Wars

Landing at Inchon: Foolish Risk or Calculated Gamble? Campaign Analysis: Operation CHROMITE The Ultimate Challenge for the Commander is deciding on where and when to commit forces to best leverage available combat power against the opponent. General Douglas MacArthur has been criticized for his decision, even though it succeeded, to make the invasion of Korea at the harbor of Inchon. This paper explores the legitimacy of that decision based on the principles of military power. A popular military aphorism is that victory has a thousand fathers, while defeat is an orphan.

The American invasion of Inchon during the Korean War must certainly be the exception to this. General Douglas MacArthur, loved by some, hated by others, rightfully deserves all of the credit for such a bold and audacious decision. In retrospect, his decision deserves perhaps a bit more circumspection. If Inchon had failed, whether tactically or strategically, not only could the war’s outcome have been different, but most certainly MacArthur would have been lambasted in his own time, as well as our own by arm chair theorists and generals.

Was his decision soundly based in military principles, balanced by ends to means? Or was it a gambler’s last toss of the dice? America’s war aims at the onset of the Korean War were simple: Drive the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) out of South Korea, back across the 38 th parallel and re-establish peace on American terms. These were the explicit aims. The strategic priorities will sound strikingly familiar to those familiar with strategic debate in this era of Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti and Operation Desert Storm: End the war as quickly as possible and keep U. S. casualties to a minimum.

Even in the 1950s, there was a political drive to keep wars short and bloodless; to attain national ends without expending resources. Perhaps the national tendency to hope to attain something for nothing is a fundamental characteristic of America. For the North Koreans, the opposite was true. Kim Il Sung’s aim was to reunify the two Koreas. Since he could not accomplish this politically, he resorted to military means to gain a political end. He had committed North Korea’s limited resources and manpower utterly and completely to the reunification of the Korean peninsula.

Kim Il Sung may not have realized it, but he had two possible branches of strategic priorities. The first was to drive the Americans out of the Pusan Perimeter and back to Japan, thus allowing him time to consolidate his hold politically, socially and militarily on Korea. The second branch, far more subtle, would have been to keep the Americans bottled up at Pusan and continue to attrit American lives, while consolidating his hold and strengthening his long logistical tail. By killing Americans, North Korea could make victory appear extremely costly to the American government and perhaps wear down the political will to fight.

The political will to fight would be backed up by how the American military would actually conduct the fight. American doctrine has historically been framed by the notion of preparing to fight the next war as the last one was fought. While this type of doctrinal thinking came back to haunt the U. S. in Vietnam; strangely enough, it was the correct approach for Korea. The American military had of course, only just finished fighting World War Two five years prior to North Korea’s invasion of South Korea. While the U. S. orce structure had been dramatically drawn down and was unprepared to fight the next war, its doctrinal approach to waging war had not changed. American doctrine during the previous war was offensively oriented, relying primarily on the infantry to hold key terrain once the enemy had been pushed off. The attrition of enemy forces was secondary to seizing and defending ground. Offensive action was used to envelop a foe’s flank, without resorting to frontal assaults. Armor’s role was to gain the initiative either with an envelopment or a penetration at a weak point in the enemy’s front.

Tanks were regarded as the best weapon to kill another tank. The doctrinal use of artillery and close air support made great strides during World War Two. By the end of that war, the U. S. Army was very good at conducting offensive war, largely because they did not have to defend their own homeland as the German Army had been forced to do. However, American defensive doctrine was weaker. Reliance on fortified strongpoints made penetration of American lines easy, as the 1 st Armored Division discovered to its regret during the opening phase of the Kasserine Pass battles.

A strongpoint defense with mobile armored counterattack forces might work against an attacking tank division, but it was ill-equipped to deal with an infiltrating infantry force which attacked at night, bypassing the strongpoint and raided logistical bases. On the whole, the experience of the previous World Wars had molded the American commanders’ methods of waging combat. General Douglas MacArthur had been a regimental commander during World War One and an Army commander during World War Two. During both of his previous experiences, he had relied on boldness, audacity and the offensive to gain and maintain the initiative over his opponents.

MacArthur’s brilliant use of amphibious operations in the Pacific against the Japanese had already provided him with the experience necessary to decide on an amphibious landing at Inchon, far behind enemy lines, to cut off the North Korean logistical lines of communication and quickly recapture the capital of South Korea, Seoul. As the American doctrinal approach to the operation was the same as in the previous conflict, so essentially were the forces at MacArthur’s disposal The U. S. Army force structure was centered on the pre-eminence of the infantry divisions, with integrated armor support.

An infantry division had three regiments, with three battalions each, and four infantry companies per battalion. The division also had one tank battalion, parceling one company of M-24s (outgunned in comparison to the Russian made T-34 which the North Koreans used) to each regiment. During the drawdown which followed World War Two, the number of infantry battalions per regiment was reduced by one. The infantrymen’s arsenal largely consisted of small arms, mortars and heavy machine guns. However, the infantry had no truly effective anti-tank weapon. The standard issue 2. 36 inch rocket was no match for the thick armor of the T-34.

The three division artillery battalions (one per infantry regiment) had also suffered cutbacks, dropping from three batteries each to two. With this structure, the X Corps, commanded by Major General Almond, was established to conduct the amphibious assault at Inchon. X Corps consisted of the 1st Marine Division, plus one regiment withdrawn from the Pusan Perimeter in order to bring that Division to a full wartime strength of three regiments, and the 7th Infantry Division. While X Corps was the assault force, overall command and joint support was under the umbrella control of Joint Task Force (JTF) 7, with seven subordinate task forces.

JTF-7 was a true joint operational command, incorporating Navy, Army and Marine units in order to support the assault force. JTF-7 would strike the North Koreans at a weak, unprepared point, effecting surprise and mass before the North Koreans could react. North Korean military doctrine closely resembled the Chinese model. Mao Tse Tung’s approach was to avoid strong points and infiltrate an enemy’s lines to hit the weakly defended rear areas, in order to destroy vital logistical areas. The North Koreans were not as road bound as the American army was, which gave them more flexibility than the Americans.

North Korean equipment was largely Russian and Chinese made, including the awesome Russian T-34. The North Korean force structure closely resembled the Chinese and Soviet triangular formation. On the offense, the two up and one back method was used. On the defense, this formation was reversed. The infantry division’s main body was usually preceded by four tank battalions, whose objective was to punch through an opponents main defenses and continue on into the rear areas, leaving the infantry to mop up.

While sorely lacking in air support with only nineteen outdated Soviet aircraft and almost no navy to speak of, the North Koreans did possess the T-34 tank and towed artillery. In the Inchon/Seoul area, the 3 d, 10 th and 13 th Divisions were astride the Seoul-Taejon-Taegu highway, within easy striking range of the landing areas. Some 400 soldiers of the 3 d Bn, 226 th Independent Marine Regiment and elements of the 918 th Artillery Regiment defended Wolmi-do Island, the invasion’s initial objective. North Korean shore artillery consisted of 75mm guns inside concrete revetments. Operation CHROMITE succeeded for several reasons.

First, the U. S. (with British assistance) was able to establish and maintain air supremacy; strike aircraft were able to hit North Korean units during daylight hours and attrit units in the Seoul-Inchon area. Control of the skies permitted the isolation of the invasion area and prevented reinforcing units from reaching the invasion area. Control of the sea permitted the logistical support of the assault force without fear of interruption by enemy surface or submarine forces. The presence of a secure logistical base on Japan ensured a smooth flow of supplies, both to units at Inchon as well as Pusan.

With naval gunfire support, the Americans also pounded defensive positions on Wolmi-do Island with high explosives and napalm, effectively neutralizing the North Koreans. Securing the island was absolutely critical to success of the operation, because without it, the North Koreans could enfilade the invading amphibious forces with artillery and small arms fire. The capture of key terrain at Inchon, specifically Cemetery and Observatory Hills was also crucial in ensuring that X Corps would have a secure beachhead. Seizing the high ground east of Inchon at Yongdungp’o and Sosa gave the American the advantage of holding key terrain rom which to continue their operations to the east. The capture of Kimpo airfield on the morning of 18 September facilitated the staging of Marine Corsairs flying Close Air Support missions for the Marines on the ground. Further, small unit actions, such as the capture of the causeway linking Wolmi-do with Inchon illustrate the value of highly trained, motivated, veteran soldiers as a combat multiplier. In retrospect, the preconditions for victory were already and in place and the outcome of foregone conclusion; the combination of U. S. naval and air supremacy seem to have guaranteed it.

However, the most critical action was Douglas MacArthur’s single minded determination to land X Corps at Inchon instead of the location preferred by the Joint Chiefs, Kunsan, 100 air miles south of Inchon. MacArthur had other options, besides Kunsan, which all seemed more prudent, but he stuck to his guns. Indeed, if he had simply introduced more troops into the Pusan Perimeter, or had made the envelopment more shallow, he would not have ended up with the results he achieved: Namely, a complete disruption of the North Korean LOCs and the recapture of Seoul.

Instead of simply pushing the North Koreans back or pushing from another side, CHROMITE was designed to completely unhinge the North Koreans and throw them off balance by hitting them from the rear. Only MacArthur’s decision ensured a quick victory without resorting to a slow, bloody series of battles back north up the Korean peninsula, which would have allowed the North Koreans to retreat along their supply lines. The smashing success of CHROMITE, followed by the recapture of Seoul, coupled with the breakout from the Pusan Perimeter by the Eighth Army, helped the Americans accomplish their principle war aim.

The North Koreans were unable to disengage from the American Eight Army units in front of them and reinforce the invasion area. As part of their force was held by Eighth Army, even while withdrawing, North Korean rear area support units were devastated by X Corps. MacArthur’s hammer and anvil technique ensured the virtual collapse of the North Korean army. While the Americans gained their goals, the North Koreans nearly lost everything. In their gamble, they had committed all of their resources, stretching themselves thinly, only to have their logistical tail cut behind them.

They retreated rapidly back across the 38 th Parallel, closely pursued by American and ROK units. MacArthur’s decision to land at Inchon, instead of further to the south as the Joint Chiefs would have preferred, was not only in accordance with the classic fundamentals of war, but more subtly, closely adhered to Clausewitz’s approach. MacArthur realized that he had to make a political statement as well as conduct a military operation. The psychological effect of quickly recapturing the South Korean national capital sent a very strong statement to the rest of the Pacific rim, including China and Russia.

CHROMITE was shrewdly designed to signal that America stood by her allies and would come through in a crisis. MacArthur’s adherence to the principles of war is a model for future similar operations: OBJECTIVE: General MacArthur chose Inchon as the landing site for the amphibious operation primarily because of its proximity to Seoul, the capital of South Korea. Inchon, located on the west coast of the Korean peninsula, is eighteen miles west of Seoul. MacArthur saw the recapture of Seoul as vital for winning the support of the United Nations and for putting fire into the motivation of the Allied Asian countries.

Inchon was thus not only a military objective but a political one. OFFENSIVE: MacArthur saw Operation CHROMITE as the means towards taking the initiative away from the North Koreans. CHROMITE would place the Allied forces on the offensive and gain the decisive momentum required to prevent the war from stagnating and becoming a long, drawn out war of attrition which MacArthur, a veteran of World War One was already familiar with. MASS: The invasion force, X Corps, consisted of 70,000 troops. Intelligence estimates put the NKPA strength in the Inchon-Seoul area at 8,000 soldiers, of whom 1,800-2,500 were garrisoned in the landing area.

This was later confirmed by POWs who stated that the Inchon garrison numbered 2,000. The U. S. Eighth Army, in the Pusan perimeter, was occupying the attention of the NKPA in the south and would keep the North Koreans busy in that sector. ECONOMY OF FORCE: MacArthur ordered one Marine regiment out of the Pusan perimeter in order to beef up the 1 st Marine Division, X Corps. This was a great risk, but the 1 st Division commander, Major General Oliver Smith, did not feel that he would be able to accomplish the landings without the regiment.

When MacArthur reviewed the risk of pulling one regiment out of Pusan, he reasoned that once the landings were successful, the NKPA would withdraw north to counterattack, thus taking pressure off Eighth Army. MANEUVER: The Americans had the advantage of interior lines at the Pusan perimeter, but were free to exploit exterior lines because of the lack of an opposing naval force. The North Koreans were strung out all along the Korean peninsula with long LOCs. The NKPA was also at a disadvantage because of their terrain induced flanks: the Korean coastline.

CHROMITE was designed to be a flank attack with the goal of attacking deep in the enemy’s rear, disrupting his LOCs and cutting off the main force’s avenue of retreat. UNITY OF COMMAND: General MacArthur activated X Corps, appointing his Chief of Staff, Major General Edward Almond, as the commander. This was more critical than it appears on the surface because of the very multi-service nature of the Corps. With one Marine Division and one Army Division, a lesser commander might have decided to let each Division commander have his own area, without a single unified command and staff structure.

MacArthur’s creation of X Corps for a single mission ensured that he could pick a commander who would follow his guidance to the letter, ensuring mission success, without squabbling over seniority and interservice rivalries. X Corps’ sole mission was the Inchon landings and the subsequent capture of Seoul. General Almond understood this, and also knew that once the landings were completed, he was to return to Japan and continue his duties as the Far East Command CofS. SECURITY: MacArthur realized that operational security of Operation CHROMITE was of primary importance to the success of the landings.

Surprise could not be achieved unless the enemy was caught wholly unprepared. Under a cloak of secrecy, X Corps staged out of Yokohoma and Kobe Japan behind a perfect natural screen, Typhoon June and in front of another one, Typhoon Kezia. SURPRISE: This was achieved partly because of negligible North Korean air and naval capability to gather intelligence on American troop movements. Also, Inchon was not considered the best location for an amphibious assault, by anyone, North Korean or American. Inchon has no beaches, only mud flats. There is also a serious tide problem, with a tidal variance of -. feet at low tide and 32 feet at high tide. However, CHROMITE was a complete success. The assault troops encountered only spotty resistance and friendly casualties were much lighter than expected. Within 24 hours of the main landings, the 1 st Marine Division had secured the high ground six miles east of Inchon. SIMPLICITY: CHROMITE was designed to be a single envelopment. X Corps made the amphibious assault at Inchon while the Eighth Army broke out of the Pusan perimeter to tie down and hold the NKPA in place. This prevented the North Koreans from reinforcing their rear areas.

The Eighth Army was then to drive north, pushing the logistically cut off NKPA back north, where the Americans would link up with the landing force at Seoul. CHRONOLOGY OF OPERATION CHROMITE: 4 July- Planning conference chaired by MacArthur, who proposes an amphibious assault designed to cut the North Korean Lines of Communication (LOC) at Seoul. 12 August- CINCFE Operation 100-B issued naming Inchon as the target area for the assault. 23 August- Planning conference in Washington, during which MacArthur convincingly presents his case for the assault at Inchon. 6 August- General Order 24 is issued activating X Corps, naming Major General Almond as the commander. 28 August- The Joint Chiefs concur in principle with MacArthur’s plan. 31 August- Lt. Eugene Clark begins his intelligence collection mission at Yonghung-do. 3 September- JTF 7 OPLAN 9-50 issued. 4 September- Air attacks begin against North Korean forces in the Seoul-Inchon area. MacArthur places the 1 st Marine Brigade under X Corps. 6 September- MacArthur confirms earlier orders and announces that D-Day will be 15 September. 11 September- X Corps units, the 1 st Marine Division and 7 th Infantry Division depart from ports in Japan. 3-14 September- The U. S. Navy’s Gunfire Support group arrives off Inchon and begins the bombardment of Wolmi-do Island with air support provided by TF 77. 15 September- D-Day- X Corps arrives at Inchon. 0500: Air strikes hit Wolmi-do Island. 0630: High tide in Inchon harbor. 0633: 3 d Bn, 5 th Marines land at Wolmi-do Island. 0750: Wolmi-do is secured. 1730: High tide in Inchon harbor. 1732: 1 st Marine Regiment lands at Blue Beach, Inchon. 1733: 5 th Marine Regiment lands at Red Beach, Inchon. 16 September- D+1: 7 th Infantry Division begins arriving at Inchon harbor. 130: Initial D-Day objectives secured. 18-19 September: 7 th Infantry Division lands and moves south of Inchon into a blocking position to protect the beachhead from counterattacks from the south. BIBLIOGRAPHY Appleman, Roy E. South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June-November 1950). The U. S. Army in World War II. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1961. Doughty, Robert A. The Evolution of U. S. Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76. Leavenworth Papers No. 1. Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College.

One of the significant features of World War II was a great number of prisoners of war (POW‘s) to be kept both by Allies and Axis. The way those prisoners were treated differed greatly dependently on the nation of a prisoner and the country of imprisonment.  This paper discusses the treatment of the American prisoners captured on the European theatre and compares it to the treatment of prisoners from other countries, such as Britain, Poland and Russia.

In total Some 95,000 American and 135,000 British and Commonwealth servicemen were incarcerated in prisoners of war (POW) camps in Germany during World War II. The prisoners were held in some fifty German POW camps, of several types. These included the Stalag (Stammlager, permanent camps for noncommissioned officers and enlisted men), Stalag Luft (Luftwaffestammlager, permanent camps for air force personnel), and Oflag (Offizierslager, permanent officers’ camps). American POWs were found in many of the POW camps, but the majority of camps contained only a few Americans. In some camps (Stalags II-B, III-B, IV-B, XVII-B, Luft I, Luft III, and Luft IV), however, the number of American POWs ran into the thousands.

The basic international instrument, regulating the POW‘s status at the time was the 1929 the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, signed by 47 governments. Subject to this convention, no prisoner of war could be forced to disclose to his captor any information other than his identity (i.e., his name and rank, but not his military unit, home town, or address of relatives). Every prisoner of war was entitled to adequate food and medical care and had the right to exchange correspondence and receive parcels. He was required to observe ordinary military discipline and courtesy, but he could attempt to escape at his own risk. Once recaptured, he was not to be punished for his attempt.

Officers were to receive pay either according to the pay scale of their own country or to that of their captor, whichever was less; they could not be required to work. Enlisted men might be required to work for pay, but the nature and location of their work were not to expose them to danger, and in no case could they be required to perform work directly related to military operations. Camps were to be open to inspection by authorized representatives of a neutral power.

 Germany in general followed the 1929 Geneva Convention in the treatment of American and British servicemen in POW camps, with little difference to be found in treatment with Americans and British. POW‘s were not to be individually confined, and the food served them should have been equal to that served to German troops. The ration was reduced by the end of the war, but this was related to the general situation with food in Germany. Much greater problem for the POW‘s was the warm clothing, often not provided by the Germans, however the prisoners could receive acceptable clothes from the Red Cross and from their families via the Red Cross.

The prisoners were allowed to arrange recreational activities, such as sport games by their own, also some attention was paid to the religious demands of catholic and protestant POW‘s, the largest POW camps had chapels on their territory. The prisoners, involved in work received small payment (5 to 10 marks) for their effort, though the amount of money, which a POW could possess was limited. An important right for the British and American prisoners was a right to send and receive mail, although the delivery of mail was very erratic, and a letter or a parcel required several weeks to transit.

American and British prisoners’ worst enemy was usually boredom. One of the most important activities which overcame this enemy was reading. The American and British peoples, through the various agencies which undertook the task of providing POWs with books, made it possible for prisoners to obtain books which were so necessary and useful. It helped the prisoners to occupy their time and keep their mental capacity. When the American and British POWs left the prisoners of war camps, approximately 1 million books were left behind.

One can notice, that the treatment of British and American POW‘s was tolerant enough, except for some cases of spontaneous violence, such as murder of USAF and RAF pilots by the German civilians, angry with their air raids. However, this human attitude was hardly applied to the prisoners from other countries, retained in Germany. Polish, Yugoslavian and especially Russian prisoners received the worst treatment ever imaginable.

There were several reasons for it, and the most important of them was the notorious Nazi racial doctrine, which considered the Slaves to be Untermenschen or underhumans, almost equal to Jews. The Soviet Union was also not a party to 1929 Geneva Convention, and so could not count for Red Cross assistance. Finally, Stalin, being suspicious of everyone out of his control, proclaimed all the Russian POW‘s to be traitors and deprived them with any rights or aid.

Dealing with Russian prisoners became even more complicated as the amount of captives at the first year of war reached 5 million, creating problems even with simple accommodation. Russian soldiers, captured in the great encirclements, were often left without food for weeks, causing starvation and typhus. Some categories of prisoners, such as Jews or Communist party members were usually shot immediately. The survivors were taken to the concentration camps on the territory of the Soviet Union, Poland and Germany itself.

At the later period working with Russian POW‘s became more organized. Germans point now was to use the mass of people in their disposal in the most rational way. Those of the prisoners, who conformed with the racial demands (mostly originating from the Baltic or western regions of Russia) could voluntary join the Wehrmacht. Other volunteers, mostly recent captives, were used as Hiwi Hilfswillige), or helpers in the army units.

The fate of the others to be kept in the concentration and death camps, such as Auschwitz, Buchenwald and Dachau. Forced labour of the Russian POW‘s was actively used at the German civil an military enterprises, including aircraft factories and V-2 rockets production. Another way of exploiting the Untermenschen was to use them for medical and military experiments. For example, 600 Soviet prisoners were gassed in Auschwitz on 3 September 1941 at the first experiment with Zyklon

B. Based on the overstated one can make a conclusion, that treatment of the American and British POW‘s, captured by the Germans was surely  preferable to the treatment of other POW‘s. General observance of international law towards allied prisoners by Germany along Red Cross activity, provided them with huge benefits in comparison with the Slavic, Jewish and other POW‘s.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

M. R. D. Fott, “Prisoners of War,” The Oxford Companion to World War II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995)

The Columbia Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition.  2001.

American Prisoners of War in Germany. Prepared by Military Intelligence Service, War Department 1 Nov 1945

W. Wynne Mason, Prisoners of War (Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939–1945) (Wellington, New Zealand: War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, 1954)

Antony Beevor Stalingrad (Penguin Books, New York, 1999)

[1] M. R. D. Fott, “Prisoners of War,” The Oxford Companion to World War II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 913–915;

[2] The Columbia Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition.  2001.
[3] American Prisoners of War in Germany. Prepared by Military Intelligence Service, War Department 1 Nov 1945

[4]W. Wynne Mason, Prisoners of War (Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939–1945) (Wellington, New Zealand: War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, 1954), pp. 42–43;
[5] Antony Beevor Stalingrad (Penguin Books, New York, 1999), pp.- 15, 60, 166
[6] Antony Beevor. Ibid. p.-59

After the First World War had ceased on the 11th of November 1918, there were a lot of negotiations on the issue of how to sustain peace, and how to treat the Central Powers, which consisted namely of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria. France wanted urgent reparation for the damages Germany had caused, and did not consider giving her a “mild punishment”, such as the one Britain had suggested. There are several important reasons as to why the Central Powers lost World War One.

During this analysis I will be looking at the most vital ones, and giving a brief idea of how and why these shaping events took place. There was one particular event involving especially Germany at an early stage of the war: the von Schlieffen plan. In 1914, Germany tried to pursue the so-called “von Schlieffen plan”, in which the goal was to surround the French armies. They planned to do so by flying through Belgium to the coasts of France, to then capture the Channel ports and use the way of the rivers to surround France, their support and their navy.

This was easier said than done; the Belgian resistance was strong, making Germany unable to capture the Channel ports and thus unable to get somewhat control of France. The fact that the von Schlieffen plan failed had a great impact on the Central Powers’ motivation throughout the war, as well the fact that it did not manage to show their authority from early on. Several smaller reasons to why the Central Powers lost also need to be taken into consideration. Britain tried to block German ports and trade routes, making it difficult for them to acquire weapons, ammunition, transport and food from other countries.

Considering that the Germans were already exhausted by the war, because of the fact that they did not expect a long-term war. To add to that, there was not a lot the other Central Powers could do to help Germany, meaning that they all-in-all did not get many new supplies of tools for warfare. In conclusion, there were many minimal causes for the results of the First World War, such as British blockade of German ports and trade routes, German exhaustion and the fact that they did not get much help from the other Central Powers. US entered the war in April 1917.

This was a vital reason for the Allies’ victory. Seeing as it was at the very end of World War One, and Germany was already exhausted, it did a great deal to their morale when a whole new continent joined the war. The US contributed by providing Britain and France with food, merchant ships and credit. By mid-1918 over half a million American soldiers were involved in the war. As well as the physical help, the USA gave a vast blow to German morale. Thus, the US joining the war was one of the leading steps to the Allies winning.

As my short analysis has shown, there were many different reasons for the Central Powers losing the First World War, in which there were small reasons as well as big ones. The causes I have mentioned are the failure of the Schlieffen plan, small reasons such as British blockade, German exhaustion and not getting any help from the other Central Powers and lastly, the US joining the war towards the end.

Reasons for Initiating Operation Torch – – The Allies planned to occupy Vichy France to prevent the land from being occupied by Axis; the invasion would eventually force Axis powers to fight a two-front war; also helped to diminish transportation of supplies to Axis forces; Key Personalities (Involvements) – – General Dwight D. Eisenhower – – Jean Francois Darlan – – Andrew Cunningham – Objective(s) of Operation Torch – – Allies planned to team up with Vichy France in North Africa in order to take Tunisia before Germans could occupy it from nearby Sicily.

After invading North Africa and convincing the French to join the Allies, American and British forces planned to head directly to Sicily, invade, and move up to the core of Europe. Victory here would also allow the Allies to clear up the Mediterranean of Axis forces for their own personal use. Important Readings – from Earl Rice’s “Strategic Battles in Europe” . . . – page 24: The Americans joined their British allies. Roosevelt’s military advisers wanted to build up immediately for an invasion of the European mainland later in the year or early in 1943.

Churchill and his counselors declared that an invasion of the continent so soon would be next to impossible because of insufficient time to assemble the necessary forces and too few available landing craft in which to haul them across the English Channel. Churchill and his advisors did not want to risk a failed invasion. – page 25: Churchill instead favored extending operations in North Africa, where British forces were already fighting. he argued that seizing North Africa and beyond would introduce American troops to the action, boost American morale and appease Stalin’s demands for a second front.

But Roosevelt’s advisors were unreceptive to Churchill’s plan and suggested redirecting U. S efforts to the Pacific Theater. In June 1942, Churchill told Roosevelt that Britain was both unable and unwilling to undertake the invasion of Europe in 1942 or even in 1943. Having already been driven from Norway, France and Greece by the Germans, the British (now page 26) intended to stay the next time they landed on the Continent. – page 26: Roosevelt accepted Churchill’s proposal. Torch’s primary objective was to take Tunisia before the Germans could occupy it from nearby Sicily.

The Anglo-American invasion force in the west would then move eastward to link up with Lieutenant General Bernard L. Montgomery’s British 8th army, advancing westward through Libya. Together the 2 Allied armies would form a vise within which to crush Field Marshal Erwin Rommel’s 100,000-man German-Italian army in Libya, including his vaunted Afrika Korps. But first they had to deal with the French. https://www. diigo. com/list/audreym96/operation-torch SOURCE and Earl Rices “Stategic Battles in Europe”; Even though Stalin required that the Allies attack somewhere in Europe, Operation Torch was successful: the Allies gained a wide amount of land and the Suez Canal was saved. So what’s the importance of the Suez Canal, huh? The Suez Canal provided a short sea route between Britain and Middle East oil supplies, and its imperial colonies in Asia and the Far East. It enabled the Allies to move supplies,men,equipment,fuel,and raw materials around the world to where they were needed much more quickly than if they had had to sail around the southern tip of Africa,which would have made them much more vulnerable to U-boat attack.

Why the British cared SO much about North Africa? – When the second World War broke out, there were many soldiers from many different nations in Cairo. The Italians were there, but there were really no serious attempts to help Mussolini by them. The only real enemies in Cairo were the Germans. The British secret police watched them very carefully. There was a political raid in which the British caught German spies that had come to Cairo with money, a radio transmitter and a house boat on the Nile.

Because the English were unable to ship all of their supplies in from Britain, they trained and employed thousands of Egyptians in various trades. Some were mechanics, electricians, drivers, engineers and even lens grinders. They repaired military equipment and even built trains and machinery. Egypt started to weave their own cloth out of silk and wool. Advances were made in mining, cement, petroleum refining and chemical industries. In Egypt, the British spent over ten million pounds every year. In July of 1942, the British were pushed back almost to Alexandria.

Rommel stopped at Alamein because his troops were exhausted and almost out of supplies. The British rushed to Cairo. Soldiers were sent to various places to train while other got ready to retreat from the city. The British officers went to the banks to try to get their money while at the British headquarters, vital papers were burned. This scare changed Cairo to a point where it would never be the same again. Montgomery took over the Eighth Army in the desert and moved them to Alamein. He won this battle in October or November of 1942.

After this battle, Egypt lost most of the fantasy and glamour that had been year during the years of occupation. Now the city settled down to the first order of business, national liberation. http://www. touregypt. net/hbritish. htm SOURCE ALGERIA AND MOROCCO – http://www. ushmm. org/wlc/en/article. php? ModuleId=10007303 Operation Torch, the Algeria-Morocco military campaign, began on November 8, 1942, and ended on November 11, 1942. US and British forces, commanded by American General Dwight D. Eisenhower, carried out this campaign.

Three task forces landed on the beaches near Casablanca on the Moroccan Atlantic Coast; near Oran in western Algeria; and near Algiers, more than 250 miles to the east in Algeria. Although Vichy French forces initially resisted, a coup d’etat by the French resistance in Algiers on November 8 neutralized the French XIX Corps before the Allied landing. General Mark Clark, Eisenhower’s deputy, induced Admiral Jean Francois Darlan, Vichy High Commissioner for North Africa, and General Alphonse Juin, the commander of the Vichy French armed orces in North Africa, to order French forces to cease armed resistance in Oran and Morocco on November 10–11. In return for his cooperation, Darlan temporarily remained head of the French administration as the French forces in North Africa joined the Allies. The Allied landings triggered the German occupation of the unoccupied zone of France and the rapid dispatch of German troops to Tunisia. To avoid capture of their Mediterranean Fleet by the Germans, the Vichy French scuttled it in the harbors of Toulon on November 27, 1942. By the end of November, the Allies had crossed the Tunisian border in the northwest.

General Haig’s status prior to the Battle of the Somme had been remarkable. In 1885 General Haig was commissioned in the cavalry and served in several campaigns – Sudan and in the Boer War in South Africa between 1899 and 1902. In the Boer war General Haig had served with distinction and showed a lot of potential and was later promoted to the war office. Many people during this period after his first taste of success thought he had a lot of potential. And he didn’t disappoint. In august 1914 when WW1 had started, General Haig was commanding his first army corps.

General Haig and his men fought in several battles e. g. Battle of Mon and Battle of Ypres – In which he was very successful. All of this success lead to extremely high expectations of him as WW1 had started. However General Haig’s title of ‘the butcher of the Somme’ originated after the First World War, when, due to large number of casualties Britain suffered from the war and mostly the Somme. In which 20,000 died in the first day of the Battle and many were injured. The people of Britain wanted someone to blame.

This was a coping mechanism in which people could deal with the loss of the ‘lost generation’. Does General Haig deserve the title ‘Butcher of the Somme’? In this essay I will discus whether General Haig deserves to be remembered as ‘the butcher of the Somme’. General Haig’s title of ‘the butcher of the Somme’ originated after the First World War, when, due to large number of casualties Britain suffered from the war and mostly the Somme. The people of Britain wanted someone to blame. This was a coping mechanism in which people could deal with the loss of the ‘lost generation’.

Arguably Haig does deserve his nickname. This is because Haig sent thousands of men to their deaths continuously after his war efforts seemed not to be working. For instance 60,000 soldiers died in the first day alone in the battle of the Somme. The reason that so many people died was that Haig ordered his men to walk across no-mans land. They were easy targets for the German machine guns. However Haig assisted Britain in winning the war and although he did so with tremendous loss of life, these men did not die pointlessly.

They died to protect their families and everyone else on the home front, and they died to prevent Britain from becoming a German Nation. Haig was also faced with an almost impossible task of winning the war in the quickest means possible. Haig was under constant pressure from the government to have a large victory to boost morale. This factor as well as the fact that Haig was not used to the tactics of a war of attrition may have caused Haig to act rashly and therefore if he was not under so much pressure he may have acted differently. Haig was also fed false Intel that was meant to boost morale.

Haig was advised that his seven day artillery bombardment had proven to be successful (the aim of the bombardment was to brake all the barbed wire and kill most of the Germans in the trenches) therefore he ordered his men to walk across no-mans land and look for mines. This shows that he thought about what to do and what was in the best interest for his men as there was no point in telling his men to run across no-mans land to be blown up by mines. It is debatable that Haig deserves his nickname as, while his men are starving in the cold and muddy trench, Haig is sipping French wine.

Why did the United States enter World War I in 1917?

On June 28th 1914, Franz Ferdinand, the Austrian archduke, and his wife were murdered by a Bosnian revolutionary named Gavrilo Princip. This assassination triggered declarations of war. Firstly, this gave Austria a reason to attack Serbia. This then led to Russia mobilizing their army in order to defend Serbia, which then led to Germany executing “The Plan” and attacking France through Belgium. The domino effect continued and war broke out due to a mixture of things.

Alliances played a great role in the war, as each nations began forming and expanding their militaries. The war was “Central Powers” vs. “Allied Powers”. The central powers were Germany, Austria-Hungary, Ottoman Empire, Bulgaria and Romania (which changed sides half way through the war). The Allied Powers consisted of France, USSR, The British Empire, Serbia and the USA. The United States initially wanted to stay out of the war mainly because they declared that they would be a “neutral” nation that only acts as a “peacemaker”.

President Wilson declared numerous time that “The United States was too proud to fight” and would not be entering the war. He also mentioned that the U. S. would not tolerate unrestricted submarine warfare. Before America’s entry, The U. S-German relations were neutral. They were not much involved with each other apart from political and labor relations. America’s opinion changed throughout the war after the sinking of the Lusitania, the Zimmerman Telegram and because of the European alliances that America was involved with.

America’s entry in World War 1 in 1917 was based on a number of key factors Economics, Retaliation and Pre-emption. Economics – .. At the time, the US had large economic investments with the British and French. If Germany was to win the war it was not clear what would happen to those investments. Protecting France and Britain was therefore in a way protecting their investment. If the U. S. joined the war, their strong military forces, especially allied with France, Britain and USSR, would substantially increase the chance of winning.

Retaliation – One of Germany’s great t=strengths was it’s submarine fleet. By controlling the seas the Germans would be able to destroy the shipment of arms to the allies. Their prime reason for sinking the Lusitania was the German belief that their were weapons on board. Unfortunately the Germans killed 128 American nationals when they torpedoed the Lusitania. This was a key contributing fact to the US joining the wasr on the side of the Allies two years later. Prevention – One of the main reasons for the US entry in to the war however was the Zimmerman Telegram. This was a proposal from Germany to Mexico asking them to go to war against the U. S. Germany did this in the hope that by keeping the US engaged close to home with a local war, it would be prevented from entering the war in European. . However, when the U. S. found out about this coded communication which was intercepted by the British,, they saw this as an act of aggression by Germany and in order to pre-emp being drawn in to the war on someone else’s terms decided to pre-empt the situation and take matters in to their own hands.

Interestingly no one has seen the telegram itself and accordingly some believed that Britain made it up in order to get America involved in the war. The major objective for U. S. ’s entry in the war was its wish to have greater influence in post-war Europe, especially with their newly acquired economic strength. Even though when America joined World War 1 it was already coming to an end, their entry did make an impact on the war. In the short term, their entry was a downside as it almost caused German victory.

Germany was well aware that the American troops would overwhelm the Germans when they would arrive, so Germany launched a massive offensive to gain victory before America could transport enough troops into Europe, however the offensive ended up halting and turning back just outside of Paris. In the long term, America’s entry was an upside because, as the war was already coming to an end, both sides were exhausted. America was fresh and ready to fight a war, which helped motivate the Allies. The U. S. brought new equipment and military force which was a gain for the Allies and helped win the war.

The U.S. entered the war at the right time because they did manage to bring fresh troops and new equipment into Europe. Before the Lusitania, America did not have any reason to enter the war. It would also have been going against their will to be neutral. Their entry did impact positively, however may not have been necessary and did go against their initial plan. It also caused America to make some enemies in Europe, which ended up causing them to be sucked into more European issues. Positively, it also bonded the U. S. with many European nations, which were very strong politically and economically.

The world’s greatest war, World War II began in 1939 and lasted for almost six years. It was between two military alliances. On the axis powers were Japan, Germany and the Kingdom of Italy. While the allies were lead by United Kingdom, China, Soviet Union and The United States of America. America was not directly involved in the war in the early stages. The necessity increased after the fall of France, the Pearl Harbor incident but mainly when Hitler declared war on U. S. This led to America’s direct involvement in the World War II and helped America to transition from a great power to a super power.

World war II started by the deep seated anger in German due to the loss in World War I. Hitler a new leader in Germany transformed it from a defeated state to powerful one with a large army of up to 400,000 men which led to the breaking of the treaty of Versailles (Langley). March 16th 1935 Hitler tore up the treaty of Versailles when he started to build up his army (Nicola Barber) . Although The United States of America had always been an ally in the Second World War its direct involvement did not came after much later. In 1939 its only involvement was to provide arms and ammunition in turn of cash from countries.

America was indirectly helping the allies by starving Japan of oil. Winston Churchill repeatedly tried to convince Franklin D. Roosevelt to enter the war but it was after Hitler’s declaration of war, America got directly involved in the war. In 1941 Congress had approved America’s entry into war after which military operations began. Operation Torch on North Africa became US first military operation. German forces surrendered in Tunisia in 1943 and that led to the first US British victory and proved invaluable in changing US public opinion behind the war.

The second front for American military action was when Winston Churchill proposed to attack Italy even though there was an urgent need to relieve pressure on Russia from the western front. This attack led to allies invading Italian mainland leading to the capture of Rome. The United States along with other allies continued to attack the Axis powers which led to the retake of Paris in the D-Day Invasion. In the Tokyo Bombing Raids American bombers destroyed up to 250,000 buildings and killed 83,000 in massive fire bombing.

It continued to play an important part in the attacks on the Axis Powers, till the end of the war where it dropped two atomic bombs in Japan bringing the war to an end. It is clearly seen by the events of the war that although America was not involved directly at first in the war it played a pivotal role once it became directly involved and it’s most important role was that of bringing the war to an end by destroying one of the main Axis powers, Japan, completely. It is often wondered how The United States Of America reached its position of dominance in the world.

And it would not be wrong to link its rise a super power to the results and events of World War II. The characteristics of super power are firstly having a strong stable economy, secondly overpowering military, thirdly immense international political power and lastly strong national ideology. Before the war America was seen as a great power along with many other powerful strong nations like Russia and Britain. It was only after the war that The United States of America emerged as a strong super power and still holds that position. Even in years before the war America was amongst the largest producers in the world.

At that time there was no country that had that immense power over the international system. Britain and France were in imperial decline which caused them to lose their international standing. Although America from the start had a stable economy due to the presence of natural resources like oil and steel. Yet its rise to super power was when it surpassed Europe as a major power. Europe was a part of many large destructive wars that left it completely bankrupt and destroyed most of its infra structure which lead to the fall of Europe.

Europe being directly involved in wars like the World War I and World War II left it far behind in the race of super powers. America which was although involved in the World War II faced much less damaged compared to the destruction faced by Europe. Soviet Union also a major power failed in the race of super power because of the damages it faced from the World War II but mainly it dropped out because of the fall of the So that left America as the only dominating power in the world which had a stable and large economy with a huge military advantage and immense power over international matters.

America was one of the main Allies in the World War II yet it did not face much destruction like other allies it continued to grow and kept its economy stable. And when the other allies failed to rise up America stood as a strong nation. Even when The United States of America was involved in World War II it was not dragged down like other allies including Britain and Soviet Union. This led to the creation of a super power. A country that before the war was just a great power became a super power. Works Cited Langley, Andrew. Living Through World War II. n. d. Nicola Barber, Ken Hills. Headlines of World War II. n. d.