Pearl Harbor: Components, Causes, Events, Significance and Intelligence Failure

The Pearl Harbor incident of 7 December, 1941, was a very important episode in the history of international affairs. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor dragged the United States into the Second World War and it surely changed the trend of the war. So long United States remained aloof from the War due to its avowed policy of isolation from European affairs. But the Pearl Harbor crisis directly fell upon it and naturally, as retaliation, the United States waged war against Japan. Due to this event, the War which broke out in 3 September, 1939, took a Global shape.

Moreover, before the Pearl Harbor incident, it was in favor of the Axis powers. But the American involvement rapidly changed the tide and ultimately the United States and its Allis came out victorious. Tension between Japan and the United States It is a coordinal truth that the United States raised a strong protest against the Manchurian adventure of Japan and former also refused to accord official recognition to Manchukuo. The United States made it crystal clear that they would never diverge from their treaty rights and not recognize any change in China affected by unilateral action of Japan.

The Japanese Government, in turned also resented this attitude of the United States; resultantly the tension gradually evoked, and though the intensity rose from time to time, it began to mount at a steady base. It future reaches up the ladder in 1937 when Japan began her full scale invention in China. In short the Government of the United States which had all along stood for the principle of ‘Open Door’ involving equality of opportunity could hardly be accepted to view it complacency Japan’s attempt to close that door by an imperialistic attitude disguised under the schemes of ‘new order’ and ‘co-prosperity sphere’.

Thus when Japan began her full scale invention in 1937, American opinion branded Japan as a wonton aggressor against China. All though the United States refused to ratify the League of Nations due to some constitutional reasons, but it co-operated with the later in its efforts to restrain Japan and participated in Brussels conference of 1937, which was meant to minimize the difference between Japan and China. But the Japanese government totally repudiated the views of the Brussels conference and definitely announced that they would not, by means, tolerate any shorts of interference by third party regarding in the issue of China and Japan.

As soon as the Second World War broke out the positions of Britain, France and Holland on their extra colonial possessions in East Asia became weak. Hence, at that time, Japan grabbed the opportunity to builds its own hold in Eastern Asia. Japan sought to strengthen their positions through diplomatic preparations. In the mean time they had already joined Germany and Italy in the anti-communist impact. In the year 1940 Japan signed a treaty of military alliance with these two powers. According to this treaty, these powers were mutually independent to one another, in terms of both military and economic affairs.

The treaty further acknowledged that, in any one of these three countries were attacked by a power not yet involved in the European war or the Sino Japanese conflict; they would unitedly face the invader. Clearly, this treaty was a serious warning to the United States to remain in a neutral position. Another major diplomatic stamps led by Japan was their foreign minister, Matsouka, to Berlin in order to study the European situation. But actually the real purpose was to conclude an agreement with Russia. During his tour to Russia, Matsouka visited Moscow and entered into a neutrality pact with Soviet Union.

By this pact both the powers agreed to respect each other’s territorial integrity and to remain in a neutral position if either were attacked by a third power. Thus, with the finalization of all her diplomatic arrangement with Russia, Germany and Italy, Japan felt herself encouraged to push on her plans in the Far East. Due to all search diplomatic attempts made by Japan to impose their hegemony. On the Far East, the United States, resultantly, stiffen her attitude towards Japan. When Japan joined the Rome-Berlin Axis, then in the year 1940 United States imposed an embargo on the export of scrap-iron and petroleum to Japan.

But Washington refused to recognize the puppet government set up by Japan at Nan king in the year 1940 and instead extended financial credit to Chiang Kai-shek’s regime. But when the weak Vichy government of France gave permission to Japan for occupying Indo-China and to use its airfields, then in 1941 the United States captured Japanese goods and thus, trade with Japan was made more difficult and made the later very angry. At that time the United States was the only power, who lay across the path of their imperialistic designs.

That time Great Britain faced life and death struggle with Germany, and France and Netherlands were strongly dominated by Hitler. None of these powers were in the position to defend their colonial possession in East Asia. Hence the temptation to size them was very strong for Japan. But Japan faced only obstacle from the United States. So they determined to overcome from this obstacle. The government of Tojo sent a special envoy to the United States for a peaceful understanding settlement. But when the negotiation had just begun the Japanese dropped bombs on American naval base at Pearl Harbor on 7th December, 1941.

America suffered a massive loss for this incident. Similarly they bombed in Singapore, Guam and the strategic centers of the Philippines and announced war with the United States and Britain. On the following day the United States, Britain and the Netherlands East Indies declared war on Japan. The European war thus developed into global conflict. International effect – Success of Japan The Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbor precipitated the United States into active belligerency and this inaugurated the Pacific phase of the Second World War. The initial success of Japanese was phenomenal.

Simultaneously with their attack on Pearl Harbor the Japanese struck at the American base Guam and Wake and captured the islands. Next they took Hong Kong from the British and seized the capital of Sarawak, a British protectorate in Borneo. They sank two big British battleships, Prince of Wales and Repulse off the eastern coast of Malaya. Then they moved rapidly down the Malaya peninsula, slashing through impassable jungles, and received the unconditional surrender of Singapore with its impregnable naval base in the year of 1942. The Netherlands East Indies were attacked at various points.

British and American ships, as well as Australian troops were rushed to the help of the Dutch forces. But all these forces were scattered by the Japanese after a brief fighting. In the Philippines the local forces, helped by the Americans, offered a gallant resistance for about four months. However, all the resistance collapsed with the capture of island of Corregidor by the Japanese in May 1942. About this time, the Japanese had made themselves masters of Burma. Thailand aligned herself with the Japanese and, although theoretically independent, felt the heavy hand of her powerful ally.

In the North Pacific, Japan had established footholds in the Aleutian Islands and in the south west, they had seized a considerable portion of New Guinea and the Solomon Island. Thus, within six months after their attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese had wiped out the colonial possessions of the British and the Dutch in the far east and the south eastern Asia up to the boarders of India and had made themselves masters of the American outputs in the Western Pacific and the of the Philippines and American protégé. It was an amazing record of victory at that time.

Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere Japan had been demanding for sometime past of a ‘new order in East Asia’ as a sort of justification for her invasion of China. Japan conquered and brought under her control practically the whole of south eastern Asia. They expanded their conquest and declared their intention of setting up a ‘Greater Asia co-prosperity sphere’. Japanese recent success against the western powers made them enable to assume the role of liberators of the people of East Asia from the white man’s yoke.

They professed that their object was to eliminate the Anglo-American imperialism and to substitute in its place a self-sufficient economic system in which all the people would enjoy prosperity in common. The Greater East Asia was to be welded together into an economic whole in which Japan Manchukuo and parts of China would be the industrial centers and other countries, within the spheres, had to co-operate with them by providing raw materials. In this way, under Japanese direction, trade and commerce would flourish to the benefit of all the countries concerned.

In the areas which they liberated from foreign rule, the Japanese set up independent Governments, but took care to select such collaborators as would govern along the lines laid down by them. In the name of economic development, they rather exploited the occupied regions for their own benefit instead than that of the conquered peoples. They posed as liberators, but in fact, they wanted to remain as conquerors and exploiters and sought to disguise their intention by setting up a pattern of rule they had already oven in Manchuria and in occupied China. Causes of Japan’s Defeat Japan had begun well and achieved a series of astonishing success.

But the strain of carrying on a far flung war began to tell upon her. As a matter of fact, she did not possess the reserves of men and material to meet the counter-attack of the power which she had deliberately provoked. The United States with her enormous resources in men, money and material produced new ships, aero planes, guns and other arms and ammunitions of war in almost unlimited number and that with a rapidity which Japan could not anticipate. Hence in spite of the priority given to the war in Europe, is the use of American men and materials, the United States could quickly bring sufficient armed might to bear on the Japanese.

Besides, the continued resistance of China was a serious drain of Japan’s men and money. It virtually handicapped her war efforts in other quarters and gave the Allies the much needed berathing spell. The first major attack on Japanese positions in the Pacific was made by the United States in 1942. In that year, a concentration on of the Japanese shipping was met by a force of American Aircraft under the command General McArthur of the North East Coast of Australia in the Coral Sea. In a six-day battle, the Japanese were defeated and turned back.

Thereafter followed the naval battle of Midway in which the Japanese suffered heavy loss. This victory prevented the extension of Japanese power towards the South East Pacific. These were in the main defensive operations. But in August 1942, the United States took first step towards recovering the lost territories by an attempt to clear the Japanese forces out of the Solomon Island in South West Pacific. The Allied strategy was to capture the Japanese bases in that region and then to proceed North on the route to Tokyo.

By severe amphibious warfare, the Americans secured a foothold on Gaudal Cannel, a strong Japanese airbase in the Solomon’s. This was the beginning of the Island-hoping strategy by which the Japanese outputs were conquered and converted into Allied bases, and then used as springboards for further attacks and progress towards Japan. By the spring of 1944, the Gilbert and Marshall Islands were captured from the Japanese and these successes opened the way to Saipan and Tinian in the Marians. These advances were made at a heavy cost for Japanese, fortified in pill-boxes and protected by mines, greeted the invaders with intense cross-fires.

The advance through the Marians prepared the way for McArthur’s re-conquest of the Philippines. His landing on the island of Leyte was fiercely contested by the Japanese. The Japanese fleets, which sought to intercept the landing, suffered a disasters defeat in the battle for the control of the Leyte-Gulf in October 1944. This battle, known as the Second Battle of the Philippine Sea, shattered the moral power of Japan. Henceforth, the Japanese wave continued to recede. The Philippines fell in July 1945. At the same time, island-hoping of the Allies continued.

They stormed low Jima, one of the Bonnin Island and less than eight hundred miles from Tokyo, after a heavy aerial bombardment which lasted without intermission for two months. The next target was Okinawa, one of the islands in the Rqu kyu group, and a ‘door step’ of Japan. Here was fought one of the bloodiest battle of the war. The Japanese casualties were very heavy, but they made effective use of ‘suicide plans’ and hit from the air about two fifty enemy vessels of the classes including battleships and cruisers and took a heavy toll of American lives.

By July 1945, an Anglo-American squadron was able to sail along the Japanese coast and dropped shells of Honshu. At the same time, the fighting air ships, the B 29s, hurled death and destruction on the important cities of Japan which, thus, was rapidly nearing her doom. In July 1945, the representatives of the Allied powers (Great Britain, American, China and Russia) met in a conference at Potsdam and called upon the Japanese Government “to proclaim the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurance of good faith in such actions.

The alternative for Japan was prompt and utter destruction”. The Japanese ignored the ultimatum and continued the loosing fight. Thereupon, on August 6, the Americans dropped an Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima which wiped out more than half of the city – Hiroshima had ceased to exist. Three days after, i. e. on August 9, a second and more destructive Atomic Bombardment destroyed the city of Nagasaki, a ship building port and industrial center. On the following day, the Japanese Government sued the peace and Emperor Hirohito acquiesced in unconditional surrender on August 14, 1945. The Japanese dream of Empire suddenly vanished in the thin air” (Shankar). Some questions But some questioned remain to be unanswered. First, ? Secondly, why did America join the war against Japan? Was not an ultimatum sufficient for the purpose? Was the Pearl Harbor incident real reason for the American involvement in Second World War? It is stark reality that the Paris Peace Conference had failed to satisfy the colonial ambition of both Italy and Japan. The spoils of colonial expansion were shared by Britain, France and America (Clement, C. ).

Naturally it joined Italy and Germany and formed the Axis-Alliance for clearing a ‘New Order’. Soon it began to expand towards China and established the puppet government. It surely embitters its relations with America which too had some interests there. Moreover, America, had in the meantime occupied a vast area in the Pacific and Japan’s ambitions in the East was evidently against the American policy. For all these reasons, a confrontation was inevitable. But both of them remained passive onlookers at the first stage of the war. America, of course, had some sympathy for the Allies.

But as the Monroe-Doctrine prevented it from taking a part in the League of Nations and similarly discouraged to be involved it in the post-war European politics and the war of 1939 (Mowat, R. B). But it was against the Axis power, because it feared that democracy might face a crisis if these powers won the war. One juncture president Roosevelt even asked the ‘Dictators’ to assure that they would not commit any aggression against 25 nations ranging from Finland to Iran (Sen, A). But as the ‘phony war’ was ensuring the Axis victory in an electric speed, America became very much anxious about the future.

In order to help the Allies, it even changed its policy of ‘catch and carry’, and switched over to that of ‘lend and lease’. He even informed Mr. Churchill that he would be gradually provocative in spite of the avowed policy of neutrality. It is true that the Congress of America had so long kept in outside the European politics, because it was satisfied with the territorial settlement much in Europe (Tandon, M. P. ). But the rapid failure of the Allies to cope with the military brilliance of the Axis powers convinced America that its interference was an avoidable necessity.

Of course, Japan was guilty of an unprovoked attack on it. But when Japan felt that Italy was reaping the harvest and Germany was breaking up the Allied-empire like a castle of cards, it could not sit idly any more. On December 7, 1941, its aim for its suddenly attacked Pearl Harbor and, there, its war with America began on that day. It was surely a case of Japanese hypocrisies because it did it, “… while its diplomats were smilingly discussing minor difficulties in Washington” (Wells, H. G. ). The American fleet was idling and unprepared and Japan did not declare a war. Naturally, America answered in a language of arms.

Intelligence Crisis According to some historians, the Pearl Harbor affair was the outcome of an intelligence-failure on the part of America. Similarly, in spite of initial success, Japan pathetically lost the war mainly because of its failure in the intelligence operations. To begin with, the Pearl Harbor affair is regarded as the worst case of American military intelligence. First, for a long time, the relationship between the United States and Japan was fast-deteriorating, but the American naval intelligence did not even have the minimum amount of strategic or tactical speculation about it.

It simply thought that, Japan might attack Thailand at that time. As Philippines were the strong hold in the Pacific, the American intelligence apprehended that Japan might launch an attack on that island. In short, Pearl Harbor was out of American calculation of any probable Japanese aggression. Secondly, another problem was that America lacked Human intelligence on Japan. America had a few geisha girls on the payroll, but no agents in the Japanese Elite or military hierarchy. This is another reason for the American intelligence problems regarding any probable Japanese attack in the Harbor.

Thirdly, America came out successful in breaking the Japanese code, but what they were really intercepting was some diplomatic and espionage-information, nothing off the nature of Japanese military plans or war-targets. Japan also tactfully changed their codes some days before the Pearl Harbor affair and the American intelligence failed to cope with it. The American fleets stationed at the Harbor to protect it, were too weak to face the Japanese heavy naval power. These fleets were inferior in quality and, in such case, a combat with the Japanese navy would have been a mere suicidal attempt.

These fleets were neither capable of countering a air-attack nor a naval attack. Clearly, the American intelligence had least expectations for any attack on the Pearl Harbor. On Japan’s part, similarly, there were some intelligence failures. The Japanese very tactfully attacked Pearl Harbor and it was a grand success for the former. But due to lack of proper intelligence service, it could not keep up the trend of its initial victory. First, its intelligence actually underestimated the American potentiality in the economic and military affairs.

Economically, America was the richest country of the world and its industrial development was enough to supply the war materials which were enough to bring Japan under control. Moreover, as war started, America stopped all exports to Japan, particularly iron and steel, which materially affected Japan’s war preparations. Thus, it was a dismal failure of Japanese intelligence. Secondly, the Japanese also failed to hit the strategic targets of America. Particularly oil-depots, large ammunitions depots etc remained outside the Japanese military target.

Japanese intelligence actually failed to supply its air force the correct information regarding the important places which, militarily were to be regarded as of basic importance for America. Finally, another fatal flaw of the Japanese intelligence service was that it failed to supply the correct information to the military department about the public moral which was galvanized during the war. The people so long remained isolated from European affairs and perhaps, the Japanese intelligence thought that such peace-loving people could hardly fight against such a military debacle.

But after the initial shock of Pearl Harbor, both the military and the ordinary people united like a solid phalanx which, ultimately brought out American victory over Japan. Was it really an Intelligence Failure? But one point is yet to be discussed with all seriousness. Was the Pearl harbor-crisis an outcome of the failure of American Intelligence Service? As Clyde P. H. observes, “Responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster presents a complex problem with which historians will wrestle for years to come (Clyde, 614). It is really a very complex question on which the historians have quarreled with one another.

It is true that the growing power of Hitler convinced the Americans that their own security was linked up with the war fortunes of the Allied powers and that Hitler, in full of control of European continent, would precede to the conquest of America. As Keswani K. B. points out, “On September 16, 1940, Congress passed the Compulsory Military Service and Training Law whereby conscription was introduced for the first time in the history of the country” (Saha). Thus, it is evident that, America was preparing for the impending war. But, surely, it was seeking for an excuse.

When Japan, the Asiatic ally of Hitler, bombards Pearl Harbor, America exactly found an opportunity to join the war. Whether it was a failure of intelligence service or not, is obviously a crucial question. As Clyde points out, by July 1946, there had already been eight official investigations – yet it seemed that the full story had not been revealed. The earliest investigation, made by the then secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox and Associate Supreme Court Justice, Owen Roberts, laid the major responsibility on the Pearl Harbor commanders, Admiral Husband, S. Kimmel and General Walter C.

Short. But later investigations, including that of a joint Congressional Committee, laid less blame on the commanders and more upon departments and personalities in the Government at Washington. Whatever the ultimate verdict of history may be, the Pearl Harbor attack was of tremendous importance not merely as a military catastrophe, but also in its political and intelligence implications. Most probably, it was not a matter of failure in the intelligence service. There are both immediate and long range reasons suggesting that the attack should have been anticipated.

J. C. Grew, the American Ambassador at Japan, had warned the State Department, eleven months in advance that if war came, Japan might open hostilities with an attack on Pearl Harbor. From September onwards, intercepted Japanese messages revealed a sharp interest in the location of ships at Pearl Harbor. Grew had also given repeated warning that the Japanese might depend on surprise attack at several points – particularly at Pearl Harbor. Now, it is a question, why did the American Government not take sufficient measures in order to prevent such a naval onslaught.

It is to be remembered that the casualties were as staggering as the damage of the fleet – 2343 dead, 1272 wounded and 960 missing. At least nineteen ships were totally wrecked by the Japanese attack. The reason of this catastrophe is perhaps not the failure of the intelligence service – it was probably an outcome of a deliberate policy of American Government. Conclusion History has not as yet uncovered the full explanation of Pearl Episode. So theories and hypothesis were abundant. Most probably, America was awaiting an opportunity to join the war.

When the Pearl Harbor incident took place, President Roosevelt took the opportunity to convince the Congress and the American people that a war with Japan was inevitable. So, some historians like Clyde, believed that it was planned and plotted by the American Government in order to find out a scope to join the war. In this way, the President surmounted the obstacle raised by the Monroe Doctrine in joining the European politics and discarding the doctrine of isolation from international affairs.

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Pearl Harbor: A Day of Infamy By Chris Smith World War II

Pearl Harbor: A Day of Infamy By Chris Smith World War II altered the face of American history forever. This being a war the United States was greatly against and never wanted to enter, They were thrust into the war by a brutal attack from the Japanese on a Navel base located in the pacific ocean on the island Oahu in what is called Pearl Harbor. This attack on the base was a direct attack against the United States and gave America no choice but to enter the war they were originally so opposed to, or were they? Did the American government know that the Japanese were planning an attack?

Did the United States allow the Japanese kill and wound several thousand Americans and sink and damage several naval ships all for a reason to enter a war our President longed to be a part of? Those questions along with several more have been raised by authors and thinkers throughout history. These questions along with several more will be examined in depth throughout this writing. The thesis of this paper is as follows, “On December 7, 1941 The United States of America changed forever with Japan’s surprise attacks on the U. S.

Navel base in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. These attacks thrust the United States into the middle of the Second World War and raised many questions and conspiracies pertaining to prior knowledge of the attacks and the plans that the Japanese executed. ” First, the anticipation of war will be discussed and the events leading to attack. Secondly, the process that the Japanese went through will be discussed, from the year of planning to the secretive launch of their “striking force” also their already obvious aggression displayed by the invasion of China.

Another crucial piece to this puzzle is the Tripartite pact signed by Japan to make them apart of the “Axis powers”. Also the Japanese fleet and how they were utilized and coordinated in this attack will play a vital part in this description of this devastating attack. Finally the question will be addressed of whether we were aware of the attacks in advance and discuss the conspiracy theories surrounding this hot button issue in World War II history. Tensions between Japan and the United States increased greatly at the start of the military oriented Showa era, as Japanese nationalists and military leaders used escalating influence over government policy, accepting the creation of a Greater East Asia alliance as part of Japan’s alleged “divine right” to unify all of Asia under Emperor Showa’s rule, threatening the already-established American, French, British, and Dutch colonies located in Asia. ”[i] Throughout the 1930s, Japan’s increasing expansion policies got them into conflicts with its neighbors, Russia and China[ii] .

In March of 1933, Japan removed itself from the League of Nations because of international displease for its desire to conquer Manchuria and for their plans to establish the Manchukuo puppet government. On January 15, 1936, Japan also removed representatives from the Second London Naval Disarmament Conference[iii] because the United States and Great Britain did not want to grant the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) parity with their navies. [iv] A second war between the Japanese and Chinese started with the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in July 1937[v].

Japan’s attack on China was looked down upon by the United States and the majority of the members of the League of Nations including Britain, France, Australia, and the Netherlands. The crimes of the Japanese during the conflict such as the Rape of Nanking[vi], definitely made relations with the rest of the world very strained. These states had several interests, as well as formal colonies, in the East and Southeast Asia. Japan’s new power and its urge to use it raised great concerns, which threatened the control they had in Asia.

In July of 1939, the United States got rid of its 1911 commercial treaty with Japan, but this effort failed to stop Japan from continuing the war in China, or from signing the Tripartite Pact in 1940 with Hitler’s Germany and Italy, officially forming the Axis Powers. Japan took full advantage of Germany’s war in Europe to better its progress in the Far East. The Tripartite Pact promised each of the nations that had signed would have assistance if attacked by any country then considered neutral. This stipulation was directed at the United States, and gave Japan more power on the political stage.

The Tripartite Pact now posed a great threat to the United States on both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. Hitler and Mussolini threatening on the Atlantic Ocean, and the Japanese on the Pacific Ocean. The Roosevelt administration felt the American lifestyle would be threatened if Europe and the Far East were to come under control of a dictatorship. Roosevelt pledged to help the British and the Chinese; he loaned both money and materials to both countries and promised that America aid would be enough to promise their survival of war. Giving this aid would start to move the United States from a neutral country to a country preparing for war.

On October 8, 1940, Admiral James O. Richardson, who was the commander of the Pacific Fleet, forced a confrontation with President Roosevelt, resending his messages from previous transmissions to Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Harold R. Stark and to Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, that Pearl Harbor was the be best place for his ships to be located. Roosevelt told Richardson that having that fleet in Pearl Harbor was a “restraining influence” on the Japanese. Richardson asked the president if the United States was going to war. [vii] In Richardson’s retelling of the account the president responded: At least as early as October 8, 1940, President Roosevelt believed that affairs had reached such a state that the United States would be come involved in a war with Japan. … ‘that if the Japanese attacked Thailand, or the Kra Peninsula, or the Dutch East Indies we would not enter the war, that if they even attacked the Philippines he doubted whether we would enter the war, but that they (the Japanese) could not always avoid making mistakes and that as the war continued and that area of operations expanded sooner of later they would make a mistake and we would enter the war. … “. [viii] In 1940, Japanese troops moved into northern Indochina. The invasion of Indochina, along with the Tripartite Pact, their war in China, increasing troops, and Japan’s leaving the League of Nations made the U. S. embargo metal that was being shipped to Japan and to tighten down its foreign policy actions towards the Japanese and shut down the Panama Canal to Japanese ships. In 1941, Japanese troops invaded southern Indochina.

On July 26 1941 the United States answered by freezing most Japanese assets in the United States and, then on August 1 1941, placed embargos on all of the oil and gas exports to Japan. Oil was the most important resource imported to Japan; at the time more than 80 percent of Japan’s oil imports came from the United States. To make sure they had oil, and several other vital resources, the Japanese had long been looking for other places for their supplies, specifically in the Dutch East Indies.

The Navy was sure any plan of action to seize the Dutch East Indies would bring the United States into the war and were very skeptical when it came time to agree with the other factions’ plans for the invasion. The complete United States oil embargo changed to the naval view to support the expansion toward support for the invasion of the Dutch East Indies and capture of all of the oil fields there. After the embargoes and the freezing of all assets, the Ambassador of Japan in Washington and the secretary of State Cordell Hull had multiple meetings to try and find a solution to the Japanese-American problems.

No solution could be found because of three major problems which were Japan’s alliance to Germany and Italy through the Tripartite Pact; Japan wanted total control and responsibility for Southeast Asia; and Japan refused to leave China. Feeling the strain from the U. S. embargoes, Japan developed a sense of urgency, they either had to agree to Washington’s demands and return to normal trade, or use force to gain access to resources that were available throughout the Pacific.

Deciding that agreeing to Washington’s demands was unacceptable The Japanese decided to prepare for war with the United States, and seeing the opportunity of the forward basing of the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, the Japanese began to plan in early 1941 for an attack on Pearl Harbor. For the next several months, planning a simultaneous attack on Pearl Harbor and invasion of British and Dutch colonies in the South Pacific occupied most of the Japanese’ time and attention.

The Pearl Harbor attack planning came from the Japanese predicting that the United States would be drawn into the war after the Japanese attacked Malaya and Singapore. The intent of a strike on Pearl Harbor was to negate the American navy in the Pacific, in turn removing it from dictating operations against American, British, and Dutch colonies in the South Pacific. Planning in the beginning had seen a battle between the two powers would take place in Japanese waters after the United States Navel Fleet traveled across the Pacific Ocean, which would come under attack by submarines and other forces all the way across.

The United States Fleet would be beaten in a climactic battle. A surprise attack presented a difficult problem for two major reasons. First, the United States Pacific Fleet was a major force, and they would not be a pushover to defeat or sneak up on. Second, for an air attack, Pearl Harbor’s shallow waters made the use of standard air-dropped torpedoes useless. On the bright side, the isolation of the island of Hawaii meant that a surprise attack could not be stopped or countered quickly by forces stationed in the continental United States.

A lot of Japan’s naval officers were very impressed with the British Operation: Judgement, where twenty one old and outdated Fairey Swordfish crippled half of the Regia Marina. Admiral Yamamoto went as far as sending a delegation to Italy, which decided that a version of Cunningham’s strike on a much larger scale could force the United States Pacific Fleet to have to return to bases in California, which would give the Japanese time to put a “barrier” defense in place to defend the Japanese control of the Dutch East Indies.

The delegation returned from Italy with information on how the Cunningham engineers devised shallow-running torpedoes. Japan’s navel planners were without a doubt influenced by Admiral Togo’s surprise attack that was executed on the Pacific Fleet of Russia at Port Arthur in 1905, and also they were influenced by U. S. Admiral Harry Yarnell’s work in the 1932 joint Army-Navy exercises, which was used to simulate an invasion of the island of Hawaii. Yarnell, as the leader of the force that was attacking the island, placed his aircraft carriers northwest f Oahu and simulated an air attack. The umpires of the exercises noted that Yarnell’s aircraft were able to impose serious “damage” on the defending team, who for 24 hours after the attack were not able to find his team. In a letter that was written on January 7, 1941 Yamamoto finally delivered a somewhat rough draft of his plan to Koshiro Oikawa, then Navy Minister, who he also asked that he be made Commander in Chief of the air fleet to carry out the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.

A couple of weeks later in another letter, this time sent to Takijiro Onishi, chief of staff of the Eleventh Air Fleet, Yamamoto asked Onishi to study the actual ability successfully carrying out an attack against the American base. After speaking with Kosei Maeda originally, an expert on aerial torpedo warfare, and being told that harbor’s shallow waters made an attack of this nature very close to impossible; Onsihi then sought the advice of Commander and planner Minoru Genda.

Once Genda studied the original plan issued by Yamamoto, Genda said: “the plan is difficult but not impossible”. During the next couple weeks, Genda made some changes to Yamamoto’s rough draft of the attack, stressing the importance of the attack being executed early in the morning and in complete secrecy, using an aircraft carrier fleet and many different types of bombing. [ix]

Although bombing the United States Pacific Fleet while they were anchored in Pearl Harbor would be a surprise, it also had two large flaws: The ships that would be targeted would be sunk or damaged in the shallow water waters of the harbor, which would mean that they could possibly be salvaged and possibly returned to duty (as six of the eight battleships eventually were); and most of the crews would be able to live through the attack, since the majority would be on leave which means they would be on shore or that most could be easily rescued from the harbor after the attack took place.

Despite these concerns, Yamamoto and Genda pressed ahead. By April of 1941, the plan to attack Pearl Harbor began to be referred to as Operation Z, named after the famous Z signal given by Admiral Togo at Tsushima. Throughout the summer of 1941 leading up to the attack, pilots were training in secret near Kagoshima City on the Japanese island of Kyushu. Genda chose this location because the geography and infrastructure of Kagoshima City presented almost all of the same problems bombers would have to overcome during the attack on Pearl Harbor.

In training, each flight crew navigated over the 5000-foot mountain behind Kagoshima City and dropped into the city, maneuvering around buildings before descending to an altitude of 25 feet at the oceans edge. Bombardiers dropped torpedoes at some 300 yards away. The skimming of the water did not fix the problem of torpedoes hitting the ocean floor in the shallow waters of Pearl Harbor. Japanese engineers developed modifications allowing successful shallow water drops. The engineers work turned out to be a heavily modified version of theType 91 torpedo, which turned out to inflict most of the damage to ships during the attack.

Japanese weapon engineers also developed special armor-piercing bombs with fitted fins and release shackles to 14 and 16 inch naval shells. These were able to pierce the more lightly armored decks of the older battleships still in service. On November 26, 1941, a Japanese Striking Force of six aircraft carriers (Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, Hiryu, Shokaku, and Zuikaku) left Japan heading to a predetermined position that was northwest of Hawaii, with the intention to launch its planes to execute the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.

A total of 408 aircraft were supposed to be used in the attack: 360 for the two attack waves, 48 on defensive combat air patrol (CAP), including nine fighters that would serve double duty on CAP and the first attack wave. The first wave was going to be the major attack, with the second wave serving as a way to finish whatever objectives remained to be completed. The first wave featured the majority of the weapons to attack capital ships; mainly the specially adapted Type 91 aerial torpedoes that we discussed earlier. x] The attack crews were told to pick the highest value targets such as battleships and aircraft carriers or, if they were not available, any other high profile ships like cruisers and destroyers. The dive bombers were ordered to attack ground targets. Fighter pilots were told to strafe and destroy as many grounded aircraft as possible to make sure they did not get into the air to attack the bombers, specifically during the first wave. When the planes fuel got low they were ordered to return to the aircraft carriers to refuel, then immediately return to the attack.

Fighters were ordered to serve CAP duties when needed, especially over the US airfields where the United States planes were grounded. Before the attack began, two aircrafts were launched from cruisers were sent to scout and gain information over Oahu and report on the composition of the fleet and their exact location. Another four planes scouted the area between the Japanese carrier force in order to prevent the task force from being caught by a surprise counterattack. [xi] The attack on Pearl Harbor actually took place before any formal declaration of war was made by Japan, but it was not the Admiral’s intention to do this.

He originally stated that the attack should not take place until at least thirty minutes after Japan had formally notified the United States that negotiations for peace had come to a close. [xii] The Japanese tried to play by the rules of war while still making the attack a surprise, but the attack began before the notice could be delivered and translated. Japan sent the 5,000-word declairation of war (commonly called the “14-Part Message”) in two sections to the Japanese Embassy in Washington, but translating the message took too long for it to be delivered in time. In fact, U. S. code breakers had already deciphered and translated most of the message hours before he was scheduled to deliver it. ). The final part of the “14 Part Message” is what some call the actual declaration of war. While it did not declare war nor did it end diplomatic relations, it was viewed by a large number of senior U. S government officials as a very strong indication that negotiations were likely done and that war was going to erupt at any moment.

A declaration of war from Japan was printed on the front page of Japan’s newspapers in the evening edition of December 8, but it was not delivered to the United States government until the day after the attack had already taken place. “The first attack wave consisted of 183 planes that were launched north of Oahu, led by Commander Mitsuo Fuchida. It included: ? 1st Group (targets: battleships and aircraft carriers) ? 50 Nakajima B5N Kate bombers armed with 800 kg (1760 lb) armor piercing bombs, organized in four sections ? 40 B5N bombers armed with Type 91 torpedoes, also in four sections ? nd Group – (targets: Ford Island and Wheeler Field) ? 54 Aichi D3A Val dive bombers armed with 550 lb (249 kg) general purpose bombs ? 3rd Group – (targets: aircraft at Ford Island, Hickam Field, Wheeler Field, Barber’s Point, Kaneohe) ? 45 Mitsubishi A6M Zeke fighters for air control and strafing ? Six planes failed to launch due to technical difficulties. ”[xiii] “The second wave was 171 planes: 54 B5Ns, 81 D3As, and 36 A6Ms, led by Lieutenant Shigekazu Shimazaki. Four of the planes failed to launch because of technical difficulties.

This wave and its targets comprised: ? 1st Group – 54 B5Ns armed with 550 lb (249 kg) and 132 lb (60 kg) general purpose bombs ? 27 B5Ns – aircraft and hangars on Kaneohe, Ford Island, and Barbers Point ? 27 B5Ns – hangars and aircraft on Hickam Field ? 2nd Group (targets: aircraft carriers and cruisers) ? 81 D3As armed with 550 lb (249 kg) general purpose bombs, in four sections ? 3rd Group – (targets: aircraft at Ford Island, Hickam Field, Wheeler Field, Barber’s Point, Kaneohe) ? 36 A6Ms for defense and strafing”[xiv] The United States suffered great losses; all eight U. S. Navy battleships were damaged, with four being sunk. Of the eight damaged six were raised, repaired and returned to service later in the war. The Japanese also sank or damaged three cruisers, three destroyers, an anti-aircraft training ship, and one minelayer. 188 U. S. aircraft were destroyed; 2,402 Americans were killed and 1,282 wounded. The power station, shipyard, maintenance, and fuel and torpedo storage facilities, as well as the submarine piers and headquarters building (also home of the intelligence section) were not attacked. [xv] “Japanese losses were light: 29 aircraft and five midget submarines lost, and 65 servicemen killed or wounded. One Japanese sailor was captured. ”[xvi] “After the attack, 15 Medals of Honor, 51 Navy Crosses, 53 Silver Stars, four Navy and Marine Corps Medals, one Distinguished Flying Cross, four Distinguished Service Crosses, one Distinguished Service Medal, and three Bronze Star Medals were awarded to the American military men who served in combat at Pearl Harbor. [xvii] Also, a special award, the Pearl Harbor Commemorative Medal, was later made and given to all military veterans of the attack. The day following the attack, Roosevelt gave his now famous Infamy Speech to a Joint Session of Congress, calling for a declaration of war on the Empire of Japan. Congress granted this request in less than an hour. On December 11 1941 Germany and Italy, honoring the Tripartite Pact, declared war on the United States. The United States Congress issued a declaration of war later the same day against Germany and Italy.

Britain declared war on the Japanese some nine hours before the United States did, mostly because of the Japanese attacks on Malaya, Singapore and Hong Kong, and also due to the promise that Winston Churchill made to declare war “within the hour” if the Japanese executed an attack against the United States. The attack was a huge shock to the Allies in the Pacific Theater. More losses made the setback even more alarming. Japan attacked the Philippines just a few short hours later but because of the time difference, it was December 8 in the Philippines.

Just a few days after the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, the Prince of Wales and Repulse, which were two British ships, were sunk off the coast of Malaya, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill later said: “In all the war I never received a more direct shock. As I turned and twisted in bed the full horror of the news sank in upon me. There were no British or American capital ships in the Indian Ocean or the Pacific except the American survivors of Pearl Harbor who were hastening back to California.

Over this vast expanse of waters Japan was supreme and we everywhere were weak and naked”. [xviii] During the rest of the war, Pearl Harbor was very often used with American propaganda to promote the war. Another huge reaction by America because of the attacks on Pearl Harbor was that most of the Japanese American residents and citizens were relocated to Japanese-American internment camps. Just a few short hours after the attack, hundreds of Japanese American leaders were arrested and brought to high-security camps that like Sand Island and Kilauea Military Camp located in Hawaii.

Later, over 110,000 Japanese Americans, this includes United States citizens, were yanked from their homes and transferred to these high security internment camps in California, Idaho, Utah, Arizona, Wyoming, Colorado, and Arkansas. [xix] As was discussed previously discussed, was America aware of the plans of the attack? Several theorists don’t accept the view that Pearl Harbor was a complete surprise and these theorists always make clear that Roosevelt wanted, though did not say so officially, the U. S. to play a part in the war against Germany.

A basic grip of the political situation of 1941 displays reasonable evidence Roosevelt invited, allowed, or even knew of the Pearl Harbor attack. Military historian and novelist Thomas Fleming poses the argument that President Roosevelt himself, had wished that Germany or Japan would make the first blow, but did not expect the United States to be hit as hard as it was in the attack on Pearl Harbor. [xx] In closing I feel that the United States was aware of this devastating attack and that my thesis of “On December 7, 1941 The United States of America changed forever with Japan’s surprise attacks on the U.

S. Navel base in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. These attacks thrust the United States into the middle of the Second World War and raised many questions and conspiracies pertaining to prior knowledge of the attacks and the plans that the Japanese executed. ” was well covered through out duration of this research. ———————– [i] The effort to establish the Imperial Way (kodo) had begun with the Second Sino-Japanese War (called sei???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????? sen, or “holy war”, by Japan). Bix, Herbert, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, 2001, p. 326-327. [ii] Japan had fought the First Sino-Japanese War with China in 1894-95 and the Russo-Japanese War with Russia in 1904-05; Japan’s imperialist ambitions had a hand in precipitating both conflicts. [iii] The Second London Naval Disarmament Conference opened in London, United Kingdom on 9 December 1935. It resulted in the Second London Naval Treaty which was signed on 25 March 1936. [iv] Lester H. Brune and Richard Dean Burns, Chronological History of U.

S. Foreign Relations: 1932-1988, 2003, p. 504. [v] The Marco Polo Bridge Incident was a battle between the Republic of China’s National Revolutionary Army and the Imperial Japanese Army, often used as the marker for the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) [vi] The Rape of Nanking was a mass murder, and war rape that occurred during the six-week period following the Japanese capture of the city of Nanking, the former capital of the Republic of China, on December 13, 1937 during the Second Sino-Japanese War. vii] Joint Congressional Hearings on the Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 40, Page 506, “Conclusions Restated With Supporting Evidence” [viii] Richardson, “On the Treadmill”, pp. 425, 434. And as recounted in Baker, “Human Smoke”, p. 239 [ix] Prange, Gordon, At Dawn We Slept, Penguin Books, p. 25-27 [x] Peattie, Mark R. (2001), Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Air Power, 1909–1941, Naval Institute Press [xi] Tony DiGiulian. “Order of Battle – Pearl Harbor – December 7, 1941”. Navweaps. com. Retrieved 2012-02-17. [xii] Calvocoressi et al. , The Penguin History of the Second World War, p. 52 [xiii] Prange. p. 102 [xiv] Prange. p. 102 [xv] “Full Pearl Harbor casualty list”. Usswestvirginia. org. Retrieved 2012-02-17. [xvi] “Full Pearl Harbor casualty list”. Usswestvirginia. org. Retrieved 2012-02-17. [xvii] Prange. p. 454 [xviii]  Churchill, Winston; Martin Gilbert (2001), “December 1941”, The Churchill War Papers: The Ever-Widening War, Volume 3: 1941, London, New York: W. W. Norton, p 1593–1594, [xix] Prange. p. 632 [xx]  Fleming, Thomas (2001-06-10). “Pearl Harbor Hype”. History News Network. Retrieved 2012-02-21. Bibliography: Primary:

Burtness, Paul, and Warren Ober. “President Roosevelt, Admiral Stark, and the Unsent Warning to Pearl Harbor: A Research Note.. ” Australian Journal of Politics & History;. 57. no. 4 (2011): 580-88. http://web. ebscohost. com. proxy. ohiolink. edu:9099/ehost/detail? vid=4&hid=113&sid=e2c20699-8560-46bb-9e81-600cf903e4af@sessionmgr111&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ==, Retrieved 2012-02-21 “Attack At Pearl Harbor, 1941, – the Japanese View” EyeWitness to History, www. eyewitnesstohistory. com (2001). Retrieved 2012-03-01 Harriet Moore, (U. S. Army Nurse Corps 2nd Lt. , interview by Erica Warren, “Army nurse recalls attack on Pearl Harbor,” North County Times, December 7, 2003, January 31, 2012, http://www. nctimes. com/news/local/article_85b4ea10-e9c2-5af7-8e74-deddc726aa5b. html. Conn, Stetson; Fairchild, Byron; Engelman, Rose C. (2000), “7 – The Attack on Pearl Harbor”, Guarding the United States and Its Outposts, Washington D. C. : Center of Military History United States Army “Damage to United States Naval Forces and Installations as a Result of the Attack”, Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Washington D.

C. : United States Government Printing Office, 1946, retrieved 2012-02-08 US Navy Report of Japanese Raid on Pearl Harbor, United States National Archives, Modern Military Branch, 1942 Churchill, Winston; Martin Gilbert (2001), “December 1941”, The Churchill War Papers: The Ever-Widening War, Volume 3: 1941, London, New York: W. W. Norton, p 1593–1594, Joint Congressional Hearings on the Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 40, Page 506, “Conclusions Restated With Supporting Evidence” Secondary Bix, Herbert, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, 2001, p. 326-327. Prange, Gordon.

At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1981. Fleming, Thomas (2001-06-10). “Pearl Harbor Hype”. History News Network. Retrieved 2012-02-21. Richardson, “On the Treadmill”, pp. 425, 434. And as recounted in Baker, “Human Smoke” Peattie, Mark R. (2001), Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Air Power, 1909–1941, Naval Institute Press Calvocoressi et al. , The Penguin History of the Second World War, p. 952 Tony DiGiulian. “Order of Battle – Pearl Harbor – December 7, 1941”. Navweaps. com. Retrieved 2012-02-17.

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911 and Pearl Harbor

Two Dark Days Pearl Harbor changed the lives of Americans; decades later 9/11 affected a new generation of Americans. Comparing Pearl Harbor and 9/11, written by Fred L. Borch points out inaccuracies of the comparisons that numerous individuals have made between 9/11 and Pearl Harbor. The author gives a unique perspective that has partial inaccuracies under the topics; whether or not 9/11 was an intelligence failure, was American unprepared, and military responsibilities. The author uses various facts and statics to support his cause, some creditable, some not.

December 7, 1941 and September 11, 2001 are two of the darkest days in American History essay writer dubai. The attack on Pearl Harbor began at 7:55 a. m. when 353 Japanese aircrafts dropped bombs on the U. S pacific fleets (Borch 846). With 2, 403 dead, 1,178 wounded, and eight battle ships sunk or damaged and 165 aircraft destroyed, the Japanese had succeeded on their attack. With their success the Japanese only lost a few ships and aircraft, and only 185 were killed or wounded. On December 16, 1941 the joint congressional committee declared that Admural E. Kimmel and Lieutenant general Walter c. hort failed to prepare Americans at Pearl Harbor for the attack of the Japanese. On September 11, 2001 most of us were sitting in class while 19 members of Al Quida boarded four commercial airlines, intending to take over and crash all four planes into traditional American landscapes. The first plane to crash, crashed into the north tower of the world trade center. Shortly after a second plane crashed into the south tower of the world trade center. An hour later a third plane struck the pentagon, destroying a portion of the building (Borch 847). The fourth plane crashed into a ruel area of southeast Pittsburgh (Borch 847).

By 12:00 p. m. there were 2,823 killed in Manhattan and 189 in Washington, D. C. Days after the attack the U. s government identified Osama bin laden and his Al Queda as responsible for the attacks. All 19 Al queda high jackers had entered the United States legally. They had student and tourist visas’. They tried to blend into American life; they took flying training at civilian pilot schools (Borch 847). This helped them pilot the planes after they killed commercial pilots. As we continue to blame bin laden for the attacks, he has never claimed responsibility for it, but has released video tapes praising the 9/11 high jackers.

He has also threatened more attacks against America. The author raises the question “was intelligence failure the reason for these attacks. He states that they knew a war with Japan was highly likely. This fact was backed up by a message received saying “this dispatch is to be considered a warning, negotiation with Japan…. have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected with the next few days. ” Also after taking command Kimmel and Short were informed that if an attack occurred it would most likely be an air bombing attack.

Borch states that if the Japanese diplomatic messages would have been decrypted, it would have shown there was going to be an attack occurring on December 7, 1941. He also says there was a lack of strategic intelligence. There was a 75 minute tactical warning, when the sinking of Ward, at the mouth of the harbor. Borch said could have made a difference, if Kimmel and Short would have acted upon that warning. Also at 7:02 a. m. radar detected a large number of aircraft approaching Oahu. Both of these warnings were missed.

He says that Kimmel and his staff were still arguing about the significance of the wards attack, when the first bombs were dropped on Oahu. As for 9/11 they could have seen it coming because of the previous attacks of the world trade center in 1993, the bombing of the USS Cole in Yemen, in 2000, and other events. The federal Bureau of investigation and others knew there was going to be an attack on an U. S target. But says no information had been collected that could directly point to the Al Queda attacking the world trade center. Both events were said to have no information that existed that a terrorist attack was about to happen.

The closest thing that could have helped was the message sent to Pearl Harbor, which was not decrypted. And although there was no imminent proof of both attacks, Kimmel and Short had more information available to them than those of 9/11. With 9/11 no one knew the terrorist themselves learned how to pilot a commercial aircraft there was no tactical warning of the Al Queda attacking. When the first plane crashed into the world trade center, many thought it was an accident. No one knew that terrorist had taken over American and United Airline flights until their suicide mission was too far along to stop (Borch 851).

To me there are some difficulties with some of the evidence the author uses, mainly because he uses his opinions. For instance when he says that no one had any evidence about 9/11, false! The 9/11 commission report is the official report of the events leading up to the September 11, 2001 attacks. One of the things the commission reported states is that they had evidence that several of the 9/11 hijackers passed through Iran, and indicates that officials in Iran did not place entry stamps in their passports. This and other evidence told there was going to be an attack on the United States.

So we did have the intelligence to prevent it, we just didn’t have to funding or resources. Borch says that we couldn’t have collected more information about the attacks and we didn’t have that much information in the first place. But with my prior knowledge and after reading his opinion, it raises the question on how much did they really know? I mean just a few days after the attack they already had suspects! This brings my attention to how secretive the government really is. Granted, they can’t release a lot of information in the fact that half America would go into panic.

But as for 9/11 being intelligence failure I would have to disagree. True we didn’t know what day it would happen or how. But with the evidence we did have and the conspiracies, we could have better prepared for it. On the other hand we has Americans have a certain way we do things, and the American way is we can’t do anything till something happens. This brings up the authors next topic which is “was American unprepared? ” Borch states that if Kimmel and Short could have prepared their troops better for this kind of attack.

And in turn, might have prevented the attack from happening. Now the unpreparedness regarding 9/11 concerns only what could have been done to prevent a terrorist attack. The unpreparedness of Pearl Harbor existed because of Kimmel and Short. Some reasons would be they were not conducting long-range reconnaissance with the ships and aircrafts, had not integrated their command and control structures, failed to take passive defensive measures, and last has not instilled in their commands a sense of urgency or realization that war was upon them (Borch 855).

Kimmel had forgotten to order the placement of torpedo netting around the ships and short rejected the use of barrage balloons over the harbor. They say both these measures would have decreased the damage caused by the Japanese. What we could have done to prevent 9/11 was to increase security at U. s airports, place “sky marshals” on all airline flights, train pilots and aircrews to resist rather than cooperate with high jackers and last infiltrate terrorist cells (Botch 856). Borch makes a very bold argument here.

I do agree with him and in what they could have done to prevented these events from happening. But as I said before we are Americans’ and our way is we can’t do anything till something happens. Now, Borch says that attack on Pearl Harbor was because of Kimmel and Short had not taken adequate measures to prevent the attack. Just the fact that they were not ready because “had not taken prudent defensive measures either to repel an attack or to mitigate its effects on their commands” (Borch 858). Personal responsibility is said to be the failure at Pearl Harbor, 9/11 was said to be systemic.

Rather a lack of preparedness of September 11, 2001 by the commercial airline security. They did not take the adequate steps to prevent a terrorist attack. Again the author actually has a very bold and logical argument on this topic. He uses logically reasoning in what Pearl Harbor and 9/11 could have done to better prepared, and in turn might have prevented, the attacks on Pearl Harbor and the world trade center. Military responsibility may have been a factor in these two events. With Pearl Harbor Kimmel and Short were to blame.

Though they couldn’t have prevented the attack, their failure to prepare an adequate defense makes them-at least partly responsible for what happened (Borch 858). As for 9/11 the men and woman running the FFA and the airlines knew that commercial aircraft were vulnerable to domestic hijacking (Borch 857). They could have expanded security. But that would have cost a lot of money. And as I said before, Americans knew we needed the increased security, but weren’t willing to spend that kind of money. Some thought if they increased security, business would go down.

As mentioned before we could have done some things that might have prevented an terrorist attack, but as for 9/11 it was an highly unfortunate event for American, that was conducted carefully and quite brightly by 9 Al Queda. The article as a whole was interesting to read. I don’t agree with everything he mentions because of the fact that it is his opinion, not facts. He gives a few bold statements, as I mentioned before. Borch could have improved this article by organizing it better and make it easier to follow. Instead of jumping from 9/11 to Pearl Harbor over and over, he could have found a better way to do that.

Pearl Harbor and 9/11 are both unfortunate events that is a big a part of our history. As my generation experienced 9/11 and our great grandparents and maybe grandparents experienced Pearl Harbor, there are questions that will forever go unanswered. A lot of questions I now have arose after reading this article. Will American learn from their mistakes? Will we think about the blood of innocent lives that was shed in a terrorist attack that may could have been prevented, but we as American’s were too greedy to spend money on increased security.

Basically I believe the whole topic of this is that we has American’s have the intelligence but don’t have the funding or resources. And we don’t want to do anything till something happens. But the question is how many more times are we going to have to sit back and watch our fellow Americans bury their sons and daughters, and watch as what was once a famous landscape come falling to the ground 100 ft. in front of us, before we do something logical and not do something that is not out of our budget.

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Attack at Pearl Harbor

Kaci Power Professor Clark World Civ B April 24, 2012 The Attack at Pearl Harbor “Yesterday, Dec. 7, 1941 – a date which will live in infamy the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan,” Franklin Delano Roosevelt proclaimed in his speech to […]

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Attack on Pearl Harbor

The attack on Pearl Harbor was an unpredicted military action by the Japanese navy against United States naval base at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii on December 7, 1941. It is the Hawaii Operation or Operation Z, as it was named by the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, which main mission was to neutralize the United States […]

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Pearl Harbor: A Day of Infamy By Chris Smith World War II

Pearl Harbor: A Day of Infamy By Chris Smith World War II altered the face of American history forever. This being a war the United States was greatly against and never wanted to enter, They were thrust into the war by a brutal attack from the Japanese on a Navel base located in the pacific […]

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Pearl Harbor

The attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters was a surprise military strike conducted by the Imperial Japanese Navy against the United States naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on the morning of December 7, 1941. The attack was intended as a preventive action in order to keep the U. S. Pacific […]

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