Terrorism

On the bright sunny morning of September 11, Al Qaeda terrorists organized one of the most destructive attacks the world has ever seen. They hijacked four commercial planes using them as weapons for annihilation. Two planes full of passengers were flown directly into the twin towers of the World Trade Center immediately killing thousands of people. The third plane targeted the Pentagon and the hijackers of the fourth plane aimed to hit Washington DC but the passengers fought back crashing the plane in Pennsylvania.

The terrorists carefully and patiently devised this plan of attack which was never foreseen by the American government. Instantly, then President George Bush vowed that fighting terrorism would be his administration’s top priority. This 9/11incident is one of the many attacks that molded the image of terrorism all over the world. This fateful incident led the leaders of the world to make a commitment to fight terrorism (Gjelten). The war on terrorism is a seemingly endless fight.

Some people say that this is a political war; others say that this is merely a clash of ideologies most specifically Islamic ideologies against the world but the raison d’etre behind every act of terror does not matter because the very act itself produces the same result- terrorism continues to steal thousands of innocent lives and strike terror in the hearts of people all throughout the world. In order to respond to these attacks, countries from all ends of the world met and created laws in order to prevent the admission of terrorists.

The worsening crisis in terrorism paved the way to the enactment of the adoption of Anti-terrorism policies by the Justice and Home Affairs Council of the European Countries on June 13, 2002. The policy describes the different forms of terrorist attack as well as the corresponding penalties keeping in mind the most sacred and fundamental human rights. The anti-terrorism campaign also includes several courses of action for the battle against international organized crimes. Through the cooperation of EU Countries, the member states adopted a uniform policy on visas thereby lessening illegal immigration.

On December 6, 2001, the United States and the EUROPOL agreed to share strategic and technical information concerning several policies about the manner of prevention and investigation of combating serious international crimes (“Reinforcement of EU Policy against Terrorism”). The United States have several laws against terrorist even before the 9/11 attack. The US Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provided that an alien who had been engaged in terrorist activity or those under suspicion of being a terrorist cannot enter the United States territory.

Terrorist activity has been defined as any violent attack against persons, assassinations including hijacking planes and using chemical or nuclear weapons and any similar activity. Shortly after the 9/11 attack, the USA Patriot Act provided a wider definition of terrorist activity which now includes any person who have taken advantage of any position whether public or private to endorse aid or abet any terrorist activity or organization (Schoenholtz & Hojaiban).

In a joint effort to capture members of the Kurdisan Workers’ party, Turkey and Iraq finalized negotiations regarding counter- terrorism agreement allowing Turkey to engage in hot pursuit of PKK terrorists at its base in northern Iraq (Anti-Terror Group, 2007). Iran is one of the countries that contributed greatly in terrorism. They have a special relationship with the Islamic Jihad due to the fact that they get paid for building nuclear weapons for them. They also played a great role in the war between Israel and Pakistan.

They provide training and weapons for the war soldiers. Yonah Alexander, an expert in counter-terrorism said that in order to start negotiations with Iran, the past events and policies of the country in connection with terrorism must first be taken into consideration. In 1980, the United States Embassy in Beirut was bombed by the Islamic Jihad resulting in the death and injuries of several people. About twenty eight years ago, the United States failed to rescue the hostages taken in the Embassy in Iran.

An important point to consider way back then was that it was difficult to plan anti-terrorism measures because the times did not call for it unlike today. Just recently, Iran’s nuclear-making operations were suspended because of the inquiries made by several countries who had been alarmed by such activity. The investigation of IAEA led to the discovery of eighteen years of hidden nuclear activities. Even though Iran answered several questions, many remained unconvinced.

On October 2003, after the Iraq invasion, Iran joined the International Atomic Energy Agency and signed a protocol stating that they support and promote its safeguard procedures (Cochran). In 2007, the Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki made a statement saying that Iran is willing to consider talks with the United States on Iraq even after the United States Ambassador in Baghdad; Ryan Crocker made a complaint about the participation of Iran in terrorist activity by extending supports by supplying weapons and training to terrorists.

Several attempts towards negotiations have been made by Iran but were rejected by the United States. Indeed, it is seemingly hard to forge anti-terrorist strategy with Iran considering that it gives support to terrorist activity but no matter what the situation is, Iran is also a country that realized how much they wanted change and hw much they desire a different way of life for its people so there is a possibility that peace and negotiation talks might happen (Winer, 2007). Policy makers all throughout the world have different ideas and strategies but they all lead to one goal, which is to win the fight against terrorism.

It is greatly devastating to see millions of innocent lives being lost and it is precisely because of this reason that in this type of battle, nobody ever wins. The value of human life is nothing compared to a political belief or an ideology. The most effective way of fighting terrorism is to stop them before they get a chance to execute their plan. However, no matter how good the intentions are in enacting these laws, the extreme policies of several countries should also undergo some changes. The definition of terrorist and suspected terrorist should be reevaluated so as not to prejudice innocent people who are also seeking refuge.

Indeed, the counter- terrorism negotiations with Iran has been on a rough road but through patience and constant communication, many people strongly believe that it will soon be achieved. An important thing to consider in opening renegotiations is that Iran should declare every detail and surrender all its accounts concerning their development of nuclear programs. They should also make a stand that they would severe all their efforts in supporting terrorism. It is important to keep in mind that the main reason why everybody is uniting against terrorism is to protect the people and not to push them directly in harm’s way.

Works Cited Anti-Terror Group. 2007. ”Turkey, Iraq to sigh counter-terrorism deal, hot pursuit on agenda”. PKKterror. com. 22 April 2009 http://www. pkkterror. com/content/view/711/27/> Gjelten, T. 2009. “September 11 Attacks. ” Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopedia. 22 April 2009<http://encarta. msn. com © 1997-2009 Microsoft Corporation>. “Reinforcement of EU Policy against Terrorism”. 2005. Hellenic Republic, Embassy of Greece. 22 April 2009 <http://www. greekembassy. org/embassy/content/en/Article. aspx? office=1&folder=39&article=58>

Schoenholtz, Andrew and Jeniffer Hojaiban. 2008. “ International Migration and Anti-Terrorism Laws and Policies; Balancing Security and Refugee Protection”. Institute for the Study of International Migration Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. 22 April 2009. <http://isim. georgetown. edu/Publications/GMF%20Materials/AntiTerrorismLaws. pdf Winer, J. 2007. “Paradoxical Policies For Pakistan and Iran”. Counterterrorism Blog. 24 April 24, 2009. http://counterterrorismblog. org/2007/08/paradoxical_policies_for_pakis. php>

This essay will generate the ideas of the role between border security and counter terrorism. The subcategories that will be discussed along side this theory are the lack of border security, both south of the United States and north. The policy of the United States toward immigration will also give the paper a close-up of the harm illegal aliens who are not apprehended will do, not only to the status of the economy but to national terrorism . In the emergence of a lax border security, finally, the issue of this juxtaposed with the opportunity that exists for terrorists to exploit will also be developed in the paper.

In order for a more substantial argument to evolve in this paper a brief history with terrorism and border control will be argued as well as the history of the US Patriot Act and other issues in the past with the United States concerning immigration, illegal aliens, and terrorists. Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, there have been many changes in the ways the United States government functions. The first act of alteration to the normal code of conduct was the drafting and passage of the USA PATRIOT Act.

There are many who see this act as a bold defense against the fear of terrorism for the American public, however, a growing number of people see the changes in American governmental policy and overall attitude towards enemies and allies alike as an affront against proper American values and freedom. As Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter explain, there is a distinct politic to the notion of terrorism. However, these tactics are not always effective. There are many events of terrorism in the world each year, yet only a handful are regarded with any merit.

According to Kydd and Walter, through a well argued and insightful article, it is “the trust between groups” that must be destroyed for an extremist attack to be successful. This is the motivation behind the response to the attacks of September 11, 2001. On December 6, 2001, then Attorney General John Ashcroft addressed the Senate Judiciary Committee in praise of this act, and it’s restructuring of the NSA, CIA and FBI. (Ashcroft 524) His rhetoric was patriotic and concise, and his views of the USA PATRIOT act and its changes seemed sincere.

This was supported with the passage of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373, which paved the road for the Patriot act itself. Eric Rosand wrote about the resolution in 2003. His response to its necessity was one of sympathy to the government, for having to face such a difficult challenge. However, not everyone who has commented on the alterations of the US governmental policy has done so with such reverence. David Cole compared the investigations into possible terrorist cells in the United States, to the “Palmer Raids” of 1919 – where, following a series of bombings, J.

Edgar Hoover led a series of “round ups” of immigrants across the country and held them without trial or charge in “unconscionable conditions, interrogated incommunicado and in some cases tortured”. (529) This attitude has spread throughout the country, as the appearance of indecency has flooded the government’s handling of the terrorists investigations. Mary Jacoby brings up the question of the legal definition of “Detainee”. This is in response to the holding of prisoners at the Guantanamo Bay military base in Cuba.

The prisoners of this facility have been acquired from around the world – from the war in Afghanistan, and from arrests done in dozens of countries around the world. However, the problem arises when the soldiers fighting for the Afghan military are brought in as detainees, rather than prisoners of war. While the Guantanamo prison has its apologists, such as Charles Krauthammer – who states that freeing of these men would be “lunacy” (537) – the fact remains, that in strict terms, the United States is in breech of the Geneva Convention by holding POWs.

The United States government however sees this detention as necessary. The United States also enlists other tactics involving border control. The United States since September 11 has kept a more watchful eye on the Mexican border to ensure that large trucks are not passing the borders which could hold weapons, but this seems to be the only action officials and military are taking in regards to border control according to Zagorin (2004) in The Mexican Border Will Get a Closer Look.

In this article Zagorin is hard pressed to find any true action the US is taking in regards to border control and Zagorin sites many examples of how Mexico is making its own efforts to decrease the chances al-Qaeda terrorists coming into the country or leaving the country, “The Mexicans will also focus on flight schools and aviation facilities on their side of the frontier. …another episode has some senior U. S.

officials worried; the theft of a crop-duster aircraft south of San Diego, apparently by three men from southern Mexico who assaulted a watchman and then flew off in a southerly direction… a senior U. S. law-enforcement official notes that crop dusters can be sued to disperse toxic substance…”(19). In contrast to the underlying belief of the lax nature in Zagorin’s article Andreas (2003) holds a very different opinion in his article Perspective.

This article gives details about the before and after September 11 border security in the United States dealing with both the Mexican and Canadian border. Prior to September 11 the United States focused its energy on deterring the flow of drugs between the borders. Thus the model by which the United States is equipped in handling border security in regards to terrorism is very juvenile in design because their previous focus has been on migrant workers and masses of illegal immigrants rather than to search a crowd and discover a few terrorists (4).

Another issue that arises in the approach of the Mexican border is that the south border of the United States received much more attention than the Canadian border, “…only 334 agents were assigned to the 5,525-mile northern border compared with over 9,000 agents stationed at the 2,062-mile southern edge” (4), however, since September 11 there are an equal amount of agents patrolling both borders. Under the Patriot Act, as stated previously, the number of agents present in the Canadian border has tripled in a response to September 11.

In an effort to stop terrorism, the US coastguard now stops every boat crossing the Great Lakes as well as escorts large tankers. Thus, Andreas states that these new border securities have merely taken the old ideas of drug trafficking measures and applied them to terrorism which makes for an increase of difficulty in border control (Andreas, 5). Fernando Reinares noted in his article, The Empire Rarely Strikes Back, that after “more than 2400 acts of terrorism against American citizens and interests” there have been only “three occasions of overt military response”.

(Reinares 92) However, because of the incredible size and depth of impact of the September 11th attacks, war became unavoidable. There did arise a problem with the military action, however, as a growing public opinion seemed to point the target ast Islam itself, rather than just Al-Qaeda. This prompted the United States to “enlist the help of as many Islamic nations as possible” to counter act this perception. (Aretxega 143)

This coalition of Islamic nations does nothing to counteract the rise in racial profiling within the United States. Sherry Colb wrote about the foreseen changes in American law enforcement following the September 11th attacks. Her article articulated the problem of racial profiling and its consequences. Cold notes that “real numbers do not support profiling”. (539) However this does not stop the utilization of profiling in airports, or in traffic stops. However, this too has its supporters, from such sources as law professor Roger Clegg.

His response to the topic of racial profiling is one of acceptance and justification. “So what? ” (Clegg 542) Clegg asks of the act of profiling. However his racial make-up lends itself easily to such opinions, as an educated white male is rarely confronted for being white, educated or male. But profiling at the borders is the number one cause by which patrols see fit to apprehend an individual since they fit the profile and the Patriot Act backs up the idea of border security no matter what the cost.

The changes in the United States since September 2001 have been many and wide in scope, however there is little agreement as to whether these changes are for the better – or even legal. As illustrated in these articles, the several aspects of governmental policy that have been affected by these attacks have been met with acceptance and praise, as well as contempt and ridicule – with communicative and sincere arguments on both sides. Though, despite the eloquent nature of the arguments, they do not dissuade one from his or her own opinion.

It is the learned set of moral values that create one’s opinion of the new America. The issue of border control seems increasingly to be an issue of economics and as much as the United States focuses its attention on increasing patrol, it is also obstructing trade between countries and so the lax behavior or approach in certain instances of policing and allowing immigrants to cross borders presents to the theorist that increased border control does not necessarily lead to a more protected country.

In Kiely’s (2006) article GOP View, she states that the United States is more focused on illegal immigration than terrorism and using terrorism as a guise by which to exert an autocratic policing style which does not give rights to immigrants, “A bill the House passed in December called for making illegal immigration a felony offense, punishable by at least a year in jail…Under the law, people who cross the border without permission are already guilty of a criminal misdemeanor.

But people who enter the country legally and then overstay their visas—as many as 40% of the nation’s estimated 12 million illegal immigrants, according to Sensenrenner—are guilty of a civil violation” (1). Thus it becomes apparent that the United States is focusing more attention on illegal immigration than on terrorism since all of their efforts are geared toward this goal. Since the United States has merely adapted their approach to finding terrorists in the same fashion by which they find illegal immigrants there seems to exist a very unreliable system.

The terrorists that entered the country each had different ways to travel, false papers of identification and would have been apprehended if the border security had not been as lax as they had been and since their approach to border control has not changed dramatically as a system, but merely as having more patrols and policing the gate is left open for terrorism, as The US 9/11 Commission on Border Control (2004), states, “We found that as many as 15 of the 19 hijackers were potentially vulnerable to interception by border authorities.

Analyzing their characteristic travel documents and travel patterns could have allowed authorities to intercept 4 of the 15 hijackers and more effective use of information available in U. S. government databases could have identified up to 3 hijackers” (570).

Since these hijackers could have been apprehended but were not, and the government has only increased the number of patrols on the either border and not per se the system by which illegal immigrants are apprehended it stands to reason that the government is not altogether prepared or establishing a methodology in apprehending terrorists, they are merely cracking down by using brute force without strategy,

Looking back, we can also see that the routine operations of our immigration laws—that is, aspects of those laws not specifically aimed at protecting against terrorism—inevitably shaped al Qaeda’s planning and opportunities. Because they were deemed not to be bona fide tourists or students as they claimed, five conspirators that we know of tried to get visas and failed, and one was denied entry by an inspector.

We also found that had the immigration system set a higher bar for determining whether individuals are who or what they claim to be—and ensuring consequences for violations—it could potentially have excluded, removed, or come into further contact with several hijackers who did not appear to meet the terms for admitting short-term visitors (570). Thus, the article emphasized the lack of a system in uncovering terrorism as part of border security. Aristotle was partial to pluralism. He did place his faith in the idea that humans ‘aped’ reality and copy what they are witnessing, and thus making reality a reserved, unattainable subject.

A person’s personal truth, through the philosophy of pluralism and Aristotle, has a background involving historical context and empirical evidence wherein truth can be extrapolated. Aristotle believed that pluralism dealt more with a person’s culture than with a vast array of immitigable scenarios. For Aristotle, pluralism, and not unity allowed for change in the universe, and in this avenue of discourse Aristotle presented the concept of both motion and rest existing in the world in simultaneous reality, “…

it is not the case that all things are at rest or in motion sometimes and nothing for ever; for there is something which always moves the things that are in motion, and the first mover is itself unmoved [Ibid. , 29-32, p. 751]. ” Therefore, life, reality, self exist on a plane where the possibility of truth is represented in many. Thus, the United States’ approach to terrorism is found to be understood as the common good for everyone as opposed to the common good based on one man.

This is shown in the allowance of holding foreigners in prisons without trial in order to gain information from them, and even in some cases indulging in torture in order to protect the greater good as is stated in Aristotle’s logos. In the reality that existed for Aristotle through the philosophy concept of pluralism, empirical facts were the focus, goal and reality which human beings base their existence. In this existence, it is not necessary for a common laborer to delve into the meanderings of the Ideal Good possibly having relevance for anyone besides a philosopher.

The absolute idea for Aristotle was not found in abstract concepts but rather in empirical multiplicity and continuous transformation of facts based on frame of reference, history, and culture. It is through these fundamental approaches that human beings come to know their own truth instead of delving into the misrepresentation of Forms given through Plato’s unity, “Pythagoreans say that things exist by ‘imitation’ of numbers, and Plato says they exist by participation, changing the name.

But what the participation or the imitation of the Forms could be they left an open question [Ibid. , ll-14, p. 7O1]. ” The interaction of Forms and human beings in the universe is the core concept on the philosophy of pluralism, as Aristotle states, “Platonists speak as if the One were homogeneous like fire or water; if this is so, the numbers will not be substances.

Evidently, if there is a One-itself, and this is a first principle, ‘One’ is being used in more than one sense; for otherwise the theory is impossible [Ibid. , 992a 7-10, p. 7O9]. ” Through metaphysics Aristotle suggests that existence is not reliant upon numbers, reasons, or Forms alone, but only that the realistic forms are primary, which is the approach the United States government is taking in regards to counter-terrorism. The number one priority of preventing terrorism is to prevent terrorist travel.

This tactic however has not been seriously employed with regards to border security and finding and preventing terrorism since the focus, as previously stated, is more about finding terrorists, not finding the means by which they are mobile. One system that has not be utilized in border security is the means by which to detect whether documentation is authentic since terrorists have system by which they infiltrate a country. Their travel channels should be found and exploited, but no real clause in the Patriot Act has been given or stated.

Terrorists establish themselves in the United States through their travel channels by which there is a paper trail of documents; therefore, the Patriot Act, and NAFTA should not only be focusing their efforts at the borders where the terrorists may or may not be traveling but the government should also be wary of terrorist activity already transpiring inside the country, as The US 9/11 Commission on Border Control, “Each of these checkpoints or portals is a screening-a chance to establish that people are who they say they are and are seeking access for their stated purpose, to intercept identifiable suspects, and to take effective action” (571). This paper has shown that although the United States is refocusing efforts on border control their methodology has not been new in design as counter terrorism efforts call for, but instead the United States seems to have merely increased the number of patrols across the border and not changed the system by which they seek out terrorists.

In the information presented in this paper it gave different avenues by which the United States could be making a better effort to fight terrorism by simply having a different strategy on terrorism inclusive of finding their travel channels and relying on identification and false passports. The United States approach to border control, since they are using the same system now as prior to September 11 have not changed how they approach terrorists and their apprehension thus leaving room for terrorists to take advantage of this lax method and exploit it. Bibliography Andreas, Peter. (2003 3rd Quarter). Perspective. Regional Review. Vol. 13, Issue 2, p3-7. Aretxaga, Begona. (Winter 2001). Terror as Thrill: First Thoughts on the ‘War on Terrorism’. Anthropological Quarterly. Vol. 75, No. 1, p138-150. Kiely, Kathy. (13 April 2006).

GOP View: Illegal Immigration Won’t be Felony. USA Today. Kydd, Andrew; Walter, Barbara. (Spring 2002). Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence. International Organization. Vol. 56, No. 2, p263-296. Reinares, Fernando. (Jan-Feb 2002). The Empire Rarely Strikes Back. Foreign Policy. No. 128. P. 92-94. Rosand, Eric. (April 2003). Security Council Resolution 1373, the Counter-Terrorism Committee, and the Fight against Terrorism. The American Journal of International Law. Vol. 97, No. 2, p333-341. The US 9/11 Commission on Border Control. (2004). Blackwell Publishing Ltd. p569-574. Zagorin, Adam. (22 November 2004). Bordering On Nukes? Time. Vol. 164 Issue 21, p19.

The increase of success of the west cork Brigade, part of the Irish republican Army was the leading factor to a spate of arresting and interrogating the suspects if the IRA volunteers in an effort to identify and ascertain the headquarters of those who were engaging in the guerilla war against the forces of the British. Through interrogation the British managed to break the IRA volunteers through torturing and this lead to discovering that the forces headquarters was in Ballymurphy.

After discovering this, British army planned for an operation aimed at capturing the IRA column. This lead to mobilizing of more than 1200 British troops to attack the area from different directions. The operation was done early in the morning to attack the IRA unaware; this was thought to lead British to victory for there were about ten British commanders for one IRA member. As the British tried to encircle the IRA, they were caught by surprise as the IRA was aware of the British plans and they attacked at the crossbarry roads which lead to having many British casualties.

The IRA took British arms and set their vehicles on fire before they were attacked by other British troops but did not succeed even after stiff fire fight and they all retired. Impact of British actions to IRA in bringing peace to Northern Ireland The IRA had structural plans that were governing them through their endeavors. It was evident that the republican were to remain anonymous to every one except the members. No one could talk about the army and this made it hard to uncover the whole truth about the army’s missions and their plans.

As their rules had restricted them not to talk about the army in public, not discuss anything concerning the army with anyone, not to go in a company of a known member and not to frequent to the houses of a known member, and the top most issue was not to drink alcohol excessively as this would lead to loose mouth and would reveal the republicans secrets. The army volunteers were made to believe that the army was legal and justified. They were taught that that was the only way to proclaim democracy in the whole Ireland.

Commitment to the movement was legal and was the only way out to struggle for political justification and is a direct representative of the Dail Eirean parliament and by that was a legal and lawful government of the Irish republic and has right to pass law and to claim jurisdiction over the land, airspace, means of production all its people regardless of creed or loyalty. (Coogan, 1997) This impacted a negative attitude to the IRA members and the people of Ireland in an effort to bring peace.

These beliefs made the British have difficulties in trying to restore peace in the country as they were regarded as intruders and were there for their own benefit. This is because the army had claimed to the sovereign government of Ireland and had all the rights to act in any capacity as a government. As the recruits were taught that British army, RUC, UDR and Gardai are occupying forces, were illegal and were completely unacceptable for that was morally wrong, ethnically inexcusable and politically unacceptable.

Through the strengthening of these believes, the IRA members were completely resistance to the British armies in their efforts of any form in Ireland. (Hopkinson, 2003) IRA PREPARATION OF RECRUITS The IRA prepares their recruits in a distinctive manner. The recruits are taught on their importance to one another. This helps bonding together the recruits from different back grounds to strengthen the movement bond. As they are recruited they are motivated even they face harsh conditions should persevere for the sake of their nation.

The IRA is form of ethnic terrorist seeking to influence the Irish people to reject the British governance. As usual to the ethnic terrorist, according to Byman (1997) they seek to create fear among the rival groups or armies by performing terrorist attacks and moderate movements. The recruitment of the army means entering in your total allegiance in life. This helps the movement to retain the recruited volunteers for they have to obey the commands and the rules set forth for the organization.

The IRA recruits are forced to believe whatever allegation is put forward for them and strictly follow the rules. The recruits are trained to persevere any form of hardship they face during their work as armies until they combat the target group. Nationalism is another force that was driving the recruits. They were from all corners of the country and were much concerned over fighting for their nation. This aspect had more power as far as recruits were concerned over the belief system.

On the other hand, nationalism can also display the general characteristic of a belief system by providing the recruits with adequate information and equipping their mind with an issue that they are to fight for their nation. (Hopkinson, 2003) Conclusion IRA movement was determined in salvaging the Ireland from the hands of British rule. The British solders effort to combat the IRA guerilla were rendered fruitless for the IRA was always ready for the attack even though they were less in number compared to British solders.

The IRA recruits were equipped in their minds that the movement was legal and morally right to fight the intruders whore were settled in the country for their own good. The IRA movement sought to influence to moderators and other ethnic groups to reject the British governance. They were to follow strict rules to ensure the safety and welfare of the movements. Reference: Byman, D. (1997) The logic of Ethnic Terrorism, Washington DC, Rand Coogan, T. (1997) The IRA, New York, Palgrave Macmillan Hopkinson, M. (2003) Irish War of Independence, Journal, Vol

Samuel P. Huntington’s essay on the Clash of Civilizations can be summarized as a snapshot of the current state of political affairs of the world through the lens of western civilization. Throughout the paper the author had made numerous hypotheses that stated while nation states will remain a powerful and formidable force in the foreseeable future, it is the non-visible boundaries of civilizations that will shape the future of conflicts and forge allies as well as adversaries. The author has drawn from history in creating his assumption that current and future conflicts will be founded on the basis of civilizations as opposed to kingdoms and emperors.

Huntington had stated that with the rise of governments “for the people” that “…the wars of the peoples had begun” signaling a major change in why mankind has waged warfare. As such, populations of each respective culture will more than likely form alliances with populations from their own civilizations and forge enemies with those they have no common ground with. The author doesn’t take the time to explain the “why” this phenomena is occurring but chooses to merely gloss over any underlying reasons it may be happing and instead reiterate that it is in fact occurring.

Many assumptions are made throughout the paper by evidence of a lack of adequate sources for many hypotheses which would leave the reader to assume that what is said is merely “common knowledge”. The author glazes over major historical events which had demonstrated peoples from different cultures and civilizations working together towards economic benefit such as the Silk Road.1

Persuasion of the Theorist

Samuel P. Huntington’s essay on the Clash of Civilizations is persuasive in historical anecdotes and real world current events. Most of Huntington’s essay need not say anything more then what is already repeated on major media outlets around the world. The essay states what has long been opposed by the far left; namely, that people choose to interact, trade and form alliances with “like peoples”. It then, shouldn’t come as a surprise that the author needs to say little in order to sway an audience to his hypothesis by simply relating real world events such as rising nationalism in Russia2, Greece3 and France.

One only has to look at the Anglo sphere of alliances in areas of conflict in the Middle East to find that Huntington’s persuasive argument is a narrative of real world events4. Non-Western nations that hope to transition into modern nations form alliances with Western nations but such alliances only serve to further destroy the credibility of the elites within those non-western countries. The elites are viewed simply as “puppets” of foreign interest.

The rise of extremist organizations such as Hezbollah that have successfully achieved legitimacy through the democratic process of their respective nation states further proves that the will of the people in non-western countries is not to be “let into the club” so to speak, but to form their indepedent civilizations identity while modernizing their economies and infrastructure. Huntington’s essay was able to be persuasive due to how it presented historical information in light of real world events but failed to mention historical periods that saw massive growth in economic trade and cross pollination of civilizations such as the silk road 6, Incense Road7 or even the lesser known Tea Horse Road 8.

Threats, Challenges, and Opportunities

Samuel P. Huntington’s essay can alternatively be summed up as a threat brief and the challenges it bears provide little opportunity for western nations to exploit economic ventures in developing nations. However, Huntington’s essay does provide a ray of light by illuminating the opportunities Western nations have to form and cultivate defense, economic and intellectual relationships within their own civilizations9. Hunting has shown that civilizations that are similar generally avoid conflicts in national security and economic trade while the reverse seems to only exacerbate the two.

This presents a unique opportunity for western nations to carefully examine who they consider as allies and coalition partners while also providing incentives for rethinking our security strategy of disarmament while simultaneously attempting to dissuade developing nations from increasing their arsenals. When one begins to look at current events and policies through the lens of civilizations it becomes apparent that many of our previous alliances with those different from us had been doomed from the start as evidence by the low participation rates of countries from East Asia who only sent token forces for operations in OIF and OEF.

One could easily support Hunting’s warning of working together with unlike civilizations by simply looking at the debacle of the South Korea armed forces in Afghanistan and its failure to support US operations while despite US forces that had shed blood on their soil in order in conflicts past10.

Analysis of the Future Operational Environment

In reviewing Samuel P. Huntington’s essay on the Clash of Civilizations it is painfully obvious that our previous alliances had been formed on convenience rather than an introspective look into who “we” as Americans are and how our supposed allies view our relationships. Do our current noticeable dearth of allies view themselves as western nations, are they simply trying to “join the club” or are they simply biding their time until they can switch alliances to a group that resembles their civilization and values more than we do?

It is my opinion based upon token efforts from allies during wartime, combined with an eager willingness to negotiate with terrorist and non-state actors that our current slew of “allies” are a bigger threat than some of our enemies. If present conflicts dictate what future areas of concern will be, we should form stronger alliances with like minded civilizations that have already proven their dedication to our shared values such as Poland11, Georgia and former East Bloc countries that have taken similar stances against terrorism by deeds and not words.

Based upon the technological advantage and intellectual innovation I would argue that the “where” US forces might deploy is irrelevant compared to “who” we might deploy with. Potential enemies to western interest will remain non-western countries for the foreseeable future and despite Russia’s growing nationalism and desire to increase its military strength it will remain an economic defunct nation susceptible to the effects of brain drain12 and disenfranchisement of its middle class.

The issues and concerns of redefining our allies along the thread of a common civilization will greatly increase the complexity of logistics in military operations due to our geographic locations as compared to those of our advesaries. For example, due to past examples of cowardice; such as negotiating with terrorist, if the US would remove South Korea as an ally it would have increased logistical challenges in dealing with North Korea and China should tensions continue to escalate.

One would be safe to assume that South Korea would naturally befriend China, a country with a history and civilization similar to its own, which would rule out the possibility of using such a former “friend” as a logistic hub for staging operations. However such friends have only proven to be costly relationships in the long lung which seldom paid dividends for services rendered unto them in their time of need. The Western way of warfare has been one of discipline and the leveraging of technology in order to gain tactical superiority over our enemies.

As such, we should look to cultivate advanced technologies with nations that share our civilizations culture and use the inherent technological innovations of these cultures to develop weapons systems that will give us the necessary edge to engage and destroy our enemies. By doing so, western civilization such as the United States of America would not have to get into bed with nation states of civilizations much different than our own whose motives remain unclear and questionable.

Abstract

There is much difficulty when it comes to establishing what a terrorist actually is because of the lack of definition that exists on an international level. The difference between a terrorist and a freedom fighter cannot easily be identified as a result of this, which prevents the War on Terror from being adequately dealt with. Nevertheless, it is questionable whether a definition would prove effective given that different interpretations of terrorism exist amongst the international community.

Introduction

The definition of terrorism has been subject to much controversy over the years because of the different interpretations that exist. Accordingly, terrorism is viewed differently by governmental agencies and under various legal systems. It is has been argued that because of the conflictions that exist within this area, a common definition of terrorism needs to be adopted by the international community (Sorel, 2003). Terrorism occurs on an international level and unless consensus exists within this area, difficulties will continue to ensue when trying to combat terrorism. It would be highly beneficial if a universal definition was employed as there would be much more consistency and terrorist acts would be more easily identified (Webster, 2011). Terrorism has been defined by Hoffman as “the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change” (1998: 32). Terrorism is present whenever there is the threat of violence or violence itself which is intended to have physical and emotional effects upon victims. It has also been suggested that “terrorists seek to obtain the leverage, influence and power they otherwise lack to effect political change on either a local or an international scale” (Hoffman, 1998: 32). Despite these interpretations, it is still extremely difficult to determine whether a person is committing an act of terrorism. This essay will consider in light of this whether a common definition of terrorism have helped to combat terrorism in the Arab uprising in relation to Syria.

Defining Terrorism

Consequently, terrorists are capable of being mistaken for freedom fighters who merely seek to achieve political freedom by taking part in a “resistance movement against an oppressive political or social establishment” (Webster, 2011: 1). Freedom fighters include the likes of the South African Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) who were both labelled freedom fighters on the basis that they fought against national governments for freedom (Webster, 2011). There is, nonetheless, a fine line between terrorists and freedom fighters because of the fact that they both act in a similar manner and so it is imperative that a distinction can be made between the two (Raport, 2013). Gioia (2006) further notes that this is difficult to achieve in practice and terrorists are capable of escaping liability on the grounds that they are freedom fighters. Whilst one jurisdiction may consider a person a terrorist another jurisdiction may consider the same person a freedom fighter. It has thus been argued that; “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” (Buchanan, 2004: 1). This makes it extremely difficult to remain consistent within this area of the law and highlights the need for a universal definition of terrorism. As put by Rosand; “the General Assembly’s inability to reach agreement on a definition of terrorism after nearly thirty-five years of discussions in one form or another has limited the impact of its counterterrorism efforts” (2006: 399).

Terrorism and Syria

Conflictions will continue to exist unless a universal definition is adopted and terrorism will remain difficult to combat. This has been exemplified by the Arab uprising in relation to Syria since the Syrian Arab Republic has been considered both a victim of terrorism as well as a perpetrator. The Syrian government has thus been accused by the US State Department and George W. Bush of sponsoring acts of terrorism for organisations like Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Popular Struggle Front (Diane, 1995: 19). However, because of the uncertainty surrounding the definition of terrorism it has proven very difficult for the Syrian government to be properly sanctioned. As argued by Rapport; “the case of Syria illustrates how the concept of state-sponsored terrorism, and evidence for it, lacks clarity and is used politically” (2013: 238). It was demonstrated by officials of the United States that whilst the actions of the Syrian government were much more professional and deadly than Libya’s, the evidence that links Syria to direct acts of violence is murky (New York Times, 1986: 1). Despite these uncertainties, the US government continues to publish lists of the number of terrorists incidents that have occurred in Syria (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2013: 4). However, because Syria has continued to support the US and other governments in their opposition to the al-Qaeda, there has been a reluctance to name Syria as a sponsor state (Diaz-Paniagua, 2008).

It has been said that this is the result of a necessity to obtain the assistance of Syria when negotiating the release of British, US and French citizens that are being held hostage in the Middle East (Dettmer, 2014: 1). Syria is thereby a vital component for the establishment of peace within this area, which is why it has proven difficult to combat terrorism in Syria. It is clear from these findings that there is sufficient evidence to name Syria as a terrorist sponsor, yet because of Syria’s political connections there has been a refusal to do so. Arguably, a common definition of terrorism would therefore have done nothing to prevent the terrorist actions from being conducted in the Arab uprising in relation to Syria since there is a political reluctance to name Syria as a terrorist sponsor. It has been noted in view of this that it would be “naive to think that there are laws in war” (Al-Saadi, 2013: 1), which is certainly true here. Although a common definition would be better overall in providing certainty, it is questionable whether it would in fact help to combat terrorism. Furthermore, because of the fact that different states view terrorism differently, a common definition would restrict the ability of states to identify terrorism on a case by case basis. This was identified by Sorel when it was pointed out that; “the problem facing a global definition is the difficulty in taking account of special circumstances according to the type of action committed, the nature of the victims or the type of method of the terrorist action” (2003: 365).

Consideration as to whether a definition is needed was made by the Security Council in September 2001 during the adoption of Resolution 1373 and it was concluded that; “one shouldn’t try to define terrorism in order to reach a quick agreement; to do so runs the risk of getting into deeper and deeper water” (2001: 1). This signifies that because terrorism acts are so wide-ranging, it would be difficult to incorporate a definition that would be able to comprehend every single act of terrorism. Flexibility is therefore vital within this area, yet because of the confusions that arise when trying to distinguish between a terrorist and a freedom fighter, it is necessary to have some conformity. This was identified by Saul who stated that there is a “need to condemn violations to Human rights, to protect the state and deliberative politics, to differentiate public and private violence, and to ensure international peace and security” (2008: 1). It is unlikely that these objectives can be achieved without a common definition since it is necessary that terrorist actions can be identified and distinguished against the actions of a freedom fighter (Diaz-Paniagua, 2008: 47). It remains arguable whether a definition would in fact be workable given the reluctance to name Syria as a sponsor of terrorism and some have suggested to define terrorism would prevent a sectoral approach towards terrorism to be employed.

As put forward by Gioia; “a definition would only be necessary if the punishment of the relevant offences were made conditional on the existence of a specific terrorist intent” (2006: 4). Many would in fact disagree with this statement on the basis that much of the complexity that exists when trying to combat terrorism is the result of the lack of consensus within this area. Hence, the current approach that is being employed by the international community does not appear satisfactory and attempts to clarify the meaning of terrorism are continuously being made. An example of this can be seen in relation to the definition that was provided by the League of Nations Convention of 1937 under Article 1.1. Under this definition an act of terrorism was described as a “criminal act directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or a group of persons or the general public.” The United Nations General Assembly also provided under Article 2.1 of the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism that a terrorist is defined as someone who causes; “death or serious bodily injury; serious damage to public or private property; or damage to property, places, facilities, or systems likely to result in major economic loss” (2002: 1). Effectively, it is evident that attempts to define terrorism have and will continue to be made, yet whether there will ever be complete consensus in this area is doubtful and it cannot be said that a definition would have helped to combat terrorism that is being committed by Syria.

Conclusion

Overall, whilst it is clear that a definition of terrorism is needed in order to provide clarity within this area, it cannot be said that a common definition would have helped to combat terrorism in the Arab uprising in relation to Syria. This is due to the political reluctance to name Syria as a sponsor of terrorism regardless of the evidence to the contrary. Furthermore, it has also been suggested that flexibility needs to remain in this area so that terrorism can be determined on a sectoral basis. Hence, not every country will view terrorist actions the same and so a determination will need to be based on a case by case basis in order to prevent confliction. Regardless of this, there is still a pressing need to provide some conformity within this area, which is why the international community have made great attempts to provide a universal definition.

References

Al-Saadi, Y. (2013) ‘The Rise of the Arab ‘War on Terror’ Discourse’, [Online], Available: http://muftah.org/the-rise-of-the-arab-war-on-terror-discourse/ [26 March 2014].

Buchanan, P. J. ‘Terrorists – and Freedom Fighters?’ AntiWar, [Online], Available: http://antiwar.com/pat/?articleid=2141 [26 March 2014].

Dettmer, J. (2014) ‘Holding Aid Hostage Syria’, Middle East Institute, [Online], Available: http://www.mei.edu/content/holding-aid-hostage-syria [26 March 2014].

Diaz-Paniagua, C.F. (2008) Negotiating Terrorism: The Negotiation Dynamics of Four UN Counter-Terrorism Treaties 1997-2005, City University of New York.

Diane Publishing. (1995) Patterns of Global Terrorism, Diane Publishing.

Gioia, A. (2006) The UN Conventions on the Prevention and Suppression of International Terrorism in Nesi, G. International Co-operation in Counter-Terrorism: The United Nations and Regional Organisations in the Fight Against Terrorism.

Hoffman, B. (1998) Inside Terrorism, Columbia University Press.

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. (2013) ‘Annex of Statistical Information’ Country Reports on Terrorism, [Online], Available: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/210288.pdf [27 March 2014].

Raport, D. C. (2013) Inside Terrorist Organisations, Routledge.

Rosand, E. (2006) ‘The UN-Led Multilateral Institutional Response to Jihadist Terrorism: Is a Global Counterterrorism Body Needed’, Journal of Conflict and Security Law, C&S Law 2006 11 (399), Issue 3.

Saul, B. (2008) Defining Terrorism to Protect Human Rights, Sydney Law School Legal Studies, Research Paper No 08-125.

Security Council. (2001) Le Terrorisme est un totalitarisme, Le Monde.

Sorel, J. (2003) ‘Some Questions About the Definition of Terrorism and the Fight Against Its Financing’, European Journal of International Law, EJIL 2003 14 (365), Issue 2.

The New York Times. (1986) ‘Evidence of Syrian Link to Terror still Murky’, [Online], Available: http://www.nytimes.com/1986/06/10/world/evidence-of-syrian-link-to-terror-still-murky.html [26 March 2014].

United Nations General Assembly. (2002) ‘Report of the Ad Hoc Committee established by General Assembly Resolution 51/210 of 17 December 1996’, Sixth Session, Annex II, art 2.1.

Webster, M. (2011) ‘Freedom Fighter’, An Encyclopaedia Britannica Company, [Online], Available: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/freedom%20fighter [26 March 2014].

Introduction

The conceptualisation of ‘terrorism’ began to occupy a prominent place in the political discourse during the 1970s, with the onset of irredentist terror employed by organisations such as the PLO and ideologically-induced acts of violence propagated by extremist outfits such as the Red Brigades and the Baader-Meinhof complex (Gupta, 2008: 33). Nevertheless, the preponderance of terrorism as form of violence has to be linked to its disruptive and pervasive nature. Unlike ideological or theological extremism, the modern conception of terrorism, epitomised by the dissemination of acts of violence by Islamic extremism in the context of the War on Terror, have the potential to shake the foundations of the international political system (Halper and Clarke, 2005: 90). As such, it is important to outline in which way terrorism differs from other forms of political violence. In order to do so, the example of the War on Terror will be used, distinguishing three variables that set modern terrorism apart from other forms of political violence. First, I will examine the discoursive implications of the concept of terrorism, introducing a thorough examination of the political rhetoric used by the great powers fighting Islamic terrorism and in which way this serves to entrench American hegemony in the international order. Second, I will analyse the ways in which terrorism is changing the moral representation of the enemy confronted by the United States and its allies. Previous forms of political violence, such as left-wing militancy and the radicalisation of particular ethnic groups did not result in the determination to eradicate those tendencies from the political landscape. Conversely, the War on Terror does not allow for any sort of accommodation with the enemy, which is to be extirpated from the political space. Third, the fight against terrorism presupposes a new demarcation of the international political system. The criteria for accepting the legitimacy of sovereign states into the legal framework of the international order is that they do not facilitate the operations of terrorist organisations, particularly those of Islamic extraction.

The discoursive implications of the concept of terrorism

Since the outset of the War on Terror in the wake of 9/11, the political vocabulary attached to the concept of ‘terrorism’ has undergone a significant transformation. It could be argued that the notion of ‘terrorism’ reflects all the negative derivatives that stem from the struggle that parries the Western nations and their allies against the threat posed by radical organisations (Steinhoff, 2007: 81). In addition, terrorism has connotations that transcend the scope of legitimate political violence. To begin with, terrorists target non-military objectives as part of their grand scheme of operations. Terrorist organisations blatantly violate jus in bello principles that are part of the Just War theory by including of non-combatants as targets as well as employing censurable methods such as mass bomb explosions in public areas and the hijacking of civilian airplanes (Silverstone, 2007: 76).

The War on Terror, which originated in the aftermath of 9/11, has propitiated the militarisation of the political rhetoric, which relies on the notion of pre-emptive attacks on the putative enemy and its Manichean representation as a foe to be pursued until it is extirpated from the political space (Burke, 2004: 22). Entrenching the link between the War on Terror and military rhetoric entails the construction of a system with particular symbolisms and political discourse (Napoleoni, 2004: 66). The political elite create socially-constructed meanings attached to the concept of terrorism that are assimilated by the public through the consumption of publically enunciated language. Academia, mainstream media and governmental organisations seem to prefer a passive way of describing particular political events pertaining to the War on Terror. For example, the War on Iraq, one of the main offshoots of the War on Terror, is seldom described as an ‘invasion’. Instead, it is usually depicted as a military action meant to protect the United States from terrorists and to bring democracy and freedom to the people of Iraq (Steinhoff, 2007: 82). It may be posited that sophisticated discoursive tools are employed in order to foment an ‘(in)security culture’ in the international order. Yongtao argues that the ‘(in)security culture’ that arises as a result of the ‘Axis of Evil’ rhetoric, which pertains to the pursuit of the War on Terror, is lexically and socially constructed, and should not be perceived as a natural occurrence (Yongtao, 2010: 85). Consequently, the War on Terror might be seen as an attempt by the hegemon, the United States, to reclaim the geopolitical discourse from the centrifugal forces of globalisation and reshape the identity of the international order according to the rhetoric of insecurity and militarisation (Shapiro, 1999: 112).

One of the most salient features of the process by which modern terrorism is fundamentally differentiated from forms of political violence, is in the idea that there is no place for the radical forms of violent extremism in the international order (Halper and Clarke, 2005: 32). The rhetoric utilised by the United and its Allies foretells an augmented spectrum of violence, which should prompt the reaction of the international community. This has been stated in the ‘Axis of Evil’ speech delivered by George W. Bush in 2002,

‘States like these [Iraq], and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic’ (Bush, 2002).

What transpires from the construction of the discoursive edifice built around the notion of the doctrine of preventive war is the idea of strengthening the legal and institutional framework that legitimised American hegemony. This framework is validated by the interposition of an imminent threat, continually activated through the deployment of discourse. In this context, there is an obvious emphasis on identifying the rhetorical loci that give magnify and entrench the need to pre-empt the actions of the putative enemies (Podhoretz, 2004: 17). The augmented political reality of entrenching American hegemony is discoursively affirmed through the encoding of language into categories that can be projected in order to activate the doctrine of preventive war. The ‘Axis of Evil’ speech is an eloquent example of this state of affairs (Nance, 2010: 60). In addition, the spectre of political regimes which are inimical to the process of legal, political and economic harmonisation has been magnified through the ‘Beyond the Axis of Evil’ rhetoric, mobilised by John Bolton, erstwhile US Ambassador to the United Nations,

‘[T]he Administration will not assume that because a country’s formal subscription to UN counterterrorism conventions or its membership in multilateral regimes necessarily constitutes an accurate reading of its intentions. We call on Libya, Cuba, and Syria to live up to the agreements they have signed. We will watch closely their actions, not simply listen to their words. Working with our allies, we will expose those countries that do not live up to their commitments…the United States will continue to exercise strong leadership in multilateral forums and will take whatever steps are necessary to protect and defend our interests and eliminate the terrorist threat’ (Bolton, 2002).

As we can see, the discourse framework employed by the most prominent figures in the Bush administration has been conducive to the entrenchment of a unilateralist approach to the management of the international order, consolidating the idea of an interventionist stance that is profoundly revamping the notion of warfare (Nance, 2010: 82). What transpires from the statements outlined above is the idea that a language of dominance is permanently deployed as a means to portray those who opposed American hegemony as enemies to be pursued until their extirpation from the international arena (Fairclough, 2010: 43). Other forms of political violence do not threaten the stability of the United States as a primus inter pares member of the international community. The rhetoric utilised in order to deal with the derivative effects of the War on Terror is geared towards seizing this historical juncture in order to consolidate the hegemony of the United States in the international order and clearly demarcate the boundaries between ‘Good’, represented by the United States and its allies, and ‘Evil’, embodied in the threat of terrorism.

The moral representation of the enemy

One of the most significant innovations brought about by the threat of ‘terrorism’ is the recreation of the moral representation of the enemy (Hewitt, 2008: 62). Since the Peace of Westphalia, the international political system gradually evolved towards the principle of cohabitation between antithetical philosophical worldviews (Patterson, 2007: 139). The epitome of this evolution was the convivial symbiosis between the two during the Cold War. Conversely, US foreign policy in the wake of 9/11 operates under the principle that state and non-state actors are to be considered ‘friendly’ only if they are willing to converge into the main tenets espoused by the United States in the context of the War on Terror. In order to consolidate a clear division between ‘Good’ and ‘Evil’, the enemy (Islamic terrorism) is represented as illegitimate and a-moral. Consequently, Washington has the moral right to use all the means at its disposal to prevent the enemy from inflicting damage upon the United States or its allies (Crawford in Rosenthal and Barry (eds.), 2009: 41). This entails the use of pre-emptive force, which has been deployed by the United States in the cases of Afghanistan (2001), Iraq (2003) and Lybia (2011). This entails the possibility that the war against Islamic terrorism may be fought outside the rules of warfare. The United States regards Islamic terrorists as devoid of any established links to a specific territorial state. In this sense, Washington is not bound to adhere to any prescriptive set of rules. The enemy therefore becomes a modern day version of the hostis perennis deprived of any legal rights either in bello or ad bellum. Since the Islamic terrorist networks seek the destruction of the United States, they must vanish from the political space. The moral identification of the enemy as ‘evil’ was presented to the American public by the neoconservative ideologues in charge of outlining the foreign policy of the United States in the wake of 9/11,

“WHO, THEN, is the enemyThe message of September 11 was loud and clear, allowing for no ambiguity: the enemy is militant Islam… At least since 1979, when Ayatollah Khomeini seized power in Iran with the war-cry, “Death to America,” militant Islam, also known as Islamism, has been the self-declared enemy of the United States. It has now become enemy number one. Whether it is the terrorist organizations and individuals Washington is targeting, the immigrants it is questioning, or the states it is holding under suspicion, all are Islamist or connected with Islamists” (Pipes, 2002).

In order to confront this enemy, the strategies predicated on ideas of deterrence and containment, once used in order to face the threat posed by the Soviet Union, are be considered efficacious,

“Throughout the Cold War, the legitimacy of U.S. power and of U.S. global leadership was largely taken for granted, and not just by Americans. The vast majority of Europeans, although they sometimes chafed under U.S. dominance and often questioned U.S. actions in Vietnam, Latin America and elsewhere, nevertheless accepted U.S. leadership as both necessary and desirable… It was not international law and institutions but the circumstances of the Cold War, and Washington’s special role in it, that conferred legitimacy on the United States, at least within the West” (Kagan, 2004: 70).

The legitimacy for seeking the annihilation of the enemy is therefore granted by the geopolitical circumstances that the United States is compelled to deal with. The enemy is represented as a-moral, lacking any sense of propriety in warfare,

“…[T]omorrow could be the day that an explosive packed with radioactive material detonates in Los Angeles or that nerve gas is unleashed inside a tunnel under the Hudson River or that a terrible new disease breaks out in the United Kingdom. If the people responsible for the 9/11 attack could have killed thirty thousand Americans or three hundred thousand or three million, they would have done so. The terrorists are cruel, but they are not aimless. Their actions have a purpose. They are trying to rally the Muslim world to jihad against the planet’s only superpower and the principal and most visible obstacle to their ambitions. They commit terror to persuade their potential followers that their cause is not hopeless, that jihad can destroy American power” (Frum, D. and Perle, 2004: 6)

American foreign policy doctrine holds Islamic extremists to be an enemy force outside the scope of international law; as such, it is to be pursued until its total eradication (Elshtain, 2004: 142). One of the main points made concerning the moral representation of the enemy is the portrayal of the threat that Islamic terrorism poses to the United States as imminent, prompting American foreign-policy makers to overstate the lethality of the foe (Fotion, 2007: 96). In any case, the moral representation of Al-Qaeda reverses an important principle of the ‘Just War’ theory. Islamic terrorism cannot be allowed to become an interlocutor for segments of the Muslim world. It is an enemy with whom no cohabitation is possible. It is an ‘othered’ moral and social entity which has to be completely eradicated from the geopolitical space. the scope of enmity has been enlarged according to a Manichean criterion, leaving outside the political space constituencies with a different cultural and moral template (Schmitt, 2007: 13). At the same time, the means to be utilised in order to deal with putative threats are augmented by the unrestricted use of pre-emption, regardless of the actual extent of the threat posed by the would-be foe. This has enormous repercussions for the notion of state sovereignty, since the doctrine of preventive war can be launched against any nation which is considered to abet terrorist activities that pose a danger to the United States, first and foremost, and the international community (Nance, 2010: 110). As we will see, terrorism differs from other forms of political violence in the sense that if fosters the intervention of the United States and the most prominent members of the international community into the internal affairs of sovereign nations.

The interventionist drive pursuant to the fight against terrorism

The first theme that is relevant to the discussion of the interventionist drive that unfolded with the onset of the War on Terror is the erosion of the strict concept of state sovereignty. Since the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) the concept of sovereignty has been entrenched as the dominant principle upon which global institutional organisations are constituted (Held and McGrew, 2002:11). Thomson defines sovereignty as the conceptualisation by which the state arrogates the right to exercise coercive authority within its territory. It could be argued that the nations involved in the struggle against terrorism are willing to sacrifice a modicum of state sovereignty in order to ensure the protection of the global commons (Thomson, 1995: 219). However, the indefinite duration of the conflict is bound to profoundly change the meaning of state sovereignty, particularly as the means to combat terrorism come to include a growing spectrum of surveillance and military robotisation.

The practice of eroding strict notions of national sovereignty involves and/or the exercise of political power in order to defend the ‘civilised’ nations of the world from the scourge of terrorism. This also entails that the process of globalisation has to be recreated according to an increasingly unified legal criterion, which serves to entrench the democratic form of government, the rule of law and free markets. The War on Terror is a concept which is commonly subscribed to the efforts made by the international community to eradicate the threat posed by Islamic fundamentalism, especially Al-Qaeda and other militant jihadi groups (Duffy, 2005: 21). The term was first employed by President George W. Bush on 20/9/2001 and has been used to designate the legal, political and conceptual confrontation against terrorist organisations of Islamic extraction (Bush, 2001a). The ubiquitous nature of this struggle is quite manifest in the statements made by George W. Bush, who stated the view that the fight against Islamic terrorism engulfed the whole world as a potential theatre of conflict (Bush, 2001b). The War on Terror has redefined the boundaries of legality, entailing a division between those countries which support the struggle against Al-Qaeda and those which are either neutral or explicitly supportive of Islamic terrorism, such as Iran. Those countries which are deemed to support terrorism risk losing their capacity of retain state sovereignty.

It could be argued that the actions of the United States and its allies can be analysed through the Realist principle of power maximisation. At the most fundamental level, anarchy is induced by the fact that there is no supranational authority capable of marshalling the international order (Biersteker and Weber, 1996: 5). Conversely, Liberal interventionists sustain the view that a peaceful international order can be attained by encouraging the spread of democracy around the world. One of the main principles behind this philosophy is that democratic states do not fight each other (Doyle, 1997: 83). The spread of democratic values entails that the countries that were most affected by the Western response to 9/11, Afghanistan and Iraq, would undergo a process of regime change and adopt the principle of accountable governance (Rasler and Thompson, 2005: 38). As we can see, the War on Terror impels states to adhere to the principles guiding the fight against Islamic terrorism in order to retain their sovereignty in an increasingly polarised international order.

One of the most salient issues linked to the discussion on the interventionism reshaping the international order after 9/11 is the issue of ‘efficiency’ as a requirement for the retention of state sovereignty. What transpires from the unfolding of the War on Terror is that ‘failed states’ constitute a significant danger to the stability of the international political system (Kagan, 2003: 22). Countries like Somalia or Afghanistan under the Taliban are eloquent examples of countries governed by a plutocratic elite unconcerned about the well-being of the population. Fukuyama has posited the criterion by which the ‘efficiency’ of the state structure of any given nation should be measured. In order to be eligible for state sovereignty retention, countries need to exhibit a high level of adherence to democratic and pluralist values (Fukuyama, 2005: 125). It could be postulated that the right to state sovereignty is beginning to be judged according to whether a country abides by the principle of liberal democracy. States deemed to be undemocratic are more likely to sponsor terrorism.

The main objective of the War on Terror is the elimination of the threat of global terrorism. At the same time, the interventionist approach which guides the foreign policy of the United States and its main allies seeks to recreate the international order according to converging rules to be adhered to by all members of the international community (Neumann, 1986: 25). The link between sovereignty and the rule of law is consolidating through the warfare conducted against terrorist networks, since states are compelled to take their position on the side of the ‘civilised nations’ of the world. It has been argued that terrorism poses a threat to the “humanness” of the victims it targets. The protection of civilian lives as well as the maintenance of the system of government by consent have become the two most important variables to be factored in when analysing the Liberal interventionist implications of the War on Terror (May, 2007: 71).

It can be postulated that the War on Terror is reshaping the international order by compelling the acceptance of the of international norms by the members of the international community. The convergence process taking place in the system of states as a result of having to fight terrorism is entrenching the rule of law as the medium for dialogue and communication in interstate affairs (Scheuerman, 1997: 39). When states display fundamental divergences from this principle, they are perceived as hostile to an international order increasingly informed by Liberal values such as democracy, free markets and the rule of law. Furthermore, by opposing these principles, these states might erode their right to be recognised as sovereign, giving rise to the possibility of intervention by the United States and its allies (Fukuyama, 2005: 130). Intervention takes place within the context of a thin form of multilateralism, by which the United States undertakes to expand Liberal values, provided they coincide with the majority of its core national interest principles. Simultaneously, it can be said that the convergence process signposted by the consolidation of homogenised legal principles of global reach is demarcating the lines between ‘efficient’ states, which may rightfully retain state sovereignty, and ‘failed states’ which may be subject to intervention (Chan, 2012: 61). The War on Terror has enabled the liberal democracies of the world to expand their values to the wider world in a manner which enables them to maintain their military and political pre-eminence and brings forth the pacification of the international political system. Therefore, it can be postulated that terrorism differs from other forms of political violence in the fact that whilst the risks it poses to the international community are magnified so are the possibilities for a profound change in its ordering principles.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it is possible to argue that modern conceptualisations of terrorism differ to a significant extent from previous forms of political violence confronted by sovereign states. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, political violence was exercised in order to achieve certain gains that were usually restricted in scope and duration (Scheuerman, 1997: 41). For example, the rise of left-wing activism was linked to defined political and economic objectives. Once the social conditions of the working class was improved, violence was shunned as a legitimate political method, as seen in the rise of social democratic parties willing to adopt a gradualist approach to income redistribution (Gupta, 2008: 53). Conversely, the onset of the War on Terror has brought with it a new demarcation of the political space, both at the domestic and international level. The spectrum of mass destruction as well as the ubiquitous presence of terrorist threats, due to technological advancement, has created a number of important differentiating variables. Terrorism, mainly propagated through the ideology of Islamic extremism, has the potential to alter the configuration of the international order (Halper and Clarke, 2005: 75). This development entails that the fight against this form of political violence has to be carried out at different levels. To begin with, the rhetorical elements of the War on Terror are recreating the communication aspects of the fight against terrorist violence. The symbolisms attached to it are meant to portray the indefinite duration of the confrontation and the polysemic nature of the threat (Burke, 2004: 87). Furthermore, terrorism differs from previous forms of political radicalisation in the way that the enemy is represented. The forces in charge of combatting terrorism have conveyed the determination to achieve a complete eradication of the ideology that underpins it, rejecting any sort of accommodation with the enemy. The War on Terror proposes a new delineation of the international order, where the criterion for state legitimacy is that nations prevent terrorist organisations, particularly those of Islamic extraction, from operating in their territory (Duffy, 2005: 151). For all the reasons cited above, it is possible to posit that terrorism, especially in the context of the War on Terror, differs significantly from other forms of political violence. The circumstances which originated this phenomenon and the means employed to combat it presage a conflict of indefinite duration which is bound to profoundly change the nature of interstate relations.

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The Internet Technology’s potential as a weapon for terrorism has long been the subject of debate.  Even before the 9/11 attack, there have always been speculations about computer hackers so skilled that they can invade the computer networks of government and private facilities.  The assumption is that if these hackers are capable of gaining access to the computer systems of government facilities to obtain sensitive information then the possibility that the Internet may be used as weapon to spread fear and terror is not remote.

The question is can the Internet be really used for terrorism?  In the post 9/11 ear, the fear that a network of computers may be used as a weapon for destruction once again became the center of public attention (“Internet Terrorism Threat Looms”, 2007, p.1).  Some started to think of the possibility that terrorists who have the skill of computer hackers may someday break into the computer system of a particular airport and cripple its computer system causing confusion among the airplanes which are scheduled to land in its runways.

Validating these fears are recognized experts in the field of computers, one of them is Dorothy Denning who even came up with the word “cyberterrorism” which is defined as the “convergence of cyberspace and terrorism. It refers to unlawful attacks and threats of attacks against computers, networks and the information stored therein when done to intimidate or coerce a government or its people in furtherance of political or social objectives”(Weimann, 2004, p.5).   

The mass media even contributed to the Cyberterrorism hysteria.  The newspapers have repeatedly engaged in sensationalism as they spread fear to the public because of their controversial headlines such as that which appeared in the Washington Post in June 2003: “Cyber-Attacks by Al Qaeda Feared, Terrorists at Threshold of Using Internet as Tool of Bloodshed, Experts say” (Weimann, 2004, p.3).  As a result, the public now thinks that Cyberterrorism is real.

In a joint study conducted by the Internet Security Alliance, the National Association of Manufacturers and the RedSiren Technologies, the companies found that “before 11 September 2002 just 22% of information security professionals were very concerned about Cyberterrorism. When questioned again in September 2002, 48% claimed to be very concerned while just 4% say that their companies are less concerned than they were one year ago.” Learn when the government uses censorship, it puts a limit on what?

In the past, has there been an attack with the use computers and Internet which has resulted in violence against persons or property? Has there been any reported act of Cyberterrorism? The answer to these questions is No.  Despite the massive improvement and the sophistication in the field of Information Technology there is yet no recorded cyberattack by the terrorists against government facilities, telecommunication facilities or any other infrastructure facilities (Weimann, 2004, p.5).

It is worth mentioning that so far Internet has only been used by corporate insiders who seek to embezzle corporate money or by individual hackers whose purpose is far from terrorism.  This does not mean, however that the security of the computer networks is not a serious concern.  However, at this point, Cyberterrorism is not the country’s problem.  Compared to chemical and biological attacks, cyberterrorism is the least of our worries.

First, the technological capability of the government is miles ahead of the private sector when it comes to protecting itself against threats of terrorism.  (Green, 2002, p.4) Second, the computer systems of some government offices are air-gapped or not physically connected to the Internet.  This makes the computer networks inaccessible to outside hackers.  Third, before nuclear weapons are detonated a special code coming from the President is required.  Insofar as private corporations are concerned, they are also protected against cyberattacks since they also have their own security measures that ensure that their computer systems are safe against terrorists.

Conclusion

It is clear that cyberterrorism is a myth.  Despite the difficulty in infiltrating government and private computer system, it is still suggested that government and private facilities must continuously monitor their own computer systems to ensure that there are no flaws or weaknesses.  At this point, we must not lose focus on the real threats to our lives and security which come from persons who use guns, bombs, chemical and biological weapons for their attack.