Foreign Policy

From Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor on January 30 1933 to the beginning of WWII on Sept 3 1939, the Nazi state pursued an aggressive foreign policy that contributed largely to the outbreak of war. This foreign policy was largely reflective of the goals Hitler had set out in his 1924 autobiography “Mein Kampf”, particularly Germany’s easterly moving aggressions. However, although Nazi ideology played a dominant role in structuring foreign policy to 1939, it was also greatly influenced by the response of the Allies to aggressions and therefore Hitler’s perception of which foreign policies could be most successful.

Hence, whilst Nazi ideology surmises the ultimate goals of Nazi foreign policy to 1939, the role of events from 1933-1939 played a significant detail in determining Germany’s actions. Hitler’s understanding of politics and race can be summed up in “Weltanschauung” (world view), as described in Mein Kampf. Written in 1924 after Hitler had been arrested for an attempted coup, the autobiography deals with the issues plaguing Germany at the time, including the instability of the Weimar Republic and the problem of WWI reparation payments as set out in the 1919 Treaty of Versailles.

Hitler, as a member of nationalist Nazi party, despised democracy, and believed that it undermined Germany’s success. Further, Hitler gave validity to the “stabbing in the back” myth, claiming that WWI’s loss had been unnecessary, and had been caused as a result of the “scheming” Jewish population. Using these understandings, Hitler believed that should Germany be expanded into a grossdeutschland by creating Lebensraum (living room) in the resource-rich East, wherein the superior Aryan race could reside.

All other races, particularly Slavs & Jews, were denoted as racially inferior, and were intended by Hitler to be used as slaves. Throughout Mein Kampf, Hitler euphorically and openly describes his war intentions for Germany, in quotes such as “Any alliance whose purpose is not the intention to wage war is useless”. However, when Hitler came to power in 1933, Germany was unfit to pursue Hitler’s aims, and required a great deal of restructuring in order to increase output and production.

Therefore, despite Hitler’s ultimately war goals, he was forced to delay aggressions until the German military could be rebuilt. This began in 1935, when Hitler announced open plans for rearmament and introduced conscription, in order to strengthen and prepare the Wehrmacht. This was a direct violation of the Treaty of Versailles, however the Allies chose not to act. At this stage, Hitler’s popularity as a leader was large, seen by the success of the Saar plebiscite in January 1935 in which the Saarland’s population chose to rejoin Germany, as before the Treaty.

Even by the end of 1935, it was clear that Nazi Germany was expanding, and intended to continue. On March 7th 1936, Hitler ordered the invasion of the Rhineland. This foreign policy was incredibly aggressive, and showed even greater disregard for the terms of treaty. The Rhineland had been established by the Treaty as buffer between France and Germany, in order to ensure France’s safety after the German invasion of WWI. By invading it, Hitler directly threatened France, and demonstrated his serious intent to expand Germany, as outlined in Mein Kampf.

However, although this invasion coheres to the ideologies outlined in Mein Kampf, namely the reversal of the Treaty of Versailles, the invasion was largely experimental, and based on the previous non-action of the Allies to Hitler’s defiance of the treaty. A mere 22,000 German troops entered the Rhineland, and could have easily been suppressed by Allied forces, Hitler himself admitting that had the French resisted, Germany would be forced to retreat immediately. Despite this, the Allies chose not to respond yet again.

This was a critical point in structuring future Nazi foreign policy, as it demonstrated the Allies unwillingness to participate in conflict, and preference to appease. Had the Allies stopped the occupation of the Rhineland, it is unlikely that Hitler’s aggressive foreign policies would have been so actively pursued, as they risked increased resistance and further embarrassment. In October 1936, the Rome-Berlin axis was created, a political alliance linking the fascist forces of Italy under Mussolini with Nazi Germany.

At this time, Italy too was pursuing an aggressive foreign policy in order to create a racially perfect Italy, goals similar to those of Hitler. Hence, the signing of this agreement indicates Hitler’s intention to keep to his racial ideologies, and to link with necessary powers in order to achieve lebensraum for the Aryan race. Further, the Hossbach memorandum of 1937 clearly demonstrates Hitler’s plans to expand Europe in order to strengthen Europe, and his intentions to formulate foreign policy based on these aims.

In March 1938, Hitler demanded Anschluss with Germany-a union that had been forbidden by the Treaty. This demand was met with opposition by Austrian Chancellor Schuschnigg, who insisted on a plebiscite. However, after a large amount of pressure, the Anschluss was agreed to, and shortly after, German troops entered Austria. German and Austrian union had been forbidden specifically after their strong alliance in WWI, and the threat they posed as a combined force. By 1938, Hitler had defied the Treaty of Versailles several times, and had yet to meet resistance by the Allies.

Particularly in the case of Austria, the Allies chose to not intervene because of a belief that Germany was simply “marching into its backyard”. On top of this, by 1938 Germany was experiencing high living standards as a result of Hitler’s volksgemeinschaft and was a formidable power, thus the Allies recognised German desire for expansion into a previously had region. It also evident that Hitler understood this detail in the timing of the Anschluss-when in 1936 Hitler had made similar demands, the Allies stood opposed, and the Wehrmacht was ill-equipped to defy Allied wishes.

In 1938 Hitler understood Germany’s military capacity, and used its position to pursue the foreign policies based on the ideologies in Mein Kampf. By 1938, Hitler had acquired all desired territories with relative ease, as a result of their size and insignificance to the balance of power on the European continent. It was this confidence that allowed Hitler to pursue his most aggressive foreign policy yet-the demand for the Sudetenland. The Sudetenland was part of Czechoslovakia, which had been created post WWI.

Previously German territory, it still contained 3 million German speakers. Hitler’s demand was based on the reasoning that its German population should be united with the rest of Germany, in spite of Czechoslovakia’s sovereignty. In this demand, Hitler demonstrated his willingness to defy the right of independent states in order to achieve his own ends. President Banes refused not only out of principal, but also because of the region’s massive industrial production and abundance of resources. Hitler stood adamant and threatened that invasion was imminent.

British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, in recognition of the situation, flew to meet with Hitler in his Wilhelmshaven residence on September 15, in order to reason with him. Hitler stood firm, justifying his demand by claiming that a Czech-Soviet pact was a threat to European security. Chamberlain, a conservative politician, believed that Hitler could be appeased, and thus suggested that perhaps Germany’s takeover of the Sudetenland could be achieved through non-aggressive means, a suggestion far surpassing his authority. On Sept 26, German, British, French and Italian delegates met in Munich to discuss the details of the takeover.

Czech and Soviet delegates were not invited to this meeting, despite their large role in the outcomes. Once the terms had been agreed to, and delegates, particularly Chamberlain, were satisfied, Germany annexed the Sudetenland. Yet again, Hitler had been appeased and had accomplished his expansionary goals, managing to attain another territory prohibited by the Treaty. The movement of Germany’s aggressions were those aimed for in Mein Kampf-hence suggesting that ideology had played an integral role in formulating Nazi foreign policy to that success.

This idea is further reinforced by the extension of Hitler’s grasp on Czechoslovakia, when in 1939 Hitler ordered that the rest of the state be handed over to Germany, which was quickly agreed to. Hitler’s accomplishments had all been aimed for in 1924-however, without the non-response of the Allies, and Chamberlain’s continuing belief that appeasement would succeed in limiting Hitler’s aggressions, Nazi foreign policy would not have been as ambitious, and it is unlikely that aggressions would have succeeded, thus further aggressions, such as with the demand for the Sudetenland, would have been unlikely.

This suggests that although foreign policy was based on ideological principles, its formulation was responsive to the European powers. The responsive nature of Nazi foreign policy is highlighted by the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 1939. In Hitler’s understanding of race, Slavs were considered racially inferior, and Hitler’s own political directly opposed Stalin’s communism. In fact, Hitler’s ultimate intentions in Mein Kampf included obtaining Eastern Europe, by crushing the Slavs.

Thus, this non-aggression pact completely contradicted what seemed to be the intention of Nazi foreign policy to 1939, and what Hitler had been adamant about in Mein Kampf. However, the pact was of strategic brilliance for Germany, for several reasons. With serious intentions to invade Poland, Hitler was faced with the possibility of a two-front war from Russia, which he understood would be crippling to the Wehrmacht. Further, whilst the German military was capable of fighting Allied resistance, should the Russians have made an alliance with the Allies, the struggle would intensify.

Therefore, when German and Russian foreign minister Ribbentropp and Molotov, respectively, signed the pact on August 23 1939, it guaranteed temporary security for both powers, and allowed for rapid capture of Poland beginning on September 1 1939. This pact demonstrated Hitler’s flexibility in achieving his aims, sacrificing one of his fundamental ideological principles in order to create an effective Nazi foreign policy. In analysing the weightings of ideology and circumstances in the formulation of Nazi foreign policy, there exists two main schools of thought: intentionalist and structuralist.

Intentionalist historians believe that Nazi foreign policy was based entirely on the principles clearly outlined in Mein Kampf, whilst structuralists, such as AJP Taylor, believe Hitler’s foreign policy was created by opportunities presented to him between 1933-1939, and that documents such as the Hossbach memorandum do not demonstrate clear intentions based on ideological principles but simply aggressive intentions, as per many European powers at the time.

In reality, neither arguement encompasses the scope of considerations taken in the formulation of Nazi foreign policy, however to disregard Mein Kampf and the ideological pursuits described in it which Hitler’s foreign policies to 1939 directly reflected is unacceptable in understanding the aims of Nazi foreign policy.

Therefore it can been seen that whilst the racial and political ideologies of Hitler, as outlined in 1924, played a significant role in Nazi foreign policy to 1939, several other factors, including the response of the Allies to Hitler’s aggressions and Germany military’s capacity, greatly affected Nazi foreign policy, and were pivotal in both its timing and creation.

The trade embargo placed by the United States on Cuba involves financial, economic and commercial restrictions that were first placed on Fidel Castro’s government in 1962. It was as a result of the government expropriation of assets and properties of US nationals and corporations. The embargo was first suggested and implemented by president Kennedy’s government on the charge that there was lack of democracy in Cuba not only in respect to the Cuban nationals but also to other nationals.

In essence, the embargo restricted certain economic and financial transactions between the nationals of the two countries whether directly or indirectly in regard to the use of a third country or national of such a country. The embargo started with the introduction of an import quota on sugar imported from Cuba by several millions. This was met by an agreement by the Soviet Union to by the rest of the sugar from Cuba. Still, the Cuban government under the leadership of Fidel Castro continued to take further actions on businesses owned by American national, confiscating most of it.

The US government retaliated by expanding the trade restrictions even further especially because of the alignment of Cuba with the Soviet Union in the cold war which caused the Cuban missile crisis. Later, the US government imposed travel restrictions to its nationals restricting them from traveling to Cuba. Further down the line, the US government charged the Cuban government of hosting Soviet Union nuclear weapons and since the union was an enemy in the cold war, regulations were put in place to freeze any Cuban assets in the states and to further consolidate the restrictions put on the country.

Various restrictions has since been put in place which include restriction on the amount of money spent by a US national on the Cuban island, restrictions on the forms and amount of gifts that a US national can give to a relative in Cuba or a Cuban national among others. Furthermore, the US government restricted any company that is involved in trade activities in Cuba from entering the US economy on the argument that such a company would be trafficking assets from US to Cuba. To date, most of the trade restrictions placed on Cuba and expenditure restrictions placed on US nationals and corporations still stand.

Despite efforts by some of the activists and United Nations has been meeting a dead end with previous and current presidents of the US suspending bills and efforts aimed at lifting the embargo. Despite the fact that some valid reasons were used in basing the embargo and the fact that the US government and its nationals are not affected much by the Embargo, the effects of it are not only affecting the unintended but also affecting the US economy in ways which were unintended. Efforts by activists and the UN are still unsuccessful despite the dire consequences that the embargo has had.

In essence, while today the embargo is much founded on democracy issues in Cuba, it goes a step further to restrain the achievement of democracy in the country, punishing Cuban citizens as opposed to the Administration. The purpose of the paper is to expound on the benefits that can be achieved by lifting the embargo not only to Cuba but also to the US and its citizens in general. Why the Embargo should be lifted As observed earlier, various efforts to lift the restrictions on Cuba and American travelers have continuously been rejected both by the President and the congress.

On the contrary, the US government has eased a little following pressure from some of the activists. For example, agribusiness organizations and American farmers put the government under pressure to lift some of the restrictions which saw the allowance of sale of medicine and agricultural goods only for humanitarian reasons. Still, many of the restrictions still are in place and there exist no evidence that these restrictions will be lifted any time soon. In light with the embargo, Cubans and scholars have argued that the embargo has and still is affecting negatively the resources of the Cuban nationals as opposed to those of the government.

This raises many humanitarian issues in regard to the US government especially considering that the embargo was as a result of democracy issues in Cuba. It has been argued and it is true to a greater extent that the economic damage that arises as a result of the embargo is to some extent responsible for the problems associated with transportation and food shortage in Cuba. As argued by some governments and activist, the embargo has had dire effects on medicine supplies, food and other economic needs of Cubans.

This by extension has resulted in vulnerability in infectious diseases and epidemics including malnutrition. The restrictions also have negatively affected the flow of medical information in the country thus resulting to diseases that would otherwise be easily dealt with. The rationing system that results as a result of food shortage have greatly affected men and the elderly since designed to give preference to women and children. On another view, the embargo has greatly influenced the capacity of US investors in Cuba but more so have affected non American investors in Cuba.

In this context, investors who have interests in the US economy have been reluctant or have been restricted by the law from investing in Cuba. As such, the embargo is not only affecting the Cuban and the American nationals but also the nationals of other countries as well. Moreover, it has continuously threatened diplomatic relationship of US and other countries in regard to the dealings and transactions of these countries and Cuba. In any case, while the embargo gives the Cuban government a scapegoat for problems not directly associated with the embargo, it gives a head start for non US businesses in Cuba should it be lifted.

In this regard, these businesses have already established firm foundations to be shaken by the competition that would arise from the lifting of the trade embargo. In general, while the embargo is aimed at improving the democracy and the compliance with human rights, it has continuously affected these rights negatively making it non humanitarian itself. It is worth noting that it an inadequate reason for the US government to argue that it is involved in charity work aimed at giving medical and food supplies to Cubans.

On the other hand, the bureaucracy involved in this charity work has greatly affected its effectiveness in Cuba. Charity organizations and other non governmental organizations have faced delays as a result of the licensing process involved and transportation problems. It also represent a violation of international law as provided for by the United Nations Charter. In this context, the fact that the embargo directly condemns the sale of certain food products and medical products abuses the human right of accessing life saving medical supplies.

Further Arguments As it stands out, the trade embargo imposed by US government hinders free trade between the two countries. While the US government is highly dependent on home production, it does not mean that it has a comparative advantage on all it consumables thus it is forced to import some of it consumables from other countries. This implies that there is an existence of free trade between US and these other countries. One of the major advantages of free trade is that it promotes liberalization of the economies involved.

As such, by maintaining the trade embargo on Cuba, the US is denying the Cuban economy better grounds for liberalization. In essence, the Cuban economy can not be open to American investors nor is it open to non US investors who have interests in both countries. In this context, the US economy is and continues to lose the advantages that are associated with the liberalization of the Cuban economy just like any other economy. In fact, it would be irrational to argue that the economy of Cuba has little to offer to that of US.

On the other hand, Cuba has been famous of having a comparative advantage on sugar production. It is imperative that the US economy can obtain such goods from other economies but the question remain, how cheap would it attain them from the Cuban economy. A good example is the tourist potential of Cuba. Travel restrictions have greatly affected the realization of benefits in Cuban tourist industry as the US government restricts its nationals in visiting the island and in the maximum amount of dollars that can be spent on the island on any given day.

Moreover, free trade allows the manifestation and improvement of diplomatic relationship between the countries involved. While the problem in Cuba is a political one, trade embargo does not help in solving other problems in the country especially social and humanitarian’s one. It has over and over been argued that as opposed to a trade embargo, the problems in Cuba can only be solved by changing the communist political organization in the country. In light with these, the US government should first lift the embargo then embark on measures that are aimed at filling the loopholes in the Cuban political system.

In any case, the embargo like others placed on other countries such as Iraq will only give the Cuban administration a reason to cling further to it political system. While, the US government restrict the provision of certain services to Cubans as was evident in the situation where the US government stressed Starwood hotels to chase away Cuban delegate who had attended the US- Cuba Trade Association, the Cuban government is also justified to retaliate in any way they think will bring equality. Such retaliation will only worsen further the diplomatic relationship between the two countries.

Still, free trade helps in increasing the amount of foreign currency held by a given economy. With the reduction of economic aid by the soviet, Cuba has been experiencing may economic problems most of which is as a result of lack of foreign currency to service debts secured from Asian countries. As a result, the living standards of Cuban nationals have greatly depreciated. In this context, it is a fallacy for the US government to argue that all the humanitarian problems in Cuba are as a result of bad governance.

In essence, the US governments and it allies whether countries, corporations or individuals have greatly contributed to the decline in humanitarian welfare in Cuba. By placing sanctions on allies dealing with Cuba and by closing it economy from Cuba, the US government denies Cuba a chance to earn foreign currency and by extension impacts heavily on the livelihood of Cubans. Perhaps the most obvious advantage of free trade is that it increases the living standard of the nationals of the two respective economies.

In this regard, free trade increases the availability of a variety of goods and services to the populations of the two countries. For one, the population has a variety of quality products to choose from and secondly, these products are available at a cheaper price keeping in mind the concept of comparative advantage. Buying these products a cheaper price will increase the real purchasing power of the constituents of the population giving them the capability to save and invest in other areas of the economy.

It would therefore be worthy to the Cuban nationals if the US government lifts the embargo as this will help in not only reducing their dependence on other economies through charity works but it would also improve their living standards. Since the US government and economy is highly involved in charity work to help Cubans, the lifting of the ban would also go a long way in helping the economy to develop given the nature and the cost of the resources used for charity work. Another advantage of free trade is that it helps in improving the infrastructure of both countries and this is inclusive of both transport and communication.

While the US trade embargo on Cuba can be seen as restricting the movements of goods and services, restrictions have been put in place which restricts the docking of Cuban ships on American docks. Similarly, there have been travel restrictions especially in regard to US citizens. In light with the restrictions and with the poor diplomatic relationship between the two countries, the infrastructures of the two countries have suffered though not in direct terms. For example, flights operating between the two countries have been rerouted as no of the country want the other to intrude in her air space.

Situations as these have increased the cost of transport between the two countries and have even hindered the movement of goods and services especially for Cuba since it has to use long routes to import goods thus a high cost of importation. Such a poor infrastructure has also been accused of harboring poor flow of medical information into Cuba and by extension increasing the persistency of epidemics and diseases in the country. Free trade encourages the increase in the level of investment opportunities between the respective countries while at the same time increasing foreign direct investments.

This on the other hand helps in raising the living standards of the population of the two countries. Should the government lift the trade embargo, investment opportunities will sprout in the two countries. As a result, even if the US does not directly participate in investing in the Cuban economy, other multinational companies will seek investment opportunities in the country. In essence, those allies of US who have been reluctant to invest in the country will reconsider their stand. Moreover, the multinational companies in Cuba will also seek investment opportunities not only in the American economy but also in the economies of its allies.

This will earn foreign currency for all the participating countries but more so will help in raising the living standards of Cuban nationals. As evidence has shown, the confiscation of Cuban assets including money held in banks, the government is only further aggregating the problem as the Cuban government is bound to take equal measures of counter attack and this can only add up to a web of tit for tat game. In addition to the above, free trade is also important in that it helps in increasing employment opportunities in the respective countries.

As is the case with the living standards, creation of employment opportunities is integrated with other factors such investment and specialization. As stated earlier, free trade creates investment opportunities which by extension create employment opportunities while at the same time improving the living standards of the nationals. In addition, free trade increases the economies of scale which means more investment and earnings from the existing investments. This will also help in creating employment opportunities for the citizens of the two countries.

In this light, it would be more advantages if the US government considers the probability of lifting the embargo as this would benefit not only the economy of Cuba but also its own economy. It would help in raising the living standards of Cubans thus reducing the level of poverty and dependence in the country. Finally, free trade helps in the harmonization of labor policies between the two countries thus offering cheap and affordable labor term. On top of this, free trade allows increased mobility of factors of production.

As stated earlier, the fact that the US economy is capable in producing most of its consumables does not necessarily mean that it has a comparative advantage in production of all of them. If the embargo is lifted, the US economy will be able to expand its base in relation to factors of production thus improving on the productivity of its economy. With the advantage arising from the geographical positions of the two countries, the US economy is capable of importing factors of production from Cuba at a lower cost and in time thus increasing productivity in its industries.

Goods can also be exported to Cuba not just for charity work but also for earning foreign currency. Conclusion As is evident following the above discussion, it is evident that the US by placing the embargo on Cuba, the US government has denied the Cuban economy to grow and by extension, it has denied Cubans the opportunity of enjoying a high standard of living. While the argument still remains that the embargo is aimed at improving the democracy in Cuba, it should be known to the US government that this has only resulted to more humanitarian problems than there was before the embargo.

It is therefore important for the US government to accept the fact that what is needed in Cuba as opposed to trade embargos is to change the whole political system. As such, the US government should lift the ban and look for other economic and political ways of influencing Cuba. Reference: Arnson Cynthia, 1993. Crossroads: Congress, the President and Central America, 1976-1993. Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania State University Press, pp. 17 Bhaqwati Jaqdish, 2002. Free Trade Today. United States, Princeton University Press, pp.

34 Fawn Rick, 2003. Ideology and National Identity in Post Communist Foreign Policies. London, Frank Cass, pp. 32 Gianaris Nicholas, 1998. The Northern American Free Trade Agreement and the European Union. Westport CT: Praeger Publishers, pp. 23 Louis A. 1995. Essays on Cuban History: Historiography and Research. Florida, University Presses of Florida, pp. 45 McGillion Chris, 2002. Unfinished Business: America and Cuba after the Cold War, 1989-2001. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 19 Pierce Anne, 2004.

The American Foreign Policy Tradition: Inspiration for Troubled Times. World and I, Vol. 19, pp. 56 Showalter D. 2007. Debating Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Foreign Policies, 1933- 1945. The Historian, Vol. 69, pp. 87 Ted Hopf, 2002. Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999. Cornell University Press, pp. 90 William M. 1998. Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 1977-1992. United States, University of North Carolina Press, pp. 41

Although Wilson had primarily been elected to reform national politics and initiate new progressive policies in Washington, he spent the majority of his time as President dealing with foreign policy rather than domestic. Wilson’s predecessors, including McKinley, Theodore Roosevelt, and Taft, had viewed the United States as an emerging power that needed to extend its influence throughout the world in order to serve national interests.

The aims of Wilson in tackling foreign affairs were to maintain isolationism by peaceful and ethical approaches, which were achieved almost successfully until the American intervention into the World War One in 1917. This imperialist policy was justified by the commonly held belief that it was America’s duty as a Christian republic to spread democracy throughout the world. These three Presidents significantly expanded America’s influence abroad with the annexation of colonies throughout the world, such as the Philippines and Cuba.

Clements firmly believes that Wilson foreign policy is mostly successful until 1917. This was because one of Wilson’s success in keeping isolationism in his early years of presidency was to repudiate his predecessors’ Dollar Diplomacy, which called for American investments in Latin America and the Caribbean. Instead, Wilson promoted democracy as the priority in private investments. As for China, Wilson gave diplomatic recognition to the new regime.

Moreover, in April of 1914, Mexican officials in Tampico arrested a few American sailors who blundered into a prohibited area, and Wilson used the incident to justify ordering the U. S. Navy to occupy the port city of Veracruz. Therefore, Bragg believes that Wilson did not fully achieve his isolationist aims because of the adoption of interventionist policy in Mexico. The Mexican Revolution threatened America’s interests due to the instability and violence, thus Wilson decided to send American marines in

1914 and military force in 1916 to Mexico but the American people on the border, as a consequence, were afflicted. However, he avoided taking over Mexico. Rowe believes this was because he was alarmed by the danger of war, Wilson reaffirmed his commitment to Mexican self-determination and agreed to discuss methods of securing the border area with the Mexican government. Early in 1917, when it began to appear that the United States could not avoid being dragged into the European war, Wilson withdrew all U.

S. forces from Mexico. The decision coincided with the publication of an intercepted message from Arthur Zimmermann in the German foreign office to the German minister in Mexico, instructing him to propose an alliance with Mexico against the United States if Germany and the United States went to war. With the outbreak of fighting in the “Great War” in Europe in August 1914, President Wilson appealed to Americans to remain strictly neutral.

He believed that the underlying cause of the war, which would leave 14 million Europeans dead by 1917, was the militant nationalism of the major European powers, as well as the ethnic hatreds that existed in much of Central and Eastern Europe. In addition to this, Wilson kept the USA of out the war until 1917 through diplomacy and his moral stance. This attitude was supported by the majority of Americans particularly the Mid-West as the American people did not want war anymore. The emerging of anti-imperialist ideas referred wars were morally unacceptable, and anti-colonial ideas against British colonial rule contributed to the neutrality.

Furthermore, in May 1915, a German submarine—called a “U-boat,” which was a relatively fragile vessels that depended on surprise attacks from below the surface for its success—torpedoed the British liner Lusitania off the coast of Ireland. Wilson urged patience. Wilson was successful in stopping U-boat activities and the sinking of ships. Therefore, Wilson tried to keep the public and the political opion against entering the war as long as possible. However, it was impossible to stay out of the ongoing war for Wilson.

Therfore, Murphy believes that Wilson’s foreign policy became more of a failure in 1917. This was because the USA entered the first world war. The America’s interests in Britain and France were threatened as huge businesses bounded many immigrants in the US. The sinking of Lusitania and the interception of Zimmermann telegram proved that the intervention was inevitable. The American intervention completely changed the war and established the world’s leading rule of America. However, murphy may believed that Wilson’s foreign policy became more of a failure in 1917, Wilson did go to war with a mission.

The main goal of the war was to end militarism and make the world “safe for Democracy,” not merely to defend American ships. He promised that the United States would fight to ensure democracy, self-government, the rights and liberties of small nations, and an international peace organization that would end war forever. He achieved this goal and he spread his ideologies into the world. The age of empire or the creation of colonies, meanwhile, came to an end. After the Germany surrendered, Murphy believes that Wilson’s failures began.

Wilson hoped to revolutionize the conduct of international affairs at the peace table. He first outlined his vision in the “Fourteen Points” speech delivered to Congress. No more secret treaties, and all territories occupied during the war must be evacuated. Wilson wanted to dismantle the imperial order by opening up colonial holdings to eventual self-rule and all European sections of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires to immediate independence. Other points included freedom of the seas at all times and free trade all over the world.

But Murphy believes that Wilson’s most important proposal was the prevention of future wars by means of a new international organization, a league of nations, open to membership by all democratic states. This new world body would be in charge of disarmament and the dismantling of colonial possessions. Most importantly, the League would hold power over all disputes among its members. Wilson believed that this League would transform international relations and usher in a new era of world peace. When Wilson sailed for France in December of 1918 to head the American peace delegation.

He wanted to persuade the Europeans to a fair peace for Germany in order to prevent wars in the future. However, in the end, Wilson faced with the determined insistence of Allied leaders to punish Germany with heavy reparations, territorial occupation, and total disarmament, Wilson was forced to compromise on most of his points. He took the leading role in ‘Peace Talks’ and he established his League of Nations, but instead of a “peace without victory,” the “Big Four” leaders—held secret negotiations and produced the Treaty of Versailles.

This treaty imposed harsh terms on Germany, and Wilson was forced to present to the Senate a treaty that bore little resemblance to the ideal peace most Americans expected. The opposition at home equaled the opposition abroad. Most Senate Democrats supported Wilson and the treaty. Embittered over Republican opposition. In one of the most controversial episodes in presidential history, Wilson to consider any compromises to the League. When the Senate Republicans amended the treaty—to ensure that the President could not use U.

S. forces on League business without securing congressional assent—Wilson told his supporters to vote against the amended treaty. America never joined the international organization that Wilson had envisioned as the foundation of his new world order. This failure of the League was a devastating conclusion to Wilson’s almost superhuman efforts for world peace based upon international cooperation and the peaceful solution of international disputes.

Woodrow Wilson was successful in keeping isolationism from 1912 to 1917, especially in staying neutrality in the WWI, the creation of League of Nations which ensured the peace, and leading the Peace Talks and Versailles Peace Treaty. By contrast, after 1917, the success he made turned out to be a disadvantage for the US, and ended in disillusionment. The League of Nations and Treaty of Versailles were rejected by the Congress successively, that was partially why Wilson was not re-elected as president in 1920 as well.

The years of Labour Party rule under Tony Blair were characterised by an interventionist foreign policy which saw troops being deployed toKosovo,Sierra Leone,AfghanistanandIraq. An analysis of the stated aims of these interventions as well as the outcomes of them, on balance, leads one to conclude that they fail to meet a minimum standard required to be deemed successful. This essay will outline in more detail those aims and outcomes which lead the author to such a conclusion.

Essay

In order to adequately answer the above question there are a number of points which must first be addressed; firstly, what were the characteristics of Labour Party foreign policy under BlairSecondly, what were the aims of this foreign policyAnd finally, how does one define successMr Blair will have one definition, the media will have another and the citizens of the countries into which British troops have been sent will have another still. Such ambiguities are likely to lead to difficulties in carrying out an objective analysis. We will begin by identifying the foreign policy ideology of the Labour Party during the Blair years.

Prior to becoming Prime Minister, Tony Blair was noted for his concentration on domestic affairs and was largely viewed as lacking in Foreign Policy clout (Dyson, 2009: 2-3). Upon entering office however this soon changed. Blair took the leadership role in his relationship with U.S President Clinton and demonstrated, in Kosovo andSierra Leone, the interventionist ideology which was to be the corner stone of labour Party foreign policy for the next ten years. “Those that can act, must” he argued at the Labour Party conference of 2001 (Dyson, 2009: 35). The arrival in 2000 of President Bush to the White House and particularly the attacks of September 11 2001 emboldened Blair in his interventionist ideals.

So what were the aims of the various interventions?

Blair’s willingness to talk in almost biblical terms has been expressly noted by many commentators; “He conceptualises the world as a struggle between good and evil in which his particular vocation is to advance the former.” (Seldon, 2005: 700). Taken at face value this was the aim of Labour Party foreign policy. In Kosovo the ethnic cleansing being carried out by Milosevic had to be stopped; in Sierra Leone civil war was tearing apart the country (Dorman, 2009): in Afghanistan the Taliban had to be removed (first for harbouring Al Qaeda and later more generally for their human rights record) and finally, in Iraq, Saddam was oppressing his people and was also a potential threat to world peace (Omaar, 2004). How successful were these interventions?

The relative peace to be found in Kosovo and inSierra Leonetoday would seem to suggest that those particular forays were indeed successful. Stable governments are now in place and the widespread violence that was typical pre-intervention has come to an end (Dorman, 2009). In these instances the Labour Party and Tony Blair are seen to have acted successfully and in a manner consistent with their ideals.

AfghanistanandIraqare however, not nearly so clear cut. While initially enjoying widespread support for the invasion ofAfghanistanand the hut for Osama Bin Laden, Blair soon found his troops bogged down in an insurgency against formidable opponents, while the purpose of the expedition became more obscure and any measure of success more elusive. As reported by the Guardian, the Taliban were not gotten rid of and remain to this day the dominant opposition to a democratic state (“Top Commander”, 2011); nor was Osama Bin Laden found there, it has it fact become a breathing ground for young jihadists. The huge civilian casualties are the overriding images of that war (UNAMA, 2011). For these reasons the Labour Party’s foreign policy in relation toAfghanistan, their attempt to bring peace and democracy as well to win a major battle in the “war on terror”, can only be judged a failure.

ConsideringIraqand the purported aims of that invasion, i.e. removing a brutal dictator, ending the threat posed by WMDs and bringing democracy to the country, we could say that leadership of the Labour Party succeeded in the first, in the second by default and failed entirely in the last. The civilian death toll inIraq, as impossible as it is to get an exact figure, has certainly been even higher than inAfghanistan(Fischer, 2008). The failure of both the Labour Party inLondonand the Republican Party inWashingtonto advance any real post war strategy has been the fatal flaw in the Iraqi endeavour. The destruction of the infrastructure of democracy that took place during the looting and burning of government buildings inBagdad, whilst American troops looked on, is viewed by many as the most important factor which prevented a successful transition (Omaar, 2004). Therefore, the foreign policy of the Labour party under Blair must here also be judged as being unsuccessful.

It would be irresponsible not to mention another point here. What if the real aims of Labour Party’s foreign policy were not quite so altruistic and not quite so obviousWhen a million people took to the streets of London in 2003 to oppose the war in Iraq (as well as the more veiled disquiet among members of his own party such as Robin Cook and Clare Short (Casey, 2009: 242)) they contended that Tony Blair was merely doing the bidding of, firstly, the oil companies who desired access to Iraq’s rich oil reserves (Wearden, 2011) and secondly the construction companies who would rebuild the country. Whether this is true or not, it is only in these terms that the Labour Party’s foreign policy under Tony Blair could be judged an unequivocal success.

In conclusion, I do not believe on the whole that the foreign policy of the Labour Party under Tony Blair was successful. A careful apolitical analysis of the stated aims and achievements of their policies is enough demonstrate this. It is not clear cut however. There have been occasions such as in Kosovo andSierra Leone where the stated aims of intervention have been achieved and for which the Labour Party, Tony Blair and their collective foreign policy deserve some recognition; not enough to tip the balance however.

Bibliography:

Casey. T, 2009, “The Blair legacy” (Palgrave Macmillan,UK)

Dorman. A, 2009, “Blair’s successful war: British Military intervention in Sierra Leone” (Ashgate Publishing,UK)

Dyson.S, 2009, “The Blair Identity: Leadership and Foreign Policy”, (ManchesterUniversityPress,UK)

Fischer. H, 2008, “CRS report for Congress: Iraqi Civilian Deaths Estimates”, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS22537.pdf (viewed 10am 9/09/11)

Omaar. R, 2004, “Revolution Day: The real story of the battle for Iraq” (Penguin,UK)

Seldon. A, 2005, “Blair” (Free Press, NY)

“Top commander looks ahead to talks with the Taliban”, The Guardian, 25/03/2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/defence-and-security-blog/2011/mar/25/petraeus-taliban?INTCMP=SRCH. (viewed 9.30am 09/09/11)

Wearden. G, “Tony Hayward in line for multimillion windfall after Iraq oil deal”, The Guardian, (7/09/11) http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/sep/07/tony-hayward-windfall-kurdistan (viewed at 12am 9/09/11)

United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) & Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) 2011, “Annual Report 2010 Protection of civilians in armed conflict”, http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/human%20rights/March%20PoC%20Annual%20Report%20Final.pdf (viewed at 9.00am 09/09/11)

‘Foreign policy in Edward’s reign was an ignominious failure’. To what to extent do you agree with this? When analysing the foreign policy of Edward VI’s reign, it is essential that one recognises that Edward was a minor and it was his protectors, the Dukes of Somerset an Northumberland, that were chiefly responsible for England’s foreign policy at this time.

While there is debate on this topic, it is generally documented that the foreign policy of Edward’s reign was not as successful as the previous Tudors.Foreign policy during Somerset’s years of control was dominated, and many would say blighted, by the campaign in Scotland. After a crushing victory at the Battle of Pinkie in September 1547, he set up a network of garrisons in Scotland, stretching as far north as Dundee. This was a great success for England; it is estimated that more than 5000 Scots were killed in the battle and England controlled vast amounts of Scottish land. His initial successes, however, were followed by a loss of direction, as his aim of uniting the countries through conquest became increasingly unrealistic.The garrisons were expensive to maintain, poorly equipped and highly unpopular with the locals. Their inadequacies were particularly evident when the Scots forced the English out of Haddington Castle.

This failed campaign resulted in a treaty between the French and the Scots. England now faced the threat of a French invasion from their northern border as well as from the channel, which put England in an compromising situation and showed Somerset’s poor management of foreign policy.England’s interest with Scotland was in part due to the prospective marriage of Edward and Mary, with the aim to improve relations between the neighbouring countries. Her being taken by the French was a failure of Somerset’s since it undermined English foreign policy and greatened the links between France and Scotland – it was arranged that Mary would instead marry the new French king, Henry II. The French quickly took advantage of the rebellions in the summer of 1549.They abandoned their campaign in Scotland and laid siege to Boulogne, which they subsequently won. The loss of French land was highly unpopular with the English and seriously compromised Somerset.

Moreover, while Somerset’s downfall cannot be directly linked to his failings in foreign policy, there is evidence to suggest that it contributed somewhat. The commanders of the English armies in southern Scotland, Lord Wharton and Lord Grey, sought help from Somerset as to what they should do. They got none.This lack of involvement and commitment by Somerset was eventually to be held against him when he was arrested in 1549. It is important to note Somerset’s lack of success in the field of foreign policy, as this put his successor, the Duke of Northumberland, in an onerous position. England was bankrupt, so raising an army to relieve Boulogne was impossible; Charles V did not offer any support; abandoning Boulogne would be unfavourable. One of Northumberland’s most significant acts in foreign policy was the Treaty of Boulogne on 28 March 1550.

Northumberland was forced to give up Boulogne, and hand over the fortress and all weapons, in return for 400,000 crowns. Also, the French king would no longer pay a pension to the King of England. At first, this result appears quite disastrous and many in England believed the treaty to have been a national disgrace – a humiliating experience against a traditional enemy. However, it is accepted that Northumberland gave in to many of the demands of Henry II because England would have been susceptible to its enemies as the economic situation was not in a state to support war.On the other hand, England and France made a defensive alliance: England would remain neutral in continental wars and it was arranged that Edward would marry the daughter of Henry II, Elizabeth. England did not abandon its claim to the French throne, however. Such an alliance was critical at a time when England was weak and vulnerable to attack.

This treaty, then, was beneficial to England and allowed Northumberland to concentrate on home affairs. The issue of Scotland continued and Northumberland made himself General Warden of the North in 1550.However, after negotiations and pressure from the French, he gave in and it was agreed that the border would be restored to its position before Henry VIII’s campaign. This was another major blow for English foreign policy as it again undermined the successes of Henry VIII and presented weakness to the European powers. England’s economy was heavily reliant on cloth trade with the Netherlands and, in fact, it had been protected by the Intercusus Magnus since 1496. Disaster occurred when trading relations broke down in 1550, due to Charles aversion to Protestantism.He ordered that any Protestants (heretics in his opinion) be arrested.

This brought about a disastrous collapse in the Antwerp cloth market as many Dutch traders were indeed Protestants. This issue was made yet more perilous for England when Charles, perhaps the most powerful man in the world at this time, considered an invasion of England in 1551. Northumberland acted swiftly and put a temporary embargo on trade with the Netherlands, satisfying Charles. Anglo-Imperial relations improved by June 1552, when economic pressures and the need for support forced Charles’ hand.Northumberland’s dealing of this difficult situation again shows his calibre in the field of foreign policy. Relations with the Empire were put under further pressure after the Anglo-French agreements at the treaty of Boulogne. Northumberland resisted the pressure from Charles to aid him in the Hapsburg-Valois wars and instead perused a policy of neutrality, preventing the expense of overseas campaigns.

D. Loades states, “Warwick was above all concerned to avoid any further war, and in that he was completely successful.This was not pusillanimity but common sense. To conclude, while foreign policy cannot be described as a complete success, it should not be labeled an ignominious failure. Somerset’s venture into Scotland was certainly a failure and a cause for his removal. Northumberland’s handling of English foreign policy was undoubtedly conservative and England was often a pawn of European powers, but it was the best approach given the circumstances. Northumberland succeeded in his aims – to avoid war, and he should be judged primarily by this.

• Discuss the impact of the end of the Cold War on US foreign policy

Introduction

When the world famous liberal thinker Francis Fukuyama in his masterpiece declared that we were witnessing the end of the history, he was greeting the new political structure and also the new international environment, which is peaceful. However, developments that occurred after the collapse of the Soviet Union showed us that the dissolution of the Soviets was unexpected. The international society was not ready for peace and Fukuyama’s optimistic assumptions were far from becoming real.

Moreover, the international society currently started to realise that the tension and the potential of mass destructive war during the Cold War era had provided a much more stable and securitize world order for any other periods of the history. Recent developments that occurred after 9/11 attacks showed us that the world is not much securer due to the characteristics of this new type of threat which is commonly known and referred as terrorism. As being the flagship of the Western powers during the Cold War, the US is facing with much more pressure than before.

Post-Cold war developments proved that although the US has the leadership features and military superiority against conventional threats or in other words ‘known’ enemies, it is still lacking of showing the same attributes in the Post-cold War era. This paper is going to analyse the impact of the end of the Cold War on US foreign policy. In order to do it so, it will provide historic background information on Cold War era and also the developments occurred after. Later on this paper will focus on the shifts that occurred in the American foreign policy after the Cold War.

Basics of the Cold War Policies

For almost five decades the Cold War was the main stage for the evolution of international relations. Many institutions, political or military organisations and even international norms and regulations of the Cold War are setting the base even for the modern day politics. Hence the legacy of the Cold War era is still shaping the political, economic and social relationships within, and also in between the states.

Although there is no specific agreement between the historians on when it began, the Cold War is the name given to approximately 50 years long conflict between the Communist block led by Soviet Union and the Western nations led by United States of America. Cold War was a conflict, which did not include any direct military engagements between these two parties. On the other hand, it was fought by various types of means including diplomatic, economic and mostly by propaganda. In general basics of the Cold War era can be grouped under 4 categories.

These are:

Bipolar System

The primary outcome of the Second World War probably was the emergence of two superpowers which created a new and never been before experienced system anytime in the history of international relations called bipolar system. A bipolar system includes two evenly matched powers in this case The US and the Soviet Union. Once allies during and opponents after the Second World War, these two victorious states have became the main actors of the world politics for over 50 years.

The US Foreign Policy of Containment

The Soviet Union and its supporters were declared as the enemy of the free world by the Western states mostly by the US during the Cold War. Although it has been argued that the first indications of hostility between these two states have emerged during The Yalta and Potsdam conferences, the first arguments on the soviet threat have taken place between the American decision makers in late 1940s. The main idea during these arguments was focusing on the essential importance of containing the Soviets, both politically and geographically in order to save and protect the US interests in overseas.

In his reply to the US Treasury Department, George Kennan a former American diplomat, mentioned the expansionist policies of the Soviets and suggested that the US should follow an active foreign policy approach in order to ‘contain’ the Soviets in its current (by late 40s) geographic borders. In following years, when the Truman Doctrine came into action the idea of containment has also become one of the main strategies of the US against its opponent, the Soviets.

Crisis without Major Conflicts

Dissimilarity between the two blocs have produced a series of international crises during the Cold War such as the Soviets intervention in Germany/Berlin (1948), Korean War (1950-1953), Cuban Crisis (1962), Although both parties did not fight or exchange fire against each other. However, they did support the fighting groups and pick sides during these crises according to their national interests.

Second Strike Capability & Mutual Assured Destruction

Both superpowers of the Cold War era were also nuclear powers. They had highly effective and destructive nuclear weapons in their arsenal.

Their nuclear capabilities were the main reason for the tension in the international society, during the Cold War. On the other hand, however this capability of theirs was also the reason why they were no major conflicts or military clashes between these super powers. Each party had the ability to respond to a nuclear attack with powerful nuclear retaliation against the attacking party. This ability is called second-strike capability. Obviously as a result of this nuclear capacity both parties could have completely created a nuclear destruction not only for each other but also for the rest of the world as well.

That is why non- of the superpowers dared to attack the other one with its nuclear powers in order to eliminate the opposition, hostility, competition etc. The competition and increasing awareness on democratic rights did force the Soviets to stand back and make some major policy changes in 1980s. The Soviet Premier of the time Gorbachev tried to set some political and social reforms in the soviet society in order to ease the pressure and help Soviets to continue to survive in the international arena. Moreover, the Soviets did not only make shifts in their internal policies but also in their foreign policy understanding as well.

For instance withdrawal from Afghanistan, signing of various nuclear deterrence agreements with multi parties including the US are some of the key changes that occurred in the 1980s. However, the reforms of Gorbachev did not prevent the Soviets to stop its collapse and eventually after a series of events in 1991 the Soviet Union formally announced its dissolution. The First Ten Years: Although the indications were present well before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world was not completely ready for the end of the Cold War.

The US was left alone without any major balancing opponents. Furthermore, after the dissolution of the Soviets the numbers of newly established independent states have increased significantly. All these new states were lacking of self-governing capabilities and also the Western vision, which was the victorious ideology of the Cold war. Moreover, some researchers courageously support the idea that international environment during the Cold War was much more safer and less hazardous system for the global security issues.

Historian Paul Dukes criticizes the former American decision makers of the Cold War for only “trying to save the day” but not working for the future. He suggests that due to the lack of long-term policies of the US administrators, the world had to face with too many new issues and problems at the same time with of the Cold War. If we generalize the facts before we start analysing the American foreign policy approach to the end of the Cold War, we can see that there are now much more various types of threats then it used to be. The lack of long-term policies has got the world into an uncertainty.

Not only the US but also most of the states got caught out without any preparation to the circumstances of the end of the Cold War. That is way the first decade after the Cold War had a crucial importance for the US to establish, promote and also to maintain its supremacy and leadership around the world. We have seen the effects of the reforms occurred during the 1980s in the Soviet Union on the previous chapters. When these reforms combined with the ne Soviet policy of compromising have eased the tension and created a new dialogue between two superpowers.

The first real challenge of the post-Cold War era was the Gulf War. Despite its historic connections in the UN Security Council meeting the Soviets (later Russian Federation) agreed to take economic sanctions against Iraq. Although it seemed like the first positive international attitude towards a multi polar political system, the US policy makers misinterpreted the facts and started to crate a hegemonic power. The first real post-Cold War indication for America’s attempts to build a hegemonic power is the so-called New World Order (NWO) doctrine of the Senior Bush’s administration.

The NOW came as a response from the US after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi military forces. On September 11, 1990 former US president G. H. Bush addressed the nation prior to a joint session of Congress and underlined the ideals that the US is willing to fight for. Some of the points that Bush underlined are:

• A new structure of international system based on international law and norms under the leadership of the West (particularly the US)
• International cooperation on the issues of nuclear disarmament and the promotion of collective peace

An integrated international financial structure International cooperation on regional issues. In other words lesser sovereignty and much more international/humanitarian interventions. Bush’s NWO have been criticised by various social scientists. In his 1992 article Joseph Nye categorises the NWO as a traditionally realist documentation, due to key points that was emphasised in it such as the leadership of the US. However, another political scientist Freedman argues that the NWO gives special importance to the UN and other multinational institutions and that is why it should be seen as a statement of liberalism and also the promotion of liberal values and norms.

No matter whose opinion is correct, Bush’s NWO is a fine statement of the US foreign policy makers on the Western leadership in the world politics. There is a significant increase on the numbers of US supported ‘humanitarian interventions’ since the end of the Cold War. One of the main reasons for this suitable environment for humanitarian intervention is the emergence of the newly established former communist states. Since the declaration of the NWO the US got more involved in world politics not only under the Bush administration but also under Bush’s successors.

Many of these humanitarian interventions, took place under the president Clinton’s administration especially in the Balkans. In order to understand the logic of these interventions it is essential to point out the main focuses of the Clinton administration. A few weeks after he took the office President Clinton mentioned the new challenges of the post-Cold War world on a speech at the American University. These challenges and goals are:

• To restore the American economy to good health;
• to increase the importance attached to trade and open markets for American business;
• to help the developing countries grow faster;
• to promote democracy in Russia and elsewhere;
• to demonstrate US leadership in the global economy

The former communist states experienced series of problems during their transition periods. They not only suffered from disintegration but also they were also “forced to redefine their national interest and roles in the light of the radical change in the international balance of power”[17]. As a consequence of establishing a sovereign nation state, especially in the Balkans, nationalistic movements grew and tuned into violent acts.

The lack of an opposing superpower helped the US to carry out the flag and start creating its global leadership. The US and its Northern Atlantic allies lunched series of military and civilian actions in order to ease the violence especially in the Balkans. During the Clinton administration US led coalition forces carried out more than 20 military missions in Yugoslavia to put an end to the ongoing violence. Main critics for the US supported missions came from a very familiar place. Although NATO eased the tension in the Balkans with its operations, the Russia was critical of the NATO operations in the Balkans.

Russia prepared a resolution proposal to the UN Security Council to condemn NATO actions in Yugoslavia, though, the proposal was defeated 12-3 during the Security Council meeting, with only Russia, Namibia and China voting in favor of the resolution while NATO member countries along with the temporary members of the Security Council voted against it. Hence, in general due to the sudden changes in the world politics it can be assumed that the uncertain environment and the need of a leading power led the international society to show full support on the US policies and foreign actions.

Post-Cold War

The tragic events of the September 11, 2001did not create a new era such as post-post Cold War. However, they did assist to end a decade of positivity. The attacks have generated a new era and a dimension not only for the US policies but also for the rest of the world as well specifically on the issues of global security. Although the G. W. Bush administration got the full support of international society after the attacks and even during the Afghanistan intervention, with the start of the campaign against Iraq and Saddam Hussein regime the US started to lose its supporters.

The US lost its soft power over the other states and even after President Obama took the office in 2008 elections it looks like the decline will continue. Conclusion: Since the declaration of the Truman Doctrine until the collapse of the Soviet Union, the tension between two major blocks led to many crucial events, which have changed the context of the international relations and also re-framed the understanding of the world politics. The effects of these major events, which occurred during the Cold War, are traceable in contemporary world politics and also in the working structure of today’s international society.

On the other hand, it should be noted that no matter how important are these Cold War based policies, the collapse of the Soviet Union has brought up a new dimension to the international relations. In general the international society faced with new radical changes with the end of the Cold War. The World has seen the implementation of various types of new policy changes in both Western and Eastern blocks. For example instead of fighting with communism the US changed its role as the promoter and the fighter of the democracy and also the global security.

Furthermore, the former communist states focused and forced to rethink on issues of transition and liberalisation as well. The US leadership started to lose its connective power within the first decade of the post 9/11 era. Unfortunately the Bush administration misread the consequences of both post-Cold War and also September 11 attacks. The administration acted much more unilaterally then its predecessor and also its successor. The support on the US supremacy/ leadership will continue to decline unless the US foreign policy makers start to interpreting correctly the current world system.

The World is no longer a secure place. International cooperation and partnership is an essential element in order to fill in the vacuum that created after the Cold War.

References

1. List Cameron, F US Foreign Policy after the Cold War, Routledge, Second Edition, 2006
2. Crockatt, R ‘The end of the cold war’, in J Baylis & S Smith (eds), The Globalization of World Politics, Oxford Press, Second Edition, 2001
3. Dukes, P ‘A long view of the cold war’, History Today, vol. 51, issue. 1, 2006, retrieved on 20 September 2011
4. Evans, G & Newnham, J The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, Penguin, 1998
5. Freedman, L ‘ Order and Disorder in the new world’, Foreign Affairs, Winter 1992 [22]
6. Fukuyama, F ‘The end of history’, in G Tuthail & S Dalby(eds), The Geopolitics Reader, Routledge, Second Edition, 2006
7. Hass, R. N. ‘Defining U. S. foreign policy in a post cold war world’, The DISAM Journal, Fall 2002/Winter 2003
8. Kennan, G. F Memoirs 1925-1950, Pantheon, 1983
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10. Mingst, K Essentials of international Relations, Norton & Company, Second Edition, 2003 Nye, J. S ‘What new world order? Foreign Affairs, Spring 1992
11. Petherick C. J, ‘Bush announces new world financial order’, American Free Press, December 2008, retrieved on 21 September 2011
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17. ‘The Yalta and Potsdam conferences’, BBC UK, retrieved on 20 September 2011
18. Mingst, K Essentials of international Relations, Norton & Company, Second Edition, 2003, p. 40
19. Kennan, G. F Memoirs 1925-1950, Pantheon, 1983, p. 356
20. Evans, G & Newnham, J The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, Penguin, 1998, p. 487
21. Sokoloski, H. D Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and Practice, Strategic Studies Institute, November 2004, p. 5
22. ‘Union of Soviet Socialist Republics’, Encyclopedia Britannica, retrieved on 21 September 2011,
23. Dukes, P ‘A long view of the cold war’, History Today, vol. 51, issue. 1, 2006, retrieved on 20 September 2011
24. Petherick C. J, ‘Bush announces new world financial order’, American Free Press, December 2008, retrieved on 21 September 2011
25. Kessler, B. R ‘ Bush’s new world order: The meaning behind the words’, Air Command and Staff Collage, ACSC Research Department NSW, 1997, pp. 2-4
26. Nye, J. S ‘What new world order? ’ Foreign Affairs, Spring 1992, p. 84
27. Freedman, L Order and Disorder in the new world’, Foreign Affairs, Winter 1992, p. 22
28. Cameron, F US Foreign Policy after the Cold War, Routledge, Second Edition, 2006, p. 19
29. Crockatt, R ‘The end of the cold war’, in J Baylis & S Smith (eds), The Globalization of World Politics, Oxford Press, Second Edition, 2001, p. 93
30. Williams, I ‘Balkan crisis report: The UN’s surprising support’, Institute for War and Peace, 19 April 1999, retrieved on 21 September 2011
31. Hass, R. N. ‘Defining U. S. foreign policy in a post cold war world’, The DISAM Journal, Fall 2002/Winter 2003, p. 31
32. Crockatt, op. cit. p. 93