Trading

The following is an in depth look at the effects the Internet has had on trading securities in the United States. Its purpose is to define the impact of the Internet by determining specific changes in the structure of the trading market as a result of the numerous online brokerages that have surfaced in the past few years. A brief look at traditional brokerages and market characteristics prior to the advent of the Internet provides a foundation with which to measure many of its impacts.

The arrival of the online brokerage model has not only introduced an entirely new vehicle with which to trade securities, but it also beginning to effect the way traditional brokerages view their own business models. Specifically, it appears that both the online/discount model and full service model of brokerages will both succeed in the next few years, with the top firms exhibiting characteristics somewhere between the two extremes. New Ameritrade television commercials debuted early this year with a twenty-something-year-old punk extolling the virtues of his new brokerage account to various business men and women.

Perhaps the witty E*trade commercial featuring monkeys that first aired during the 2000 Super Bowl was more notable. These commercials are quite a contrast to the traditional brokerage commercials of Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, and Fidelity among others. This contrast is for good reason. Online brokerages have uprooted the traditional model of consumer securities trading and have attracted a critical mass of followers. Before brokerage fees were deregulated 1975, eliminating fixed commissions, trading was something only done by the wealthy.

Since then, fees have dropped considerably among the full-service firms making it possible for more and more people to manage portfolios. Until 1995 there was still a fundamental restraint for many consumers: access to timely and accurate information at any time from their own computer. With the arrival of online brokerages in 1995 came a slew of options for investors, new and old, to access an abundance of information and research, and to initiate their own trades all at considerably discounted fees.

According to Deutsche Banc, as of 2Q00, online brokerage accounts represented approximately 25% of all accounts in the United States. Furthermore, by 2003, online brokerage accounts are estimated to control 50% of the brokerage market. The online model has already attracted nearly 20 million investors, initiating an increase in overall trading volume. An brief examination of the brokerage industry pre-arrival of the Internet and an in depth look at the brokerage industry now illuminates the many differences and possible implications for the future of consumer securities trading in the United States.

Traditional brokerages have been operating freely since 1975. The deregulation of brokerage fees at this time allowed new firms to enter the market, marking the first major alteration in the way Wall Street traditionally offered its services. Before 1975, the market consisted solely of “full service” firms, those firms who offer trading, research, and financial advice through brokers or financial advisors at a considerable fee. After fees were deregulated, “discount” firms began to appear, offering consumers smaller fees, but at the cost of less research and financial advice.

The market slowly split between these two types of business models, but they were fundamentally similar for 20 years: generate revenue by providing consumers the ability to trade and receive financial advice based upon firm research. The concept of having a broker, or financial advisor who acts as an agent for consumers, was the prevailing idea of stock trading in between 1975 and 1995. Many of those who had portfolios would leave its management entirely up to their brokers, others would call periodically for advice, and some would be actively co-managing their portfolios with the broker.

The prevailing model for securities trading was still professionally managed, although different levels of management and cost evolved at this time. Wall Street was altered again in 1995, probably more significantly than in 1975, when securities trading and the Internet converged. According to the Securities Industry Association, K. Aufhasuer & Company was the first to execute securities trading online in 1994. However, it was not until 1995 that the first online brokerages debuted their new business model.

Momentum mounted quickly, as many investors flocked to the lure of extremely discounted prices and quick trade execution. Without the “brick and mortar” presence typical of the traditional brokerages and a significantly less extensive network of research and financial advice, online brokerages can offer transactions at fractions of the costs of traditional brokerages, even of the traditional discounters. The first online investors were, and still are, predominantly “a mix of young, first-time investors and older, more experience ones,” according to a McKinsey & Company study.

When online brokerages first surfaced, they introduced an entirely unique channel for delivering securities trading to consumers. No other brokerage firms offered the ability to trade securities over the Internet; it was exclusively reserved for those companies referred to as “online brokerages. ” This has changed however over the past couple of years. Traditional full-service brokerages are beginning to adopt their own online components.

The two most frequently cited reasons for the scramble of full service firms to enter the online market were customer pressure, and the fear of asset flight to online brokerages, according to a Deloitte & Touche Survey. The ability to distinguish these early online brokerages from full service firms is no longer a matter of whether or not they offer online services.

The distinguishing feature now is between the cost of their services, segregating firms into a classification again of “discount” or “full service. In a sense, the online model has redefined “discount,” moving the discount brokerage to a much further extreme. Indeed, it is true that most of the firms that are classified today simply as “discount” are founded on an online business model or have quickly adopted online capabilities, but many of the full service firms, as mentioned, are turning to the online channel in hopes of competing with the discounters. Therefore, when an “online brokerage” is referred to, it implies both the discount firms and the few full service firms with online capabilities.

The evolution of the online brokerage market has been explosive in growth, catapulting from just one online brokerage in 1995 to an estimated 170 in 2000, totaling 19. 5 million online accounts (refer to Figure 1 below). The first online brokerages to emerge were predominantly “deep” discount, followed by mid discount firms, and finally some of the traditional discount incumbents adopted an online strategy and are now classified as mid-tier firms. To illustrate this trend, consider the emergence of 5 of today’s top 6 online brokerages: In 1996, two major deep discount firms emerged, Datek and Ameritrade.

Over the next two years, two major mid-discount firms appeared, E*trade and DLJdirect. In 1998, Charles Schwab made their presence felt in the online market which was one of the few traditional discount firms before the online model developed. Fidelity quickly followed suit. This upsurge of online brokerages and the trend for some of the traditional brokerages to go online has had some lasting effects on the securities trading market, which will be explored in the next two sections. The impact of online brokerages is manifested in nearly every aspect of the securities trading market today.

Trading volume increase is one of the largest impacts, as a result of the ease and availability of trading that online accounts bring to consumers. It is worth examining the numbers to determine if the large increases in trading volume are actually a result of online accounts, or merely pure correlation with a booming bull market. Over the past decade, the volume of shares traded on the NASDAQ stock market has grown at a compound annual rate of 26%, but since the arrival of online brokerages in 1995, it has grown at a rate of 30%.

Although this is not an enormous increase, it is certainly quite significant. To look at it in another light, online accounts represented 15% of all brokerage accounts in the US, but more than 37% of the trading volume. Based upon past experience in the stock market, it may seem that this increase in trading volume is an entirely productive result. However, much of the trading volume from online accounts is a result of day trading, which raises concerns with the SEC. Day trading was not possible before online brokerages made it possible to quickly and effectively trade securities multiple times daily.

It is a speculative business, more so than the traditional brokerage business. As Deloitte & Touche describes it, “Customers usually [trade] in and out of several securities positions every day hoping to earn a positive spread on their transactions. ” The SEC is responsible for maintaining fair and orderly markets, to protect investors, and to enforce securities laws that were established upon principles that day trading discards. According to a Deloitte & Touche survey, 62% of discount firms said they would offer services to day traders versus 0% at full service firms.

Most online brokerages recognize that day traders make up an integral portion of their customer base, and do not wish to sacrifice the relationship. Day trading is one negative result of the advent of online brokerages that will remain a challenge for some time to come. Another notable consequence of online brokerages is the further development of after hours trading. The New York Stock Exchange first expanded its hours to “off hours” trading in 1991. The NYSE added a modest extension extending the after hours from 4pm to 5:15pm. It is now possible, with an online account to trade at any time.

This can be advantageous to many investors in giving them more flexibility regarding time availability and for investors overseas who have holdings in US securities and cannot trade at regularly scheduled hours. After hours trading in 1999 represented 50% of all online transactions. Online brokerages have improved execution time quite dramatically to an average of 20 seconds per trade versus nearly 60 seconds for full service firms. In addition to improved execution time, the reliability and accuracy of online executions at discount firms is generally considered to be far superior to full service firms’ online counterparts.

The reasons most frequently cited for this are two-fold. First, most discount firms are built upon an online model, it is their core competency, allowing them to devote all of their efforts to perfect the core of their business model. Discount firms rely on trade volume for revenue, not asset accumulation, so it is imperative that their trade execution is the best that it can be. The second reason for superior trade execution at discount firms is that full service firms simply do not devote the same technological resources to their online channel.

Full service firms focus primarily on performing cutting edge research, and providing sound financial advice through its network of brokers. The speed and reliability in execution at discount firms has been one of the top attractions of investors, along with largely discounted prices. The online brokerage market has also greatly impacted the availability of brokerage services to those who were previously unreachable. This hinges upon Internet penetration in the US, which is approaching 120 million active adult Internet users, or a penetration rate of 50%.

As was mentioned previously, the first investors to move online were mainly those who were brand new to securities trading, or those who were experienced enough to feel confident trading with little or no professional advice. Most of them brought below average asset values online. In fact, in mid-1999, although online accounts represented 15% of all brokerage accounts, they only represented 5% of the total assets. As stated previously, these accounts also accounted 37% of the trading volume. That would indicate that the online brokerages do not focus on producing revenue through asset accumulation, but through trading volume.

This has some major implications to be discussed in the next session. The majority of discount firms rely on trading volume to create revenue through their online offerings. This means they depend on accumulating customers who trade frequently in order to collect fees for trades made. Trade volume has been increasing quite dramatically over the past few, as the percentage of online trades increases as a proportion of total. This bodes well for the online brokerages who are accumulating customers, although those players who are at the bottom of the pack will likely fall out soon.

The market is remarkably consolidated after just 4 years in existence. In fact, the top ten online brokerages comprise 90% of the online assets and accounts, and the top 4 comprise 86%. Those brokerages who are having a tough time accumulating customers and trade volume even while the online brokerage market is hot, will likely fall out soon. Referring back to Figure 1, it can be seen that the number of online brokerage firms is expected to decrease over the next few years while the number of online accounts increases. The online industry is consolidating quickly while continuing to grow.

Although there is still a large disparity between discount firms and full service firms in terms of how they operate and what they offer, this is likely to change in the coming years. Already, the trend for full service firms to go online is in motion, and there are even some discount firms that are beginning to complement their trading services with plans for banking, insurance, and bill payment services. Currently, discount firms have approximately 74% of their transactions online versus 18% online at full service firms.

In a Deloitte & Touche survey, 100% of full service firms said they planned to use online trading to enter new businesses, create alliances, or shift the business model, and 74% of discount firms said they planned to add additional services that are typically offered only by full service firms. It appears that the two extremes in brokerage services are headed towards a common middle ground. As the author of the Deloitte & Touche study put it, “the distinction between discount brokers and full service firms is becoming less evident.

There is distinct evidence that the brokerages that will prevail in the next decade will have features of both a discount brokerage and a full service brokerage. A 50/50 hybrid model of online and full service could prevail, but it is more likely that the future constituents will be based on one core competency (online vs. full service) and have significant characteristics of its counterpart. This is because each business model appeals to different segments of the population.

It is generally agreed that full service firms have a distinct advantage in advertising dollars and brand equity, and appeal to investors with more money and/or less knowledge of investing. Online brokerages appeal generally to investors with less money and/or more knowledge of investing. At this point in time, they are quite distinct, but the gap is closing. Another salient example of this phenomenon is that the top focus of current marketing strategies for 18% of online brokerages is to build brand equity, a la the full service firms. Each model, discount and full service, is moving to a common ground.

The question that now stands is, who will win out? It is not an easy task to predict the future, or the future of brokerage services in the United States for that matter. One thing is for sure: the online channel will succeed. The top brokerages of the future will certainly incorporate online components very significantly. Those that will continue to succeed will be able to be flexible and adjust to the changing demands of consumers and technology, just as the top firms today are able to embrace the online channel. As Deloitte & Touche put it, “firms that cannot be innovative will find themselves niche players or acquisition targets. “

When she was young, Martha committed her attempts to school assignments, obtaining report books full of best marks. She gained a scholarship to Barnard College, where she employed as a model and wedded with a law scholar, and changing her name becomes Martha Stewart. She discontinue her career as model when she was pregnant. Then she worked as a broker for few years. She was pretty good in doing the job, so she would have recognized about insider trading laws (“Martha Stewart, broker indicted”, 2003).

When she was a college student, Stewart involved in business with her friend. Stewart began a catering business. Her catering business became productive and successful. Stewart started a retail store and sold her home equipments. She co-wrote a best-seller book, entertaining peoples, with long-period fashion ace Elizabeth Hawes. She began cropping up on Television talk shows with confidential information for troubled housewives. She was also having crucial problem with her husband. After Stewarts divorced, her husband married the worker. In the meantime, Martha Stewart’s business remained successful (“Martha Stewart, broker indicted”, 2003).

Stewart launched her magazine, Martha Stewart Living, in 1991. It became an achievement. Two years later, she began her own TV show, Martha Stewart Living. Initially, the insiders were unsure it would run well, but surely it was become tremendously rewarding TV show. Stewart generated a lot of money increasingly at that period (“Martha Stewart, broker indicted”, 2003).

Insider Trading in case of Martha Stewart

The Securities and Exchange Commission, in 2002, informed that Martha Stewart was investigated for insider trading case. In December 2001, she had sold 3,928 shares of ImClone Systems merely ahead the Food ; Drug Administration informed that it was entrancing ImClone’s utilization to sell a modern supposed wonder medicine. It seemed like standard insider trading, and it believably was (“Stephen Moore on Martha Stewart & Insider Trading”, 2004).

However, inquisitively the federal officials never testified this in courtyard, or even attempted to establish it. Alternatively, they appointed Stewart with four law-breaking, such as confederacy, construction of natural virtue, and two numbers of creating incorrect statements to officials. A jury said that she is blameworthy, and she was decided to be prisoned for five months. They thought that it is a law-breaking to telling the falsity to a fed. The speech communication does not have to be recorded, and witnesses are elective (“Stephen Moore on Martha Stewart & Insider Trading”, 2004).

Martha Stewart has been in the news program and media for some months because the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission considers that she was confirmed by Sam Waksal that his company ImClone’s cancer medicine had been declined by the Food and Drug Administration earlier than this report was published (Schroeder, J., 2004).

This state of affairs was a great stroke to his company and the monetary value of its stock descended spectacularly. Nevertheless, Martha Stewart was not monetary injured because she had her stock broker sell her 4000 shares earlier than this information was published. If it is accurate, and it should be lined it has not been evidenced yet, and so she is chargeable of insider trading. The Stewart beliefs should make a resentful after-sensation in conservatives’ openings for other causes. Stewart was a unfortunate person of socio-economic class conflict that has filtered down from the unintelligent (Schroeder, J., 2004).

One of the panelists remarked joyously that this final judgment was warrantied, because it would bring a subject matter to the “valuable and strong”, which they cannot escape with such maltreatments. The print media also pleasured in performing the “socio-economic class conflict  correspondence” by spiting Martha Stewart for such wrongdoings as dressing high-priced jewelry at the time of the legal proceeding (“Stephen Moore on Martha Stewart ; Insider Trading”, 2004).

Stewart now confronts possibly two years in correctional institution and the termination of as a minimum one-half of her financial condition, all because she handled to preserve herself $50,000 selling ImClone stock at the time of she perceived that one of the medicines the companies had been expanding had unsuccessful to acquire FDA acceptance (“Martha Stewart Stock Scandal”, 2003).

In conclusion, Martha Stewart has been one of the great and victorious entrepreneurs of this contemporaries era. She produced hundreds of millions of dollars of innovative economic condition and nearly an innovative business enterprise that was effectively by herself. She made many occupations and was a booming enterpriser who materialized to produce much money.

The origin my edginess is that a number peoples in our social group praise her ruination incisively because of her tremendous attainment. However, attainment is a moral excellence in United States, and while the people begin handling it as frailty, they minimize their competitive arrangement. And so they have an untold greater difficulty in their social group than whether people are exchanging on active stock confidential information among the period of time.

Bibliography

Martha Stewart, broker indicted. 2003. [Online]Available at: http://money.cnn.com/2003/06/04/news/martha_indict?cnn=yes

Martha Stewart settles SEC’s insider trading case. 2004. [Online]Available at: http://redorbit.com/news/general/605372/…/index.html

Schroeder, J. 2004. SSRN-Envy, Jealousy and Insider Trading: The Case of Martha Stewart. [Online]Available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=419580

SEC Charges Martha Stewart, Broker Peter Bacanovic with Illegal Inside. 2003. [Online]Available at: http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-69.htm

Stephen Moore on Martha Stewart & Insider Trading. 2004. [Online]Available at: http://www.nationalreview.com/moore/moore200403090901.asp

Unfair Trading Practices and the EU Law

The objective of the European Community is to establish a common market with a high level of competitiveness and integration of economic performance. The European Commission enacted some rules, so as to promote competitiveness; prevent anti – competitive behaviour and thwart undertakings enjoying a dominant position, from engaging in anti – competitive activities. The European Commission imposed these rules through Article 82 EC.[1]

However, there is no clear definition with regard to dominant position. Experts analyse dominance on the basis of the product market, the geographical market and the temporal factor[2]. The provisions of Article 82 EC do not prohibit companies to be in a dominant position, but they prohibit the abuse of such position or the exploitation of dominance by companies and undertakings[3].

            Dominant position can be construed, in the context of trade; as a position of considerable power, which is enjoyed by a company or undertaking, in order to influence trade relating to a particular product in a geographical market, such as the EU[4]. Article 82 EC concerns the abuse of a dominant position by companies; therefore, in the absence of such dominance there can be no abuse[5].

            The ECJ established the principle of dominant position, for the first time, in the case of United Brands. This case, which is often referred to in the EC Competition law, covers the definition of the market, the notion of a dominant position and other aspects of abuse under Article 82 EC. The United Brands Company was alleged to have abused its dominant position. This company imported unripe Chiquita brand of Latin American bananas into the EU. It supplied these unripe bananas to the wholesale distributors in several Member States of the EU in large quantities. The wholesale distributors purchased these bananas, from the company, while they were green and unripe. Subsequently, they used their own techniques to ripen them and distribute them to retailers. In the year 1975 the European Commission came to the conclusion that the company had violated Article 82 EC. The United Brands Company challenged this decision of the Commission and contended that it did not enjoy dominance. Moreover, it denied the charges of having abused a dominant position[6].

            The case was referred to the ECJ, which held that the company enjoyed a dominant position in the market. It defined the relevant market as the retail market in which the sale of bananas to consumers took place. The company did business with distributors and not with retailers or consumers, which indicated a dominant position. Furthermore, it did not carry out any business terms in the retail market, but engaged in trade terms to supply bananas to wholesale distributors. Therefore, the company had abused its dominant position. The Court based its decision on Article 82 EC, and held that the company had misused its dominant position in the common market to prevent effective competition in the relevant market. Moreover, it was held by the ECJ that the company had acted independently of its competitors, customers and finally of its consumers. The Court also held that United Brands had promoted Chiquita as a brand name. This had compelled the distributors to depend on the company for the supply of bananas[7].

            With regard to its abuse, the Court noted that the company had prohibited the distributors from reselling the bananas while they were green or unripe. This had forced the distributors to sell ripe bananas to the consumers; further, ripe bananas had a short shelf life. This restriction to sell ripe bananas effectively prevented the resellers from making sales in the other Member States. The Court opined that the imposition of such restrictions hindered competition, which had affected inter – state trading within the Community. This was an abuse according to Article 82 EC. The contention of United Brands was that they imposed the restriction to ensure the quality of the product to the consumers; the Court dismissed the contention of the company on the grounds that the restrictions had wider application than what was needed to ensure quality to consumers.

            The other alleged abuse by United Brands was its refusal to supply bananas to an established Denmark distributor namely Olesen. To this charge, United Brands argued that its decision was justified on the grounds that Olesen had been promoting another brand of bananas, Dole, which would be detrimental to the sales of the Chiquita bananas. While acknowledging the right of a company to initiate action to protect its commercial interests, the ECJ held that such an action should be proportionate to the commercial objectives of the company. The third alleged charge of abuse against United Brands was that the company had applied different rates to distributors in different Member States. To this, the company attempted to justify its actions by stating that this variation in price was directly related to the market price in that particular Member State. The Court held that the price variation had affected inter – state trade, which was tantamount to the abuse of a dominant position[8].

            Furthermore, the ECJ had accepted the argument that the conduct of the company was to be considered, while establishing dominance. In that context, the economic status of the company had made the company to adopt a flexible marketing strategy, which had directly affected its competitors[9]. This had been amply illustrated in instances where a company had legitimately offered discriminatory rebates to customers, which had acted as a barrier to new entrants into the common market. The European Commission had pointed out in the Michelin case that price discrimination by companies could be equivalent to dominance. The ECJ held that it could be an indicator of dominance[10]. In Eurofix-Bauco v Hilti, the Commission alleged that the behaviour of the company had demonstrated that it had acted independently on the relevant market, without considering the interests of its competitors or customers[11].

            In AKZO, the Commission found that the company had the ability to either weaken or eliminate competitors from the market. This indicated the dominant position of the company in the common market. The company appealed before the ECJ, which upheld the Commission’s opinion[12].

AKZO Chemie BV v. Commission dealt with predatory pricing by a dominant firm under Article 82 EC. In this case the ECJ held that if the pricing was such that it was above the average variable costs but less than the average total costs, then such pricing was predatory, provided it objective was to eliminate a competitor. It is essential to demonstrate the intention to eliminate a competitor, because such pricing may be necessitated by various legitimate factors like a reduction in demand[13].

Such mala fide intent is established by considering two classes of evidence. The first is based on the documents pertaining to the dominant undertaking and is direct in nature; whereas, the second relies on a number of indirect facts that serve to prove such intent. In the AKZO case, the dominant firm was a manufacturer of organic peroxides, like methyl ethyl ketone peroxide, benzoyl peroxide and acetone peroxide. Benzoyl peroxide is used as a food additive, in order to render wheat flour white[14].

ECS was a major company in this area and its chief activity was in this field. In a series of documents, which the European Commission scrutinized, a strategy to eliminate ECS from the market by fixing the price of the flour additive below the average total costs was unearthed. In addition, threats were issued to the ECS to withdraw from their primary activity or in the alternative to countenance retaliatory measures in its other areas of industrial activity, such as that of plastics. The ECJ concluded that the intention of AKZO was to eliminate ECS from the market[15].

The Gordon Ltd was a Scottish manufacturer of bagpipes. It was in a dominant position as it had eighty percent of the market share. The Aberdeen Ltd and the Dundee Ltd were two other bagpipes manufacturing companies, which used to obtain replacement parts from Gordon Ltd. The latter two companies merged as the Edinburgh Wind Company Ltd, and commenced to sell bagpipes. These bagpipes were cheaper than those sold by Gordon Ltd. A series of measures were adopted by the Gordon Ltd, these were a sudden and drastic reduction in the selling price of bagpipes, to the tune of fifteen percent, so that their bagpipes were much cheaper than those sold by the Edinburgh Wind Company Ltd. This measure served to capture the bagpipes market. Subsequently, Gordon Ltd, discontinued its previous practice of supplying the spare parts on credit to the Edinburgh Wind Company Ltd. Finally, it totally ceased to supply any parts, for the ostensible reason that such parts were required by it for its own purposes.

Clearly, the Gordon Ltd enjoys a dominant position. Moreover, it had indulged in a series of measures aimed at eliminating the Edinburgh Wind Company Ltd, from the bagpipes market. This measure would have affected the trade in bagpipes with the Republic of Ireland, a Member State of the EU.

The case law of the European Court of Justice acts as the source for the integrity of the Community. Article 82, which engenders a free and competitive market, requires four conditions for its application. First, there must be one or more firms that enjoy a dominant position; second, these undertakings must enjoy the dominant position, within the common market to a considerable extent; third, these undertakings must have abused their dominant position and fourth, such abuse by these undertakings should affect cross – border trade[16].

In the United Brands case, the dominant firm had refused to sell to a Danish company. This had been treated as a breach of Article 82 EC by the ECJ. Therefore, the refusal to sell by Gordon Ltd is a breach of Article 82 EC. Furthermore, in the AKZO case, the dominant undertaking had initiated a series of measures, like reducing the cost price of a product that was manufactured by the ECS Company, in order to reduce if not stop its sales and threatening to do so in other areas also, where the ECS was a manufacturer. In that particular case, the ECJ had held the AKZO to have breached Article 82 EC. In the light of these decisions, the Gordon Ltd has violated Article 82 EC.

The European Community Competition law ensures healthy competition in the free market. Member States are required to implement the principles of the Competition law in their national legislation and to ensure that dominant companies do not engage in anti – competitive behaviour.

Bibliography

Case 27/76 United Brands Company and United Brands Continental BV v. Commission of the European Communities [1978] ECR 207

Case 322/81 Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Michelin v. Commission (1983) ECR 3461

Commission Decision: Eurofix-Bauco v. Hilti OJ (1988) L 65/19

Craig Paul, and De Búrca, Gráinne, EU Law-Text, cases and materials, third edition, 2003,

Great Britain, Oxford University Press

ECS/AKZO OJ [1985] L 374/1 and Case 62/86 AKZO Chemie BV v. Commission (1991) ECR I-3359

Goyder, D.G, EC Competition Law, fourth edition, 2003, Great Britain, Oxford University

Press

Jones, Alison and Sufrin, Brenda, EC Competition Law-Text, cases and materials, second edition, 2004, Great Britain, Oxford University Press

Korah, Valentine, An introductory guide to EC competition law and practice, fifth edition,

1994, Oxford, Sweet and Maxwell Ltd

O’Donoghue, Robert and Padilla, A Jorge, The Law and Economics of Article 82 EC, first

Edition, 2006, Great Britain, Hart Publishing

United Brands (ECJ), retrieved 23 January 2008 from http://www.reckon.co.uk/open/United_Brands

[1] Jones, Alison and Sufrin, Brenda, EC Competition Law-Text, cases and materials, second edition, 2004, Great

  Britain, Oxford University Press. P.1
[2] Craig Paul, and De Burca, Gráinne, EU law-text, cases and materials, third edition, 2003, Great Britain,

   P. 993
[3] Korah, Valentine, An introductory guide to EC competition law and practice, fifth edition, 1994, Oxford, P. 83
[4] Goyder, D.G, EC Competition Law, fourth edition, 2003, Great Britain, P. 268
[5] O’Donoghue, Robert and Padilla, A Jorge, The Law and Economics of Article 82 EC, first edition, 2006,

   Great Britain, P. 107
[6] Case 27/76 United Brands Company and United Brands Continental BV v. Commission of the European

  Communities [1978] ECR 207
[7] Case 27/76 United Brands Company and United Brands Continental BV v. Commission of the European

  Communities [1978] ECR 207
[8] United Brands (ECJ), retrieved 23 January 2008 from http://www.reckon.co.uk/open/United_Brands
[9] Case 27/76 United Brands Company and United Brands Continental BV v. Commission of the European

    Communities [1978] ECR 207 para 121
[10] Case 322/81 Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Michelin v. Commission (1983) ECR 3461
[11] Commission Decision: Eurofix-Bauco v. Hilti OJ (1988) L 65/19
[12] ECS/AKZO OJ [1985] L 374/1 and Case 62/86 AKZO Chemie BV v. Commission (1991) ECR I-3359
[13] O’Donoghue, Robert and Padilla, Jorge Atilano. The Law and Economics of Article 82 EC. First Edition. 2006. Hart

    Publishing.  P. 249
[14] O’Donoghue, Robert and Padilla, Jorge Atilano. The Law and Economics of Article 82 EC. 2006. Hart Publishing.

    P. 249
[15] O’Donoghue, Robert and Padilla, Jorge Atilano. The Law and Economics of Article 82 EC. 2006. Hart Publishing.

    P. 249
[16] Jones, Alison and Sufrin, Brenda, EC Competition Law-Text, cases and materials, second edition, 2004, Great

  Britain, P. 255