Soviet Union

The New Frontier a term used by John F. Kennedy in his inaugural speech in 1960 that revealed Presidents Kennedy’s intention to create programs to aid in economic, International and social issues with a clear focus on key points such as Increasing the economy, creating international aid programs, adding to national defense, and the creation of a more ambitious space program. Although met with resistance from congress President Kennedy was able to fulfill some of the Initiatives mapped In his acceptance speech.

Economically, he was able to pass bills providing financial lad to depressed Industrial and rural areas (Davidson, 2005), Increased the minimum wage and blocked big business from price gauging. Socially, he was an advocate for call rights for minorities and women. Internationally, President Kennedy accomplished two major agendas with creation of the Peace Corps and the Alliance for Progress. The peace Corps concentration was education In poorer nations and the Alliance for

Progress focused on assisting Latin American with health and education. President Kennedy increased the armed forces ground troops and signed an agreement with the Soviet union to limit nuclear testing to underground only. He also advocated the expansion of the U. S. Space program including challenging congress to authorize a manned space mission to the moon in efforts to surpass the Russian cosmonaut orbiting the world after Kennedy’s inauguration.

Despite resistance from Congress ND his untimely death President Kennedy’s New Frontier Program in many ways was considered a great success by influencing reform socially, economically. Internationally and politically. References Davidson, J. (2005). Nations of nations: A concise narrative of the American republic. New York: McGraw-Hill. New Frontier. (2012, March 24). In Wisped, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 05:33, April 13, 2012, from http://en. Wisped. Org/w/index. PH? Title-New

Stephen Wears Assess the mall factors of the break-up of the soviet Union The break up and dissolution of the soviet union on the 25th December 1991 heralded the end of the Cold War. It ushered In what had been termed ‘the new world order’, furthermore, it was suggested by Francis Fauvism to have signaled the end of history and the battle of ideas which had dominated much of the twentieth century (Huntington, 1996; 31). The ‘clash of civilizations’ had already seen the demise of fascism as a credible force in 1945, the close of 1991 would see the end of communism in Europe.

The relatively sudden collapse of the USSR has compelled winkers and analysts to seek answers as to why the world’s second superpower could collapse so quickly and so utterly. Can it be attributed to one single catastrophic event, or is it far more appropriate to place blame on a number of contributing factors? The controversy surrounding the collapse of the USSR has been compared to the collapse of the Roman Empire among others and will also continue to be interpreted and reinterpreted for many years to come (Liqueur 1993; 387).

This essay will look at some of the factors which lead to dissolution and assess the importance of each. The key issues that this essay will assess include the problem of he nationalities, the Geographer factor, economic problems, and the social and political upheavals caused by Perestroika and Glasnost. The Geographer factor must be viewed In the context of state of the country he Inherited from his predecessors coupled with the effects of Glasnost and Perestroika. It has been suggested that Glasnost and Perestroika played key roles in hastening the collapse of the world’s second superpower.

Glasnost (meaning openness) allowed people to see the flaws In the system and questions were raised as to whether or not communism had been good for Russia. Perestroika (meaning restructuring) also highlighted flaws in the lattice and bureaucratic system that could not be given a quick fix. The economic problems of the USSR have also been cited as a considerable factor in the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The command economy had stifled Innovation and its existence outside of the world economy had caused major problems. Further to this the USSR could not keep up with the military spending of the USA during the 1 sass.

Competing against the military spending of the Reagan Administration as well as fighting a protracted war against the Munched in Afghanistan had all but exhausted the economy of the USSR. The nationalities provided a great problem for any ideas of national unity. It has been argued by Lord William Wallace that it would be very difficult for the European union evolve into a unified state because there is a lack of identity and little sense to shared history across the continent (Smith, 2005). This is the same problem facing attempts by soviet leaders to foster a single soviet nationality.

The very same Issue had been faced by the Tsarist system before It. One of the few things the nationalities had in common was the centuries of Russian domination. Sitting on what 75 years before had been the Tsarist Russian Empire, the Soviet union faced same problem as had the Tsarist regime, namely the Incredibly republics of the USSR, was made up of many smaller semi-autonomous republics. Russians formed the biggest ethnic group at Just over 50%, followed by the Ukrainians with 15% of the total population. Other nationalities included Zebu; Biliousness; Khaki and Volta Attar among many others.

The downfall of the Soviet Union gave an opportunity for peoples across the vast territory from Kampuchea to the Kola Peninsula to glamour for recognition (Dukes, 1998; 332). This suggests that the problem of the nationalities would continue to e a headache for the newly formed Russian Federation. The rise of nationalism added to the troubles faced by the Kremlin during the sass. The growth of the Transactions and Baltic Popular Fronts had brought the problem of the nationalities to the fore when in 1989 the Red Army entered Tidbits to assist the Georgian authorities in putting down a rally.

Soviet troops were also used to prop up the communist government of Azerbaijan under threat from nationalist forces (Chubbier, 2001; 195). The Baltic States did not Join the chorus of statements of sovereignty which had come from Astrakhan and Ukraine, this was because they regarded their incorporation into the USSR as an illegal act. They challenged the legality of the Molotov – Robertson pact of 1939 and achieved international support in the form of the American refusal to recognize the annexation of the region (Strayed, 1998; 152-153).

The policy of Perestroika can be seen as the catalyst for the increase in nationalism as the planned restructuring of the USSR exposed fundamental flaws in the Soviet system. The policy of Glasnost also exposed corruption within the Caucasian and Central Asian republics, Geographer responded by replacing the Khaki Communist Party leader Sunken with a Russian. This caused a great deal of rioting in Almost (Strayed, 1998; 150-151). Further to the rise of popular front movements within the constituent republics, the Soviet Union was also facing a crisis with its East European satellites due in part to the policies of Glasnost and Perestroika.

Glasnost and Perestroika are often cited as the most important factors in speeding the demise of the Soviet Union. Eric Hobbies claims that the only thing that made the soviet system work was the command structure of the party and the state which had been inherited from the days of Stalin (1995; 480). Once again it mimed that reform from the top was going to introduce fundamental change which was to be ultimately uncontrollable. Hobbies also suggests that ‘glasnost amounted to the disintegration of authority’ and ‘perestroika amounted to the destruction of the old mechanisms which made the economy work’ (1995; 483).

Perestroika had to an extent legalized dissent, and groups in cities across the USSR began forming larger political groups known as ‘clubs of socially active citizens’ (Chubbier, 2001; 190). This radical departure from the Soviet norm of suppressing membership of political parties other than the Communist Party was acclimated by the decision to stop arrests on the grounds of political activity. The release of political prisoners saw the growth of new organizations outside of the Soviet system, however by 1988 this opposition numbered Just a few thousand (Chubbier, 2001; 191).

Glasnost played a major part in the unraveling of the Soviet Union. It brought forward into stark light the myriad of social problems which had 320-321). Part of glasnost and perestroika involved the relaxing of censorship of the press and other media. It was clear to Geographer that hard line censorship was a utile exercise given the increasing public access to western broadcasts, particularly in the aftermath of the Coherency disaster of 1986 (Acton, 1995; 320). It was recognized that reform of the economy and wider society could not happen under the current level of state censorship.

Not even Lenin escaped criticism under glasnost, it was claimed that the October revolution had been an unmitigated disaster for Russia, leading the nation on a long road to nowhere (Acton, 1995; 323). Geographer and his policies of glasnost and perestroika soon faced serious problems with regards to implementation of the reforms. It seemed that Geographer was trying to do the impossible by marrying completely opposing concepts, ‘socialism with capitalism, totalitarianism with democracy'(Chubbier, 2001; 194). This was also known as the Geographer Factor.

The Geographer Factor stems from the problem of the Soviet Union being too reliant on the top figure in government (Chubbier, 2001; 194). It was almost impossible to override the powers held by Geographer, even if it did mean following his lead to the destruction of the USSR. It can be argued that this same problem led to economic stagnation under Brethren and the less than successful schemes of Khrushchev. Regional fragmentation and the erosion of the USSR as a ‘political and economic empire’ pushed the republics further towards secession, the communist parties in the Baltic States split from the main communist party of the Soviet Union (CUPS).

This caused a wave of similar actions in other constituent republics and served to hasten the disintegration of the country. The process of demonstration initiated by Geographer set the Soviet Union on the course to oblivion for it allowed the republics to elect popular governments and vote to secede from the union via referendum. This most significant of these was the referendum held by Ukraine the results of which indicated the will of the people to leave the union. However this is at odds with the referendum set down by Geographer regarding the retention and reform of the USSR, which received overwhelming popular support.

Nevertheless the simple fact that the largest republic in the USSR other than Russia had voted to leave the union could only have a catastrophic effect on the future of the country as a whole. Geographer had no choice but to accept these events, as there could be no return to Stalinist era of brutal suppression such as that en during the Hungarian Uprising in 1956. Geographer faced opposition to the introduction of restructuring and openness to the soviet system. The opposition came to a head in August of 1991, the central state bureaucracy made an attempt at regaining political control of the country (Chubbier, 2001; 193).

A coup d’©tat was launched in an attempt to reassert conservative values to the Soviet system. Geographer was put under house arrest in Crimea while attempts were made at reversing the damage done by perestroika. This however received no popular support from the public, prompting Boris Yielding to act to put a stop to the coup. Yielding, President of the Russian SF led a three day resistance movement which involved barricades being set up in central Moscow and around the ‘White House’ to prevent the plotters from assuming power (Chubbier, 2001; 193).

This proved to be Geographer’s power almost completely eroded, a secret meeting of the leaders of the three main Slavic states declared that the USSR officially ceased to exist. Without a country to lead Geographer tendered his resignation on 25th December 1991. All but five signatures were present on the declaration of the end of the USSR. The Baltic tastes had long maintained their annexation was illegal, Georgia would sign later. The other noticeable absence was that of Mikhail Geographer (Chubbier, 2001 ; 194-195).

This essay has given an assessment of the events leading to the dissolution of the USSR in 1991. Although it cannot be said with any great certainty that any one factor was more influential than another, it must be noted that Glasnost and Perestroika have not been too far away from any of the issues discussed here. The two flagship policies of Geographer had been intended to complement each other, in reality they had the opposite effect. Attempting to Join opposing concepts was a futile exercise which no doubt hastened the demise of the Soviet superpower.

The problems faced by the Soviet government ran much deeper than appeared to the Soviet public. Years of economic stagnation and bureaucratic strangulation had left the Soviet Union a spent force by the late sass. Robert Strayed suggests that ‘tinkering with its fragile structures would send it [the USSR] spinning into oblivion’ (1998; 88). One can’t avoid this harrowing assessment being very similar to the assertion made by Doll Hitler shortly before launching Operation Barbarous, hat ‘one has only to kick in the door, and the whole rotten edifice will come crashing down’.

Of course this was a statement of propaganda and should be viewed with that in mind. Ultimately the Soviet Union was broken by a series of intertwining events, both long term and short term, some more important than others but each playing a crucial role. Just as the USSR was established on the ruins of the Tsarist Empire, the newly formed Russian Federation is established on the ruins of the USSR, marked by the raising of the Russian Atrocious, watched by a small group of pro-communist supporters. List of References

White walls. In having white walls, there is always room tort improvement. You are never stuck with one look because you can always simply change it. Tolstoy is very optimistic in that she feels that with the end of Communism and the Soviet Houses 3 Union, there is great room for improvement. I believe that she is correct in this assessment because Russia today is not as big of super power as the United States, but it is certainly on its way to be there soon. Another big symbol in this piece, I believe, is Johnson + Johnson.

Tolstoy never clarifies entirely what Johnson + Johnson is, but it seems to be a big company. This could be a new company that was formed after the collapse of the Soviet Union. We learned about how when the USSR dissolved the government and the economy took a huge hit. I believe this is an example of a company that is on the rise. This can definitely be viewed as a symbol due to the fact that it is not only a business, but the name Johnson + Johnson makes it seem as if it is a family run operation.

The sentence after Tolstoy mentions Johnson + Johnson, she says, “From broad, there were quick-acting cleaners and spot removers-aerosols to erase memory, acids to eliminate the past. ” This is another example of how she wants the past to be erased. Although Johnson + Johnson is only mentioned a few times in this short story I believe it is a crucial symbol. The business industry is on the rise in Russia. The final symbol I chose was Mikhail Avouching Jason. M. A . Jason was the builder of the dacha that Tolstoy and her family lived in when they were kids.

He is constantly mentioned throughout this piece. Tolstoy alas about how she always found some of his old stuff in the attic and how she was always very intrigued by what she would find. The way they describe Jason, makes it seem that he was a very nice and kind man. The main message that I get from reading this is that Russia is a rebuilding country. All the examples in the story of tearing down old things to replace them with new Houses 4 items shows this message. If it weren’t for Jason then Tolstoy would never have lived in this house and she wouldn’t have found all of the old items left behind by IM.

She talks about how Jason essentially dispersed without any remembrance of him. Tolstoy says that, “Jason dispersed, disintegrated, vanished into the earth. ” This shows how over time things become lost. She then talks about how his plaque saying his name had been stolen by an admirer of nonferrous metals. Many people have come and gone but the country has remained alive. As new generations evolve the country has to adapt to their specific needs. Again this is why I believe Tolstoy is trying to tell us that Russia is a rebuilding country.

All three symbols mentioned played crucial parts of this story. Different people could interpret them in many different ways, but this is how I see them. They all show different parts of Totality’s childhood and how she grew up. All of these symbols also have historical references in them. Again it depends on how you view and interpret them. Someone could think it meaner one thing when another person could thinks it meaner the complete opposite. She never makes a comment specifically about Communism in this piece.

She mentions Lenin and Stalin a few times but does not give you her impression of them. An author for The New York Review of Books says about “White Walls”, that “Totality’s favorite theme is an inexhaustible one: the passage of time, often accompanied by a potent regret for opportunities lost. ” This is extremely relevant because the whole story is about the passage of time and how things change. All in all the main message is that Russia is a rebuilding country that is on its way to becoming more of a super power than it is today.

There are many factors that allowed to Bolsheviks to take power in October 1917 such as the growing unpopularity of the Provisional Government at the time. Moreover, events such as the July days and the return of Lenin and Trotsky. The Bolshevik slogans “Bread, Land and Peace” and “All Power to the Soviets” also sum up the other major factors to their rise. The Provisional Government was becoming increasingly unpopular.

They had failed to end the war and were blamed for food shortages and rising prices. Also, the Russian people were unable to choose their own government as the Provisional Government had not held elections which had displeased most people of Russia. The Bolsheviks took advantage of the unpopularity of the Provisional Government and increased its support. Its slogan “Bread, Land and Peace” was a really attractive offer to the Russian people. The “Bread” issue was not being solved by the government, but the Bolsheviks promised that they would deal with it.

Lenin promised to provide the people with sufficient food, and the starving population turned to him for help. Furthermore, most peasants were furious with the government and the landowners for not giving the peasants a chance to earn their own money with their own land. Lenin, in accordance with the communist ideology, promised that the landowners’ property would be split up and distributed equally, naturally attracting mass support from the majority of the population. In addition, the slogan ‘Peace’ was the most ppealed out of the 3 by the Russian people.

Almost everybody wanted the war to stop, as it continued for so long. The devastated economy and dwindling food supplies were all caused by the war, and people wished to return to their old lives. Lenin knew this and aptly used this as a slogan for his campaign. Being the only party which constantly opposed the continuation of the war, the Bolsheviks attracted many supporters. Additionally, the leadership of Lenin was another factor that allowed the Bolsheviks to take power. Lenin was a dedicated, determined and skilled leader.

He motivated his party and, through agitation and propaganda, the Bolsheviks became very popular in the army and in the factories. The leadership of the party was loyal to Lenin, and they followed his orders with conviction. The party had a proficient propaganda machine, producing newspapers, banners, posters and setting up recruitment drives in the army and factories. Lenin promised to bring an end to the war, to give land to peasants, to give workers control of factories, to take control of he banks and to give power to soviets of workers and soldiers set up throughout Russia.

During the July Days, a political crisis erupted as soldiers in Petrograd refused to go to the front and sailors Joined the workers in anti-government demonstrations. These people were mostly Bolshevik supporters, and these riots were no doubt sparked off by party instigators. However, they were delivered a crushing defeat when the government managed to suppress the demonstrations and arrested a few leading Bolsheviks. Lenin himself was shot twice in the chest from close range, but urvived to escape to Finland.

However, this event emphasises that the Bolsheviks Bolsheviks were able to take power in October 1917 because of Lenin’s outstanding speaking skills and use of propaganda. Equally because of the state Russia was in during 1917 with shortage of food, and the need to end the war. The Bolsheviks were the only party that opposed the continuation of the war – which the majority of the Russian population wanted – promising to give the people of Russia what they urgently needed at the time, “Bread, Land and Peace”.

Russian short story writer, novelist, autobiographer and essayist, whose life was deeply interwoven with the tumultuous revolutionary period of his own country. Gorky ended his long career as the preeminent spokesman for culture under the Soviet regime of Joseph Stalin. Gorky formulated the central principles of Socialist Realism, which became doctrine in Soviet literature. The rough, socially conscious naturalism of Gorky was described by Chekhov as “a destroyer bound to destroy everything that deserved destruction. ” LIFE

Maxim Gorky whose real name was Aleksei Maximovich Peshkov, was born on March 16, 1868, in the Volga River city of Nizhny Novgorod, which in 1932 was renamed Gorky in his honor. His father, a cabinetmaker, died when Gorky was 4 years old, and the boy was raised in harsh circumstances by his maternal grandparents, the proprietors of a dye works. From the age of 10 Gorky was virtually on his own, and he worked at a great variety of occupations, among them shopkeeper’s errand boy, dishwasher on a Volga steamer, and apprentice to an icon maker.

At a very tender age he saw a great deal of the brutal, seamy side of life and stored up impressions and details for the earthy and starkly realistic stories, novels, plays, and memoirs which he later wrote. He was self-taught in many areas, including literature, philosophy, and history, both Russian and Western. In 1884 Gorky moved to Kazan, dreaming of entering university. That didn’t come to happen because of lack of money. Instead he enrolled in the “revolutionary underground school. ” He attended gymnasium and university populist clubs, reading the relevant literature and fighting with police.

At the same time he earned his living doing menial work. In December 1887 a series of misfortunes led him to a suicide attempt. After that, Gorky traveled around Russia in search of a job and experience. He traveled to the Volga Region, the Don, Ukraine, Crimea, South Bessarabia (now part of Moldova) and the Caucasus. He worked as a labourer in a village, a dishwasher, a railroad guard and a worker at a fishery, a salt-works and a repair workshop. At the same time he managed to get acquainted with people from arts circles, take part in clashes with police and earn an overall reputation as an “untrustworthy” individual.

In his travels, he collected prototypes for his future characters, which can be seen in his early works, where the characters were people from the “bottom” echelons of society. In 1895 he was appointed at the “Samara Newspaper” (“Samarskaya gazeta”), where he wrote daily articles for the gossip column “By the Way” (“Mezhdu prochim”), signing them as Iegudiil Khlamida. While at the paper he met Ekaterina Volzhina, an editor, whom he married a year later. In 1897 he suffered from aggravated tuberculosis and moved to the Crimea together with his wife. Later they moved to the village of Maksatikha in Ukraine’s Poltava Region.

That same year, his son Maksim was born. At the beginning of 1898 Gorky returned to Nizhniy Novgorod and in April 1901 Gorky was detained in Nizhniy Novgorod for having taken part in student unrest in St. Petersburg. Later he was expelled to Arazmus. Gorky was elected an honorary academic of polite literature. However, under Emperor Nikolay II’s order, the result of the election was annulled. In 1903 he broke up with his wife and in 1904, the Moscow Theatre Actress Maria Andreeva became his common law wife. In 1905 Gorky was an active participant in the revolution.

He was a close associate of the social-democrats but at the same time, on the eve of “Bloody Sunday” (a key moment in Russia’s history, which served as a trigger for the 1905 Revolution) he visited Sergey Witte, the author of the October Manifesto of 1905, and together with a group of intellectuals he tried to prevent the tragedy. After the revolution Gorky was arrested on charges of preparing a coup d’état, but both Russian and European cultural figures rose up to defend the writer. He was released and at the beginning of the following year, emigrated from Russia.

He went to America to collect funds to support the Russian Revolution. In 1913 Gorky returned to Russia. After the 1917 Revolution his position became ambiguous: on the one hand, he was supportive of the new authorities, but on the other hand, he kept to his own beliefs, thinking that mass culture is more important than class struggle. At the same time, he started working at the “World Literature” (“Vsemirnaya literatura”) publishing house, founding the newspaper “New Life” (“Novaya Zhizn”). Gorky’s relations with the authorities gradually aggravated.

In 1921 he left Russia, officially going to Germany for medical treatment, but in fact escaping Bolshevik retribution. He lived in Germany and Czechoslovakia until 1924. During this time he actively wrote articles for German magazines (“The Acknowledgement of a Poet and the Russian Literature of Our Time,” “The Russian Cruelty,” “The Intellectuals and the Revolution”). All the articles show his rejection of what had happened in Russia. Gorky actively strived to unify Russian artists working abroad. In the mid-1920s Gorky moved to Sorrento, Italy, where he started work on the novel “The Life of Klim Samgin” (“Zhizn Klima Samgina”).

The novel was never finished. In 1928 he journeyed to the USSR and spent the summer traveling around the country. His impressions on the trip were published in the book “Around the Union of Soviets” (“Po Soyuzu Sovetov”). Three years later Gorky moved to Moscow. Having seen the results of Bolshevik rule while traveling, he set as his goal the promotion of the new “cultural construction” of the country. He initiated the creation of literary magazines and publishing houses. Later he organized and chaired the first all-Soviet meeting of Soviet writers. In May 1934 Gorky’s son was killed.

Some suspected the NKVD (the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs) was responsible for the killing. Two years later Gorky died himself. Speculations continued to surround his death for years; one popular theory suggested he was deliberately poisoned. Gorky is buried in Moscow. LITERARY CAREER Gorky rose to prominence early in life and made his mark as a writer, playwright, publicist, and publisher in Russia and abroad. His literary career began in 1892 with the publication of the story “Makar Chudra. ” His articles and stories were soon appearing in provincial newspapers and journals.

His ideas of the writer’s involvement in the social, political, and economic problems facing Russia were close to those of Leo Tolstoy and Vladimir G. Korolenko, who became his mentor and friend. Some of his literary works had important political significance, such as the poem Burevestnik (The Stormy Petrel), which in 1901 prophesied the oncoming storm of revolution. While visiting the United States in 1906 on a mission to win friends for the revolution and raise funds for the Russian Social Democratic Workers’ Party (RSDWP), he wrote the novel Mat (Mother).

Gorky’s revolutionary ideology lay in his insistence on the inevitability of radical change in Russian society. He started to write for newspapers, and his first book, the 3-volume Sketches and Stories (1898-1899), established his reputation as a writer. Gorky wrote with sympathy and optimism about the gypsies, hobos, and down-and-outs. He also started to analyze more deeply the plight of these people in a broad, social context. In these early stories Gorky skillfully mixed romantic exoticism and realism. Occasionally he glorified the rebels among his outcasts of Russian society.

In his early writing career Gorky became friends with Anton Chekhov , Leo Tolstoy , and Vladimir Lenin. Encouraged by Chekhov, he composed his most famous play, The Lower Depths (1902), which took much of the material from his short stories. It was performed at the Moscow Art Theater under the direction of Konstantin Stanislavsky. The Lower Depths enjoyed a huge success, and was soon played in Western Europe and the United States. Gorky was literary editor of Zhizn from 1899 and editor of Znanie publishing house in St. Petersburg from 1900.

Foma Gordeyev (1899), his first novel, dealt with the new merchat class in Russia. The short story Dvadsat’ shest’ i odna (1899, Twenty-Six Men and a Girl) was about lost ideals. “There were twenty-six of us – twenty-six living machines locked in a damp basement where, from dawn to dusk, we kneaded dough for making into biscuits and pretzels. The window of our basement looked out onto a ditch dug in front of them and lined with brick that was green from damp; the windows were covered outside in fine wire netting and sunlight could not reach us through the flour-covered panes.

Our boss had put the wire netting there so we could not give hand-outs of his bread to beggars or those comrades of ours who were without work and starving. ” (from ‘Twenty-Six Men and a Girl’, 1899) The joy in the lives of the bakers is the 16-year old Tania, who works in the same building. A handsome ex-soldier, one of the master bakers, boasts of his success with women. He is challenged to seduce Tania. When Tania succumbs, she is mocked by the men, who have lost the only bright spot in the darkness. Tania curses them and walks away, and is never again seen in the basement.

Gorky became involved in a secret printing press and was temporarily exiled to Arzamas, central Russia in 1902. On leaving Russia in 1906, Gorky spent seven years as a political exile, living mainly in his villa on Capri in Italy. Politically, Gorky was a nuisance to his fellow Marxists because of his insistence on remaining independent, but his great influence was a powerful asset, which from their point of view outweighed such minor defects. He returned to Russia in 1913, and during World War I he agreed with the Bolsheviks in opposing Russia’s participation in the war.

He opposed the Bolshevik seizure of power during the Russian Revolution of 1917 and went on to attack the victorious Lenin’s dictatorial methods in his newspaper Novaya zhizn (“New Life”) until July 1918, when his protests were silenced by censorship on Lenin’s orders. Living in Petrograd, Gorky tried to help those who were not outright enemies of the Soviet government. Gorky often assisted imprisoned scholars and writers, helping them survive hunger and cold. His efforts, however, were thwarted by figures such as Lenin and Grigory Zinovyev, a close ally of Lenin’s who was the head of the Petrograd Bolsheviks.

In 1921 Lenin sent Gorky into exile under the pretext of Gorky’s needing specialized medical treatment abroad. In the decade ending in 1923 Gorky’s greatest masterpiece appeared. This is the autobiographical trilogy Detstvo (1913–14; My Childhood), V lyudyakh (1915–16; In the World), and Moi universitety (1923; My Universities). The title of the last volume is sardonic because Gorky’s only university had been that of life, and his wish to study at Kazan University had been frustrated.

This trilogy is one of the finest autobiographies in Russian. It describes Gorky’s childhood and early manhood and reveals him as an acute observer of detail, with a flair for describing his own family, his numerous employers, and a panorama of minor but memorable figures. The trilogy contains many messages, which Gorky now tended to imply rather than preach openly: protests against motiveless cruelty, continued emphasis on the importance of toughness and self-reliance, and musings on the value of hard work.

Gorky finished his trilogy abroad, where he also wrote the stories published in Rasskazy 1922–1924 (1925; “Stories 1922–24”), which are among his best work. From 1924 he lived at a villa in Sorrento, Italy, to which he invited many Russian artists and writers who stayed for lengthy periods. Gorky’s health was poor, and he was disillusioned by postrevolutionary life in Russia, but in 1928 he yielded to pressures to return, and the lavish official celebration there of his 60th birthday was beyond anything he could have expected.

In the following year he returned to the U. S. S. R. permanently and lived there until his death. His return coincided with the establishment of Stalin’s ascendancy, and Gorky became a prop of Stalinist political orthodoxy. Correspondence published in the 1990s between Gorky and Stalin and between Gorky and Genrikh Yagoda, the head of the Soviet secret police, shows that Gorky gradually lost all illusions that freedom would prevail in the U. S. S. R. , and he consequently adjusted to the rules of the new way of life.

He was now more than ever the undisputed leader of Soviet writers, and, when the Soviet Writers’ Union was founded in 1934, he became its first president. At the same time, he helped to found the literary method of Socialist Realism, which was imposed on all Soviet writers and which obliged them—in effect—to become outright political propagandists. Gorky remained active as a writer, but almost all his later fiction is concerned with the period before 1917. In Delo Artamonovykh (1925; The Artamonov Business), one of his best novels, he showed his continued interest in the rise and fall of prerevolutionary Russian capitalism.

From 1925 until the end of his life, Gorky worked on the novel Zhizn Klima Samgina (“The Life of Klim Samgin”). Though he completed four volumes that appeared between 1927 and 1937 (translated into English as Bystander, The Magnet, Other Fires, and The Specter), the novel was to remain unfinished. It depicts in detail 40 years of Russian life as seen through the eyes of a man inwardly destroyed by the events of the decades preceding and following the turn of the 20th century.

There were also more plays—Yegor Bulychov i drugiye (1932; “Yegor Bulychov and Others”) and Dostigayev i drugiye (1933; “Dostigayev and Others”)—but the most generally admired work is a set of reminiscences of Russian writers—Vospominaniya o Tolstom (1919; Reminiscences of Leo Nikolaevich Tolstoy) and O pisatelyakh (1928; “About Writers”). The memoir of Tolstoy is so lively and free from the hagiographic approach traditional in Russian studies of their leading authors that it has sometimes been acclaimed as Gorky’s masterpiece.

Almost equally impressive is Gorky’s study of Chekhov. He also wrote pamphlets on topical events and problems in which he glorified some of the most brutal aspects of Stalinism. Assessment. After his death Gorky was canonized as the patron saint of Soviet letters. His reputation abroad has also remained high, but it is doubtful whether posterity will deal with him so kindly. His success was partly due, both in the Soviet Union and to a lesser extent abroad, to political accident.

Though technically of lower-middle-class origin, he lived in such poverty as a child and young man that he is often considered the greatest “proletarian” in Russian literature. This circumstance, coinciding with the rise of working-class movements all over the world, helped to give Gorky an immense literary reputation, which his works do not wholly merit. Gorky’s literary style, though gradually improving through the years, retained its original defects of excessive striving for effect, of working on the reader’s nerves by the piling up of emotive adjectives, and of tending to overstate.

Among Gorky’s other defects, in addition to his weakness for philosophical digressions, is a certain coarseness of emotional grain. But his eye for physical detail, his talent for making his characters live, and his unrivaled knowledge of the Russian “lower depths” are weighty items on the credit side. Gorky was the only Soviet writer whose work embraced the prerevolutionary and postrevolutionary period so exhaustively, and, though he by no means stands with Chekhov, Tolstoy, and others in the front rank of Russian writers, he remains one of the more important literary figures of his age.

Death by Starvation “The famine began…The dead were all around; on the roads, near the river, by the fences…Altogether 792 souls have died in our village during the famine, in the war years – 135 souls” (Kuryliw, p. 2). This is how Antonina Meleshchenko remembers the Holodomor, or the Ukrainian genocide famine. This famine took place between 1932 and 1933 in a country in Europe called Ukraine. Although many survivors wish not to remember, this event needs to be recognized.

The Ukrainian genocide famine killed hundreds of thousands of people; this tragic incident occurred because Stalin wanted to convert the world to communism. After 250 years of living under Russian Tsarist rule, the Ukrainians became part of the Soviet Union in 1922. Farmers thrived, economic freedom was permitted, and private enterprise was allowed. Among these, writers, artists, and scholars grew. Stalin, in 1924, took over Russia after the previous leader, Vladimir Lenin, died. Later, in 1928, Stalin launched a plan to force farmers into giving up their private land, livestock, and farms.

Joseph Stalin felt he could not trust the Ukraine peasantry; he believed that the upper class farmers, or kulaks, were holding crops. Stalin took all the grain from the peasants. He had his men search for any hidden grain and Stalin analyzed fecal matter to see if the Ukrainians had stolen ‘government property’ and eaten the grain themselves. It was because of Stalin that many starved and resorted to eating anything. They drank water to fill their empty bellies. Small children perished first, then the elderly, followed by the men, and soon after, the women.

Up to twenty-five percent of the population died because Stalin took all of the food. When Stalin seized all of the rations, starvation became widespread. Blockades prevented the hungry to leave and search for food. Viachislav Molotov was in control of transporting grain to other countries. He punished the Ukrainian farmers by taking away anything that could be eaten. Help from other countries was not an option. Stalin was very careful in keeping this famine a secret and denied the world and international aid from entering the country.

Secret police and troops were used to control rebellious farmers and keep all the Ukrainians inside Ukraine. Lazer Kaganovich controlled a particular section of the secret police. He handled mass executions and became the organizer in charge of mass murder. The troops were also in charge of the camp in Siberia were over 850,000 Ukrainians are deported. Stalin ordered the kulacks, or wealthy farmers, into three groups: those to be executed, those to be imprisoned, and those to be shipped off to Siberia and Russian Asia. Stalin caused starvation and death in Ukraine when he detained all of the food.

Stalin’s plan to take all the food was based off of the ideas of the former Russian leader, Vladimir Lenin. Lenin knew that peasants believed that what they grew was theirs and that the peasants could do whatever they wanted with their crops. He knew that this would result to poor rationing. Non-equal rationing went against Lenin’s policy of communism. Since the farmers controlled the crops, Stalin knew he would have to ‘break the body and spirit of the Ukrainian farmer and nation, thus, subjugate the Ukrainian people completely to Soviet rule’ (Kuryliw, p. 1).

Stalin recognized that without the farmers, Ukraine would not be strong enough to stand by itself. He wanted to overpower the Ukrainian people to Soviet rule and convert Ukraine to communism. He desired to control Ukraine because the country was the last to resist Russian control. He needed a capital to build more factories and increase agricultural exports. Stalin believed the fastest way to increase exports was to obtain Ukraine and use their farms to attain and trade crops. After Stalin achieved power in Ukraine, he was able to reach his goal and break the farmers.

From 1932 to 1933, Ukraine suffered through a famine that killed between seven to ten million people. Various were shot and killed by firing squads while others were shipped to concentration camps. Twenty-five percent of the population was starved. This event was caused by Joseph Stalin in his effort to convert Ukraine to communism. He wanted to use Ukraine’s agricultural exports to his advantage and break the spirit of the farmers to control the whole country. The Ukrainian genocide famine was known as the ‘Holodomor,’ which means death by starvation.

Outline I. Introduction Thesis statement: The Customs Union for Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus is a purposeful union, which serves to meet several aims. II. Body A. In the light of common aspiration to the WTO accession, it is worth of examining why preference of states was given to multilateral over preferential trade. B. The idea of the multilateral cooperation and creation of a common economic space, elimination of borders and regional integration is not new in the post-Soviet space. 1. “Putinomics” an attempt of Putin to bring back Soviet Union and Russian supremacy; 2. “Eurasian Union” similar to “ASEAN”;

C. In theory, customs unions are created to eliminate the trade barriers and decrease customs obligations between several states. 1. It requires confidence in partners and share of responsibilities; 2. single economic region; D. There are many different assumptions why Customs Union was created. 1. supremacy of Russia over the territory of the former Soviet states; 2. a strategic step in the WTO accession; 3. reduction of Chinese influence and prevent massive imports of Chinese goods; 4. beneficial for entrepreneurs and domestic production enterprises; 5. fair competition; 6. ffective legal protection against corrupt schemes and fraud mechanisms; E. Several other post-Soviet neighboring states were also invited to join the club. 1. The Ukraine; 2. Tajikistan; 3. Kyrgyzstan; F. It is noteworthy of saying that pre-existing Customs Union trade relations and economic ties cannot be described as dynamic ones. 1. statistical numbers; G. An interesting observation is that “with few exceptions, all the countries bordering the Western fringes of the former Soviet Union have intensified their trade relations with the European Union as well as with China, whose importance in Central Asian trade has been growing. . statistical data; H. Official Astana firmly defended its position on the Customs Union accession, and denied any political motivations behind the membership of the alliance with Russia and Belarus. 1. a unified customs territory would make Kazakhstan even more attractive for foreign investors; 2. geopolitical position, as the largest land-locked country; 3. access to global markets; 4. expand trade with Russia and China; 5. diversity of economy through technological and service advances; I. Belarusian position toward the Customs Union brought many obstacles. 1. “arm-twisting” politics of the Kremlin; 2. Russian pressure;

J. At first it seemed that Russia benefited from creation of the Customs Union more than others, as it has the largest market and biggest production industries. 1. diversification of opinions; K. What does the World Trade Organization is? 1. a network of agreements; 2. a single system, which regulates trade relations of members; 3. advantages and requirements; L. The decision to create the Customs Union between three states could signal willingness to engage in deeper cooperation and integration, and thus, the WTO accession provides access to more states willing to cooperate and a platform for finding new “friends”. . advantages and disadvantages of being a member of WTO; M. Russia was the only Security Council and G8 member not on the WTO, thus its accession was a requirement to be fully admitted as one of the superpowers. 1. further policy of Russia toward Kazakhstan and Belarus; III. Conclusion Creation of the Customs Union between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan caused a lot of debates about why these countries are forming the union, what are the benefits that they get and why exactly these states?

First of all, I would like to define the meaning of “Customs Union”. According to Business Dictionary “Customs Union is an agreement between two or more (usually neighboring) countries to remove trade barriers, and reduce or eliminate customs duty on mutual trade. A customs union (unlike a free trade area) generally imposes a common external-tariff (CTF) on imports from non-member countries and (unlike a common market) generally does not allow free movement of capital and labor among member countries” (Business Dictionary. com, n. d. ).

In part, debates were around preference of regional over multilateral trade, as for many years Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan aspired to join the World Trade Organization (WTO); therefore, creation of the Customs Union was at first seen as an alternative to the WTO accession. However, just after the ratification of the Customs Union charter and all relevant agreements, Russia joins WTO club and leaves the rest to wonder what is going to happen to the Customs Union. The Customs Union for Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus is a purposeful union, which serves to meet several aims.

In the light of common aspiration to the WTO accession, it is worth of examining why preference of states was given to multilateral over preferential trade. In particular what pre-conditions existed prior to the Customs Union creation that inspired Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan to create the Union and what benefits it provided that three states could not obtain by joining the WTO only? The idea of the multilateral cooperation and creation of a common economic space, elimination of borders and regional integration is not new in the post-Soviet space.

Adelaja (2012) asserts that a number of political scientists and former Soviet Republics believe in so called “Putinomics” – an attempt of Putin to bring back Soviet Union and Russian supremacy (p. 1). It is difficult to label the Customs Union creation an attempt to bring back the Soviet Union and expansion of the Russian authority over the territory of the former Soviet states. However, the countries are clearly bound by the common past that unlike others (Ukraine, Turkmenistan) makes Kazakhstan and Belarus seek for cooperation with Russia. According to Eurasian Union (n. d. , another regional cooperation the idea of “Eurasian Union” belongs to Nursultan Nazarbaev, the idea is to create a union similar to ASEAN (p. 3). After collapse of the Soviet Union, states tend to isolate themselves from their post-Soviet neighbors and especially from Russia. In part, it happens due to unwillingness to cooperate with possibly depending neighbors and also due to the aspiration to get rid of rudiments of the Soviet centralized economy that intentionally established mutual dependence of the Union states. Thus, existing regional organizations are not effective in terms of policy implementation.

CIS and EurAsEC could become a platform for negotiations and decision making over regional integration. However, states are reluctant to give up their sovereignty and create supranational body authorized to decide on behalf of its member states. Instead, states were defining their foreign policies depending on national interest and regional integration was not one of them. Thus, Customs Union between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan could become first real and effectively operating regional cooperation body, where states would indeed execute provisions of signed agreements and declarations.

In theory, customs unions are created to eliminate the trade barriers and decrease customs obligations between several states. It requires confidence in partners and share of responsibilities. Initially, the Customs Union was created and signed by Kazakhstan and Russia. Belarus was negotiating its interests with Russia and postponed ratification of the agreement until July 2011. To illustrate the advantages of the union, official media was speculating with huge market that the Customs Union opens for three states. The union has a population of 167 million, a total GDP of USD 2 trillion and goods turnover of USD 900 billion. The aim of the Customs Union is to create a single economic region and eliminate the state borders and to facilitate the freedom of movement” (Krotov, 2010, p. 1). According to Prajakti and Varadzhakov (2012), further to demonstrate that the Customs Union brings advantages not only to Russia, official media reported Kazakhstan agriculture and steel sectors will benefit from newly introduced import duties for non-Customs Union member states (p. ). In addition, Kazakh and Belarus obtained access to Russian labor market. In general, the Customs Union agreements should have improved quality of goods, increase competition and help diversify economies of three states. There are many different assumptions why Customs Union was created. Some see hidden agenda and conspiracy behind creation of the union. Opponents of the Customs Union claim that it only benefits Russia and establishes its supremacy over the territory of the former Soviet states.

Zlatkin (2012) comments that opponents also interpret Belarus unwillingness to join the union as a rebellion against Russia, and say that in the end Belarus was forced to join the union. Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus (2012) Russian supporters say that the creation of the Customs Union was a strategic step in the WTO accession, as it was obvious that Russia will become a member first and then it will promote its partners in the WTO accession (p. 1). In the end, they add that Russia needs reliable partners and friends in the WTO and promotion of Kazakhstan and Belarus interests still benefits Russia.

Russia, Belarus, Kazakh (2012) claim that the Customs Union was created to reduce Chinese influence and prevent massive imports of Chinese goods (p. 1). Other reasons are less sophisticated and mostly indicate economic benefits that three states obtain from participation in the union. “Eurasian Development Bank study released, that the effects of economic integration of 2011 – 2030 will reach 14% of gross domestic product of Belarus, 3. 5% in Kazakhstan, and Russia (2%)” (Russia, Belarus, Kazakh, 2012, p. ). The Customs Union was also said to be beneficial for entrepreneurs and domestic production enterprises, as they got greater market access, fair competition and effective legal protection against corrupt schemes and fraud mechanisms. Decreased trade barriers should have contributed to the free movement of goods and services between three countries, and improved quality of products. Russia, Belarus, Kazakh (2012) states that in total, Customs Union opened access to about 170 million consumers (p. ). Several other post-Soviet neighboring states were also invited to join the club. In particular they were Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. None of three Central Asian countries have fully considered and started the Customs Union accession negotiations. Ukraine was assessing and comparing its benefits from the Customs Union versus WTO accession, as well as waiting for the decision on Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) with the European Union.

Adilaja (2012) asserts that in a while, official Kiev preferred to abandon its plans on the Customs Union accession negotiations, saying that this will destroy its ongoing negotiations with the European Union. According to Russia’s Inevitable (2012) asserts that for Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, membership in the Custom Union would have brought access to the labor market and increase cooperation in the field of the energy resources supply with Russia and Kazakhstan (p. 2).

Although, Kyrgyzstan is currently a member of the WTO, its historical ties and economic dependency on Russian energy resources contributed to its willingness to join another union with Russia. It is noteworthy of saying that pre-existing Customs Union trade relations and economic ties cannot be described as dynamic ones. “European Union Institute for Security Studies describes trade relations between Customs Union member states prior to the Customs Union creation. In particular, share of intra-CU trade to the total amount of trade of CU-member states within three years prior to CU creation.

Thus, 48. 1% of Belarusian the total amount of trade in 2008 accounts for Russia and Kazakhstan. While only 7. 3% of Russian trade turnover in 2008 accounts for Belarus and Kazakhstan. And 18. 8% of the total volume of Kazakhstan trade turnover accounted for Russia and Belarus in the same period. 2009 indicators did not change significantly, but in 2010, the year of establishment of the Customs Union, the share of intra-customs union trade of Russia dropped” (Zagorski, 2012, p. 5).

An interesting observation is that “with few exceptions, all the countries bordering the Western fringes of the former Soviet Union have intensified their trade relations with the European Union as well as with China, whose importance in Central Asian trade has been growing. There is a trend that between 41 and 45% of Russian exports to former Soviet states are currently comprised of energy resources, while 39 percent of its imports consist of machines and equipment” (Adelaja, 2012, p. ). These facts makes many experts doubt trade relations of the Customs Union states; while others suggest that the Customs Union could become a fundamental change in relations between former Soviet states and that become a push to growth in trade. The figures mentioned above, as well as the fact that post-Soviet states were reluctant to form another union, made the decision to establish the Customs Union look spontaneous and unjustified.

However, throughout the whole process of negotiations and ratification of the Customs Union policies and implementation of the necessary procedures, official governments were justifying their decision to create a union and finding new benefits of the participation in the regional cooperation between three states. Although not all of them played in a concert, all three were citing economic benefits that countries obtain from the participation in the regional union. Official Astana firmly defended its position on the Customs Union accession, and denied any political motivations behind the membership of the alliance with Russia and Belarus.

Kazakhstan officials were speculating that “a unified customs territory would make Kazakhstan even more attractive for foreign investors who have considered Kazakhstan as one of the most attractive markets in our part of the world” (Accession to the WTO, n. d. , p. 1). Kazakhstan also speculated over its geopolitical position, as the largest land-locked country and the state with the most number of transit routes that will ensure large income from transit tariffs.

For Kazakhstan the membership in the Customs Union will increase access to global markets, expand trade with Russia and China, and diversity of economy through technological and service advances. Belarusian position toward the Customs Union brought many obstacles. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko has openly complained about the “arm-twisting” politics of the Kremlin, saying that his country had been under pressure to cede control of some of its juiciest companies like Belarusian potassium company (Belkali) and Belarus’ state-run Minsk Automobile Plant (MAZ) unless the country joined the union. “Given the importance of ‘champion enterprises’ such as MAZ and Belkali for Belarus or Gazprom for Russia, it is still unclear how the states can agree on regulating these enterprises with supranational institutions, especially when they are governed not by economic, but by political logic,” said George Plaschinsky, an associate analyst at the Center for European Transformation in Minsk. “Previously the Russian authorities had an experience of imposing different decisions on gas and oil companies in order to achieve some political aims and assert them as the ‘energy superpower. ” (Russia’s Customs Union, 2012, p. 2). At first it seemed that Russia benefited from creation of the Customs Union more than others, as it has the largest market and biggest production industries. Experts suggested that some competition from Kazakh and Belarusian producers will be beneficial, but not risky for Russian producers and entrepreneurs. In addition, it will create positive conditions for transition from Soviet centralized to market economy. Russia would also benefit from the labor market of its neighbors, as Russia’s own demographic situation is worse than in Kazakhstan and its population is aging.

It is also working on North and South stream gas pipelines to bypass such transit countries, such as Ukraine. Thus, a union with some of its neighbors would ensure protection of Russia’s interests and concessional conditions for pipelines placement. In addition to traditional argument on competition for the regional dominance in the Central Asia, a union would solve some tensions between Russia and neighboring states regarding debt payment for gas supply, political influence and alliances creation.

However, some experts were more skeptical. “Some businesses are likely to move to the neighboring states, like Kazakhstan, where the investment climate is more favorable,” said Alexei Devyatov, the chief economist at Ural Sib Capital (Adelaja, 2012, p. 2). Russia might also lose from the opening of it market to the labor from Kazakhstan and Belarus, as Russia also has a huge population of unskilled and unqualified population hat will be left out from participation in the marked taken over by foreign nationals.

Considering positions of the Customs Union member states expressed above, it is crucial to consider what regulations or conditions influenced Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan in their decision to access WTO. What does the World Trade Organization is? The WTO is a network of agreements. It unites states around the world into a single system and regulates their trade relations. The WTO member states may chose the degree if integration, but should aspire to opening of deeper and wider access to domestic markets. The WTO member states are allowed to create the regional agreements and unions within the organization.

General goal of the organization is free trade and liberalization of the economies. As it was mentioned above, the Customs Union between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan was also created to facilitate liberalization and decrease trade barriers without fully abolishing tariffs. The WTO does not require elimination of borders, unlike the customs union that stipulates common border and single economic space. Thus, the Customs Union requires deeper integration of its member states than primary WTO accession documents.

The decision to create the Customs Union between three states could signal willingness to engage in deeper cooperation and integration, and thus, the WTO accession provides access to more states willing to cooperate and a platform for finding new “friends”. Creation of the Customs union with outside WTO partners can also be a sign that the state relies on partners who do not necessarily share the idea of free trade on global level. Interestingly, with the creation of the Customs Union, Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus enhanced WTO accession process.

In this case, the creation of the trade liberalization institution could be an illustration of states’ readiness to access the WTO and negotiate conditions. The main reason of the WTO accession for many states is said to be a wide access to foreign markets and integration into a global club of “advanced” nations. Some of the advantages are improved competition that ensures supply of qualified products, attraction of more foreign investors to the country, securing their interests and protection by legislation common in the WTO space, as well as lowering the costs of running business. According to General benefits from WTO (n. d. , however, there are also some disadvantages of being a WTO member, such as limited abilities to protect infant industries, inability to compete with advanced economies, prohibition of governmental subsidies and elimination of fixed currency rates (p. 1). Economies of state applicants for the WTO accession should be ready for a drastic change and shock therapies. Even with the transitional period, the changes brought by the WTO accession and commitments made by states are significant. Russia was the only Security Council and G8 member not on the WTO, thus its accession was a requirement to be fully admitted as one of the superpowers.

Putin and other Russian governmental officials assured other Customs Union member states that with the accession of Russia to the WTO, it is still going to preserve the Customs Union and keep close relations with Belarus and Kazakhstan. Furthermore, Russia has promised promotion of two countries in their accession to the WTO. Experts believe that Russia will not abandon its partners, as it is still interested in integration of the post-Soviet states, and will not give up on the struggle for domination in the region.

Therefore, even after the WTO accession it is not efficient for Russia to exclude Kazakhstan and Belarus from its foreign policy. In case Kazakhstan is left outside of the WTO, it will become a reliable partner of Russia outside of the organization. While Belarus can be more reluctant in implementation of the agreement reached before the WTO accession. Thus, Russia will probably use more force to get Belarus remain in the union. Since Russia dominates in the union, in case all member states access the WTO, Russia will be established as a single power in the region that decides on economic and political processes.

Other states will be bound by obligations under the agreements, and since their accession comes after Russia, it is most likely that they will negotiate similar if not the same tariffs as Russia did. Considering unequal political positions of the Customs Union member states, and economic ties prior to the creation of the Union that did not directly contributed to the establishment of the union, it can be assumed that the Customs Union was created as a demonstration of the commitment to the trade liberalization and aspiration to be a part of the globalized world.

It is also important to mention that it is a Russian-led union and neither economies of its partner states or their political leadership are sufficiently competitive to challenge Russian industries, market and politics. Russia played very important role in the promotion of the idea of the union, and the Customs Union could become the first effectively working regional integration mechanism on the post-Soviet space. However, since Russia aspired to join the WTO, Customs Union member states have to catch up and also join the club, although they might be less interested in it than Russia.

Bibliography Adelaja, T. (2012). Putinomics Abroad. Russia Profile, Section: Politics. Retrieved November 16, 2012 http://russiaprofile. org/politics/57118/print_edition/ Krotov, I. (2010). Customs Union between the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation within the framework of the Eurasian Economic Community. World Customs Journal, 5 (2). Retrieved November 16, 2012, from http://www. worldcustomsjournal. org/media/wcj/-2011/2/Krotov. pdf Prajakti, K. , & Varadzhakov, S. (2012).

The Customs Union between Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus: First Steps Towards the Rivaval of the Silk Road, Academia, 894. Retrieved November 18, 2012, from http://cambridge-centralasia. academia. edu/PrajaktiKalra/Papers/472081/The_Customs_Union_between_Russia_Kazakhstan_and_Belarus_First_Steps_towards_the_Revival_of_the_Silk_Road Zagorski, A. (2012). Russia’s neighbourhood policy. European Union Institute for Security Studies. Retrieved November 16, 2012, from http://www. iss. europa. eu/publications/detail/article/russias-neighbourhood-policy/

Zlatkin, I. (2012). A Sovereign Surge, Not a Soviet Resurgence: The Mutualism of Eurasian Reintegration. SRAS, The Journal of Russia and Asian Studies. Retrieved November 17, 2012, from http://www. sras. org/a_sovereign_surge_not_a_soviet_resurgence_the_mutualism_of_eurasian_reintegration IXGV, Financial News, “Russia, Belarus, Kazakh customs union will benefit enterprises in Asia”. (2012). p. 1. Retrieved November 17, 2012, from http://www. ixgw. com/2012/05/russia-belarus-kazakh-customs-union-will-benefit-enterprises-in-asia/

Astana Economic Forum, News, “Nursultan Nazarbayev «Eurasian Union: from idea to the history of the future»”, (n. d. ), pp. 1 – 10. Retrieved November 16, 2012, from http://aef. kz/upload/news/statya%20Nazarbayeva. pdf Belarus Digest, Economy, “WTO v. Customs Union: Russia Decides”. (n. d. ). Retrieved November 17, 2012, from http://belarusdigest. com/story/wto-v-customs-union-russia-decides-7434 Business Dictionary. com. (n. d. ). Retrieved November 16, 2012, from http://www. businessdictionary. com/definition/customs-union. html

Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Discover Kazakhstan, Economy, “Accession to the WTO”, (n. d. ). Retrieved November 18, 2012, from http://www. kazakhembus. com/page/wto-accession The Fish Site, News and Analysis, “Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus Keep Customs Union”, (2012). p. 1. Retrieved November 18, 2012, from http://www. thefishsite. com/fishnews/17679/russia-kazakhstan-belarus-keep-customs-union U. S. A. Poultry and Eggs Export Council, News, Analysis, “Russia’s Inevitable Customs Union in Central Asia”. (2012). pp. 1 – 3. Retrieved November 17, 2012, from http://www. usapeec. kz/en/news/10204/