Navy

World war II was a global military conflict fought in every one of the five continents and involving combatants from every continental region. Fought in two phases, the first phase involved Asia in 1937 and also known as Sino Japenese war. The second phase began in Eupore in 1939 with Germany voilating the treaties and by being aggressive, without any previous declaration invaded poland. The globe was divided into two military alliance: the allies and the Axis powers. Allies primarily were formed by the union of United Kingdom and France, whereas the Germany, Japan and Italy dominted axis powers.

World War II involved over 100 million military personnel, making it the most widespread war in history, and placed the participants in a state of total war, erasing the distinction between civil and military resources. This resulted in the complete exhaustion of a nation’s economic, industrial, and scientific capabilities for the purposes. Tension cretaed due to great depression that swept the world in early 1930s sharpened national rivalries, increased fear and distrust and made masses susceptible to the promises of demagogues.

Also the condition created by post world war I settlement, led to the this global military conflict of world war II. After world war I, defeated germany and ambitious Japan and Italy anxious to increase their power, eventually adopted forms of dictaorship. In Gemany the National socialist Adolf Hitler began a rearming campaign on a massive scale and in mid 1937 and following a marco Bridge incident Japan invaded China. Some tolerance was shown to these invasions as they were of anti communist nature but soon entering of Soviet to aid China marked the division of the global scenario.

America in world war II Through the global turmoil for the power and series of conqest,United states chose to be a isolationist and passed neutrality act in August 1933, a dyanamic impulse to stay aloof from all Europeon politics . But in November 1939, the American neutrality act was amended to allow cash and carry, to support Allies. United stated, to protect and aid china, implemented a series of embargos, including oil, iron, steel and mechanical parts, against Japan.

The Tripartite pact between the Axis powers served as a warning to United States of the consequences resulting in war if it continued extending help to the allied power. But regardless of the pact, the United States continued to support Britain and China, further, by introducing the lend-lease policy and creating a security zone pning roughly half of the Atlantic Ocean, where the United States navy protected British Convoys. Though attacks on America were rare by the Axis power, but ultimately, it was attack on pearl harbour in 1941 that drew United States into direct war .

In later years of 1942 Japan repeatedly attacked America in wars of Aleutian Islands and fort Stevens attack. America- Japan relations Attack on china, led Japan into series of trouble when the move prompted America embargo on oil exports to Japan, which in turn caused the Japanese to plan the takeover of oil supplies of Dutch east India. The attack on the Pearl Harbor was a surprise attack of Japan against the United States naval base on December 7; 1941, also called “a day of infamy” by President Roosevelt .

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, dramatically heralded the new age of naval combat, divided into two phases, the first attack wave targets airfields and battleships. The second wave targets other ships and shipyard facilities. It was intended as a preventive action to remove US pacific fleet that was involved in protection of British Convoys and Dutch East India, and also to wage war against United States. Both the U. S. and Japan had long-standing contingency plans for war in the Pacific, continuously updated as tension between the two countries steadily increased during the 1930s.

Though numerous sanctions were imposed on Japan as a result of steadily growing tension, and America under the export control act halted the shipments of machine tools, high octane gasoline to japan, but the oil export was continued to japan in early pre war years to resist undue provocation. Assets were to be frozen till Indochina was declared as neutral. The Japanese high command was certain, though mistakenly so that an attack on the United Kingdom’s colonies would bring the U. S. into the war. So a preventive strike appeared to be the only way to avoid US interference in the Pacific.

. With the Pacific cleansed of American ships, Japan would have an unchallenged defensive perimeter, stretching from the North Pacific through mid-ocean to the South Pacific. The attack wrecked two US Navy battleships, destroyed several aircrafts, and US suffered huge personnel losses though the, Vital fuel storage, shipyard, maintenance, were not raided. The japanese suffered minimal losses in artiliary and personnels. While it accomplished the intended objective, the attack was pointless. US Navy The new Navy 1890-1909 A crucial date in the reconstitution of U.

S. naval shipyards is 1890 . From about 1850, American shipping and shipbuilding rose from a position of superiority to near international significance. Until the late 1880s the United States possessed no modern warships, and the technological gap widened, where European progress was rapid with the assembly of armor plate, guns, torpedoes, high-speed propulsion systems, and steel hulls. By 1890 American shipyards lagged far behind their European counterparts in techniques and in speed of construction. Progress started in year 1885 with the funding of “new navy”.

Warships of the new American navy built between 1890 and 1909 were steel hulled, purpose-built for steam power, and substantially more complicated than their predecessors. In its first thirty years, armored ships dominated new American naval construction. Between 1910 and 1929 a much wider range of warships was built. Battleships still dominated tonnage figures, and the pace for construction of new ships steadily increased. Both the number and the size of these ships amplified, in the competition to build better warfare compared to European powers, also called “dreadnoughts fever”.

Shipbuilding in World War II World War II saw the U. S. Navy emerge as the world’s largest naval force, a commanding role that would be maintained for the next fifty years. Hallmarks of the two decades included an intensified effort of existing private shipbuilders, massive new construction at government navy yards, and the development of new private shipyards, in new locations, to produce large numbers of small- or medium-sized warships. At a time of near-total national commitment, almost 1. 5 million workers built American warships in dozens of locations.

Destroyers were numerically were the most important warships built during the period. More than 550 full-sized destroyers were eventually launched, because of the German submarine threat, these ships held a very high priority. Pacific produced majority of warships, and some of the mass produced warships were “escort aircraft carrier” at Todd- pacific, and at Kaiser Yards, Vancouver. Also, pacific were specialized war- damaged ships. Submarines were built at a number of yards, but majorly at two locations, Portsmouth Navy Yard, near Portsmouth, New Hampshire; and Electric Boat, at Groton, Connecticut.

Another in land production included the fabrication of almost 1,051 large landing ships, most of them tank-landing ships out of which, more than 60 percent were constructed along inland waters by five major steel-fabricating firms. World War II encompassed a massive national effort for production of massive warships. Pacific fleet A Pacific Fleet was created in 1907 and was marked as the largest naval construction effort ever undertaken by any nation.. Building warships for the U. S navy was a major sector of the American defence industry over a hundred year period during which the growth of the US navy was substantial.

It was also the chief activity of most large American shipyards and had a sizable influence on regional economy and identity. Until May of 1940, this unit was stationed on the west coast of the United States . During the summer of that year, as part of the U. S. response to japanese expansionism and prevent its intrusion into Phillipines, it was instructed to take an “advanced” position at Pearl Harbor,Hawaii. During the time of attack the pearl harbor strength consisted of, nine battleships, three aircrafts, eight light crusiers, 50 destroyers, 33 submarines and 100 patrol bombers.

American battleships can be roughly divided into four groups, pre-dreadnoughts, dreadnoughts, standards and World War II ships Japanese Imperial Navy Japanese imperial navy was one of the most powerful and world third largest navies. Initially, it was built overseas in England but soon Japanese yards built ships on English designs. The advancement in the concept resulted in Ships that were at par or better than any ship afloat. Early years of the war were dominated by the Imperial navy, however in later years it succumbed to the pressure of huge opponent power.

Its naval aviation corps, consisting of 10 aircraft carriers and 1500 topnotch aviators, was the most highly trained and proficient force of its kind. Victory of American Navy over Japanese Imperial Navy America had a period of economic depression prior to commencement of the War, though Japan was also “economically disadvantaged” in waging a war against allies but, its misplaced sense of superiority in economic and military areas, against the allies, led to its ultimate downfall.

While, America in the midst of seemingly interminable economic crisis, still had almost seven times more coal production, five times more steel production, eighty times the automobile production compared to the production of Japan. There is no doubt, however, of the abundance of American resources even though in the depth of depression, it had much more capability for war production compared to any other nation. Also US had nearly twice the population of Japan and hence, the manpower was never a setback.

Around one million people had engaged in war production in America and furthermore, it was ever willing to utilize its women population in the war effort counting work of 6. 5 million women as a tremendous advantage, a concept not acknowledged till later years by the Axis powers. Also, America had some hidden advantages that didn’t show up directly in production figures. First, the U. S. factories were, on average, more modern and automated than those in Europe or in Japan. A rapid boom to the industrialization and technological advantage worked significantly in favor of the US navy.

Additionally, American managerial practice at that time was the best in the world. Together taken, the per capita productivity of the American worker was the highest in the world. The average income of America was seventeen times more compared to that of Japan. By mid-1942, even before U. S. force of arms was being accepted as a most powerful force globally, American factories were nevertheless beginning to make a material effect in the war’s progress. The U. S. churned out seemingly endless quantities of equipment and provision, which were then funneled to forces and provided an endless support.

By 1944, most of the other powers in the war, though still producing furiously, noticed a decline in the economic front and also the production was steadily decreasing from destruction of industrial bases and constriction of resource pools. But the enormous productive apparatus of the U. S. economy was pouring out war munitions in overwhelming volume Especially in Japan, the oils supplies had cut down to a trickle owing to decisive battle of the US against the Japanese imperial navy. And unless Japan could ward off obvious enemy retaliatory blows designed to capitalize on her greatest weakness, vulnerability to blockade,

seizure of the southern areas would be just a hollow and ephemeral event, improving but little the basic weakness of Japan’s economy. The American submarines had specially targeted the oil carriers of Japan, and its only source left was from the Dutch East Indies behind a screen of islands that ran from the Philippines through Formosa and the Ryukyus. . After that the Japanese economy, with the possible exception of oil, was based on the continent and upon Japan proper. Resources proved much less than the expansionist propaganda had previously anticipated. . Inadequate rail facilities made it difficult to bring resources to the coast.

And from mid-1944, due to the attack on shipping, only a small percentage of the material that reached the coast could be transported to Japan proper further leading to commotion. Owing to its large resources backup and abundant manpower, America suffered none of these problems and as a consequence its economy grew at an annual rate of 15% throughout the war years. It is perhaps not surprising that in 1945, the U. S. accounted for over 50% of total global GNP. Battle of Midway. Midway is often cited as the ‘Turning Point in the Pacific’, the ‘Battle that Doomed Japan,’ and a string of other stirring epithets.

And there’s no question that it broke the offensive capability of the Japanese Navy and led to major crisis. The United States built more merchant shipping in the first four and a half months of 1943 than Japan put in the water in seven years and there was really no noticeable increase in Japanese merchant vessel building until 1943, by which time Japan was deeply involved in war with US and was not able to do much. Just as with their escort building programs, the Japanese were operating under a tragically flawed national strategy that dictated that the war with the United States would be a short one.

Again, the United States had to devote a lot of the merchant shipping it built to replace the losses inflicted by the German U-Boats. But the battle of Leyte Gulf, the largest naval battle in history markedly changed the prevalent condition and favored US more than the axis powers. Underlying the Six naval forces, four Japanese and two American, were converging on, a titanic clash spread over three days and 100,000 square miles of sea, engaging 282 ships and 200,000 sailors. In the condition of loss of massive number of war ships and the inability to produce adequately, the Japanese war front was further deteriorated.

.Japan’s own ability to produce basic materials was completely inadequate to support a war against a major in¬dustrial power. In retrospect, it is difficult to comprehend how Japan’s leadership managed to rationalize their way around the economic facts when they contemplated making war on the US. The war ended with Japanese Imperial Navy defeated in shortage of material and personnel resources, while the resources of US were just warming up and could continue for years to come. , Bibliography Keegan John; Who’s who in World War II; routledge; 2002

World War II; Article; The Columbia Encyclopedia; sixth edition 2007 Rohtermund Dietman; Global impact of great depression 1929-1939; routledge; 1996 Heinrichs Waldo; threshold of war: Franklin Roosevelt and American entry into World War II; New York; Oxford university press; 1988 Cull John Nicholas; selling war: the British propaganda campaign against American “neutrality” in World War II; New York; Oxford University press; 1995 Kimball warren F; the most unsordid act: lend-lease, 1939-1941; Baltimore; Johns Hopkins press; 1969

Gregory Urwin; the siege of Wake Island; University of Nebraska press; 1997 Gailey A Harry; The war in the pacific: from Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay; Presidio press; 1995 Sluimers Laszlo; Japanese military and Indonesian independence; Japanese Journal of Southeast Asian studies; Vol 27; 1996 Walters. D. William; American naval shipbuilding 1890-1989; Journal article; the geographical review; Vol 90; 200 Hector C. Bywater; sea power in the pacific: a study of America-Japanese naval problem; Houghton muffin company; 1921

Lindberg Michael; Anglo-American shipbuilding in World War II: A geographical perspective; 2004; Daniel Todd Praeger Padfield peter; the great naval race: The Anglo-German naval rivalry 1900-1914; Birlinn; 2005 George Q Flynn; the mess in Washington: manpower mobilization in World War II; greenwood press; 1979 Kennedy M David; Victory at sea; magazine article; Atlantic monthly; vol 283; March 1999 Barrett Judy, Smith C. David,; US women on the home front in world war II; Journal article; The historian; Vol 57,1994

The First World War or the Great War was primarily a global conflict that was fought in Europe from 1914 to 1918. Some nations were actively involved in this war and among them were Britain and France. All this long America had not being involved in this war . They sought to remain neutral. They had the intentions of being silent both in deeds and thoughts . As a matter of fact, in December 1916 the then president of America Woodrow Wilson had offered himself as a mediator in this European conflict. This idea of being neutral did not go for long following a series of events that were going on between 1915 and 1917.

The Americans lost their lives when German submarine warfare declared the “sinking of ships tradition”. The most hurting was the attack on May 7, 1915 against Lusitanian ship when 128 Americans perished. This broke the relationship between the Americans and Germans. One of the factors that led to joining in this war was President Wilson’s idealism. He persuaded the congress to declare war on Germany . He argued that western civilization could be destroyed or hampered thus his announcement “war to end wars” This was taken to mean that his intention was to create a ground for peace building and prevention of catastrophic future wars.

According to Wilson, the way out to resolving these disputes could only be attributed to issues like ,general association by nations that would form international associations of nations to preach peace for example the league of nations, The Turkish People of Ottoman empire were to become a sovereign. He also looked forward to seeing integrity being granted to Romania, Montenegro, Serbia and Balkan states at the same time Serbia to be given the freedom to use the Adriatic Sea. He wanted the freedom to the seas and free trade. The Italian borders were to be redrawn on lines of nationality.

Wilson wanted the abolishment of secret treaties . Another key factor for joining the war was the economic interests. As these conflicts went on, the Americans were eying on it. It was becoming clear that the British-French alliance was at the verge of loosing the war to the Germans. Their anxiety was attributed to the fact that the Americans were fully involved in financing them. As observed earlier, the turning point for waging war on the Germans was when they declared the “unrestricted warfare on submarines” in January 1917. The trading business ties between the Americans and other central powers had a negative impact.

It was at this point that Americans declared war but there was nothing to do with naval policy as perceived to be. It was about the safe guarding of their economic investment and trade rather than protecting the poor Americans. In another perspective, due to Americans neutral stand, their businessmen were in a position to trade with both sides and got large profits. They were trading with both the Germans and other super powers like the British and French. (Vincent Joseph 2003) As the war went on and continued the private European business and the British government and its allies bought more and more American weapons and non-military goods.

To pay for them, they had to borrow money from American financiers since they had exhausted their resources. This made them earn lots of wealth. Before the World War 1, majority of the American exports went overseas in foreign ships. Unfortunatery when British entered into war, the British navy blocked German ships from conducting and engaging in international trade. The German Navy also halted the British and allied from shipping. This resulted to decrease in the number of ships available for freight and consequently increase in cost of shipping goods.

This made American exporters find it difficult to conduct their business as usual . They reiterated by joining the war with an aim of ending this stalemate. (Allan R Millet2001) America was also influenced to join the war against the Germans by pressure from domestic propaganda campaigns. This was executed by a committee on public information. These propagandas were being conducted by many government committee community leaders who were giving pro-war speeches in many public gatherings. There were private and government vigilante groups that were involved like; the American Protective League.

There was a general harassment and repression on those opposed to Americans joining the war. There were also other forms and means of propagating propaganda and among them were; large print posters, photos, newsreels, magazines and newspapers among other methods. Americans were also influenced to join in the war due to the issue of German Naval policy. In 1917 Germany returned to the policy of unrestricted warfare on submarine. This policy was first introduced in 1915. This naval policy declared the area in the British Isles a war zone.

This meant that the ships trading along these waters and those of neutral states would be attacked by the naval. There were chains of attacks on ships that led to the sinking of the British ship,Lusitania by a German U_boat. Despite the fact that this ship was carrying military equipment and was rather meant for passengers only did not hider the then president of America Woodrow Wilson to declare war on Germany in 1917(Allan R Millet ,2001) In conclusion, the German Naval policy stipulated that, whenever an American ship was found on the Atlantic Ocean and be suspected to be providing military equipment to the British would be destroyed.

The economic interest of the American was to open the trade-links especially in Europe. However, this could not happen because the German U-boats were destroying ships including the Lusitanian which made America join the war. Work cited Allan R Millet, Military effectiveness in First World War, Oxford University Press. (2001) Albert Edward, McKinley World War I McKinley Publishers, London (2002) Vincent Joseph, A concise History of World War I, Oxford University Press, London, (2003).

“My dad is in the Navy,” my high-pitched, six-year-old voice would proudly proclaim when asked what my father’s profession was. Other children’s dads were managers, lawyers, and doctors, which was fine with me, but my dad was a Naval Officer. He sailed on gigantic aircraft carriers for a living. Now that was cool. My family is undoubtedly the thing that sparked my desire to become a Naval Officer: my dad was a Naval Academy graduate, my uncle a Navy doctor, and my grandfather a Naval Flight Officer. For me to join the Navy and become a Naval Officer is a continuance of a tradition generations old.

I would consider it a great honor to be able to follow in their footsteps, but there’s more to my decision than that. I am not blindly pursuing a career as a Naval Officer, I have done endless hours of research on this career choice, and the more research I do about the Navy and Naval Officers, the surer I am that this is what I want to become. Because Naval Officers have played such a large part in my family life, I know what type of person it takes to be one, and what type of extraordinary people they are.

You can recognize them by the pride with which they hold themselves and the confidence with which they speak. They are the people who command battleships, fly jets, and dive submarines, things that most people can only imagine doing. They are willing not only to give up their life for their country, but also to lead likeminded men and women who are willing to do the same. They have to make split second decisions that test who they are and will vastly impact the lives of those under their command. This is the type of person I want to be; I want to be a Naval Officer.

I realize that becoming a Naval Officer isn’t going to be easy, that officers have to go through rigorous mental and physical training before they can receive their commissions. I look forward to the challenge; I know that the intensive training I will undergo on the path to becoming a Naval Officer will make me better physically, mentally, and morally. I know that becoming a Naval Officer will push me to my limits and that the trials I face will result in me becoming the best that I can be. I hope that one day in the future I will have earned the right to call myself a United States Naval Officer.

Introduction

The Royal Navy of the United Kingdom (UK) is the oldest part of Britain’s combat forces and is often referred to as the “Senior Service”. The Naval Service is comprised of the Royal Navy, Royal Marines, Royal Fleet Auxiliary, Fleet Air Arm and reserve forces. From the 18th century up to the end of World War II, the Navy was the world’s principal and most powerful navy. Therefore it played a very important role during the period in keeping Britain’s position as the ultimate ‘superpower.’ The Royal Navy used various strategies and tactics such as the Antwerp, Mesopotamia, Gallipoli and the Zeebruge campaigns. The involvement of various sections of the Royal Navy helped to make sure of victories against serious enemies and opponents of British interests (Benbow 2011). This paper discusses the role of the Royal British Navy during the First World War by analyzing the war tactics they used in varying campaigns both on land and on sea.

In the first place, the Royal Navy was crucial from a defensive point of view, a point made all the more acute by the fact that Britain is an island nation that is relatively isolated geographically. In terms of the home front, therefore, the navy was the first and more imperative line of defence. It must be considered, as an adjunct to this, that the wealth and power of Britain relied in large part on his expansive Empire, which could not have been protected by means other than naval power. It might be argued, of course, that Britain had established effective naval supremacy at the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805 (Benbow 2011; Halpern 1994). However, despite the nation’s best efforts in conflicts such as the Seven Years War, among others, the state of affairs in 1805 had in actual fact been reversed to a significant extent by the turn of the 20th century. By the time of WWI, Britain’s navy was fairly outdated and its competitors were on the ascendant (Benbow 2011).

The changing status quo by WWI made the burden on the navy heavier than ever. It still remained its 19th-century reputation as the ultimate military power and it had massive capacity to move soldiers and vessels across large international spaces territories. It still, moreover, had the capability to prevent rivals from doing similar strategic moving of troops and equipment (Halpern 1994). The floating gun vessels in particular were a devastating tool in the arsenal that frequently made it impossible for foreign leaders to act against Britain. The crucial fact was that the Royal Navy was able to stymie the efforts of foreign powers, making certain that there was always a supply of tradecrafts and raw materials so that Britain’s factories could make and distribute their products overseas. The Laissez Faire economic model that Britain adopted as the basis of its trading would not have been possible without the authority of the Royal Navy (Friedman 2001; Halpern 1994). It is clear, therefore, that regardless of apparent historical supremacy, the navy as important as ever in economic and defensive terms during WWI.

Another aspect of the Royal Navy’s powerful role was control of communications and supply lines, so that it was possible to link up the Empire and control activities across the globe. Throughout the whole period, the Royal Navy’s war preparation and entry into the First World War demonstrates its state-of-the-art operation. This ability, however, arose not just through the navy itself but also the vast and sophisticated underpinning of expertise and strategy. For example, the Royal Navy was backed by a comprehensive research programme into maritime history, careful studies of allied and defensive maneuvers, and knowledge of politics and power in various regions across Europe and beyond (Friedman 2001). An important part of this was that Navy’s role in reconnaissance and observation. It was able to procure information about the capabilities of rivals, for example, whether political, military, or economic.

The strategic role of the navy is best discussed in the context of contemporary events. The Germans marched into France and Belgium in August 1914 and desperately needed a “flying column”. At this time, Britain had between 20 000 to 30 000 navy reservists but could not make sure that all these reservists played a full role. Those parties in charge of strategy concluded that there were enough reserve soldiers to create two groups that would form vital brigades. So, in Britain the Naval Brigades and the Royal Marines Brigade were set up. The brigades became publicly recognized as the RND (Royal Naval Division) and soon after they were sent to Ostend, where they took part in a fierce battle in Antwerp.

This battle demonstrates a number of different things about the strategic important of the navy. On the one hand, it indicates a clear purpose: the opposing of a German threat on the continent which, if unimpeded by the reservists, might have become a serious threat. The Marines were among the only British forces participating at the battle of Antwerp, and they brought about Germany’s withdrawal of a large proportion of their troops from the French front in order to capture of Antwerp (Stephenson 2011). However, the extent to which these soldiers struggled in due to poor training and shortages of proper equipment suggests that at this stage the Royal Navy was of limited strategic value. Thus, the Belgium army, which was comprised of mainly six divisions, was overcome by the Germans at Liege and the River Gate and had to retreat to the stronghold city of Antwerp (Halpern 1994). Had the Royal Navy been more adept in the first place this might never have occurred.

However, the strategic role of the navy in this instance was salvaged to an extent when Winston Churchill, astutely realizing the important of Antwerp, bolstered the city using the Royal Navy Division. In this way, a key strategic position, in terms of Allied shipping, was saved by virtue of the navy. This point is made all the more compelling by the fact that the Belgians were forced to withdraw their forces from the fray on 6t October 1914, opening the path to a German victory. The intervention of the Royal Navy therefore came at a critical moment, heightening its importance (Grove 1987).

The tactics of the Royal Naval Division on this occasion also suggests strategic relevance. An innovative plan was devised by which the troops dug trenches so that they could position themselves strategically during the battle. The aftermath of the battle is also worth mentioning. On 11 October 1914, the residual divisions of the Royal Navy Division arrived back home in England and immediately commenced their training camp in Blanford in Dorset (Jolly 2000). Crucially, they brought with them Belgian experience and the innovation of British armed forces. Changes were made to the training to better prepare the Naval Division as well as the Marine substitutes, that in the future would be selected and serve in Royal Marine battalions. Thus, through the navy’s combat experience and later role in Britain, the capability of the armed forces was enhanced.

The French believed the Germans were on maneuvers in Belgium and sent some ships to trouble the German cavalry which were by now in North of Dunkirk. This maneuver was successful, which managed to give the impression that it was the central army. The British forces began to move ahead towards Brasa and captured Fort Zain. They also stopped efforts by the Turks to obstruct the river so the Turkish forces retreated from Brasa. Then, General Sir Arthur Barrett, the commander of the British army, deployed regiments to the city and the British forces established a strong occupation on 23 November 1914 (Knight 2006). The triumphant campaign allowed the majority of the British troops to return home, leaving only a small garrison. This episode is more than mere narrative. It reveals that for certain periods the Royal Navy was rendered almost redundant in a military sense due to a lack of conflict at sea. This is suggested by the fact that on 28 August, marines were located on ships during the battle of Heligoland, with no lives lost. Later, however, at the Battle of Coronel in November, the British forces experienced a loss of 196 soldiers. One of the last encounters at sea was in 1914 during the Battle of the Falkland Islands in December. The importance of the navy was brought back into focus when, towards the end of 1914, the deadlock between the Western and Eastern Fronts ceased (Friedman 2011). This allowed the British Navy to establish and consolidate maritime control and superiority, but it was not practical to have the opening of a similar instance as Trafalgar. The British administration therefore needed to begin searching for an alternative that would conclude the war.

During December 1914, the strategic importance of the navy on the Western Front became apparent. The British government had responded to a request for assistance from Russia, which was struggling to fight the Turks in the Caucuses. On 2 January 1915, the Secretary of State for War, Field Marshal Lord Kitchener agreed to demonstrate British strength to support Russia (McMillan 2013). Kitchener could not take any troops from the Western Front, so he turned to naval capacities for active involvement. As a result, the best location for action would be the tapered strip of water from the Mediterranean into the Sea of Marmara. The purpose and plan, masterminded by Winston Churchill, was to avoid the Turkish capital, First Lord of the Admiralty. Churchill created a complicated structure of a ‘third Allied front’ which gave tremendous assistance to Russia. The Royal Naval Division, moreover, went on to form an important part of the Mediterranean Expeditionary force (MEF), was which also included the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC), the 29th Division (British Army) and the Royal Naval Division (RND) (Dupuy 1967). Responsibility for the division was given to General Sir Ian Hamilton, The marines’ first conflict was in March 1915, where they targeted Turkish citadels and 22 individuals lost their lives while several others were injured. On 25 April the Plymouth Battalion with a group of 2nd South Wales Borderers landed on “Y” beach where a number of soldiers lost their lives (Churchill 1940). However, these successes were not without setbacks, and it should not be concluded that the Royal Navy was unequivocally of strategic value in these cases. There had been an early problem when the navy initially landed on 25 April and this had given Turkey chance of help to organize their defenses from Germany especially on top of cliffs that gave a direct view of the neighboring beaches and into the interior of the land (Dupuy 1967).

On 28th April, the Chatham Battalion landed on the Anzac shoreline in order to safeguard a beach, and they stayed there until 12th May despite many deaths and casualties. On the 29th April, the Admiralty gave control of the Royal Navy Division to the British War office and it became the 63rd Royal Naval Division. The 63rd also had control of the RM training division located at Blanford (Herwig 1987). During May and June, Royal Marines participated in warfare at the 2nd and 3rd Battles of Krithnia. Additionally, there was action at Achi Baba on the 12th June. The MEF held their initial position at Gallipoli to try and find a conclusion to the struggle (Herwig 1987).

One point of important to note about this episode is that the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (MEF), along with the Royal Navy, experienced various levels of difficulties and higher levels of casualties. This prompted MEF’s withdrawal from Gallipoli, moreover. Winston Churchill’s administration has received severe criticism for the large number of lives lost over this period, and it can reasonably be questioned whether such as campaign can be deemed of strategic value. One might even say it was a strategic folly in human terms; and as Osbourne (2004) points out, the fact that Churchill stepped down from the Admiralty as a result is damning.

Following the activities of this period, more action then took place in the sea rather than on land. The Battle of Jutland was the largest wartime conflict that occurred at sea during World War I. The battle commenced on 31st May 1916 when Germany fired against the British Battle Cruiser regiments. Royal Marines proved their strategic value here, as they were involved in 10% of the most important naval attack on crafts (Osbourne 2004). This proportion comprised mainly RMA whose job during this time was to operate guns. As it got bigger, the battle looked like it was getting out of control. The next day, British demolisher vessels attacked and sunk the Pommern. However in total, the Germans lost 11 ships while the British lost 14 ships, which suggests strategic folly in numerical terms (Osbourne 2004).

In May the same year, RMLI brigades arrived from Gallipoli and were repatriated to France where new resources and weapons were organised. In addition, they were given more manpower and upgraded weapons to machine guns. In July, the RM Company was joined by companies called Howe and Anson the 188th Brigade of the re-titled 63rd RND (Herwig 1987). This group moved to a fairly quiet region of the Western Front. At this point, because of new weapons technology it was necessary to safeguard the line using three trench positions. Common Trench warfare was intended for use in heavy infantry but that was not commonly experienced through the commando tactics of RMLI (Friedman 2011). These battalions became a vital element to the Battle of Ancre Heights near Beaumont Hill. There were financial implications for this battle, as well as many casualties. On 17th April 1917 the 1st and 2nd regiments participated in armed combat at Miraumant and also during the 2nd Battle of the Scarpe later that month. During this armed effort, troops from the 63rd Division took over captured Gavrelle, led by General C. Lawrie. Immediately afterward, the 63rd Division also participated in the Battle of Arleux (Friedman 2011). The RND marched to various regions including Arras and Ypres during the winter weather, carrying heavy army equipment. In Ypres, the battalions trained very hard to prepare for a key offensive on the German border, north of Ypres. When it happened, the attack would take the forces to the strategic location of the Paddebrek stream, in the north region of the canal (Randier 2006).

Because of significant losses earlier that year the 1st and 2nd RMLI contingents joined together to increase their masses numbers. However, at this point, there were some signs that the war was moving towards an end and the Germans begun realizing that their momentum begun to slow down. Finally, on 8th August the British put into place their counter plan to impact on German troops, disturbing all levels of hierarchy in the army, including the German High Command. This appeared to be a possible chance for victory, although it is vital to point out that victory was not guaranteed. On 2nd to 3rd September 1918, the 1st and 3rd Armies fought at the Battle of Drocourt-Queant, alongside the 63rd (RN) division in the Third army (Morison 1942). On 27th September to 1st October 1918, the 1st and 3rd Armies also engaged in combat at the Battle of the Canal du Nord. During this time, the 63rd RN group was once again a component of the third Army (Stephenson 2011; Osbourne 2004).

As has emerged through this essay, the strategic value of the Royal Navy was mixed. Many historians viewed Gallipoli as a catastrophic tragedy, facilitated by confusing tactics and problems that allowed the enemy to prepare for the attack (Stephenson 2011). However, despite awful circumstances, the Marines still managed several successes demonstrating that they were a significant force on the ground in the capacity of infantry. Many of the experiences acquired by soldiers in World War I were valuable resources that were applied again in the experiences they would go through in WWII (Stephenson 2011).

This essay has detailed the many triumphs of the Royal Navy; however, of them all the Zeebruge campaign was arguably the most important in strategic terms (Koerver 2010). After dealing with frightful conditions and dreadful weather, the Marines still managed to carry out their responsibilities and sabotage the canal (Stephenson 2011). Their accomplishments led to an unintentional benefit of giving a confidence boost and momentum for all British soldiers involved in the conflict in other places (Knight 2006).

As a final, but by no means insignificant point, the importance of the Royal Navy as a blockading force deserves a mention. The efforts of the marines and the navy kept Germany surrounded, creating barrier to many trade routes and ports, causing starvation and eventually defeat. This contributed to higher levels of bankruptcy, as Germany exhausted its finances trying to keep up with Britain (Stephenson 2011; Osbourne 2004).

In conclusion, is clear that the Royal Navy was an indispensible strategic tool during WWI. It had the capacity to fight effectively in different environments and landscapes, as has been outlined in the narrative sections of this essay. It was also useful in observing and introducing a wide range of tactics, strategies, and military equipment to Britain, which helped to evolve many modern aspects of warfare that are still with us today (Knight 2006). Its versatility on land and sea, moreover, which has been outlined throughout this essay in description of campaigns, was enormously useful. In concrete terms, the most essential raids that consolidated included Antwerp, Mesopotamia, Gallipoli, and Zeebruge, all of which involved the Royal Navy. Of course, it certainly had its shortcomings, and some of its failures and blunders have been discussed. However, this is an inevitable part of the operations of any force. In the end, while the Germans lost the war for a wide range of reasons, the impact of the British Royal Navy was certainly one of them; it was undoubtedly of great strategic value.

Reference List

Benbow, T Naval Warfare 1914-1918: From Coronel to the Atlantic and Zeebrugge. (Newbury: Amber Books Ltd, 2011)

Churchill, W The Second World War. Vol. 2, Their Finest Hour ( Houghton Mifflin Company, 1949)

Dupuy, T. N. The Military History of World War I: naval and overseas war, 1916-1918. (New York: Franklin Watts, 1967)

Friedman, N., Naval Weapons of World War One: Guns, Torpedoes, Mines, and ASW Weapons of All Nations: An Illustrated Directory (UK: Naval Institute Press 2011).

Grove, E. Vanguard to Trident, (London: Naval Institute Press/The Bodley Head, 1987)

Halpern, P. A Naval History of World War I. The Standard Scholarly Survey. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1994)

Koerver, H. J. German Submarine Warfare 1914 – 1918 in the Eyes of British Intelligence, (Reinisch: LIS 2010)

Herwig, H. H. Luxury Fleet: The Imperial German Navy,1888-1918. (Oxon: Routledge, 1987)

Joll, R. Jackspeak. (UK: Maritime Books, 2000)

Will Knight, UK unveils plans for a new submarine fleet. New Scientist (Environment) 2006,

McMillan, M. The War That Ended Peace: The Road to 1914(London: Profile Books Ltd, 2013)

Morison, E. Admiral Sims and the Modern American Navy. (UK: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1942)

Osbourne, E. W. Britain’s Economic Blockade of Germany, 1914–1919. (London and New York: Routledge 2004).

Randier, J. La Royale: L’histoire illustree de la Marine Nationale Francaise. (Brest: Editions de la Cite, 2006)

Stephenson, D. With our backs to the wall: Victory and defeat in 1918. (UK: Penguin, 2011)

Introduction

This essay examines the claim that the Crimean War (1853-1856) was ‘disastrously planned and poorly executed’ (Economist 2014). The first section looks at the circumstances out of which the war arose, providing some background to the conflict while suggesting that from its inception the war was characterised by errors in judgment and miscommunication. The next section proceeds to discuss the many naval blunders that took place during the war, looking both at the Crimea as well as the less commonly discussed Far East. This is followed by a consideration of the land operations of the conflict, paying particular attention to actions of the British. The analysis then turns to the provisioning of the Allied and Russian forces, as well as the quality of services such as medical care. Finally, the last section briefly considers the consequences of the war for the parties involved. It is concluded that the Crimean War was characterised by an unusually large number of errors in terms of planning and execution.

Poor planning and organisation can arguably be seen from the outbreak of war. The desire to access the Mediterranean had been a long-standing ambition of Russia’s by the mid-19th century (Economist 2014; Lambert 2011). Thus the weakness of the Ottoman Empire in the period was seized upon, partially concealed, of course, by excuses about the persecution of Christian minorities in the Ottoman Empire. The backdrop to this was a broader dispute about who should rule the Holy Land: Orthodox Russia or Catholic France (Clough 1964). The Turkish-Russian dispute included several lacklustre, abortive attempts at peaceful resolution through diplomacy, after which the Russian Army invaded Moldavia and Wallachia (parts of modern-day Moldova and Romania) on 2 July 1853, sinking the Turkish fleet at Sinope in 1853. This was followed by a Turkish declaration of war on 5 October of the same year (Economist 2014).

However, the actions of Russia were to an extent the result of a miscalculation. In spite of a caustic public reaction in Britain and France, the Allied response to the invasion was a cautious one to begin with, characterised by dithering, uncertain diplomacy (Economist 2014). This ‘misled Russia into believing that it could continue its aggression against the Ottomans without consequences’, and Britain and France unexpectedly declared war in March 1854 (Economist 2014). The conflict then escalated when the Kingdom of Sardinia-Piedmont joined the war against Russia the following year. A degree of poor coordination and misunderstanding can therefore be seen from the outset. For Britain and France, this took the form of confused, uncertain policy; for Russia, it was a misinterpretation of the likelihood that other parties would join the war (Lambert 2011). Clough (1964: 917) makes this point succinctly, arguing that war arose from ‘Napoleon’s search for prestige; Nicholas’s quest for control over the Straits; his naive miscalculation of the probable reaction of the European powers; the failure of those powers to make their position and the pressure of public opinion in Britain and Constantinople at crucial moments’. For Clough (1964), therefore, the war was a disorganised, poorly planned shambles from the very beginning. It was the product not only of confusion but also of the hubris and inflated ambitions of the leaders of Europe at the time.

It seems probable that the war arose out of somewhat chaotic circumstances and was therefore tainted from the start, but the question of whether this pattern continued remains. The actual combat side of the war appears to have been shambolic in many cases. This is suggested by the first events of the war. Despite being unyielding in the face of Russian aggression, it seems that Turkey was not prepared for the eventuality of conflict (Economist 2014; Bloy 2002a). When the Russian fleet arrived off Sinope on the southern coast of the Black Sea, the Turkish Admiral was unprepared for battle. His squadron was relatively weak, consisting of only 6 frigates, 3 corvettes, and two small paddle steamers. Additionally, his largest guns were only 24-pounders, and his troops were poorly trained and unready for war. By comparison, the Russian fleet under Admiral Nakhimov was ‘vastly superior in numbers, size and gunpower’ (Brown 1989). The full extent of the imbalance is revealed by the fact that with the exception of one ship the entire Turkish fleet, including 3000 sailors, was destroyed, with the Russians suffering negligible losses. The Turks were not prepared to defend their territories, and probably did not have the ability to do so in any case (Brown 1989).

The dramatic outcome of this conflict was a great shock. Few in the navy or elsewhere had anticipated the devastating effect of shells on wooden ships, and as Brown (1989) notes, ‘Naval and public opinion showed surprise, shock and horror at the casualties’. Therefore, even at this early there is evidence of poor preparation and a lack of understanding of how the war would be conducted on the part of the Turks if not the Russians. The same cannot quite be said of the British and French. While many critics expressed shock at the event of Sinope, preparations had been made. The British had tested shells against the Prince George and the French had done likewise at Garve. Moreover, in response to the success of the Russian navy the French began the construction of heavily fortified armament batteries for coastal attack. That this was prior to the declaration of war suggests a degree of naval preparation on the part of the Allies (Lambert 2011).

Nevertheless, there were serious shortcomings with the British fleet in particular that suggest both poor execution and planning. In the first place, it was wrongly believed that the Russian Baltic fleet might invade the United Kingdom, which turned out to be unjustified and stalled operations for over a year (Brown 1989). This was a strategic error and what it suggests about execution and planning can be debated. Additionally, when the British fleet went into the conflict it had problems with manpower. For example, admirals were promoted by seniority, which meant they tended to be older than was desirable. More importantly, many vessels were undermanned due to the poor pay and conditions on ships. When Britain declared war these problems had yet to be resolved, which indicates a distinct lack of preparedness (Brown 1989).

In recent decades it has been argued by historians that Britain was guilty of extremely poor naval strategy, which would amount to a poor execution of the war on their part. Lambert (1990, cited in Fuller 2014) is among the most famous to put forward this thesis. He argued that ‘the real war could have been decided…in the Baltic, and won by the full might of a modern maritime power against a continental one’ (Fuller 2014: 2). When the strength of the British navy at this time, in terms of size and technology, is considered, this argument seems like a strong one. The British navy was notably ahead of its counterparts insofar as it included large numbers mortar vessels and ironclad batteries. Lambert believed that Cronstadt would definitely have fallen to the heavily armed British flotilla, and that the Russian realisation of this fact what forced peace in the end (Fuller 2014). Perhaps, then, the failure of the British to fully utilise its navy’s potential in the Baltic amounts to a strategic blunder.

It is doubtful, however, that this part of the war was as poorly executed as Lambert argued. As Fuller (2014) notes, unilateral action (the so-called ‘Great Armament’) against Cronstadt might have alienated the French, who were on poor terms with the British. It might also have driven up the cost of the war to unsustainable levels, stretching the economy to breaking point. This much is suggested by a review in 1856 of the ‘Great Armament’, which noted that Britain could not provide any ‘proof of unabated strength and unexhausted resources’ (Fuller 2014: 38). This warning was echoed by Sir George Cornewall Lewis, Chancellor of the Exchequer in Palmerston’s ministry, who expressed concern that ‘our financial prospect is very bad, a declining revenue, rising prices, a large loan wanted which will be got on bad terms, and more money lent to Sardinia and Turkey’ (Fuller 2014: 38). The so-called missed opportunities in the Baltic, therefore, do not suggest poor planning and execution. Nevertheless, one might make the case that the poor financial prospect of Britain by the end of the war suggests a lack of preparation.

Another line of argument, directed once again at the British, focuses on naval operations in the Pacific. Stephan (1969: 257), for example, describes the ‘tragi-comic nature of tactical operations in the Far East’. He notes that despite the overwhelming superiority of the Allied naval forces in around China and the Pacific, almost no headway was made in that sphere. Indeed, the Allies had twenty five ships of war, including six steamers, while the Russians could muster only six which were later reduced to four (Stephan 1969). Poor execution and planning in this case manifested in two ways. In the first place, there was little coordination between the China and Pacific squadrons and the British and French fleets in the area. As Stephan (1969: 258) notes, ‘at the outbreak of war…the British Commander-in-Chief of the China Squadron, Rear Admiral Sir James Stirling, was sailing from Singapore to Hong Kong. The rest of the squadron lay scattered among the Chinese treaty ports such as Shanghai, Amoy, and Canton.’ This arose from the folly of dividing command of the fleet, as well as a lack of information about the location of both friend and foe. Indeed, Stephan (1969) suggests that Stirling (who rather tellingly was only appointed Commander-in-Chief on 4 March), probably did not even know the location of Russian warships.

There is relatively clear evidence that naval operations were fairly shambolic on the part of both the British and the French. The same is true of events on land. The Battle of the River Alma on 20 Sept 1984, for example, saw the British forces charge headlong against a fortified Russian position, the result of a ‘lack of information and lack of reconnoitre’ which meant that a number of easier routes went undiscovered. The British forces only triumphed because such an imprudent move was considered too unlikely to prepare against. The aftermath, moreover, saw poor execution insofar as the cavalry did not pursue the routing Russians, allowing them instead to fortify Sevastopol and thus draw out the war. This was further compounded when disagreements between the French and British commanders delayed the march to Sevastopol by several weeks, after which the city was heavily defended. The most famous of the blunders was, of course, the Charge of Light Brigade during the Battle of Balaclava on 25 Oct 1854, in which a brigade of 670 cavalry under Lord Cardigan attacked an extremely heavily fortified Russian redoubt. The now famous calamity during which much of the Light Brigade was destroyed was the product of a simple miscommunication but reflects deeper issues with the British forces related to internal divisions, inexperience, and the unwillingness to question absurd orders. All of this translates to poor execution in warfare.

In examining the conduct and organisation of the war more generally it is obvious that there was little sophisticated coordination or planning (Sweetman 2001). At every level of the Allied war effort this was true. Within the British army, for example, the artillery and engineers were commanded by the Master-General of Ordinance while the infantry and cavalry were commanded by the Commander-in-Chief at the Horse Guards, Lord Raglan, which made coordinated planning difficult (Sweetman 2001). Then, of course, the Royal Navy was a separate branch of the military, answerable only to the Lords of the Admiralty. This chaotic set-up hindered the Allied offensive at Sevastopol, as Raglan could not coordinate the British forces on land and sea without undertaking time-consuming and inefficient communications (Sweetman 2001). This is not to mention the fact that there was no overall commander with the authority to coordinate the various national armies of each Allied nation, as had been the case during the Peninsula War with the Duke of Wellington. Thus, ‘the entire ramshackle structure palpably lacked coordination’, and it is important to appreciate ‘the constraints that this put on drawing up strategic plans or executing tactical operations’ (Sweetman 2001: 16).

The Russians were less culpable in these terms, although there were many shortcomings in their preparations. Urry (1989) has noted how the Russian land forces suffered severely from poor provisioning, something which became particularly damaging in the summer of 1854. By September, there were 50, 000 Russian troops in the Crimean Peninsula, but the Provisions’ Commission was comparatively small and badly managed. Place this in the geographical context and it appears even more serious. Most of the Crimea was barren and sparsely populated, which meant that the troops and animals in the region were more reliant on their supply chain than usual (Urry 1989). The infrastructure necessary to support the Russian war effort was also inadequate in many cases. Roads were of poor quality and transport networks were badly run and unreliable, which contributed to the problem of supplying the troops. Even those supplies that did arrive had often spoiled because of the excessive time it took to transport goods. This situation was improved somewhat when the new Russian Commander, General Prince M. D. Gorchakov, saw the reorganisation of the supply system, but much of the damage was already done (Urry 1989; Curtiss 1979). This is a clear example of poor preparation on the part of the Russians.

Poor planning in terms of supplies was also a major problem for the Allies. The most striking example of this occurred on 14 November 1854 when a ‘Great Storm’ sunk 30 ships in Balaclava harbour and destroyed ?3 million worth of supplies, coinciding with the onset of the harsh winter. The Allies, however, had only prepared for a summer campaign, and the results were catastrophic. As Bloy (2002a) put it: ‘The Allies…had to make do with summer equipment: tents, light clothes and so on. It took months to re-supply them. Men died of exposure, disease, starvation.’ The situation was compounded by poor organisation and management in the aftermath, as well as the natural barriers of substandard roads and communication networks (Bloy 2002a).

As poor as the organisational side of the war was for all sides, the Russian war effort was comparatively impressive. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the Russian were operating under very difficult conditions. Firstly, the defence of Sevastopol was an inherently problematic affair. The size of Russia required a wide distribution of troops, especially in the Baltic to prevent the Allies landing there (Urry 1989). Then there was uncertainty regarding the neutrality of Prussia, and especially Austria, which meant that troops had to be stationed along Russia’s lengthy western border. The barren nature of much of the Russian territory, moreover, especially in the south, was an unfortunate barrier that hampered supply, communication, and the movement of troops (Urry 1989). As Urry (1989) argues, these factors contributed to difficulties experienced by the Russians, and in many cases even good preparation and execution would have made it difficult to overcome such factors. On the other, one might argue that the decision to start a war in the face of so many natural barriers should be regarded as a major strategic failure (Jones 2013; Bloy 2002a).

One area in which all parties lacked planning was medical provision. The low quality of care afforded to wounded soldiers in British hospitals has become notorious primarily because of Florence Nightingale’s work as Scutari. The quality of French medical care was supposedly slightly better, as is attested by William Howard Russell: ‘Here the French are greatly our superiors. Their medical arrangements are extremely good… and they have the help of the Sisters of Charity…. These devoted women are excellent nurses.’ Nevertheless, even this relied on volunteers (Curtiss 1966: 98). The Russians likewise had to rely on volunteers, who operated under the aegis of the Exaltation of the Cross (Curtiss 1966). Testimony from the brace medical volunteers in the Russians forces reveals the shoddy set-up in place, especially with regard to the convoy system designed to transport wounded soldiers. This was supposedly poorly supplied with blankets, had few good drivers, and little in the way of food and water (Curtiss 1979; Curtiss 1966).

The Crimean War was concluded peacefully at the Treaty of Paris on 30 March 1856 after the fall of Sevastopol, probably to the advantage of all parties. The conflict itself was of little obvious benefit to any nation, with the possible exception of Turkey, which had captured possessions restored to it by Russia (Bloy 2002a; Seton-Watson 1988). In turn, regions captured by the Allies, such as Sevastopol and Balaclava, were restored. Territories were thus redistributed to the participants in much the same way as before the war had begun. One of the most important effects of war was that it prohibited both Turkey and Russia from establishing a naval or military arsenal on the Black Sea, which weakened the Russian position. However, this turned out to be unenforceable and a few decades later Russia had violated the agreement (Gorizontov 2012; Seton-Watson 1988). The conflict did have important long-term implication insofar as it permanently weakened the position of Tsarist Russia, and saw the ascendency of the France as the preeminent power in Europe. It therefore saw the end of the Concert of Europe, the balance of power that had existed since the Congress of Vienna in 1815 (Bloy 2002a, 2002b).

In conclusion, the Crimean War was both poorly planned and poorly executed. This essay has outlined the numerous strategic, tactical, and logistical failures perpetrated by all sides, but especially by the Allies and Britain in particular. However, as important as these moments were in defining the nature of the conflict and solidifying its reputation, it was problematic from the outset. As Clough (1964: 917) puts it: ‘it was not the result of a calculated plan, nor even of hasty last-minute decisions made under stress. It was the consequence of more than two years of fatal blundering in slow-motion by inept statesmen who had months to reflect upon the actions they took.’ Ultimately, while there are many mitigating factors, moments of triumph, and cases of heroism and coordination – especially in the medical sphere – this is a reputation well-deserved.

References

Bloy, M. (2002a) The Crimean War: ‘Britain in Blunderland’, The Victorian Web http://www.victorianweb.org/history/crimea/blunder2.html [Retrieved 10/06/2014]

Bloy, M. (2002b) The Crimean War: comment on attitudes in Britain, The Victorian Web http://www.victorianweb.org/history/crimea/attitude.html [Retrieved 10/06/2014]

Brown, D. K. (1989) The Royal Navy in the Crimean War: Technological Advances http://www.worldnavalships.com/forums/showthread.php?t=14517 [Retrieved 04/06/2014]

Clough, S. B., ed. (1964) A History of the Western World. Boston, Heath: University of Michigan Press

Curtiss, J. S. (1979) Russia’s Crimean War, Durham, N.C: Duke University Press

Curtiss, J. S. (1966) Russian Sisters of Mercy in the Crimea, 1854-1855, Slavic Review, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 84-100

Fuller, H. J. (2014) Could Have, Would Have, Should HaveEngland’s ‘Great Armament’ during the Crimean War, the proposed naval assault upon Cronstadt’s defences and the Peace of 1856: Re-examining the evidence, University of Wolverhampton

Gorizontov, L. E. (2012) ‘The Crimean War as a Test of Russia’s Imperial Durability’, Russian Studies in History 51 (1), pp. 65–94

Jones, H. P. (2012) Southern Military Interests in the Crimean War, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 25, pp. 35–52

Lambert, A. (2011) The Crimean War: British Grand Strategy against Russia, 1853–56, Farnham: Ashgate Publishing

Seton-Watson, H. (1988) The Russian Empire 1801–1917. Oxford: Clarendon Press

Stephan, J. J. (1969) The Crimean War in the Far East, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 257-277

Sweetman, J. (2001) The Crimean War: 1854-1856, Oxford: Osprey Publishing

The Economist (May 2014) What the original Crimean war was all about, Economist http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/03/economist-explains-5 [Retrieved 11/06/2014]

Urry, J. (1989) Mennonites and the Crimean War, 1854 – 1856, Journal of Mennonite Studies, Vol. 7, pp.10-32

What was the main cause of the United States joining World War 1 because of the Germans resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare

Research Question: To what extent did the U.S. enter World War 1 because of unrestricted submarine warfare used by the Germans.

Question: This essay will be investigated in this research paper is; To what extent did the U.S. enter World War 1 because of unrestricted submarine warfare used by the Germans. The purpose of the essay is to find out whether the U.S. joined World War 1 just because of the use of unrestricted submarine warfare.

The historical significance of this research question is because on February 1917, Germany, determined to win its war of attrition against the Allies, resumed its policy of unrestricted submarine warfare in war-zone waters. A few days later, America declared war on Germany and broke off any diplomatic relations with the Germans because an American liner was sunk by a German U-boat. The significance from is that if it wasn’t for the U.S. entering World War 1 we wouldn’t be here, and the people I cared about as well.

The main reason why World War One was mainly because of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand on June 28, 1914, in Sarajevo. Historians believe that there were a number of different factors that contributed to the Great Powers that made the war broke out on such a large scale. On January 9th, 1917 the Germans announced that they would resume their use of unrestricted submarine warfare. Therefore it played a major role in World War One as well as being one of the main reason the Americans joined the allies.

When Bethmann Hollweg the German Chancellor announced that her country intention to resume the use of unrestricted submarine warfare, his biggest fear was that it would instigate the United States entering – and later on he found out he was correct. Some people might ask themselves why did the Germans have tiresome a tactic that would provoke the United States, a powerful country with enough troops to eliminate them. Close to the beginning of 1917, the Germans were struggling on the western front.

When the use of unrestricted submarine warfare was used the Germans thought that it might be enough to keep the United States out of the war, it was mainly an act of cowardliness because the Germans were very desperate (” WW1 US Involvement “). When the German Navy could not defeat the Royal Navy during the Battle of Jutland they realized they were very weak. The U-boats impact was overestimated, at the start of the war they were successful with this tactic on British naval targets but later on, success was uncommon.

One of the first commercial targets attacked by U-boats was in February of 1915 because it was a piecemeal campaign. At the end of January of 1917 when Chancellor Hollweg, was convinced by officers in the German Imperial Navy and then ordered the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare. The one reason that made Hollweg doubt herself was the sinking of neutral ships. This was major because the United States was neutral and this would be a major turning point of the war leading to the defeat of the Germans.

During this time the United States sailed very frequently across the Atlantic with supplies for the Allies. By February 18th of 1915 Germany had announced that it would begin a war against the nation’s trading with the British. Among those nations was the United States and the Americans replied with a letter to Berlin stating that it would be responsible for any sunken ships. The Germans knew if the United States joined the war they would be defeated, therefore Chancellor Hollweg convinced the naval officers to exclude neutral ships especially ones from America.

Near the end of February of 1915, the U-boat commerce had begun. In March 1915, about 5000 ships sailed and departed from British ports an only 21 were attacked. As a result, neutral shipping was thought to be safe from the neutral nations. On May 7th, 1915, the Germans made a big mistake by sinking the ‘Lusitania’ a British liner. 128 American citizens were on the liner and died which caused an outrage in America, but that was not enough to convince President Woodrow Wilson to declared war on Germany. on July 23rd,1915, another note was written by Wilson stating that the Germans changed their ways of attacking by a submarine.

The method to sink the Lusitania’ was for a U-boat to come up to the surface and use newly equipped deck guns to destroy ships. Any neutral ship not carrying contraband was allowed to pass and enter the port it was sailing to. Any neutral ship that had contraband was sunk – but after the crew had got into the lifeboats. This seemed enough for Wilson to remain neutral in 1915. When President Wilson broke off ties with Germany trying to bring them to their senses.

When Wilson realized that the Germans would not come to their senses the United States relationship with Germany became very tense. Wilson was trying to avoid war as long as he could but once the British intercepted a message from the Germans to the Mexicans offering support to take back California this is known as the Zimmerman Telegram. Seven American ships holding goods to trade were sunk by the Germans by March 21st, Wilson then called upon Congress on April 6th, 1917, and America entered World War One.

Economic: Some historians believe that the main reason for the United States to join World War One might be for economic purposes. Most Americans who were wealthy businessmen wanted the Allies to win because the helped fund the French as well the British which would make them about three billion in loans and bond purchases. But if the Allies had been defeated the countries could not repay their debts, therefore, they supported ‘Preparedness Movement’ which was used for campaigning on joining the allied forces in the war.

Conclusion: The conclusion that I reached was to a significant extent that the United States joined World War One because of the use of unrestricted submarine warfare used by the Germans because of desperation. Even though there were many other reasons as well.

The sources used in the essay are from scholarly articles in different databases. Some are general accounts of the different battles that occurred during WWI.

Historical Significance: This research question is significant to me because I have always had a passion for learning about the significance of World War I. I’ve watched a lot of documentaries on WWI and the use of unrestricted submarine warfare that’s on youtube. While learning about the war, the most interesting part to me was the battle of Jutland because it was the only major battle fought on the sea. Also, I visited the Century Tower which is 157 feet tall and its beautiful memorial.

Scope

This essay will be covering significant of World War One from 1914-1918. The thesis statement is, to what extent did the United States enter World War One because of the use of unrestricted submarine warfare used by the Germans? The reason I am investigating this is that I am trying to find the main why the United States joined World War 1. The structure used to develop the argument is to talk about some of the important battles leading up to the structure used to develop the argument is to talk about some of the important battles leading up to the United States joining World War One, then I will analyze the effects of the United States had on the war.

Political:

Treaty of Versailles:

Their seven different terms Germany had to abide by the first term was to hand over all overseas, term two was that Germany could only have an army of 100,000 men maximum, term three was that Germany’s navy could only have six battleships with zero submarines, term four they were not allowed to have or use an air force, term five the west side of Germany would be demilitarized, term six Austria and Germany could not reunite, and term seven Germany had to take the blame and accept the ‘War Guilt Cause’ and pay back war reparations.

Perspectives

”Note by President Woodrow Wilson about the Armistice, November 11, 1918”
“In the October 2017 issue of Social Education, the journal of the National Council for the Social Studies, our “Sources and Strategies” article features two manuscript documents from individuals with very different responses to the armistice that ended the major fighting of World War I. One was a letter by President Woodrow Wilson who jotted down a few sentences to notify the people of the United States that the war was at its end. This letter is part of the Woodrow Wilson Papers in the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress, which includes more than 200,000 items related to Wilson’s life and presidential administration (“Today in History – April 14”). The letter also appears in the Library’s exhibition “Echoes of the Great War: American Experiences of World War I.”

”Page from the diary of Private Harry Frieman, November 11, 1918”
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“The other document is diary entry by Private Harry Frieman, a U.S. infantryman fighting in France. Frieman’s diary is held by the Veterans History Project at the Library of Congress, along with firsthand accounts from thousands of veterans of World War I and all U.S. conflicts since. A sidebar describes the Library’s current efforts to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the United States’ participation in the war, including a new World War One Topic Page that brings together resources from across the Library.”

These two documents were written at about the same time, but they represent complete opposite perspectives on World War One and the ending. President Woodrow Wilson letter, written on the White House stationery, had an international point of view armistice, he spent most of the time writing about the role the United States would be taking in assisting the former combatants and initiating “just democracy throughout the world.”

Private Harry Frieman’s diary, although jotted down a personal letter about the end of the war. He explains that his squad was going to advance on enemy troops in foggy weather, but in the nick of time, the commanding officer told his troops to cease fire around 11 am. The shooting stopped at around 11 am and the fog had lifted, Frieman’s squad realized that they had been surrounded by German soldiers. “If the war would have kept up a few hours longer there wouldn’t be many of us left to tell about it.”

World War One Stats

World War One is also known as the “Great War” was an international war, most of the battles were fought in narrow trenches and most soldiers were equipped with machine guns. The battles that were fought on the ocean and the coast we bombed by warships provided by the Germans. The planes were rarely used for fighting, they were mostly for scouting out the enemies. However when the battles were fought in the air as well as air raid s the Germans used zeppelins.

While the soldiers were off at war the civilians worked in factories and produce weapons, equipment, supplies for troops, and gun ammunition. The doctors and nurses on and off the battlefield cared for hundreds of thousands of wounded and sick soldiers. The allied countries involved in WWI were Great Britain, Canada, United States, Australia, New Zealand, Russia, France, Greece, India, Italy, Serbia, and South Africa. Their casualties in total were approximately 9.37 million; 60% were from the military and the remaining 40% were civilians while approximately 12.8 million were wounded from the military.

The central powers countries involved in WWI were Germany, Bulgaria, Austria-Hungary, and Ottoman (Turkey) Empire. Their casualties in total were approximately 9.22 million; 43.6% were from the military and the remaining 56.4% were civilians while approximately 8.42 million were wounded from the military. Battles were on the Western Front in Europe plus in Italy, Gallipoli, Greece, the Balkan Peninsula, Africa, the Middle East, and the Falkland Islands, to name only a few. Globally, WWI losses consisted of 9,720,450 casualties from the military and 8,865,650 civilians while 19,769,102 were wounded from the military.

In WWI, many weapons and technologies were used for the first time including Trench Warfare, Airships ; Planes, Tanks, Trucks ; Submarines, Wireless Communication (Telegraph), Machine Guns ; Long Range Artillery, Chemical Warfare (poisonous gas), and Flame Throwers. The estimated cost of WWI fro the major countries involved was $186,333,637,000; the allied powers endured 67.45% of it while the central powers endured the remaining 32.55%.

The total troops deployed were 65,038,810; 13.13% were killed and 32.63% were wounded. 64.87% of the troops were deployed by the allied powers while the central powers deployed the remaining 35.13%. The total number of the allied powers troops that were killed was 5,152,115 while 3,386,200 troops were killed from the central powers side. The total number of the allied powers troops that were wounded was 12,831,000 while 8,388,448 troops were wounded from the central powers side.

Germany endured most of the cost and it was about 20.3%, 18.96% by Great Britain, 13.02% by France, 12.14% by the United States, 11.96% by Russia, 0.009% by Canada, and 0.0062% by Belgium. Russia deployed 12 million troops; 1.7 million were killed and 4.295 million were wounded, Germany deployed 11 million troops; 1.77 million were killed and 4.2 million were wounded, Great Britain deployed 8.9 million troops;

908,371 were killed and 2.09 million were wounded, the United States deployed 4.335 million troops; 126,000 were killed and 264,000 were wounded, France deployed 8.41 million troops; 1.358 million were killed and 4.266 were wounded, Belgium deployed 267,000 troops; 13,716 were killed and 44,686 were wounded, and Canada deployed 619,500 troops; 66,655 were killed and 172,950 were wounded.

League of Nations

The League of Nations was founded as a result of the Treaty of Versailles which was the meeting of the victorious Allied Powers following the end of World War I to set goals such as disarmament the defeated Central Powers, preventing war through collective security, improving global welfare, and settling disputes between countries through negotiation diplomacy. Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and the United States controlled the talks in Paris.

The U.S. proposed the idea of peace without victory and wanted to make sure that Germany was not treated too harshly but France and Britain saw that punishing Germany was the only way to justify the costs of the war. In the end, The U.S. compromised on the treatment of Germany to ensure its weakness to push through its idea; a peacekeeping organization called the League of Nations which was founded on 10 January 1920.

In 1920 the League created its Mandates Commission to protect minorities and look after the former colonies of Germany and Turkey. The League had 42 founding members although the U.S., USSR and Germany were not members. It began organizational work in the fall of 1919  with a headquarters in London before moving to Geneva. The League lasted for 26 years then it was replaced by the United Nations (UN) after the WWII and took control of several agencies and organizations founded by the League. In 1944, the United Nations held its first planning conference in San Francisco, ending any need for the League of Nations. The League of Nations was  officially dissolved in 1946

Persuasive Essay: In Harm’s Way The sinking of the USS Indianapolis was a horrible event, which killed hundreds of soldiers, and left hundreds floating adrift in the sea with swarms of sharks circling around them. Captain McVay, the captain of the Indianapolis, was charged with negligence. Truly, Captain McVay did his job with what he had, and should not be the scapegoat for the navy. Generals, Lieutenants, and Commodores are all partially responsible for the sinking due to negligence, miss communication, and important top-secret intelligence.

Captain McVay did nothing wrong, and did a great job as Captain with the knowledge and information that he was aware of. Inconsistent communication and information that were out of McVay’s control are responsible for the sinking of the USS Indianapolis. Captain McVay was an experienced captain and knew what needed to be done to run the ship and the procedures to travel safely during a period where Japanese subs were everywhere waiting to take down American ships. When the USS Indianapolis left San Francisco, McVay had a crew that was not experienced.

Therefore, he requested to have his crew be trained and was promised that training would take place in Guam when they arrived. When they arrived to Guam the crew was not completely trained. If an emergency were to happen, the crew would not be trained properly, which would result in many deaths. McVay was not being negligent, he knew what needed to be done in advanced and the navy denied his request. With a crew that was not very experienced, McVay was about to sail from the Marianas Sea Frontier into the Philippine Sea Frontier, a passage that had a navy communication conflict between Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur.

The political conflict between Nimitz and MacArthur was somewhat resolved because Nimitiz ended up getting control. However, there was still tension between them that caused information about ships and important facts to sometimes become lost. During this time, the passage was dangerous due to Japanese subs and with inconsistent communication, The USS Indianapolis could be in trouble and communication could get lost. The ship was not equipped with sonar because it wasn’t used for finding and hunting down subs.

McVay was aware of this and how dangerous it was to cross to Leyte. Aware of the dangers, McVay requested an escort to assist with a safe sail to Leyte. Lieutenant Waldron, the convoy routing officer then called to request an escort “Waldron inquired of the officer on duty whether there was an escort leaving for Leyte, with whom the Indianapolis might tag along. Waldron was told that none was necessary”(Stanton 70). McVay did his duty by requesting the escort however; Captain Oliver Naquin was the one who denied it.

As Captain, McVay had to rely on mainland communication and intelligence. “naval command assumed that she could travel safely in the backwater unescorted”(70). Even if McVay disagreed with their decision, he would still have to follow orders. With no escort, McVay follow protocol to steer the ship to decrease the risk of getting hit by a torpedo and requested an intelligence report for the whereabouts of enemy subs. McVay knew to travel in a zigzag direction, which made the ship harder to hit. He was to follow a zigzag course during daylight hours, and at night, at his discretion, during periods of good visibility”(71). McVay followed this order but when the Indianapolis was hit, it was at night when McVay was sleeping and not zigzagging. The Navy blamed McVay for not zigzagging when the ship was hit, Zigzagging was only required by the navy during daylight. Also, the naval command thought it was going to be a safe sail unescorted in which McVay would obviously have to trust and agree with. This ended up being false and making his trip more dangers than expected.

McVay took action and requested an intelligence report to be aware of any enemy subs since he had no escort. When McVay received the intelligence report, the most crucial and important information was not given. “Three days earlier, the USS Underhill, a destroyer escort, had been sunk by a Japanese torpedo”(72). This message was kept a secret, neither McVay or anyone that he was communicating with was aware of this attack. However, this was crucial information for McVay, because the attacked happened in the same route as the USS Indianapolis.

Commodore James Carter met with McVay at the CINCPAC headquarters and was aware of the attack but neglected to mention it to McVay. Communication was a big factor in the attack of the USS Indianapolis and even when the ship sank, successful SOS messages did not get communicated right resulting in a delayed rescued mission. Before the ship went down SOS and even the ships coordinates were sent out multiple times to multiple communication stations. One of the messages was received at Leyte and Commodore Gillette sent out tugboats out to the location of the sinking.

After seven hours of the twenty-one hours initial trip, Gillette ordered the tugs to abort and come back to Leyte. McVay did the right procedures during the sinking; Gillette on the other hand was negligent and did not further investigate the reported sinking. Many of the other messages that were received were either ignored or thought to be fake distress calls from the Japanese. Throughout World War two, consistent communication was very difficult. Japan was intercepting America’s communication and getting leads throughout the war.

This caused inconsistent communication and intelligences, which resulted in disasters such as the USS Indianapolis because information was not being provided correctly. The navy new of such crucial information that was very important to the USS Indianapolis such as, the sinking of a navy ship three days before the Indy. The Indianapolis was carrying atomic bombs making its delivery very important even though very few people knew about the bombs. The navy was negligent for doing this, and if McVay had known about the secret information, he would have changed his tactics to make sure he completed his mission.