Crisis

The role of IMF in Turkish crises of 2000 and 2001 is very controversial. On one hand, this international financial institution has participated in the development of a program for the reform of Turkish economic sector and provided financial assistance of over $28 billion for the country. “From July 1999 to-date, the aggregate value of the IMF’s officially approved assistance to Turkey amounted to 31. 9$ billions, and the realized value of disbursements reached to 28. 2$ billions. ” (Erinc Yeldan. BEHIND THE 2000/2001 TURKISH CRISIS: Stability, Credibility, and Governance, for Whom?

Retrieved on May 1, 2006 from URL: http://papers. ssrn. com/sol3/papers. cfm? abstract_id=290539) On the other hand, IMF’s experts failed to predict both crises before they started. In many ways, the failure of reforms can be contributed to the inability of IMF to develop the program for reformation of the economic sector. Ziya and Rubin (2003) argue that IMF is institution which should be blamed for both Turkish crises: “the IMF itself-the key institution involved in the Turkish stabilization and reform program-should share a significant part of the blame for the outbreak of the two successive crises.

” In order to make a conclusion about the benefit of IMF support for Turkey, it is necessary to investigate the final recipients of IMF’s financing in the country. The money which was received by Turkey was primarily channeled into two directions: to Treasury for fiscal purposes and in order to strengthen its reserve positions; to the Central Bank of Turkey in order to increase its currency reserves. The major purpose for which Central Bank of Turkey used its reserves was financing problem banks which did not meet their liquidity requirements and were almost bankrupt.

The other part of the money received by Turkey was targeted at Treasury; however, this money was also channeled to assist failed banks because Treasury issued treasure debt instruments to these banks. As the result, all of the money provided by IMF was channeled to the banking sector of the country. This fact makes it clear that the primary purpose of IMF funds in Turkey was to assist the banking sector. There are some hidden motives in it. As the result of this development, foreign debt of Turkey reached the highest levels.

It increased by over $20 billion during these three years, and Turkey was forced to start paying large amounts of money to service the debt. At the same time, Turkey had to repay its short-term obligations. Thus, IMF has managed to achieve its strategy in Turkey created to make it more “marketable” in the eyes of the foreign investors. The short-term debt of the country declined greatly, but Turkey had to pay 16. 8% of its GNP to service its debt. This action cannot be considered wise because Turkey became very vulnerable after such a large increase in its foreign debt.

IMF also played a controversial role in the development of banking sector in Turkey. According to IMF’s regulations, Central Bank of Turkey was not allowed to take any actions which could possible cause inflation. “One of the main tenets of the stabilization program was the “no sterilization rule” as a safeguard against possible monetary indiscipline in order to add credibility to the disinflation program. ” (Ziya, Rubin, 2003, p. 11). This rule was considered universal by IMF experts.

However, they did not take into consideration that at certain times it might be crucial to “pump” some money into the banking sector, even if there is a danger of higher inflation. For example, some of the banks which suffered liquidity needed support from Central Bank of Turkey. They could solve some of their financial problems with the help of additional resources. However, Central Bank was not allowed to provide assistance to them in such a way. This policy led to bankruptcy of the largest commercial bank in Turkey. Alper and Onis (2002) also consider IMF’s policy one of the major reasons of financial crises in Turkey.

The authors present well-supported criticisms of IMF’s policy in relation to client countries and argue that this policy is not efficient in the present era of globalization. The researchers mark that IMF did not realize that full capital account liberalization in Turkey would have a negative impact on the economy because Turkey did not have a well-formed business environment yet and was not able to attract enough foreign investments. Alper and Onis (2002) conclude that IMF bears primary responsibility for opening Turkey’s capital account before time for that came.

Timing is the crucial factor when it comes to liberalization, and IMF failed to choose the right timing. There is no evidence supporting the fact that IMF resisted full opening the capital account of Turkey, and thus it is possible to conclude that it fully agreed with this policy. However, it is necessary to say that the authors also put a part of blame for the crisis on the Turkish politicians. As they mark, prior to crisis, IMF did not have real power in the country and it was only providing recommendations to it concerning the possible development of monetary policy.

At the same time, IMF needed to realize long before reaching a stand-by agreement with Turkish government that this coalition government would not be able to conduct the necessary reforms. First, they were too expensive. Second, the government did not have a sincere desire to implement the program. Experts of IMF needed to understand it much earlier than the crises started. As the result of investigations, it is possible to conclude that IMF’s actions towards Turkey turned out wrong in many ways. The program was developed without understating of its possible consequences.

The major mistakes made by IMF in regard to Turkey can be summarized in the following way:

• IMF did not manage to provide adequate amount of resources to Turkey. The amount which was given did not answer the needs of the sector which was being reformed. Instead of giving the money for the development of the economic sector, the money was provided to decrease the dependence on the short-term debt and thus get a better credit rating, disregarding the potential negative consequences of this action.

• Inability to obtain necessary information for successful implementation of the program. Even though IMF launched a very large-scale program in Turkey, it did not provide adequate research of conditions which could place obstacles for the development of the program. Therefore, the assistance which IMF provided for Turkey was not enough to ensure adequate development of the projects chosen for the reform. Information is crucial in economic reforms development. Unfortunately, IMF did not consider it important in this case.

• Application of the same principles and approaches to all of the countries for which IMF was providing assistance. It is common truth that international financial organizations, like IMF, are characterized by bureaucratic principles and attitudes. It is difficult for such large organizations to apply different principles to different client countries. As a result, those actions which are proposed by IMF are oftentimes “cliches”. They do not always meet the objectives of a specific country, like it happened in case of Turkey. • Inability to determine the sequence of economic reforms.

Even though experts of IMF did their best to come up with a well-developed plan of economic reforms for Turkey, they did not manage to make a correct decision concerning the sequence of reforms. Conclusion In conclusion, it is necessary to mark that Turkey’s crises of both 2000 and 2001 had a deep impact on Turkish economy. Even though the first crisis of 2000 was not as powerful as the second one, it also left a large number of people unemployed and decreased the wages for other people. Crisis of 2001 had a severe impact on the economy, because a large number of jobs were lost as the result of it, and many companies collapsed.

Both of the crises had a large impact on the banking system of Turkey. Many banks became bankrupt during the crises; those banks which survived suffered large amounts of losses. At the same time, the crises had positive impact on the economy as well, as it was shown in the research. All of the reforms which followed the crises were enforced by the government after it realized that the previous program was not working. Financial crises of 2000 and 2001 became a peculiar trigger for further reforms. One of the major reasons of financial and economic crises in Turkey was liberalization of financial market regulation.

Among other factors, it created major problems for the financial sector in the country. Many policies carried out by Turkish government officials did not work in the new environment. The major flaws of financial markets regulation in Turkey include inability to adapt to the economy integrating into the global market, bureaucracy in many levels of financial institutions organization structure, and failure to adopt important legislation in the areas regulating activities of financial institutions. IMF has played a very important role in the financial crisis in Turkey.

Its program was supposed to provide assistance to the country’s government in its reformation of the economic system. Unfortunately, IMF did not manage to fully realize its potential in its assistance to Turkey prior to crises. The lessons of the financial crises in Turkey have proved that bureaucratic organizations have a hard time helping developing countries in achieving their goals. IMF’s experts used the same tools for regulating monetary systems of different countries without conducting necessary research of specifics of these countries.

As a result, in the case of Turkey, IMF’s recommendations failed entirely because they were not fine-tuned for Turkey’s economy. It is very important for international organizations to ensure in future that they provide support to their client countries based on the history and current situation in those countries. In case if it is not done, financial crises similar to the ones which happened in Turkey under IMF’s guard will happen in future.

Bibliography

1. Akyuz Y_lmaz and Borata Korkut. The Making of the Turkish Crisis. Accessed on May 1, 2006 at URL: http://www. umass.edu/peri/pdfs/fin_akyuz. pdf

2. Alper C. Emre and Onis Ziya. Emerging Market and the IMF: Re-thinking the Role of the IMF in the Light of the Turkey’s 2000-2001 Financial Crises. 2002.

3. Alper Emre. The Turkish Liquidity Crisis of 2000: What Went Wrong…Forthcoming: Russian and East European Finance and Trade (2001). Vol. 37, No. 6, pp. 51-71

4. Gencay, Ramazan and Faruk Selcuk. Overrnight Borrowing, Interest Rates and Extreme Value Theory” Bilkent University, Department of Economics Discussion Paper No 01-03, March. 2001.

5. Gorvett Jon. Turkish Fiscal Crisis a Necessary Evil? The Middle East. April 2001.

6. Grabel, Ilene. Speculation-Led Economic Development: A Post-Keynesian Interpretation of Financial Liberalization Programmes in The Third World” International Review of Applied Economics 9(2): 127-249. 1995.

7. Ozatay Fatih and Sak Guven.

Introduction:

  The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is mainly responsible for maintaining the economic stability and economic systems of the countries worldwide. It is the hub for all the countries in order to seek help in keeping their economies stable. The assistance of IMF played a vital role in fighting with the crises faced by the Latin American countries during 2002, it was due to the help and support of the IMF that these countries successfully cope with the critical situation they were up to.

             Uruguay is a country with limited population of three million and its per capita GDP is greatest in Latin America, which is $12600. Regardless of this good per capita GDP and all assets Uruguay still depends on its neighbouring countries specially Brazil and Argentina. The reason why Uruguay is dependant on these countries is that they are having a strong GDP of 50(Brazil) and 12(Argentina) times greater than that of Uruguay. Besides that these two neighbouring countries lead in financially viable size and position. Hence any policy designed in Uruguay is affected and resulted by the influence of its neighbour countries.

            In this paper we will explore the economic condition, fiscal and monetary policy and its economic ups and downs. We will also see the Government’s policies to tackle the critical situations, the economic crises happened in Uruguay, the role of IMF in Uruguay economic crises 2002 will also be discussed and especial attention will be given to the circumstances how IMF helped Uruguay to get out of those crises.

            Lets begin the discussion with the initial condition of the economy and then will move towards the fall down and crises phase. The economy of Uruguay was established until the second part of 90’s and the end of 2001. The economic activity during this period and before was quite good, the GDP experience transform of up to $1 billion. These circumstances lead to the well off situation of population and consumption of goods generally stayed stable during 95-2001 periods. But at some point this stability was not maintained and because of continually importing goods from the rest of the world. The inflation rate in the country was rising by 13.3 % during 95-2001, which is too much comparing to the dollar.  From this point in history of economic growth and stability Uruguay started to face crucial time and there were a number of factors, which played role in the circumstances created. We will start by the role of Argentina.

Role of Argentina in Uruguay Crises of 2002:  In 2001, Argentina faced some currency crises, which had really bad affects on all the corresponding regions. Before that crises Uruguay had great terms of trade with Argentina and many times Uruguay experienced benefits with doing trade with its close and strong neighbor. Uruguay exports and imports both depended on Argentina to a large extent.

            More crucial time begins in December 2001, when Argentina crises became severe and Uruguay was serious affected by it. The crises were so severe that the banks in Argentina had to freeze the accounts and as a result Argentines took their money back from the Uruguay banks in a large amount. Hence Uruguay falls back in assets and foreign capital. Since Argentina was always been a closest partner in trade for Uruguay, falling back of assets and foreign capital led the Uruguay economy to experience poor production. Uruguay exports all the goods it produces in large amount to Argentina but when the crises phase started the export to Argentina was cut down by 10%, which was a heavy loss for Uruguay economy. This was the bad progress between 2001 and 2002. This period almost ruin the Uruguay economy and the inflation rates were increased by 50%.

AA-DD International Finance Policy Model:  The Argentina crises and its impact on the Uruguay can be well explained by using the AA-DD international finance policy model. The impact of the economic instability of Argentina on Uruguay during 2001-02 cut down the exports and investments decreasing the aggregate demand and GDP growth by 10%. The demand curve moved inward and the withdrawals of assets and decline in foreign capital caused the overall system to be seriously upset. The money supply was contracted and the AA curve moved inward, resulted in a decline of overall investment. The inward shifting of the DD and AA curves cut down the output of the country by $ 3 billion, also the Uruguayan peso was depreciated compared to the overseas currency. [6]

Cutting Down of Production and Depreciation of Currency:

            The cutting down of production and depreciation of the currency jointly, decreased the purchasing power of the consumers to buy imported goods, as imported items became much expensive for the Uruguayans. But the exports on the other hand were increased. This was due to the reason that the items produced at Uruguay became cheaper for the rest of the world. Somehow the exports were increased during the crises phase but they were far behind the decline in imports. Therefore the DD curve move toward in and the exports were enlarged. As the exports overtake imports, the situation became such critical that Uruguay was converted from a rich to a poor country, which could not afford to import and heavily depend on its exports. Another unfortunate thing happened, and that was the exports goods being non-industrialized which was due to the decline in industries and imports in Uruguay during the crises period, so the value added on the goods it produced was not much which could benefit the economy on the whole.

Economic disturbance is observed during the last decades through out the world. The economic disturbance is not only observed in powerful countries US, Germany, and Japan but also in the South American countries, Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil. Among the South American countries Uruguay crises of 2002 are the focus of our discussion, therefore we will keep the track of our thesis towards it.

On real grounds the external debts and the exports didn’t cause the problem, which Uruguay faced since the country maintained good policies and corruption was not a part of it ever. Hence it’s not wrong to say that, the decline of its economy occurred due to the collapse of its neighbor’s economy, Argentina.  The real collapse started when the central bank didn’t lend money when the Argentines Bank’s in Uruguay faced crucial time. This act was actually a mistake because after that the Argentine’s as well as the local depositors started running towards the banks to withdraw their amounts affecting the overall financial system of Argentina adversely. Also the recovering of this collapse and the deposits from foreign countries were become a dream for Uruguay in such circumstances.

Circumstances in Argentina at Time of Crises:

            Argentina is a country having most poor relationship between external debts and exports. The foundations of the crises took place were years old since the economy of Argentina was facing the depressive time before it went worst. In late 90’s technical progress was at a very high level, the transport of goods through land and sea was going great. The main transport goods were grains and meat, which was being supplied to the European markets mainly. This export of goods to the international markets cut down the food supply in Argentina, and they have to import food for themselves. Argentina was a country, which stood at seventh rank of highest per capita income in world. The main market for Argentina’s export goods was Europe but after World War II the progress in all fields was made readily throughout the Europe. This technological change brought a revolutionary increase in the agricultural and manufacturing side of Europe. Therefore Europe was able to fulfill its own food needs and subsidies were granted to utilize the over production of milk, grains and meat done there. These subsidies make it easier for the surrounding countries to have cheaper goods easily. And this way, the Argentina’s economic circumstances started to become worst day-by-day.  Worst situation was experienced when Argentina didn’t accept the situation thinking that the subsidies may be taken back and the markets throughout the world will ask for Argentina’s goods.

Match each of the international organizations below with one of its functions

The impact of false hopes of getting back same position in world markets, the exports of Argentina left to only 30% as compare to Brazil and Uruguay.  During late 90’s era the living standard at Argentina was maintained, $ 30 billion were received by the state’s enterprises, but as the foreign credits were stopped the crucial time for the nation started and everything was started facing bad time. The problem of declining economic circumstances along with the injustice and corruption factor made the backbone weaker. Also the currency of Argentina decreased as compare to dollar and the purchasing power got down and limited. The tax collection was left only equal to 15% of the GDP while countries like Brazil was far above in tax collection, which was almost 30% of its GDP

            All these crises and many more resulted in the decline of Argentina’s economy, which as a result affected the economy of its immediate neighbour Uruguay and the other countries in the southern cone.

Testimony before Subcommittee on International Trade and Finance:

            In the same year (2002) when crises in Uruguay and adjacent countries were started different discussions, debates and committees were setup to discuss this issue and suggestions were accepted if any from the experts and economists. On October 2002 this issue was discussed in the Subcommittee on International Trade and Finance Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and the highlighted points will be added in our thesis.

• The situation, which happened in 2002, was the worst in Latin America in last two decades. The largest decline was observed in Argentina, after the peak time of 1998the GDP drop by 15%, on second position Uruguay is placed with a serious recession whose GDP declined by 8-10% in the a same year and last but least Venezuela faced 5 % decline in its GDP.
• There are a number of factors, which contributed in the crises situation occurred in whole Latin American block. The most obvious reason according to economists and experts is that the economic situation had been disturbed globally during this period and the price level of different commodities is decreased to a large extent thereby contributing in the negative growth of exports and revenue graphs.
• Besides the factors discussed earlier which are visible and obvious there exists some internal and domestic matters as well which lead the Latin American block to fact the difficult time it had. On top of the list is Argentina who is affected by theses crises, secondly Brazil wit same severity and then Uruguay comes, these three nations are affected the most in the whole Latin American block.

The highlighted points of this testimony were not only limited to Brazil, Argentina or Uruguay but they were generally discussed for the whole Latin American block under crises. The weak time for the Latin American economy was the result of reduction in foreign investment. The consequences started to become worst for seriously indebted Latin American countries.

            The crises faced by the world in last decades have had very bad affects on the world. Theses crises include financial crises, exogenous shocks and many more. However the financial crises are the most unbearable and harmful. Hence they need to be prevented. When any crises situation occurs it’s not necessary that people belonging to all income groups are affected. There are different sectors and levels that are worst affected. The burden of financial crises of any country is transferred to different sectors and categories of society in several terms. Some of them are:

1. The burden is transferred to the financial sector
2. To the depositors in many cases the burden is so heavy that they are discouraged to keep their money with the bank anymore and transfer all their assets somewhere else which is a cig loss to the bank.
3. The burden is also transferred to financial institutions.
4. It also affects the borrowers.

In this paper we emphasized mostly on the Uruguay crises due to the Argentina’s economic collapse. We said initially that due to the withdrawal of money by Argentines from Uruguay banks massive loss was faces by Uruguayans. Lets take a deep look inside the matter and how banking sector was become the root of Uruguayan collapse. The run on deposits in Uruguay caused due to the crises situation in Argentina. The withdrawal of deposits started from the two largest banks of Uruguay Banco de Galicia Uruguay (BGU) and Banco Comercial, these banks were associated with Argentina, and the withdrawal was started from December 2001 till January 2002. This withdrawal of deposits lasts until the end of 2002.

By the second half of 2002 the international reserves of Uruguay fall by $1.6 billion, the major loss to the Uruguay economy caused by the foreign depositors. The foreign depositors withdrew almost 2.7 billion dollars from December 2001-2002, which gave a blow hit to the Uruguay economy and the foreign investment fall back by 75.5%. On the whole small depositors leave only 6.1 % deposits in peso with Uruguay banks and large depositors kept 30.1% hardly, the part consisting of foreign investment in dollars decline from 52-27%.

The crises of Uruguay set a very high up and immense instance for the rest of the world.  The above-mentioned circumstances, adverse affects, and the fall back of economy were a crucial phase in Uruguayan history. However to come out from this phase several steps were taken and   help and support from various parts of the world was granted. Above all the major solution presenter and problem solver was IMF. We will now move toward the second half of the theisis i.e. how the IMF helped Uruguay get out of the crisis.

Sources: Central Bank of Uruguay; Ministry of Finance; and IMF staff estimates.
Covers debt of the NFPS and the central bank (excluding monetary policy instruments and free reserves).

How IMF helped Uruguay Get Out of Crisis: The period after crises can be truly said a period of recovery after a big time of recession. Since we know that the period of crises was a hard time for Uruguay and its currency and GDP both were adversely affected by it therefore beginning the recovery the Uruguay Government firstly had to increase its GDP growth and make its currency alleviate in order to match the international market level. The money supply in Uruguay was raised to 35% by 2003, which led the people toward a hopeful tomorrow, a better output and an outward shift in the AA curve. In this process DD curve was also moved toward outward since the net exports increased and the hard work made by the Central bank and the Government became fruitful.

            The key factors which identified the recovery period have been started and positive changes in overall economic situation were:

GDP growth increased in 2003-04 comparatively to 2001, somehow the output didn’t match the level before crises but still it was not far below that hence one can expect it to be a sign of recovery.
The exchange rate of peso was decreased from 28 pesos per dollar in 2002 to 25 peso in 2005. This change was occurred due to the outward shifting of DD and AA curve.
These were not the only factors, which helped in recovering from crises, but the most importantly and above all was the help from international organizations, especially the IMF. The loans granted from IMF alone were $1.6 during the year 2002, $510 million in the year 2003 and $ 717 million in the year 2004. Due to this help from the IMF the foreign assets of Uruguay increased and besides that steps were also taken to cut down the debt burden of Government. The debt rate increase rapidly in just 4 years in Uruguay, it was so rapid that the growth was noticed to be 60% in such a short p of time.

Taking deep insight of how the IMF helped Uruguay to come out of the crises, we will start from the day when the banks in Uruguay were shut down due to transfer of foreign assets from Uruguay banks back to their original places. According to New York Times, 2002 a large amount of loans decided to be granted from US and other international organization to the struggling countries. It was expected that the total amount transferred would be sum up to $ 3.8 billion. This news was arrived as the Treasury Secretary Paul H. O’Neill, reached Brazil and announced that he was there to help the Latin American nations come out of the crises phase they were suffering from.

            As the Treasury secretary intervene in this matter things become easier and quick since the IMF and the World Bank announced that had already discussed the matter with their Board of Directors and other concerned departments and the loans should be granted as soon as possible.

            The real facts were opened after few years of the crises, especially at the conference held in account of 2002 Uruguay crises. The speakers on the conference started the discussion and revealing of the facts like a tale.  At the time of crises Americans and the Uruguay committees were working together to cope with the crises at the front. They were looking forward and trying to find a better solution to the problem.

The first step they took was to gather all the big names around the world, which contribute in the crises period, like IMF, World Bank and others. At the beginning the re-opening of the banks, which were shut down, was the top most priority. Therefore a loan of $1.5 billion proposal was sent to IMF out of which $ 500 million were readily granted, the rest of the amount was hopeful to be arranged by the world bank and the other bank of status, following this quick decision of the IMF management the G; countries were also inspired by it and the banks were re-opened within the disbursement of loans in few days.

            This rescue plan for the banks turned out to be the most successful in history of Uruguay or any other country in the world. The bank run procedure was stopped and the economy was saved by this miracle in a very short p of time. Not only the crises situation was tackled but also the economy was started progressing again and the loans granted by the US and the IMF mainly were returned timely.

            The figure above gives a clear picture about the changes, which happened in a cumulative way in the size of dollars and peso, during the year December 2001-2002.

When we see the efforts made by IMF and several other organizations to take Uruguay out of the crises it had confrontation with, a very important question arrived in mind and i.e., why the IMF helped Uruguay so efficiently? And what might be the risk factor?

The plan to implement was of course very risky but somehow the authorities concerned were confident about the recovery of loans and the stabilization of economy again and their prediction was true to a large extent. The reason was not only that to help financially but also to create friendly ties of Latin American countries with the rest of the continent.

There were also some lessons learned by the IMF while helping Uruguay. These lessons may include the experience of preventing countries from crises, preventing the loss by depreciation of currency, increasing burden of loans and coping with declining economies.

Conclusion:  Starting from the beginning and moving toward the core literature we have seen the problem from its roots and taken it to the solution now ending up with a conclusion and summarization of everything we studied above.

            The problem under consideration was the Uruguay crises of 2002, which was termed as the most crucial time on its economy. The year 2002 brought a really hard time for the people of Uruguay, economists, experts and analysts not only belonging to Uruguay but also other parts of the world sat together to find a solution.

             However at this point the fact cannot be neglected that the most obvious role-played by the IMF along with World Bank and the US Government. It was their joint effort and frameworks that brought a resolution to the problem and made the economy stabilize again. Not only this but also the efforts were so fruitful and the resulted were so guaranteed that the plan made by them worked successfully and implemented in a really professional way. And hence the Uruguayan economy recovered from its crucial time refunding all loans back and regaining its currency depreciation against dollar. It should be noted here that this recovery of currency depreciation was below the point where it was before crises but somehow the change in situation was a light of hope for the Uruguay people. We have also shed light on the roots of the problem that it started because of the decline of Argentinean economy, which is immediate neighbour of Uruguay.

            If the economy of Argentina would not have been collapsed there were very strong chances that Uruguay would never have experienced such bad time. In this thesis we take a deep insight to the Argentinean crises. Its reasons, problems and finally collapse of economy, from there we created a linkage between these two country’s economies and also the impact other had due to the decline faced by the first one.

            The framework maintained by the IMF was so powerful, that framework asked for the need of huge loans from different organizations thought out the world. And due to those huge loans it was possible for Uruguay to stand again. It is also said by experts that this crises introduced a lesson for IMF and other organization to cope with any problem of same nature. We have also seen some fact sheets, diagrams and tables in order to make the study more interactive and understandable.

            Concluding the study, one can clearly observe that how the cone of three Latin American countries are affected by each other. However Uruguay is not so well known but it is developed and has maintained its position in the international markets, and although it faced the worst crises ever but not wrong to say that luckily being a part of the super power US it has got much support and help to regain its lost position!!

References

1. IMF Survey Magazine
2. http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2005/pn0577.htm
3. Accessed Oct 17 2008
4. Druncniak, Julie Granof, Matt Jacobs, (April 13, 2004)
5. Crises in Uruguay:”A snapshot of the country’s finance policies over the last decade”, Jeff http://www-personal.umich.edu/~kathrynd/Uruguay.2005.pdf.
6. Accessed Oct 16 2008
7. Eduard Brau, Successes of the International Monetary Fund,
8. http://www.palgrave.com/PRODUCTS/title.aspx?PID=290162
9. Accessed Oct 16 2008
10. John B. Taylor, Hoover Institution, (2007), p1-6
11. The 2002 Uruguay Financial Crises: Five years later, http://www.stanford.edu/~johntayl/The2002UruguayFinancialCrisisFiveYearsLater.pdf
12. Accessed Oct 17 2008
13. Marina Halac Sergio L. Schmukler, (2003)
14. Distributional Effects of Crises: The Role of Financial Transfers
15. http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/01/20/000160016_20040120172705/Rendered/PDF/wps3173.pdf
16. Accessed Oct 17 2008
17. Michael Mussa, Peterson Institute, October 14, 2002,
18. Latin American Economic Crises, http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=483
19. Accessed Oct 16 2008
20. Richard A Oppel JR, (2002)
21. New York Times: Easing its instance, US offers loans to nations in crises, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C04E0D8133BF936A3575BC0A9649C8B63;sec=;spon=;pagewanted=all
22. Accessed Oct 17 2008
23. Sr. Baldinelli, (Sep 5,2002),American Diplomacy,
24. http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/2002_07-09/baldinelli_political/baldinelli_political.html
25. Accessed Oct 16 2008

• [1] Successes of the International Monetary Fund ,Eduard Brau,
• [2] Crises in Uruguay:”A snapshot of the country’s finance policies over the last decade”, Jeff Druncniak, Julie Granof, Matt Jacobs, (April 13,2004)
• [3] Crises in Uruguay:”A snapshot of the country’s finance policies over the last decade”, Jeff Druncniak, Julie Granof, Matt Jacobs, (April 13,2004)
• [4] Crises in Uruguay:”A snapshot of the country’s finance policies over the last decade”, Jeff Druncniak, Julie Granof, Matt Jacobs, (April 13,2004
• [5] Crises in Uruguay:”A snapshot of the country’s finance policies over the last decade”, Jeff Druncniak, Julie Granof, Matt Jacobs, (April 13,2004
• [6] Crises in Uruguay:”A snapshot of the country’s finance policies over the last decade”, Jeff Druncniak, Julie Granof, Matt Jacobs, (April 13,2004
• [7] Crises in Uruguay:”A snapshot of the country’s finance policies over the last decade”, Jeff Druncniak, Julie Granof, Matt Jacobs, (April 13,2004
• [8] American Diplomacy, Sr. Baldinelli, (Sep 5,2002)
• [9] American Diplomacy, Sr. Baldinelli, (Sep 5,2002)
• [10] American Diplomacy, Sr. Baldinelli, (Sep 5,2002)
• [11] Latin American Economic Crises, Michael Mussa, Peterson Institute, October 14, 2002
• [12] Distributional Effects of Crises:,The Role of Financial Transfers*, Marina Halac Sergio L. Schmukler, (2003)
• [13] Distributional Effects of Crises: The Role of Financial Transfers*, Marina Halac Sergio L. Schmukler, (2003)
• [14] Distributional Effects of Crises: The Role of Financial Transfers*, Marina Halac Sergio L. Schmukler, (2003)
• [15] Distributional Effects of Crises:,The Role of Financial Transfers*, Marina Halac Sergio L. Schmukler, (2003)
• [16] Distributional Effects of Crises:,The Role of Financial Transfers*, Marina Halac Sergio L. Schmukler, (2003)
• [17] IMF survey magazine,(Anonymous),(2006)
• [18] Crises in Uruguay: A snapshot of the country’s finance policies over the last decade”, Jeff Druncniak, Julie Granof, Matt Jacobs, (April 13,2004)
• [19] Crises in Uruguay: A snapshot of the country’s finance policies over the last decade”, Jeff Druncniak, Julie Granof, Matt Jacobs, (April 13,2004)
• [20] Crises in Uruguay: A snapshot of the country’s finance policies over the last decade”, Jeff Druncniak, Julie Granof, Matt Jacobs, (April 13,2004)
• [21] New York Times: Easing its instance, US offers loans to nations in crises, Richard A Oppel JR, (2002)
• [22] The 2002 Uruguay Financial Crises: Five years later, John B. Taylor, Hoover Institution, (2007), p1-6
• [23] Distributional Effects of Crises: The Role of Financial Transfers*, Marina Halac Sergio L. Schmukler,(2003),pp52
• [24] The 2002 Uruguay Financial Crises: Five years later, John B. Taylor, Hoover Institution, (2007), p1-6
• [25]The 2002 Uruguay Financial Crises: Five years later, John B. Taylor, Hoover Institution, (2007), p1-6
• [26] Distributional Effects of Crises: The Role of Financial Transfers*, Marina Halac Sergio L. Schmukler, (2003), pp52
• [27] The 2002 Uruguay Financial Crises: Five years later, John B. Taylor, Hoover Institution, (2007), p1-6
  [28] The 2002 Uruguay Financial Crises: Five years later, John B. Taylor, Hoover Institution, (2007), p1-6