risks and losses, to strengthen national capacity for disaster management; enhance knowledge and skills of personnel in handling disasters; establishing disaster action plans in the most disaster prone areas; promoting local-level risk reduction measures; and improving early warning systems.

In 2003 Bangladesh also established a Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (CDMP) with UNDP and other donor assistance, with the aim of refocusing the government towards greater emphasis on disaster preparedness and risk reduction. CDMP has a number of disaster management components, among them to establish an integrated approach to climate change and disaster management, expanding risk reduction approaches across a broader range of hazards, with specific reference to climate change. There are three main areas of focus i.

Capacity building for the Ministry of Environment and the Department of Environment to coordinate and mainstream climate change into their existing activities; ii. Strengthening existing knowledge and information accessibility on impact prediction and adaptation; iii. Awareness raising, advocacy and coordination to promote climate change adaptation into development activities. Capacity building included assisting the creation of a ‘climate change cell’ within the Department of Environment (DOE) to build government capacity for coordination and leadership on climate change issues.

The cell coordinates awareness raising, advocacy and mechanisms to promote climate change adaptation and risk reduction in development activities, as well as strengthening existing knowledge and information accessibility on impacts and adaptation to climate change. Mainstreaming climate change into development and national planning The Bangladesh government is integrating climate change into sectoral plans and national policies. The World Bank’s recommendations on the impacts of limate change have been incorporated into coastal zone management programs and adopted in the preparation of disaster preparedness plans and a new 25 year water sector plan. In agriculture, research programs have taken place in light of climate change information, particularly drought and saline tolerant rice varieties. Bangladesh’s interim poverty reduction strategy paper (I-PSRP) recognizes the direct link between poverty and vulnerability to natural hazards, and notes that the incidence of disasters is likely to increase rather than decrease as a result of global warming.

According to the National Water Management Plan (NWMP) (in 2001), the factors determining future water supply, including the impacts of sea level rise, which guides the implementation of the National Water Policy (NWP). Further, many of the NWP and NWMP priorities are synergistic with climate change adaptation, such as the recommendation in the NWP for early warming and flood proofing systems. Other environmental policies, including the National Environmental Management Plan (NEMAP), the National Land Use Policy, and the National Forest Policy, do not make specific reference to climate change.

Some initiatives usually taken and some are in underway for adaptation 1. Giving donations and raising after disaster. In Bangladesh, after any major disaster we went for relief activities, rehabilitation and medical care with local and foreign donations. Government and NGOs are involved in extensive activities after the disaster. Bangladesh has already earned a reputation for disaster management especially after the management of cyclone Sidr in 2007. 2. Raising homes in the flood prone areas. In the flood and cyclone hit areas people are building houses with higher heights. 3.

Building protecting walls and dams is important to save houses and croplands from floods and inundation. These are needed to avert erosion. 4. Need faster maturing crops (seeds). In this regards, we got some achievements. Now in our country, we can grow three crops in a year in the high agricultural lands. Research is underway in this regard by BRRI, IRRI and other private organizations and NGOs. 5. Need drought tolerant crops (seeds). Research is underway in this regard by BRRI, IRRI and other private organizations and NGOs. In some African nations, some successful plantation f drought tolerant crops (seeds) encourages us to grow in the north-western regions of Bangladesh. 6. We need saline tolerant crops (seeds) as the salinity in the southern region is increasing and it is swarming deeper inside. An Extensive research is underway in this regard by IRRI and other private organizations and NGOs for the southern region of Bangladesh. 7. Met office information should be communicated with all even farmers. Met office always tries to communicate the information through radio and television and also through print media.

But it should be more intensive. In this regard, Mobile communication can be used for disseminating information to the farmers. 8. Using rainwater in gardens and household use. It is not that popular in our country though government is trying to promote it. 9. Seed and food storage is needed for the food and seed security. Government is increasing its capacity to store food. Government is also trying to build capacity of the seed bank in Jessore. People also should play their role in this respect. 10. Flood and cyclone shelters.

Governments with its own fund and donors’ funds have built many shelters. Many more shelters will be built in future. 11. Raised wells and ponds in the flood and cyclone hit areas. 12. Raising latrines in every house because low level toilet facilities would contaminate water when flood strikes. People are coming forward for making safe and raised latrines. 13. Reforestation is important because trees are lifesavers. They help to regulate rainfalls, mitigate extremes of floods and droughts and also landslides.

In Bangladesh government department, NGOs and common people are planting trees. There is a campaign for tree plantation from all. 14. In some areas floating vegetable gardens are built on water bodies. Farmers can grow vegetables even during flood. It will be popular in future in many more areas. Conclusions and recommendations Climate change is not only an “environmental” concern but really a “development” concern for Bangladesh. This means that climate change as an issue must take center stage as a major developmental problem.

Bangladesh is particularly vulnerable to climate change in its coastal zone, covering about 30 per cent of the country. Here prospects of industrial development, based on its rich energy resources, will seriously be constrained by the increased occurrence of coastal storms, flooding and reduced fresh water availability. The study also analyzes impacts on water resources, agriculture, ecosystems and human health, concluding that in all these sectors, the country’s drive to development might be seriously restrained if no anticipatory actions are taken.

Ecosystems and biodiversity, as a key sector for sustainable development, merits particular attention and of all sectors vulnerable to climate change this may be the most vulnerable. This not only refers to a few itemized ecosystems or endangered species. This will result a loss of productivity as well, seriously challenging the country’s prospect for sustainable development. Cyclone shelters and improved warning systems are confirmed as effective tools against the increased risks of disasters. Bangladesh has already a good record in this respect, which merits to be strengthened where possible.

For water resources should aim to substantially reduce the risk of drainage congestion, erosion and drought, explicitly addressing the management of water resources both in the wet and in the dry season for domestic, industrial, irrigation, navigation, and ecosystem use. Reducing water demand may be needed and this requires an integrated approach to water resources planning and management that will also coordinate design, operation and maintenance of major infrastructure and embankments. In agriculture should aim at changing agricultural practices to improving water efficiency and crop diversification in the whole country.

The development and introduction of new varieties and corresponding dissemination measures are important and need to be facilitated by (inter)national research. Government and private sector should invest more money and resources in Research activities. Experience with new crops and agricultural practices have to be shared on the farm level. The impact of climate change on human health depends critically on the success to adapt to climate change in the other sectors. Of course, human health would be less vulnerable with an improved health care system, reliable drinking water supply and improved sanitation.

All kinds of climate change impacts should be accounted for in both design criteria and location. Selected development programs on the need and possibilities to include climate change considerations in their approach and the possible contribution they could have to anticipatory adaptations. Sometime physical interventions are generally in-effective and costly, whilst requiring maintenance arrangements and coordination of separate initiatives. More promising anticipatory adaptations are changes in behavioral patterns, human practices and international actions.

However, these type of adaptations meet serious institutional constraints and consequently should be carefully prepared and, if possible, integrated in existing structures and procedures. The main mechanisms to gradually overcome these constraints are coordination of climate change activities, (integrated) planning and information management. It is highly recommended that next steps to reduce Bangladesh’ vulnerability to impacts of climate change and sea level rise, concentrate on the adaptation mechanisms of planning, information management and international actions.

Here, the National Water Management Plan (NWMP) that is currently being developed and the Integrated Coastal Zone Management Plan (ICZMP) under design offer key opportunities. The following specific actions are recommended 1. Establish an operational structure to coordinate climate change activities in Bangladesh. The following steps could be considered. 2. Revive the Climate Change Committee and review their Terms of Reference. 3. Involve the CCC in the design of planning procedures and guidelines; the research agenda and activities; the awareness building program; and the preparation and support of Bangladesh’ international actions. . Establish an operational technical secretariat, to support the CCC. 5. Link the CCC activities to or establish communication with the national councils on water resources and environment. 6. Strengthen the existing structure and ongoing processes to develop and implement integrated water resources management. Participation on different levels and strengthening of local management organizations are essential parts of integrated planning. 7. Strengthen integrated coastal zone management, focusing on protection, land use and water management. 8.

Prepare practical guidelines to include climate change issues in procedures for planning and design, and explore the possibility and feasibility of Climate Change Impact Assessments. 9. Establish, manage and execute a coordinated research agenda on climate change impacts. 10. Develop and operate a shared climate change knowledge base 11. Develop a plan of action for awareness building, optimally using the platforms and avenues created by the BEMP and SEMP projects, explicitly involving the Ministry of Information, the FEJP, CBOs and NGOs. 12. Promote, structure and support international activities.

Two types of international activities have been identified (i) international debates on effects, mitigation and adaptation, and (ii) water sharing negotiations with neighboring countries. Bibliography 1. The European Parliament’s temporary committee note on climate change February 2008 (Ref. to contract IPACLIMIC2007-106) 2. DOE (Department of Environment, M. o. E. a. F. , Government of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh),, Addressing Climate Change in Bangladesh National Efforts”. 2006, 3. Huq, S. , Climate Change and Bangladesh. Science, 2001(294) p. 1617. 4. Rahman, A. nd M. Alam, Mainstreaming Adaptation to Climate Change in Least Developed Countries (LDCs) Bangladesh Country Case Study. IIED Working Paper, 2003(2). 5. UNDP (United National Development Programme), Country-in-focus Bangladesh. UNDP RCC web bulletin, 2007(2). 6. Huq, S. and J. M. Ayers, Critical list the 100 nations most vulnerable to climate change, in IIED Sustainable Development Opinion. 2007, International Institute of Environment and Development London. 7. WB, An investment framework for clean energy and development a progress report in DC2006-0012. 006, World Bank Washington DC. 8. Climate Change Cell, Who is doing What in Bangladesh Report on the First Meeting. 2006, Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme, Government of Bangladesh 9. Agrawala S, et al. , Development and Climate Change in Bangladesh Focus on Coastal Flooding and the Sundarbans 2003, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 10. IPCC, Summary for Policymakers, in Climate Change 2007 Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, M.

L. Parry, et al. , Editors. 2007, Cambridge University Press Cambridge. p. 1000 26. Bangladesh Department of Environment, D. Ongoing Projects. [cited 2008 11. 01. 2008]; Available from httpwww. doe-bd. orgprojects. html. 12. Agrawala, S. , et al. , Development and Climate Change in Bangladesh Focus on Coastal Flooding and the Sundarbans. 2003, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 13. UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change). [cited 22012008]; Available from httpunfccc. intparties_and_observersitems2704. php.