Soviet Union

To what extent was a totalitarian state established in the USSR in the 1930’s? From the start of Stalins self-imposed reign of control he always had the makings as a leader to create a totalitarian government, for example his ideology. Stalin wanted ‘his’ people to believe that he cared for them. It’s interesting to say ‘his’ because it refers to the sense that Stalin himself believed he owned the Russian people which completely contradicts a lot of what he did and the reasons for which he did it. For example Stalin always told the people that he was doing things for ‘the greater good of the Russian people’.

This contradiction could alter the disposition of things when considering the totalitarianism in the USSR in the 1930s. The term ‘totalitarianism’ means that a state would hold complete control over everything in it, which is largely what happened in the USSR. Collectivisation is a great example of this total control that Stalin held over Russia, the fact he could take all of the farms and merge them together into one big farm to create more produce which was then sold or traded showed significance in comparison to totalitarianism because it showed that there was complete control over what happened all over Russia.

As well as collectivisation Stalin also used terror to create a totalitarian state. The great Terror from 1936-38 is a great example of how a totalitarian state was achieved. The Moscow show trials which were essential in justifying a communist government. The main reason for and main success of the show trials were that it showed that the communist was the only party that was trustworthy, although this wasn’t true. The fall of Yagoda let Stalin re-establish a once slacking NKVD as a more brutal force, new, less retrained agents were recruited to help speed up and extend the great terror.

The mass murder created by the Politburo’s Order No. 00447 enabled the NKVD to produce a list of over 250,000 people that were associated with ‘anti-soviet behaviour’. This led to many Russian people denouncing their friends or family due to the fear of Stalins Great terror and the NKVD, this shows great examples of complete control of the people and the state itself through the fear Stalin had inflicted. It was not only fear that Stalin used to put people on his side, Stalin also appeased a lot of what people wanted. Women were given more rights and responsibilities in everyday life in Russia.

For example, in World War One women didn’t have a lot to do with it whereas in the the Second World War hundreds of women fought on the front line and many women achieved the highest award possible for serving in the armed forces. This was because Stalin believed that women were at the centre point of Russian society and therefore appeased them because he knew how important they were. Stalin also put himself at the point of every family and made it known how he felt about the importance of family life, it was made a rule that every family had to have a picture of him in the house so that he could be at the centre point of everything.

To create a totalitarian state there has to be acceptance from everyone, this was not fully achieved in the USSR, but because of Stalin’s Great Terror acceptance was not needed by everyone, the fear he inflicted left a great wound in the Russian people, through his ‘reign’ Stalin was responsible for over 20 million deaths. This would’ve meant that people feared for their lives which led to people being submissive to the State, therefore creating a totalitarian state because of the total control held by the communist government.

Overall I think it’s easy to see that a complete totalitarian state was established in the USSR in the 1930s because complete control was achieved by the communist party and by Stalin himself, it was mainly due his Great Terror that inflicted fear to ‘his’ people that totalitarianism was achieved. Stalin also achieved a totalitarian state because of the ways he made himself known everywhere in Russia, he was inescapable, finally leading to a fully totalitarian state.

“As a leader of Russia, Stalin achieved great success between 1924~1939. ” To what extent do you agree with this statement? Explain your answer. I agree to the statement to a large extent. A leader is a person who stands out different from other ordinary people with main ideal characteristics of having aggressiveness in speech and action and love for people and of being able to cope with problems and find a solution to it.

Stalin had two of the qualities of being aggressive in speech and action, and being able to present a solution in difficult situation, but his passion for his people was minimal. These traits of his as a leader influenced how he achieved successes, such as consolidating his rule over Soviet Union and achieving significant economical development, or resulted in failure, such as huge human cost involved, between 1924~1939. Stalin was politically an aggressive orator and a ruthless dictator.

These characteristics of him enabled him to secure his position as the leader of Russia and establish totalitarian rule over Russia. Stalin formed a new constitution for the Soviet Union which seemed democratic outwardly but in fact was his own backyard where everything was under Stalin’s or the Central Committee of the Communist Party’s rule. Furthermore, he embarked on a policy of purges in which many oppositions and rivals were executed mercilessly.

Kamenev and Zinoviev were just few of his potential rivals that were executed after a pretend “show trial” and some were even believed to be assassinated. Through all these ruthless measures taken with his aggressive personality, Stalin had achieved his ultimate goal of steering he and his Communist Party to total control of Russia. Stalin also had a vision of his own and was able to produce solutions according to his vision in difficult situations and this helped him to achieve great economical development in short period of time.

In 1931, Stalin prophesied – correctly as it turned out – that Russia had 10 years to modernise before it was attacked. Stalin wanted Soviet Union to be strong industrially as it would be more prepared to resist invasions and be more powerful than other Western countries. Thus, Stalin announced collectivisation, where larger farm is formed by gathering tiny farms in each village and more advanced agricultural machineries were used, to create an efficient and modernised farming environment.

In order to further aid in progress in economics by expanding industries and industrial production, Stalin also introduced a series of Five-Year Plans. It enabled rapid expansion of heavy industries, such as coal, iron, steel and power, modernisation of existing industries and formation of new industries with foreign experts employed. It also exercised tight control over labour force by setting production targets for each factory and harsh punishments for poor absence and workmanship.

Through Stalin’s economic policies, in long term, both grain and industrial production increased by manifold and almost full employment was achieved. Therefore, Stalin’s Stalin could prevent Russia’s economical collapse economy and instead developed Russia as a country with one of the strongest economy. However, one characteristic Stalin lacked as a leader was love for his people which reflected negatively on his ruling of Russia. His people’s, especially the peasants’, deaths were none of his concern and thus his little care for his people led to poor quality of life for people.

As a result of his economic plans, there was large influx of people from the countryside and the towns and cities were unable to cope, resulting in break out of slums and poor living and working conditions. Production of consumer goods was also forgone to accommodate the concentration on heavy industry. The forced and harsh nature of his ruling and plans also incurred extremely high human cost. For example, due to resist against collectivisation, peasants burned their crops and killed their livestock.

This resulted in widespread famine, especially in Ukraine where more than 7 million died of starvation. Furthermore, to eliminate resistance, estimated 10 million Kulaks were executed. This shows how merciless Stalin was towards his people, particularly to those who oppose him. As such, Stalin’s uncompassionate feeling towards his people made him blind to all those human cost involved in his policies and caused much hate directed towards Stalin.

To sum up, Stalin was in fact a great leader who achieved great success between 1924~1939 with his strong visions, totalitarian rule and economic policies. However, there are other side of the coin where by his lack of love for his people caused great human cost. From here, one can realise that though much developmental and economical successes have been achieved through his totalitarian ruling and economic plans as evident from the fact that under Stalin’s rule, Russia became the second largest economically powerful country then.

However, due to his lack of compassion and forced nature of the way he carried out his plan, he achieved little on improvement of social conditions and his people’s quality of life and had failed to win over the heart of his people. Still it is undeniable that Stalin was one of the most memorable leaders, not only in Russia, but also in the world for his achievements mentioned above that lasted till the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991.

Boris Yeltsin proved to be an invincible leader. In the year 1985 he was made the first secretary to the Moscow Communist Party by President Mikhail Gorbachev. In the succeeding year he was elected to the Politburo. Subsequently, he was made the chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet. In June 1991, he became the first elected president to Russia. His efforts at separating the Commonwealth of Independent States secured complete independence for Russia. Yeltsin faced several administrative setbacks and his economic and market reforms resulted in unrest and parliamentary disagreement.

In November 1993 internal conflicts in parliament led to the seizure of the Russian Parliament Building. Subsequently, he emerged victorious and obtained greater presidential powers. Yeltsin faced serious health problems, he had to frequently shuffle cabinet members and he had to countenance the armed conflict in Chechnya. Nevertheless, he was re – elected in 1996 (Yeltsin, Boris (1931 – ). In Andromeda Encyclopedic Dictionary of World History). Boris Yeltsin strongly believed in the socialist ideology of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union or the CPSU.

The party’s ideals of economic progress and social equality had made him to join the CPSU in the year 1961. Gradually Yeltsin gained in importance in the party and became a member of the construction department of the party’s Sverdlovsk Oblast committee in the year 1968. His rise in this department was remarkable and by the year 1975 he became the secretary of the committee. In 1976 Boris Yeltsin was appointed the secretary of the Sverdlovsk Oblast committee by Leonid Brezhnev. This position enabled him to procure membership of the CPSU’s Central Committee in 1981.

He became an important leader in the CPSU and openly criticized perestroika or the political reforms introduced by Gorbachev. Later on Yeltsin followed Gorbachev’s policies, in order to reduce strained relations with the Western nations (Colton). President Yeltsin’s foreign minister was Andry Kozyrev favored a Western alliance. However, the Russian foreign policy did not change. Boris Yeltsin encountered his western counterparts on several occasions during international summits. He maintained friendly relations with US presidents George H. W.

Bush and Bill Clinton. He solicited US backing in international platforms such as the International Monetary Fund. Yeltsin was friendly with the European economic giants. Accordingly he maintained cordial relations with Helmut Kohl the Chancellor of Germany and leaders of France and the United Kingdom (Colton). Yeltsin was disinterested in NATO’s plans and he reluctantly acceded to its proposals to admit former non – Soviet bloc countries. In the year 1999 the NATO waged a war against Yugoslavia. This measure resulted in strained relations with Russia.

Subsequently, Yeltsin terminated all relations with NATO and this served to isolate Russia. However, Russia did not assist Yugoslavia to fight with NATO. Yugoslavia was compelled to agree to NATO’s proposals and had to accept foreign occupation of the Kosovo Province. Yeltsin ensured that Russia was included in the joint forces that occupied Kosovo. He made attempts to make an ally of China in Russia’s battle against the supremacy of NATO, further trade practices and mutual cooperation with China flourished in his era (Colton).

The economic and market reforms implemented by Yeltsin were opposed by the parliament. In 1993 the free market reforms created internal conflicts and military intervention had to be resorted to, in order to control the situation. Yeltsin was successful in these military operations. During the period 1994 to 1996 the Chechnya crisis developed and Yeltsin’s response to it invited international criticism. Moreover, the parliament was dominated by communist members who opposed and disagreed with him.

His power commenced to decline due to his ill health and much of his authority was transferred to the parliament owing to the constitutional conflicts of 1998, which emerged due the serious financial crisis. Despite these setbacks, Yeltsin reclaimed his powers by dissolving the government four times in the period 1998 to 1999. In May 1999 the parliament made an abortive attempt to impeach him. Eventually, he submitted his resignation on the 31st of December 1999 and Vladimir Putin succeeded him (Yeltsin, Boris (1931 – ). In The Macmillan Encyclopedia).

Boris Yeltsin had supported the Baltic States for independence. In order to achieve this he emphasized that there should be fundamental and radical reforms. Yeltsin relinquished his CPSU membership and contested in the presidential elections. He was elected president of the RSFSR or Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. Yeltsin had always demanded autonomy for the member republics of the federal USSR. He also persuaded the Russian parliament to enact legislations to give the republic’s laws precedence over the laws of the Soviet parliament.

The congress bestowed emergency powers upon Yeltsin, which permitted him to rule by decree. This made him a popular president. After the futile coup, in 1991, against President Gorbachev, Yeltsin condemned the acts of the usurpers and demanded his reinstatement (Yeltsin, Boris Nikolayevich (1931 – ). In The Hutchinson Unabridged Encyclopedia including Atlas). Yeltsin’s leadership capability was severely tested during the economic crisis and subsequent deterioration of conditions in Russia. In September 1993 a coup attempt was made against him by the leaders of parliament, which was defeated.

The conservative political parties won the December elections and this unexpected victory forced Yeltsin to review his economic policies (Yeltsin, Boris Nikolayevich (1931 – ). In The Hutchinson Unabridged Encyclopedia including Atlas). Yeltsin was criticized for taking the military initiative in Chechnya. Although, a peace treaty was entered into with Chechnya in May 1997, the war did not stop. Yeltsin dissolved the entire cabinet in March 1998, which surprised both Russia and the Western nations. He also appointed the fuel and energy minister Sergei Kiriyenko to the post of the prime minister of Russia.

The Kiriyenko led government faced a major economic crisis, because of the sudden devaluation of the ruble in 1998. In the month of August in the same year, Yeltsin dismissed both Kiriyenko and the government. Yeltsin tried to appoint Viktor Chernomyrdin as the prime minister, but the Duma, which was dominated by communist members, rejected Chernomyrdin’s candidature for prime minister. This compelled Yeltsin to nominate Yevgeni Primakov as the prime minister. Subsequently, in May 1999, Yeltsin dismissed Primakov and his government.

Yeltsin took this decision following a debate, in the Duma, as to whether Primakov was to be allowed to continue or Sergei Stepashin was to be made the acting prime minister. He appointed Stepashin as the acting prime minister after impeaching Primakov. The Duma approved of Yeltsin’s actions and confirmed Stepashin as the prime minister. However, Yeltsin was criticized all over the world for his failure to resolve the crisis in Chechnya (Yeltsin, Boris Nikolayevich (1931 – ). In The Hutchinson Unabridged Encyclopedia including Atlas).

Yeltsin tried to continue the process of reforms but the conservative members of parliament opposed his initiatives. In order to evaluate the public’s attitude towards him, a referendum was conducted in 1993 in which he received a significant number of the votes. This prompted him to propose a new Russian constitution (Hough). Incidents like the confrontation with the hard core conservatives, which resulted in the dissolution of parliament and an armed conflict in which the Moscow parliament building was shelled, rendered Yeltsin’s political position very powerful.

However, there was growing opposition towards him and economic instability and the war in Chechnya made it very difficult for Yeltsin. He emerged victorious but his ill health prevented him from participating in active politics. Yeltsin used to take sudden decisions, which would cause a great deal of astonishment to everyone and a very telling instance is that of his resignation as president in the year 1999 (Yeltsin, Boris (Nikolayevich) (1 Feb 1931 –). In The Crystal Reference Encyclopedia).

In March 1998, President Yeltsin dismissed the government which included two prominent leaders, namely the prime minister and pro free market activist, Viktor Chernomyrdin and Anatoly Chubais, the first deputy prime minister. This action surprised the West which tried to improve trade practices with Russia. The sudden sacking of the government created tremors in the West. At this juncture, Yeltsin issued a communique that Russia would continue with the process of reforming the economy. This resulted in widespread disapproval in Russia, because of the economic setbacks that had lasted for years.

Consequently, Yeltsin attempted to pacify the West and to secure their confidence he appointed Sergei Kiriyenko as the acting prime minister, who was considered to be a committed reformist. The Duma accepted his candidature as acting prime minister in its third round of voting. Kiriyenko formed the youngest cabinet in Russia (Russian Federation. In The Hutchinson Unabridged Encyclopedia including Atlas). Boris Yeltsin brought about the dissolution of the USSR. Scholars acclaim the contributions of Yeltsin in establishing the post Soviet order in Russia.

Historians have named four men as having wrought change in this context, namely, Nikita Krushchev, Leonid Brezhnev, Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin. These four men constitute the four pillars of modern decentralized Russian politics. Krushchev attempted to reform the age old centralized political system, Brezhnev tried to consolidate and then adopt it, Gorbachev endeavored to transform it into a social democracy and Yeltsin attempted to destroy the whole system and replace it with a new system (Brown). Works Cited Brown, Archie.

Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and Putin: Political Leadership in Russia’s Transition. ISBN 0870031864: Carnegie Endowment, 2001, p45. Colton, Timothy J. “Boris Yeltsin . ” Microsoft® Student 2008 [DVD]. Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation, 2007, 2007. Hough, Jerry F. Democratization and revolution in the USSR, 1985-1991 . ISBN 0815737483, p405: Brookings Institution Press, 1997. Russian Federation. In The Hutchinson Unabridged Encyclopedia including Atlas. 2005. 7 November 2007 <http://www. credoreference. com/entry. jsp? xrefid=6462313&secid=. 14. – >. Yeltsin, Boris (1931 – ).

In Andromeda Encyclopedic Dictionary of World History. 2001. 7 November 2007 <http://www. credoreference. com/entry/971089 >. Yeltsin, Boris (1931 – ). In The Macmillan Encyclopedia. 2003. 7 November 2007 <http://www. credoreference. com/entry/3314822>. Yeltsin, Boris (Nikolayevich) (1 Feb 1931 –). In The Crystal Reference Encyclopedia. 2005. 7 November 2007 <http://www. credoreference. com/entry/5763144 >. Yeltsin, Boris Nikolayevich (1931 – ). In The Hutchinson Unabridged Encyclopedia including Atlas. 2005. 7 November 2007 <http://www. credoreference. com/entry/6477895 >.

One of the definitive factors of Stalin’s Russia is the mass array of terror he cast over his nation during his tyrannous reign which was fuelled by purges of people from all walks of life; this stemmed from kulaks on the collectivised farming to ‘saboteurs’ in the industrial aspects who were said to be at fault for un met quotas. Stalin held his country in peril, but for what reason?

Ultimately it can be regarded as a disproportionate amount of fear and suspicion blinding Stalin in extenuating paranoia thus leading to the terror seen in the years from 1936-39. Although this is not the full reason, it must also be taken into account the economic difficulties and external threats faced at the time, so Stalin’s fear is not the full reason to the extent of the terror.

Notably, in 1936 Stalin declared the Soviet Union was in “a state of siege” which lead to his progressive terrorising of the Soviet Union. The key origin of the terror that unfolded is often remarked as the murder of Kirov on the 1st of December 1934. Stalin was said to become suspicious of others and is likely to have feared for himself after the death of this highly regarded member of the central committee because it could indicate that someone was attempting to overthrow him.

This fear of losing his power is to and extent accountable for the terror which took place, in particular the purges of the party because these are likely to be the people who wanted his position so he would have been suspicious that these were the one that wanted him dead and therefore they had to be cleansed- this, if true it would be a driving factor because Stalin wanted more than anything to maintain his power. However, it has been postulated that the murder of Kirov was an elaborate plot devised by Stalin.

Kirov was said to at times receive more applause than Stalin in meetings, this demonstrates that Kirov was highly popular and because he opposed the speed of industrialisation and extreme measures of party discipline Stalin may have not wanted him to be impressionable on other party members, which he clearly was exemplified by him receiving more applause than Stalin a man who was clapped where ever he went.

So overall it appears rather apparent that whether the murder was or was not organised by Stalin fear was a fore frontal element which drove him to the terror as Kirov portrays how he thought of party members may change ideas of others over his so he had to therefore eradicate them hence accounting for the terror which transpired. Although this cannot be fully noted as simply as fear because relating back to the fact Kirov received more applause could show that his death and the purges were a result of Stalin’s irrational jealousy of others and not fear, he wanted to ensure he remained top and was jealous of any who even mirrored in the slightest his appraisal.

Contrary to jealousy, a factor which heightens the portrayal that fear and suspicion were the driving force is the rise of fascism at the time. In March 1936, just before Stalin sprung his terror on the party and military, Hitler reoccupied the demilitarised zone of the Rhineland and much to Stalin’s disarray his supposed western allies did nothing but idly stand by. This may have created fear in Stalin and alarmed him of the fascist threat spiralling into him attempting to liquidate not only his external but also his internal enemies.

Combined with this it has been postulated that he was haunted by the fate of Nicholas II who had been brought down by a mixture of internal and external enemies, with this in his mind Stalin would not want to suffer the same fate hence we see how he would have been fearful of this possibility. Supporting this is the fact that in August 1936 Zinoviev and Kamenev were pulled out of prison and put on a show trial, accompanied by 14 other oppositionist group members in the party.

From this we can deduce that suspicion was a driving factor in Stalin’s motivation for the purges because he was obviously mindful of the past which led to him to prevent it from happening- and this meant the terror which he unleashed on the party to prevent this and also on the military to prevent the new force of fascism seeing to his downfall (so yet again mindful of the external threats fuelled by his fear).

In agreement with this idea is the fact that from members of the central committee in 1934 by 1938 70 percent of them were dead, if we link this back to the as fore mentioned idea that Stalin planned the murder of Kirov, we see an un disputable depiction of Stalin’s terror unleashed on the party and because of the former it was fuelled by his fear and contrite of potential downfall at the hands of others and he did see an apparent threat in the form of members such as Kirov.

In stark contrast, it cannot be regarded that Stalin’s fear and suspicion were the soul contributor to the extent of the terror; Stalin’s very personality is notably a dominant factor to the outbreak of the terror. Stalin’s cult of personality refers to how he dominated every aspect of Soviet life, he was no longer a leader but an embodiment of the nation itself- communism was now what Stalin said and did.

One famous Russian politics of the time Khrushev who went on to lead the soviet union during the cold war and who had worked with Stalin stated that “ Stalin is hope, Stalin is expectation…. Stalin is our victory”. From this account it begins to enlighten us to how Stalin must have been a rather self-absorbed man, this is displayed by firstly on Stalin’s 50th birthday in 1929, a huge all day parade and celebrations were held were tanks and soldiers were deployed to march through the streets and on may day celebrations planes flew overhead with portraits of Stalin.

Through this depiction of how his cult of personality presented him as this man who highly thought of himself it presents how he idealised himself as the hero of the revolution, a genius who alone could take Russia forward to socialism and effect the transformation of the country, and who therefore could not be thwarted.

Not only do this ideas contrast such that he was fearful, because as he thought of him-self in such prestige and being so powerful he had no reason to fear and consequently this could not have been the reason for his terror, but it also provides an explanation to why he had to get rid of the Bolshevik who knew that he was not this all-encompassing hero, because they would still have Lenin’s testament in their minds where Stalin was denounced by the man the Russian people saw as a God, so they would not accept him in the light he saw himself and may try to thwart him therefore this lead to his purges because he wished to maintain this cult of personality which resembled him as a demi God and it was in such interests security that he purge the party of either those who may disagree or those mindful of times of the power struggle where the testament was revealed.

However, Stalin’s personality is said to account for his suspicion which may have led to the terror as he was described as being deeply suspicious, verging on paranoia. Referring back to Khrushchev he reported that Stalin was ‘a very distrustful man, sickly suspicious, seeing everywhere about him “enemies”, “double dealers”, and “spies”. Combining with this, the suicide of his wife on the 8th November 1932 which will have convinced him even more that those around him would betray him because the women closed to him has resorted to killing herself which he will have seen as her rejecting his ideals and thus betraying him, it meant his personality became deeply suspicious.

So although his personality does partially portray ideas that it was Stalin’s own ego which fuelled the terror, there was definitely and element of suspicion because of past events and how his peers regarded it as being natural to his personality. Alternatively, the terror can also be seen to mimic the cunningness Stalin showed at the time of the power struggle where he outwitted his opposition and thus eliminate them leading him to gain control of the communist party. First off this can be shown by the fact he wished to keep the party under his full control so he could therefore carry out his policies end edicts without question, keeping the party in a constant state of insecurity ( who would be arrested or denounced next? ) was a way of keeping control.

This can be seen most by the nomenklatura around the central committee: allowed Stalin to keep his lieutenants guessing about whom he would adopt as ‘his people’. So the purges of the military allowed for this, so through this it shows Stalin’s cunningness being a reason for the purges because he used them to keep those higher up in line. However, yet again this can be seen to also mirror the fact in how Stalin felt threatened by the growing opposition to him in the 1930’s thus it portrays how fear is still a root element to thee purges because despite his cunningness being apparent it still all comes back down to his fear as being the intrinsic reason for the terror.

Contradicting this still is how Stalin’s cunningness and intellect can be seen to have instigated the purges because of the economic difficulties the Soviet Union faced at the time. Production figures from the five year plans were beginning to level off and fall behind schedule , there had been a bad harvest in 1936 (just before the start of the terror) and Stalin’s management of the economy had been criticised heavily. Stalin through the purges of the people adopted scapegoats for these failings and allowed him to pin problems on so called ‘wreckers’. Thereby Stalin was also able to shake up managers and workers which made them work much harder as they did not want to face accusation – this tied in with the Stakhanovite campaign of 1936.

The terror allowed Stalin to increase workers to be more productive and encourage them to be Stakhanovite’s and demand more tools and materials to increase production rates, Through this we can see how the terror amongst the workers was fuelled by Stalin’s cunningness to manipulate the workers into working much harder and reeking greater results for Russia, so it would seem that part of the reason for the terror is in fact drawn from Stalin’s intellect and cunningness supposed to the fear and suspicion that drove the purges in other sectors. Overall Stalin’s fears and fears and suspicions heavily contributed to the terror within the USSR from 1936-39. It was the fear of losing control of the party to numerous factors such as fascism and rejection of his ideology which led him to purge the party and military.

Although the purge of the workers is prominently a result of Stalin’s cunningness to manipulate them in order to gain greater results in an attempt to meet his five year plans, it is the suspicion which we saw evident after the murder of Kirov that led him to purge his own party first of all and the fear of external and internal threats which led him to purge the military. In conclusion fear and suspicion heavily contributed to the extent of the terror from 1936-39 as it is so evident from the party and militarily, but it still must be acknowledged that it was not the sole reason as Stalin did cause some terror amongst workers as a result of his intellect not fear, however overall the major factor which lead to the most influential and majority of purges was in fact his fear and suspicions that dwelled with his personality and led to vindictive paranoia.

This essay will argue that the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) reached an agreement over Laos but not in Berlin because Berlin was politically important for both the US and the USSR. If ever the USSR gains Berlin, the integration of the entire Eastern Europe into the Soviet bloc will finally be accomplished. Should the US acquire Berlin, the former will have a strategic stronghold from which it can attack the USSR.

In sharp contrast, the absence of an agreement over Laos will plunge both the US and the USSR into very costly wars. Nikita Khrushchev is famous for being a bold reformer who ended the brutal legacy of Stalinism and rejected the Soviet foreign policy of waging a world war with the West. His diplomacy likewise destroyed the Stalinist doctrine of isolationism that controlled the Soviet Union for decades.

But Khrushchev’s reckless brinkmanship and ultimatums interspersed these positive developments, resulting in the Berlin Crisis (1958-1962). Some political experts believe that the Berlin Crisis drove the world to the brink of a nuclear war. Prior to the Berlin Crisis, Khrushchev was a dictator whose major decisions were unchallenged, particularly those related to Soviet foreign policy. Under his regime, Soviet foreign policy focused on countries and issues that affected important Soviet interests and his political expediency.

“Priorities” included finalizing a German peace settlement, achieving a detente with the US, preserving and strengthening ties with the People’s Republic of China and supporting Communist movements throughout the world. Despite Khrushchev’s reformist stance, he was still determined to win the Cold War by spreading Communism across the globe. Shortly after the failed Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961, Khrushchev and US President John Fitzgerald Kennedy (JFK) met at the Vienna Summit, which lasted from June 3 to June 4, 1961.

The summit turned out to be a very tense affair. Khrushchev initially resisted JFK’s attempts to discuss Laos, saying that he was fully aware of US military intervention in the said country. But Khrushchev was in a more conciliatory mood when JFK again brought up the subject of Laos the following day. The former “agreed to work in good faith for the Geneva goals. ” Khrushchev also claimed that “interested parties should be locked in a room and told to find a solution. ” The agreement on Laos apparently was the sole conclusive outcome of the Vienna Summit.

Read through the attached case study, which outlines the marine border dispute between the USA and Russia in the Bering Sea. Summarise the main points of the case study, making sure you include the following:

• What factor(s) led to the initial dispute?
• Which resources are at the centre of the dispute?
• What agreements have been made between the two nations in relation to rights of use in the Bering Sea?
• What is the current situation and how could the conflict be resolved?

Russian Bering Sea Marine Border Dispute

Conflict over Strategic Assets, Fisheries and Energy Resources Vlad M.Kaczynski, Warsaw School of Economics

Abstract

Despite the universal implementation of the Law of the Sea principles in defining national sovereignty over coastal waters and the end of the Cold War, Russia continues to press marine border disputes with several neighboring countries. The most important conflicts are with the United States, Norway, and Japan. Fortunately, these are not military confrontations, but political disputes over the economically and strategically important marine regions claimed by all four countries.

At stake are strategic considerations, abundant fish resources and large oil and gas deposits at the bottom of the sea. This article discusses the history of the US-Russian conflict, the viewpoints of both sides, and the impact of this dispute on access to marine living resources of the area.

Historical Overview

In 1867 the United States purchased the territory of Alaska, acquiring nearly 600,000 square miles of new territory. The land was purchased for $7. 2 million or approximately 2 cents per acre. The purchase agreement defined a marine boundary between Russia and the newly acquired US territory.This boundary was readdressed in a 1990 treaty, commonly known as the Baker-Shevardnadze Agreement, between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).

With the collapse of the USSR, the Russian government has taken the position that the Baker-Shevardnadze Agreement was invalid since USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze did not effectively represent Russian interests. Consequently, Russia refused to ratify the agreement, thus placing the United States in the position of negotiating in order to seek a modified treaty.One of Russia’s key demands in revising the treaty is its desire to secure cross-border fi shery quotas for its vessels, particularly gaining access to Alaska’s Pollock stocks. However, the US ultimately rejected this Russian request. From the Russian perspective, there is no definitive agreement defining the marine border between the two countries although international law favors the US position. Absent ratification of the 1990 agreement or other arrangements, this conflict in the Bering Sea will continue.Russian–American Dispute over the Bering Sea Marine Boundary Line When the United States purchased Alaska from the Russian government, mutually accepted marine claims were limited to a narrow band of the coastal zone.

However, the 1867 Treaty contained language which defined a boundary between the two nations through the Bering Sea. Over time, and in particular when the Law of the Sea principles started to govern the world’s oceans, the 1867 Treaty line became the most contentious marine boundary in the world. Unfortunately, the language of the purchase agreement between Russia and the US is silent on the type of line, map projection and horizontal datum used to depict this boundary. Further, neither country has produced the original or other authenticated maps used during the negotiations to resolve the issue. Differences in defining this line fuel the continuing conflict. Cartographers normally use two types of lines to delineate marine boundaries. These are rhomb lines and geodetic lines (also known as great circle arcs) that are used on two common map projections, Mercator and conical.

Depending on the type of line and map projection used, lines will either appear as straight or curved lines. For example, a rhomb line will be a straight line on a Mercator projection, whereas a geodetic line is curved. Because each country interpreted the line described in the 1867 Treaty as a straight line, the Soviet Union depicted the Bering Sea marine boundary as a rhomb line on a Mercator projection whereas the US used a geodetic line on a conical projection.While both appear as straight lines on their respective map projections, each country’s claim maximized the amount of ocean area and seafloor under their respective control. Figure 1 overleaf depicts marine borders between the Russian Federation and the United States showing the diff erences resulting from the different interpretations of the borderline in this sea area.

While the two countries agreed to continue respecting each other’s interpretation of the 1867 Treaty as an interim measure, negotiations began in the early 1980s to resolve the differing interpretations. Soviet negotiators had specific instructions from the Politburo to “insist on a straight line boundary”. Some authors speculate that Soviet negotiators may have ceded territory in the Bering Sea to the US in order to quell the US objections the Soviet Union’s proposed division of territory north of the Bering Strait.Following nearly a decade of negotiations, a new agreement was reached between the two countries in 1990. The 1990 agreement split the difference between the US claim to a geodetic line and the Soviet claim to a rhomb line as shown on a Mercator projection. It also created several “special areas”. Although both countries ceded territory from their previous claims, the US still controlled a far greater amount of area in the Bering Sea than if the new agreement had been based on the equidistant line principle normally used in international boundary disputes.

Marine Resources The 1990 Agreement “represents a very favorable outcome in terms of US strategic and resource interests…” and was quickly ratified by the US Congress, which was eager to begin the sale of offshore oil and gas leases. The US Minerals Management Service recently estimated the potential oil and gas reserves in the Bering and Chukchi Seas at 24 billion barrels of oil and 126 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. In addition, fish harvests from this egion are vital to the fishing industries of both countries. US fisheries alone harvest over two million metric tons of fish from the Bering Sea each year and it is the dispute over access and harvesting rights to these fisheries resources which have fueled much of the rising dissent within Russia towards the 1990 Agreement. Although the U. S. quickly ratified the 1990 Agreement, the Soviet Union, prior to its collapse, did not ratify the Agreement.

The US and Russian PositionsWhen the agreement was signed, provisional arrangements were made by each country to abide by its terms until ratification, but resistance to the ratification of the 1990 agreement has continued to rise within Russia along with accusations of conceding to American interests. The Moscow Times stated that Gorbachev, in his enthusiastic pursuit of good bilateral relations with the US, rushed into signing the 1990 agreement. Other claims suggest that Foreign Minister Shevardnadze exceeded his authority by signing the 1990 agreement with the US. Many accuse Gorbachev and Shevardnadze of ceding Russia’s rightful fishing areas in their haste to negotiate a deal for signature at the 1990 White House Summit. “Russian parliamentarians understood perfectly well that the agreement infringed upon Russia’s interests and therefore the document has never been ratified by the Russian parliament,” these critics say. Other Russian officials have voiced their opposition to the treaty not only because of lost fishing opportunities, but also due to the loss of potential oil and gas fields and naval passages for submarines. Many seek a new treaty “that would settle claims and protect Russian fishermen.

”Russian Far East fisheries industry stakeholders assert that 150,000 metric tons of fishing quotas from US waters should be given to Russian fishermen as compensation for the area lost in the 1990 agreement and to earn their support for ratification of the treaty. A senior Russian Consulate officer stated: “I don’t remember figures, but as far as I remember there was something said about 150,000 tons of Pollock compensation in an annual quota from the American side if the treaty is to be ratified. Personal communications with Russian sources indicate that this figure may have arisen from estimates of fish abundance or Russian harvests in the disputed area between the two countries in the 1980s. However, given that most Bering Sea fish stocks are considered fully utilized or even depleted, it is unlikely that this quota demand will be granted. From the Russian viewpoint, the 1990 agreement remains in limbo. Efforts to ratify it have raised dissent and opposition, making the boundary set forth in the 1990 agreement more fragile as time progresses. However, the US has steadfastly continued to abide by and enforce the provisions of the 1990 agreement.

The US position may provide evidence of a continued “general state practice” and a basis under customary international law that the boundary delineated by the 1990 agreement is the actual marine boundary between the two countries. Determination of a state practice in customary international law requires evidence of “general state practice” and “opinio juris” – a sense of obligation to comply with the practice. The United States’ continued position and enforcement of the boundary prescribed by the 1990 agreement builds evidence of the general state practice that the 1990 agreement is the marine border between the two countries.

Challenging Russian Activities

However, the recent actions of Russian fishing vessels are destabilizing the situation. From April through November of each year, dozens of Russian fishing vessels fish along this boundary to intercept Pollock migrating from US waters. The number and harvesting capacity of the fishing vessels operating along this border raises serious concerns among US fisheries managers that the Pollock stock is being overexploited by Russian fishermen. While near continuous Coast Guard aircraft and vessel patrols attempt to protect the integrity of the U.S.

EEZ, the belligerence of the Russian fishing vessels towards US enforcement efforts continues to increase. In one notable case, more than a dozen Russian fishing vessels surrounded a Coast Guard vessel while it was trying to seize the Russian fishing vessel GISSAR for illegal fishing. The Russian fishing vessels threatened to ram the Coast Guard vessel if it tried to seize and escort the GISSAR off the fishing grounds. Many Russian vessels simply refuse to submit to Coast Guard inspections when caught inside the US EEZ. The situation has become so inflamed that the US is contemplating the use of naval gunfire, in the form of warning and disabling shots, against non-compliant vessels. Such a resort to violence may only further destabilize the situation.

Searching for SolutionsAgainst this background, talks between the US State Department and Russian officials have begun in an attempt to resolve the issue. However, the United States maintains its staunch position that the 1990 agreement is binding and constitutes the marine border between the two countries. While there was an offer to concede some fish quotas to the Russian Federation as an incentive for ratification in 1997, this offer has recently been withdrawn. From the Russian perspective, there is no definitive agreement regarding the marine border between the two countries although international law favors the US position. However, absent ratification of the 1990 agreement or other arrangements, this conflict in the Bering Sea will likely continue. About the author: Vlad M. Kaczynski is Associate Professor at the School of Marine Affairs and Affiliate Associate Professor of the Ellison Center for Russian, East European and Central Asia Studies, University of Washington, Seattle, WA, United States.

Currently he is a Visiting Fulbright Professor at the Warsaw School of Economics, Poland. Further Reading Vlad M. Kaczynski, “Ocean Policy Toward Russia and the Pacific Fisheries: The U. S. and Western Countries’ Perspective”; in Harry N. Scheiber with Kathryn J. Mengerink, eds., Multilateralism &amp; International Ocean Resources Law, The Law of the Sea Institute, Earl Warren Legal Institute, University of California, Berkeley, 2004. “Integrative Analysis of Human Impacts on the Ocean and Coastal Environment,” in Economic Globalization and Environmental Policy, Adam Budnikowski and Maciej Cygler, Warsaw School of Economics, 2006.

This study was prepared using the research findings and studies of School of Marine Studies’ graduate students Mr.Jeff Randall, Mr. Greg Cassad and Mr. Artur Soule under the aegis of the University of Washington courses “Russian Ocean Policy” and “Comparative Marine Business in the North Pacific: Russia, Japan, Canada and the United States” jointly listed by the Russian, East European and Central Asia Studies Center and School of Marine Affairs, University of Washington. Both courses are offered by Prof. Vlad Kaczynski.

Special areas were areas on either country’s respective side of the 1867 marine boundary but beyond 200nm from the baseline. There were three such areas on the United States side of the marine boundary called “eastern special areas” and one on the Russian side called the “western special area. ” In the language of the 1990 Marine Boundary Agreement, Russia ceded all claims to sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the eastern special areas to the United States and conversely the United States ceded all claims to sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the western special area to Russia.