Why Was the Irish Revolution of 1919-21?

On December 6 1921 the Anglo-Irish treaty was drafted and signed by representatives of both the Irish and British Governments. After centuries of bitter feuding involving both sides the British Government was for the first time to offer the Irish independence. In this essay I seek to outline how the Irish revolution of 1919 and 1921 was successful in achieving Irish independence. Richard English says, “There had never been any chance of a formal military victory… nor in practice of the British recognising an Irish republic. [1] If English is right to say this then how did the Irish manage to gain independence when the odds were stacked against them both militarily and politically? I believe that independence was reached for a number of reasons to be discussed in more detail later. These factors can be divided into the two crucial areas of political and military. Politically, there was a list of British failures including the negative publicity attracted by the revolution at home, pressure from America and the Government of Ireland Act. Failures only exacerbated by political achievements on the Irish side.
Such as De Valera’s trip to the U. S to canvass American support for the revolution plus the establishment of Dail Eireann and its de facto courts. The next section of the essay will be based on the military issues. Was the revolution’s success down to Britain’s failures or Ireland’s triumph of military tactics? Military mistakes were made on the British side which nullified the fact that they had a vastly superior army. The harsh reprisals in nationalist territories for example stoked tensions unnecessarily. A large part of the revolutions success could be attributed to the military strengths of the IRA.
With Michael Collins at the head the IRA was extremely strong tactically and used guerrilla warfare to great effect. The also had a mass intelligence system to rival any according to figures like Thomas Bowden for instance. Although some historians such as Peter Hart try to unravel the legend of Michael Collins and believe he did not have quite as big a role in the war as many would later claim. Political In order for the revolution to work the IRA had to defeat Britain politically and in a propaganda war as well as militarily.

It has to be noted that as far back as 1916 the Irish public had no interest in a revolting. The men who took part in the Easter Rising were looked upon as villains in the immediate aftermath not heroes. It was political failure that allowed such a dramatic swing in public opinion to take place. The harsh treatment of the rebels was the turning point in Irish popular opinion. It formed the motivation for many who joined the IRA during the revolution becoming a superb propaganda tool for the republican cause. With each execution of the men who took part in Ireland the fury grew.
A student in the University College of Dublin Barry once studied remarked, “I never experienced anything like this surging fury with the news produced in everyone. ”[2] Later in the interview the student claims that there was notable rejoice when three Englishmen were shot for every Irishman hung. Primary quotes like this go some way to showing the feelings of resentment caused through Britain’s political own goals that multiplied the supporters of an armed revolution in a matter of days. It was not only public opinion in Ireland that was affected by the mistakes of the British administration.
Public opinion in Britain throughout the revolution had reached a low. Many normal British citizens were horrified by what they saw as atrocities going on in their name. A sketch of opinion at the time can be viewed in a report of the Labour commission to Ireland in 1921. The report claims that the results of a government policy of reprisals on the people manifests in three main ways they are health economic and spirit. The report states, “months of oppression, coercion, and physical violence cannot but have far reaching effects upon the people who suffer under them. The Labour party believed at the time that British Government policy was to the detriment of the economy both in Ireland and in Britain. While the armed forces “provocative behaviour” was only creating “a new bitterness of spirit” among the people. Perhaps a concluding line from the document may sum up the thoughts and fears of many in Britain. “Things are being done in the name of Britain which must make her name stink in the nostrils of the whole world”[3] A crucial failure of British policy was the Government of Ireland Act passed in 1920.
The Act was to create two subordinate parliaments one in Belfast and one in Dublin. The Belfast Parliament comprised of the same six counties that would later make up Northern Ireland. The Act was ignored in the twenty six counties but the Dail was powerless to prevent its operation in the North. Ronan Fanning believes that the Act later caused the British to give away more independence than previously hoped by the very fact it had Ireland divided into separate legislative bodies never an intention of the Act. Britain continually faced U. S pressure to solve the Irish question.
Lloyd George faced constant pressure from U. S president Woodrow Wilson. It is said in Hopkinson’s book that Wilson told him until the Irish question was resolved it was bound to not only affect the relations between England and the U. S but inevitably effect the relationship of England with her colonies as well. [4] It would be wrong for one to say the Irish revolution of 1919-1921 in achieving Irish independence was all down to Britain’s failure politically. For one to do claim would do a great injustice to many strengths the Irish displayed politically before independence was achieved.
Three factors to be considered here are the rise of Sinn Fein, De Valera’s canvassing of U. S support and the creation of the Dail parliament and Courts. The rise of Sinn Fein led to a radicalisation of the masses which had previously not existed in Ireland before this the majority were happy with Home Rule now it was all or nothing. When discussing this many historians would say that the rise Sinn Fein was as much if not more a consequence of Britain’s failings more than any great genius on behalf of Sinn Fein. A school of thought shared by historians including Hopkinson and Dangerfield.
Dangerfield was of the belief that by not implementing Home Rule the rise of a more radical politics was unavoidable. “The point is that when the concept of Home Rule vanished… Nationalist Ireland drifted into a position were only republican and revolutionary leadership became possible. ”[5] Once this process had begun it was simply irreversible. Whereas Hopkinson would state that the British Government had a misplaced optimism involving Sinn Fein. They tried to suppress them by making many arrests which all led to propaganda victories for the party.
Who could now claim they were unjustly victimised. “Like many other British politician both before and since, they believed that a few extremists were the problem and that usual order would be restored once they were dealt with. ”[6] By trying to introduce conscription in Ireland Britain only managed to give Sinn Fein another boost. Townshend asserts, “In resistance to conscription, the Sinn Fein leadership found for the first time a national political issue which could mobilise the mass of the people. ”[7] Not all of Sinn Fein’s rise can be blamed on the British according to Peter Hart.
The party he argued was strengthened by female involvement and the support of first time female voters. De Valera’s visit to the Treaty of Versailles may not have laid to the American backed independence hoped but was beneficial in other areas. Yet despite this there was support for his cause in America. According to Ferriter, De Valera managed to raise something in the region of $6 million between January 1920 and October 1921 a figure higher than that raised in Ireland. Ferriter asserts that to call Irish Nationalism a mass movement in the U. S by 1920 was no exaggeration.
Perhaps the central political success by Ireland before eventually achieving independence was the creation of Dail Eireann on January 21 1919. An illegal parliament based in Dublin separate from British control. The Dail followed the path of which Ronan Fanning called “Sinn Fein’s unilateral solution to the age old problem of the constitutional relationship between Britain and Ireland was to deny that there was any legitimate connection. ”[8] Thus it made sense that the Dail’s first law was to break with Britain. Townshend was complimentary in speaking of the decision to set up Dail Eireann. Their (nationalists) action in assembling on 21 January 1919 as Dail Eireann, the Parliament of Ireland was in itself revolutionary. ”[9] At the beginning Britain simply ignored this new parliament. They shared the same beliefs Stephen Gwynn echoed in 1921. “When the decision was taken to constitute the Irish members into an Irish parliament people were inclined to laugh. ”[10] Gwynn later claimed that the fact the British Government did not initially interfere merely added unreality to the whole proceedings. Yet many believe that when Britain did interfere in 1919 in banning the Dail more harm than good came as a consequence.
Arthur Mitchell says the banning of the Dail was not its end but really its making driving it underground was generally to its advantage. The fact that Dail Eireann created its own judicial system greatly undermined British rule. Ferriter points out positives and negatives of these courts. It was said, “The promptness and efficiency of the courts impressed even most unionists. ”[11] Although at times reality bit as Ferriter tells us how figures such as Cathal Brugha the minister of defence had little time for courts they were a distraction from war.
Military Despite all the ramifications of each side’s political manoeuvres it is highly unlikely of course the Irish revolution would ever have taken place were it not for what happened militarily. Similar to political, military could also be divided into both Britain’s failures and Irish success. How did the IRA gain a truce when they were fighting the military might of the British Empire? If English’s point earlier in the essay is to be considered the IRA could never have gained a formal military victory.
Could it be a case that the British overestimated the IRA’s staying power? For the IRA’s key leader Michael Collins himself believed the IRA was close to breaking point. The British policy of reprisals was in itself a military disaster. Augustein puts the point across that, “The actual and alleged bad behaviour of the crown forces was an extremely persuasive force which caused and justified a violent response by the IRA in the eyes of men and women on all sides. ”[12] Thomas Bowden is of the view that reprisals were advocated at the very top level of British intelligence.
Sir Henry Wilson, chief of the Imperial General Staff was a known sponsor of these methods declaring “shoot all Irish leaders by roster. ”[13] On May 21 1921, General McCready sent a memo stating, “Defeat the IRA by the summer or pullout” It is possible the general did not want to get bogged down in a guerrilla conflict in unfamiliar terrain. Though historians like Townshend believe McCready was giving too much credit to the IRA who would soon fall. While others including Hart have the view that the IRA’s organisation was such McCready was right to issue the memo.
In order to achieve independence the IRA had to have been strong militarily. Much of this is put at the door of historians to Michael Collins held by many as a master of tactician and great exponent of guerrilla warfare. Collins is chiefly judged in history as the main man behind the revolution. One such historian is Dangerfield who complements Collins highly. “Neither Richard Mulcahy, the volunteers chief of staff, nor the Minister of defence come close to Collins, with his administrative genius, his enormous energy, his warm blooded presence, his cold and concerted purpose. [14] Strong praise for a man Peter Hart claims never held a gun post 1916. For Collins was based in Dublin mainly undertaking intelligence duties. ———————– [1] English, p29 [2] Augustein [3] Labour, pp54-56 [4] Hopkinson, p33 [5] Dangerfield, p246 [6] Hopkinson, p31 [7] Townshend, p318 [8] Fanning pp1-2 [9] Townshend, p328 [10] Gwynn, p62 [11] Ferriter, p202 [12] Augustein, ‘Motivation’ [13] Bowden, p119 [14] Dangerfield, p313