Pakistan

East Is East East is East is a play by Ayub Khan-Din, first produced by Tamasha Theatre Company in co-production with the Royal Court and Birmingham Repertory Theatre. It is often cited as one of the key works to bring Asian culture to mainstream British audiences. The play is published by Nick Hern Books. Ayub Khan-Din (born 1961 in Salford, Lancashire) is a British Pakistani actor and playwright. “When I began to write East is East, I was sitting at my kitchen table pouring out my life story bit by bit.

The first draft came incredibly quickly: there’s writing what you know and there’s writing what you’ve known your whole life” Given Circumstances · Who am I? Ella Khan, 46, Irish-Catholic, housewife, works in family shop · What time is it? Century? Year? Season? Day? Night? Early? Late? Date? 1970’s · Where am I? UK, Salford, family house, fish and chip shop · Who is here with me? Family (Husband, 7 children) · What are my relationships? Husband (George) – she loves him but doesn’t agree with everything he does

Children – she tries to protect them from George and what’s them to be happy · What is my super-objective? Feelings? I consider Ella as the “victim” of the film. It’s easy to understand that she loves her husband, and wants to please him, but when he starts to decide too much about their children, she doesn’t know what to do anymore · What is the obstacle? Is there more than one? She finds herself unable to stand up to George until he pushes her too far by abusing their children. Ella Khan Ella has a strong belief in freedom, fairness, family … and Salford.

Ella is ferociously protective of her kids. She’s learnt that society is hostile to them and also that their father is not prepared to allow them the freedom she herself feels they should have. So she spends a lot of her life fighting for them or keeping things from George to protect them from his anger. I think Ella is like someone who lives under an oppressive regime – she has had to develop cunning, she is sometimes passive, sometimes aggressive and will do anything to make allies. One thing she has above George is that she sees her situation with clarity.

He believes that moving to Bradford would solve their problems but Ella knows that the Pakistani community there, especially the women, will never accept her. This is why she has insisted on staying in Salford. Friendships with women are vital to her, with the affection and support they bring, and without Annie, Ella would perish. Whats the story? In EAST IS EAST, George (Om Puri), who is Pakistani, marries Ella (Linda Bassett) and they settle down in Manchester to have seven children and run a fish and chips shop.

George wants his children to adopt the religion and customs of Pakistan, yet oldest son Nazir objects to an arranged marriage and bolts in the middle of the wedding ceremony, and in all the family chaos, they have neglected to have their youngest son circumcised. With India at war with Pakistan, George’s fear of the loss of his homeland and culture makes him even more concerned about passing on that culture to his children.

They go to the mosque, grudgingly, but they feel like Brits and only one of the seven kids wants to live according to Pakistani traditions. The others want the freedom of Western culture. They may feel English, but they look Pakistani, and George fears that the culture they want will never accept them. His neighbors support a politician named Enoch Powell who is calling for repatriation of foreigners. But George and the neighbor do not know that their children are romantically involved.

Denise Phillips, revised 25 July 2012 Denise Phillips, revised 25 July 2012 Why Hazaras flee: An historical perspective of their persecution1 Submission for the Government’s Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Denise Phillips BA (Hons), PhD Candidate, University of New England, 19 July 2012 Quetta are also discussed. The past ethnic and religious animosity against minority Shiite Hazaras continues to drive the bloodshed today. When we shift our esponsibilities offshore, vilify refugees and pursue a punitive style of deterrence as a solution, we ignore these past and present atrocities. Executive summary This paper provides historical information about the source country, Afghanistan. As minority Shiites, Hazaras’ current persecution is borne out of an unresolved, century-old religious and ethnic hatred of them. This has resulted in massacres, dispossession of their lands and decades of institutionalised discrimination. Their persecution was fiercely reignited during the civil war and by the Taliban in the 1990s.

Understanding that history is critical to policy-making. Not only are Hazaras dying on boats, but also in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Australia must respond to this over-all crisis with humanity rather than punitive measures. I support the recommendations made in the Asylum Seeker Resource Centre’s submission and the Open Letter. As Afghanistan moves towards a possible Taliban alliance or faces growing lawlessness, and as Hazaras continue to be slain or attacked in Hazara-populated regions and in neighbouring Quetta, Hazaras are likely to continue to flee and have grounds under the 1951 Refugee Convention to fear persecution.

Introduction In addressing the problem of asylum seekers risking their lives on boat journeys to Australia, the reasons for their flight should remain at the forefront of policy-making and political debate. I offer an historical overview of a key source country, Afghanistan, and of the origins of Hazaras’ persecution. Current crises in both Afghanistan and Abdur Rahman’s subjugation of Hazaras in the nineteenth century After the traditionally dominant Pashtuns and the Tajiks, Hazaras are the third largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, although a minority. The Hazaras traditionally live in the

Hazarajat, a loosely defined region within the central highlands. While about 85 percent of Afghanistan’s population follow Sunni Islam, most Hazaras are Shiite Muslims, causing them to be condemned as ‘infidels’ at different points throughout history. 2 Their suffering began in earnest in the late 1800s. The Hazaras were a semi- autonomous society living in Afghanistan’s central highlands, the Hazarajat. The entire Hazara population possibly numbered over half a million, with about 340,000 families in the Hazarajat. Although not a cohesive group, most were Shiites and spoke the

Hazaragi language, a derivative of Dari. In contrast, their surrounding ethnic groups were mostly Sunni Muslims and spoke Pashto or Dari. 3 Against a backdrop of imperial tensions between Britain and Czarist Russia, Britain helped install an anti-Russian Pashtun, Amir Abdur Rahman (1880-1901), on the throne in Kabul in 1880. In between British India and Russia. 4 exchange for a British annual subsidy, Afghanistan was to provide a buffer zone In the previous century, the Pashtun tribal ruler, Ahmad Shah Durrani (1747-1773), had already established a pattern of subjugating sub-groups and other ethnic groups within he region. To bring Afghanistan’s many different tribes under a centralised authority, Abdur Rahman proclaimed the Durrani Pashtuns as supreme and mobilised Sunni Islam with a patriotic xenophobia. Condemning Shiite Hazaras as ‘infidels’, Rahid Rahman 1 Over-all notes drawn from Denise Phillips, From Afghanistan to Australia: An oral history of loss and hope among Hazara refugees, PhD thesis, University of New England, Armidale (forthcoming); Denise Phillips, ‘Wounded memory of Hazara refugees from Afghanistan: Remembering and forgetting persecution’, History Australia, vol. , no. 2, August 2011, pp. 177-198; and Denise Phillips, ‘Hazaras’ persecution worsens: Will the new government show leadership by lifting the suspension on Afghani asylum claims? ’, Australian Policy and History, August 2010, http://www. aph. org. au/files/articles/hazarasPersecution. htm. 2 William Maley, Security, People Smuggling and Australia’s New Afghan Refugees, Working Paper no. 63, p. 8; M. Hassan Kakar, ‘The pacification of the Hazaras’, in M. Hassan Kakar, A Political and Diplomatic History of Afghanistan, 1863-1901, Leiden, 2006, p. 26. 3 Sayed Askar Mousavi, The Hazaras of Afghanistan: An Historical, Cultural, Economic and Political Study, Richmond, 1998, p. 114; Kakar, ‘The pacification of the Hazaras’, pp. 120-122, 126. Amin Saikal, with assistance from Ravan Farhadi & Kirill Nourzhanov, Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival, London, 2004, pp. 6, 7, 12. 4 1 2 Denise Phillips, revised 25 July 2012 Denise Phillips, revised 25 July 2012 rallied soldiers and tribal levies to quash Hazara rebellions in the Afghan-Hazara wars of 1891-1893.

Hazaras were slain, raped and sold into slavery. Soldiers piled Hazaras’ heads into towers to warn others against dissent, and some were skinned to death or had their tongues cut out. Although slavery was banned in 1895, many remained enslaved until King Amanullah’s emancipation laws were passed in the 1920s. Much of the Hazarajat was decimated, and their agricultural economy destroyed. Starving, some ate grass and sold their children for wheat to survive. The Hazaras were fined for rebelling and taxed indiscriminately. All facets of Afghani government, society and law conspired against Hazaras, seeking to destroy their property, tribal systems, religion and culture. Rahid Rahman attempted to impose Sunni Islam and demanded that qazis (judges) and muftis (Islamic leaders) in various districts use only Hanafi, a Sunni Islamic legal system, for dealing with Hazaras. To depopulate the Hazarajat, the government issued ‘firmans’, royal decrees, authorising Pashtun nomads, Kuchis, to access Hazaras’ lands for grazing their livestock. Possibly several tens of thousands fled to Central Asia, and Balochistan in what is now Pakistan. Victorious, Rahid Rahman demeaned the Hazaras and claimed that Afghanis saw them as ‘enemies of their country and religion’,7 laying the foundation for a century of persecution to the present. Marginalisation in the twentieth century Successive governments have since marginalised Hazaras. Under the banner of nationalism in the early 1900s, ruling Pashtuns tried to assert their identity, culture and history over all other ethnic groups. The Hazarajat was removed from official maps and lands were divided into five provinces to weaken the Hazaras’ political authority.

King Nadir Shah (1929-1933) outlawed the promotion of Hazara history and culture, 5 Peter Marsden, Afghanistan: Minorities, Conflict and the Search for Peace, London, 2001, p. 6; Saikal, Modern Afghanistan, pp. 5, 12, 17, 35-39; Kakar, ‘The pacification of the Hazaras’, pp. 120122, 132-137; Burchard Brentjes & Helga Brentjes, Taliban: A Shadow over Afghanistan, Varanasi, 2000, p. 75; Mousavi, The Hazaras of Afghanistan, pp. 101, 120-129, 131-136. 6 Kakar, ‘The pacification of the Hazaras’, pp. 137, 138; Lenard Milich, ‘The Behsud conflicts in Afghanistan: A blueprint to avoid further clashes in 2009 and beyond’, Eurasia Critic, June 2009, pp. , 3, http://www. eurasiacritic. com/articles, accessed 10 June 2010; Alessandro Monsutti, trans. Patrick Camiller, War and Migration: Social Networks and Economic Strategies of the Hazaras of Afghanistan, New York, 2005, p. 105. 7 Mir Munshi Sultan Mahomed Khan (ed. ), The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan, with a new introduction by M. E. Yapp, vol. 1, Karachi, 1980 (1900), pp. 276-279, 282-284. imprisoning or executing intellectuals who wrote on the subject. Official policies tried to strip names associated with the Hazaras from historical archives. Between the 1930s nd 1970s, the Anjom-e Tarikh (Historical Society), aided by the Pashto Tolana (Pashto Academy), rewrote much of Afghanistan’s official histories. Significant texts were also reportedly burnt. Until 1978, the Hazaras were marginalised, taxed indiscriminately, and denied equal rights and vital infrastructure in their villages. 8 Former president of Afghanistan Dr Najibullah (1986-1992) acknowledged their suffering, saying that ‘the most difficult and lowliest paid jobs, poverty, illiteracy, social and nationalist committed, and bloodshed continues to this day. discrimination were the lot of the Hazara people’. No justice was gained for atrocities Massacres during the civil war and Taliban regime Hazaras became politically mobilised in the 1980s and have since gained greater political representation. However, their persecution was brutally re-ignited during the civil war by rival ethnic groups and by the Taliban. In 1993, soldiers under command of the Rabbani government (1992-1996) targeted the stronghold of the Hazaras’ political party, the Hizb-e Wahdat, in Afshar, a district in West Kabul with a large Hazara population. Soldiers, however, turned against civilians. After a frenzy of looting, rape killed or remain missing. 10 nd summary executions driven by ethnic hatred, approximately 700-750 Hazaras were Persecution intensified under the Taliban regime (1996-2001) as its soldiers advanced into Afghanistan’s north and the Hazarajat. Not only do Hazaras shun the Islamist beliefs of the Taliban, the Taliban are recruited mostly from the Pashtun group, the Hazaras’ traditional enemy. (In reverse, being Pashtun does not automatically equal Taliban support and millions of Pashtuns have also suffered within Afghanistan’s 8 Hafizullah Emadi, ‘The Hazaras and their role in the process of political transformation in Afghanistan’, Central Asian Survey, vol. 6, no. 3, 1997, pp. 363-371; Mousavi, The Hazaras of Afghanistan, pp. 5-8, 155-174, 218; Saikal, Modern Afghanistan, pp. 111-113, 283. Hazaras cite Puta Khazana (The Hidden Treasure), published in 1960, as an example of a controversial or fictitious history funded by the government which promoted Pashtun superiority. 9 Quoted in Mousavi, The Hazaras of Afghanistan, p. 162 10 Mousavi, The Hazaras of Afghanistan, pp. 198, 199; Human Rights Watch, Blood-Stained Hands: Past Atrocities in Kabul and Afghanistan’s Legacy of Impunity, New York, 2005, pp. 70-100. Numbers have never been accurately ascertained.

One Hazara website estimates that approximately 1,000 were killed or remain missing. See ‘Afshar and Kateh Sahe massacre’, Hazara. net, 2009 http://www. hazara. net/taliban/genocide/afshar/afshar. html, accessed 19 June 2010. 3 4 Denise Phillips, revised 25 July 2012 Denise Phillips, revised 25 July 2012 conflicts. ) In 1998, in retaliation for war crimes committed by the United Front (of which Hazaras were a part) against Taliban soldiers, the Taliban slaughtered approximately 2,000 or more Hazaras in Mazar-e Sharif. Civilians were killed in residential areas and market places, some dying with their throats slit.

Highlighting the accompanying religious hatred, Taliban governor Mullah Manon Niazi had publicly incited the attack, preaching that, ‘Hazaras are not Muslim. You can kill them. It is not a sin’. Hazaras were reportedly warned to take lessons from their own history, and to either convert, flee or be killed. Hundreds fled the terror of Mazar-e Sharif. Massacres continued, with Taliban soldiers rounding up civilians in the Yakaolang district in 2001, publicly executing at least 170, many of whom were Hazaras. Near Robatak Pass, the Taliban also executed at least 31 civilians, with 26 confirmed to be Hazaras. 1 A resurgent Taliban After more than a decade, American and NATO forces have failed to bring peace and a withdrawal is imminent. Regrouping since 2001, the Taliban is now made up of an alliance of three Islamist groups; the Quetta Shura Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and Hezb-i Islami Gulbuddin, an insurgency described by the US Department of Defence as ‘resilient and evolving’. 12 With safe havens for terrorism in western Pakistan, the insurgency maintains strongholds in southern and eastern regions of Afghanistan, and has been expanding to the west and north. 3 The Taliban’s clear presence in Shinwari district of Parwan province, less than a few hours from Kabul, was demonstrated with news last week of the Taliban’s execution of a young woman on ‘adultery’ charges. 14 Terror in the Hazarajat Analysts recently deemed Ghazni to be ‘among the most volatile provinces in southern Afghanistan’. 15 In 2006, a former governor was assassinated, and in 2007, the Taliban held 23 South Koreans hostage. Located in Ghazni province is Jaghori, an Hazara- populated district and former home of many Hazara refugees now in Australia. Jaghori nd Hazara-populated Malistan are surrounded by Pashtun areas under Taliban control. In June 2010, the Taliban reportedly distributed ‘nightletters’, a method of intimidation, to districts within Ghazni province, warning that the main road out of Jaghori to Kabul is now closed. Residents need to travel beyond Jaghori for medical, commercial, study and work reasons, but travel is now perilous. Taliban routinely search travellers on the Qarabagh-Jaghori road. Travellers have been tortured, detained and some have gone missing. Their vehicles have been stolen and the road is periodically closed.

Many fear a repeat of the Taliban’s 1997 road blockade of essential supplies. Additionally, Jaghori strongly supports education, with numerous high schools and primary and middle schools. The Taliban, however, have targeted schools. For example, in July 2010, the Taliban attacked and burnt schools in Tamki, Jaghori district, and in Qarabagh district. The Taliban also killed Syed Sekander Muhammadi, the head teacher of a school in Shaki Nuka, in Qarabagh district, as he travelled to Ghazni. 16 In nearby Oruzgan province, the decapitated corpses of 11 Hazara males were iscovered in the Khas Oruzgan district on 25 June 2010. Police official Mohammed Gulab Wardak reported that the Taliban killed them ‘because they were ethnic Hazaras and Shiite Muslims’. 17 This occurred in the very province where Australia’s Defence Personnel have been deployed in a security and reconstruction role, showing the dire 11 Human Rights Watch, Afghanistan: The Massacre in Mazar-I Sharif, vol, 10, no. 7(C), November 1998, http://www. unhcr. org/refworld/docid/45c9a4b52. html, accessed 18 June 2010; Human Rights Watch, Massacres of Hazaras in Afghanistan, vol. 13, no. (C), February 2001, http://www. hrw. org/legacy/reports/2001/afghanistan/, accessed 18 June 2010; Peter Marsden, Afghanistan: Minorities, Conflict and the Search for Peace, London, 2001, p. 22; Mullah Manon Niazi quoted in ‘On genocide of Hazaras’, Hazara. net, January 2011, http://www. hazara. net/taliban/taliban. html, accessed 18 July 2012. 12 Department of Defense, Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan: Report to Congress in Accordance with 2008 National Defense Authorisation Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181), USA, January 2009, p. 7, http://www. efense/gov/pubs/OCTOBER_1230_FINAL_pdf, accessed 12 August 2010. 13 Maria Golovnina, ‘Factbox: Insurgency in Afghanistan: Who are they? ’, 25 September 2009, Reuters, http://www. reuters. com/article/idUSTRE58O2F620090925, accessed 12 August 2010. Dylan Welch & Ben Doherty, ‘‘God tells us to finish her’: Taliban remind world they are no spent force’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 10 July 2012, p. 1. 14 threat to Hazaras, even alongside a broader military presence. 15 William Maley, ‘On the position of the Hazara minority in Afghanistan’, 28 June 2010, posted on Welcome to Ataullah’s Page, http://ataullahnaseri. ordpress. com/2010/06/28/on-the-position-of-the-hazara-minority, accessed 5 August 2010. 16 Thomas Ruttig, ‘A new, new Taliban front’, Foreign Policy, 21 June 2010, http://afpak. foreignpolicy. com/posts/2010/06/21/a_new_new_taliban_front_0, accessed 5 August 2012; Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, New Haven, 2000, p. 67; Abdul Karim Hekmat, ‘Unsafe haven: Hazaras in Afghanistan and Pakistan’, Special report, University of Technology Sydney, October 2011, pp. 18, 19. 17 Tahereh Ghanaati, ‘The Hazara carnage in Afghanistan’, Press TV, 27 June 2010, http://www. resstv. ir/pop/Print/? id=132225, accessed 28 June 2010; Ismail Sameem & Jonathon Burch, ‘Police find 11 beheaded bodies in Afghan South’, 25 June 2010, Reuters, http://www. reuters. com/article/idUSTRE65O2ML20100625, accessed 28 June 2010. 5 6 Denise Phillips, revised 25 July 2012 Denise Phillips, revised 25 July 2012 Hazaras. Although the Taliban denied involvement, Afghani analyst Ahmad Shuja fears In Maidan Wardak province, land disputes between Hazaras and Kuchis often erupt each summer but have worsened in recent years.

Kuchis have been arriving in the Behsud and Daimirdad districts heavily armed for conflict. Kuchis believe the aforementioned decrees issued under Abdur Rahman entitle them to access, while many Hazaras have never accepted the loss of full rights over their land. Consequently, Hazaras have been killed and their homes burnt. In 2008, approximately 60,000 people were displaced, and in May 2010, a report estimated that 1,800 families had been displaced, 68 homes burnt, and 28 schools closed, leaving10,000 students without school facilities.

As nomads, the Kuchi are also a minority group, but belong to the traditionally dominant Pashtun group. It is feared that the Taliban may be exploiting the past to incite attacks by their fellow Pashtuns, the Kuchi, against Hazaras. The Karzai government has either largely ignored repeated Hazara pleas for assistance or has been impotent in stopping the violence, sparking worldwide protests by Hazaras. 18 These crises cannot be dismissed as internal land disputes; rather, they stem from the nineteenth century acts of conquest, dispossession and persecution – and another government’s marginalisation of Hazaras.

Terror in Kabul Brutal assaults also have occurred recently in Kabul. On 6 December 2011, a suicide bomber killed at least 56 Shiites pilgrims worshipping at the Abdul Fazal Abbas Shrine in the Murad Khani district in Kabul during commemorations for Ashura, the holiest day of Muharram. On the same day, a bomb attached to a bicycle exploded, killing Shiite pilgrims in Mazar-e Sharif and bringing the death toll to 60. A spokesperson for Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ) claimed responsibility via Radio Free Europe.

LeJ, formed in 1996, is a militant Sunni Deobandi Islamist group based in the Punjab region of Pakistan. Among links with numerous terror groups, it has a close relationship with Afghani Taliban and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Most killed and injured were 18 Lenard Milich, ‘The Behsud conflicts in Afghanistan: A blueprint to avoid further clashes in 2009 and beyond’, Eurasia Critic, June 2009, pp. 1-3, http://www. eurasiacritic. com/articles, accessed 10 June 2010; Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, ‘AIHRC grave concern about armed onflict between Kochies and native inhabitants of Behsood district of Maidan Wardak’, Kabul Press, 22 May 2010, http://kabulpress. org/my/spip. php? article11725, accessed 9 August 2010; ‘UNAMA silent on Kuchi attack in Behsud’, Hazaristan Times, 21 May 2010, http://hazaristantimes. wordpress. com/2010/05/21/unama-silent-on-Kuchi-attack-in-behsud, accessed 6 August 2010. the attacks will inflame religious tensions, echoing a recent past in which the Taliban massacred thousands of Hazaras. 19 Increasing bloodshed in Quetta, Pakistan

Since the nineteenth century, Hazaras have traditionally fled or migrated to Quetta, the capital of Balochistan province, in what is now Pakistan. Quetta has long been a ‘second home’ for Hazaras; some live there as permanent Pakistani citizens, others as refugees. Possibly 30,000-50,000 Hazara refugees now live in Pakistan after fleeing the Taliban in 1996. Over the last decade, however, Shiite Hazaras in Balochistan have been dying in an escalating spate of sectarian attacks, often occurring daily. LeJ have distributed leaflets condemning Shiites as ‘infidels’.

Proclaiming their right under Islam to kill them, LeJ publicly state that they will continue acting against Shiites. One of its leaders, Milak Ishaque, had 40 murder charges pending against him: after serving 15 years imprisonment he was released on 14 July 2011. Hazaras and the Asian Human Rights Commission report that the Pakistani government, army and law enforcement impunity. 20 authorities are failing to act, openly allowing the banned terror organisation to kill with These are but a few examples in a litany of bloody attacks. Eight Hazaras were slain in

Poodgali Chowk in 2001, and 12 Hazara policeman killed in Sariab, in 2003. On 20 September 2011, armed men intercepted a bus in the Ganjidori area of Mastung, southeast of Quetta. It carried 45, mostly Shiite, pilgrims travelling to Taftan, Iran. Ordering them off the bus, gunmen shot those identifying themselves as Shiites in the ‘head, chest and abdomen’. Twenty-nine Shiites were killed and five escaped. An hour 19 Ernesto Londono, ‘Dozens dead in rare attack on Shiite mosque in Kabul’, The Washington Post, 6 December 2011, http://www. washingtonpost. om/world/rare-attack-in-kabul-targets-shiitemosque/2011/12/06/gIQAVnEkYO_print, accessed 7 December 2011; ‘Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ)’, Australian National Security, Australian Government, updated 15 March 2012, http://www. ema. gov. au/agd/WWW/nationalsecurity. nsf/Page/What_Governments_are_doing_Listing _of_Terrorism_Organisations_Lashkar_I_Jhangvi, accessed 18 July 2012. 20 Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ)’, Australian National Security; Syed Shoaib Hasan, ‘A year of suffering for Pakistan’s Shias’, BBC News, Balochistan, 6 December 2011, http://www. bbc. co. k/news/worldasia-15928538, accessed 21 January 2012; Hekmat, ‘Unsafe haven’, pp. 20-23; ‘The state of human rights in Pakistan in 2011’, Asian Human Rights Commission, 2011, p. 42, http://www. AHRC-SPR008-2011-HRRptPakistan. pdf, accessed 18 July 2012. 7 8 Denise Phillips, revised 25 July 2012 Denise Phillips, revised 25 July 2012 later, gunmen killed 3 Shiites, believed to be victims’ relatives on their way to retrieve the bodies of their loved ones. LeJ claimed responsibility. 21 On 28 June 2012, a bomb blast killed Shiite pilgrims travelling by bus near a fruit market in the Hazarganji area of Quetta.

Thirteen were killed and 30 injured, with most of the victims Hazaras. LeJ again claimed responsibility. Prominent leaders, professionals, intellectuals and policemen have been assassinated, along with a sportsman and artist. For example, Chairman of the Hazara Democratic Party, Hussain Ali Yousofi, was slain on 26 January 2011. The general Hazara population, including women and children, are now also being indiscriminately targeted. Australian Hazaras visiting relatives in Quetta speak of witnessing attacks on Hazara civilians in the streets and of a climate of terror.

Abdul Karim Hekmat reports that ‘over 500 Hazaras have been killed and over 1,500 injured as a result of targeted’ attacks in Pakistan since 2003. 22 Other sources cite even higher numbers. Failures of protection and continuing fear Afghanistan’s 2004 Constitution includes exemplary protection for human rights and Hazaras have gained prominent government positions. However, with critical failures to implement the rule of law beyond Kabul – or even maintain it in Kabul – reform has not translated to improved safety for Hazaras in remote villages. Insurgents do not recognise government law.

Moreover, Afghani culture is bound up with traditions of governing and maintaining security through tribal and religious consensus, gained at district and community levels rather than through a centralised authority. In December 2009, the Karzai government also gazetted a law giving amnesty to all who committed war crimes in the past two decades of conflict, allowing alleged war criminals from various ethnicities to hold parliamentary positions with impunity. Professor William Maley cautions against ‘tokenism’, arguing that the inclusion of Hazaras within overnment has not brought about real changes. 23 History shows that the 1980s’ reforms which delivered greater equity for Hazaras did not stop the bloodshed which followed in the 1990s and beyond. That this is the sixth constitution since 1923 also exemplifies the fragility of Afghani reforms. Safety for minority groups requires broad social changes to address deeply-rooted tribal, religious and ethnic prejudices – this is something that will take years. The possibility of a Taliban alliance with international support, set against the draw-down of troops, causes terror among many Hazaras. 24

In summarising why Hazaras risk their lives on boats, an Hazara refugee says: When the government and law enforcement agencies can’t provide protection, when your house [in Quetta or Afghanistan] is on fire, when your home country becomes hell for you, when you can’t go anywhere without the fear of being killed, when your religion and your facial features make you the easy target. When death is hovering over your head every day, then you don’t have options but to flee, seek refuge, knock at other people’s door for help, sit on a leaky boat, choose a dangerous journey that possibly leads to death.

Today the Hazara Shias (boat people, the asylum seekers) are in a state of desperation and struggling for their survival as it is a basic human instinct. 25 Recommendations flee. I therefore make the following comments: Based on the continuing and unresolved history of bloodshed, Hazaras will continue to 1) Given the need for negotiation within a democratic process, I have reflected deeply on the current options being debated. However, we cannot participate in the ‘trade’ of 21 Shehzad Baloch, ‘Sectarian atrocity: 29 killed in Mastung, Quetta ambushes’, The Express Tribune, 21 September 2011, http://tribune. om. pk/story/256419/gunmen-attack-bus-in-balochistan-20killed/? print=true, accessed 22 September 2011. 22 ‘Shia pilgrims bus attacked by a rocket near Quetta, 13 martyred over 30 injured’, Jafria News, 29 June 2012, http://jafrianews. com/2012/06/29/shia-pilgrims-bus-attacked-by-a-rocket-near-quetta-13martyred-over-30-injured/, accessed 16 July 2012; ‘Hazara Shia community on strike over Quetta attacks’, BBC News, Asia, 29 June 2012, http://www. bbc. co. uk/news/world-asia-18640945, accessed 16 July 2012; ‘Blast kills 13, including Shia pilgrims, in Quetta’, Dawn. om, 28 June 2012, http://dawn. com/2012/06/28/eight-including-policeman-killed-in-quetta-blast/, accessed 16 July 2012; Hekmat, ‘Unsafe haven’, p. 22; Informal discussions with Australian Hazaras. 23 William Maley, Radio interview conducted by Geraldine Doogue, ‘Afghan Hazara’, Breakfast, ABC Radio National, 13 April 2010, http://www. abc. net. au/radionational/programs/breakfast/afghanhazara/3039616, accessed 16 June 2010; Una Moore, ‘UN human rights rep in Kabul calls for repeal of war crimes amnesty’, UN Dispatch, 30 March 2010, http://www. undispatch. om/un-human-rightsrep-in-kabul-calls-for-repeal-of-war-crimes-amnesty, accessed 11 June 2010; Department of Defense, Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, p. 11; Shahmahmood Miakhel, ‘Understanding Afghanistan: The importance of tribal culture and structure in security and governance’, US Institute of Peace, November 2009, p. 1. 24 Sonya Hepinstall, ‘Holbrooke: Reformed Taliban in Afghan government not wrong’, Thomson Reuters, 6 June 2010, http://in. reuters. com/article/2010/06/07/idINIndia-49088220100607, accessed 18 June 2010. 25 Anonymous Hazara refugee, 29 June 2012. 9 0 Denise Phillips, revised 25 July 2012 human lives with the Malaysian option. I support the principle suggestions made in the Asylum Seeker Resource Centre’s submission and the Open Letter, so will not reiterate their points here. 2) Help educate parliamentarians and the public as to why refugees flee their homelands. Exercise clear leadership in depoliticising the debate. 3) Hazaras tell me they want peace and human rights in their homeland – only then will they stop fleeing. Hazaras have witnessed the brutal deaths of their family members, including fathers, mothers, siblings and children.

Flight is accompanied by intense grief, trauma and longing. Waiting years for family reunions will drive loved ones to get on boats. Those left behind in Afghanistan not only face destitution, but are also often brutally targeted by warlords who learn that their husband, son or brother has fled to a Western country. In a recent case, the intimidation of a young Hazara refugee’s family members left in Jaghori resulted in an attack on the family home, killing an eight-monthold baby. I have witnessed refugees’ debilitating distress as they wait years

The debate There is a groundswell of sympathy for Malala and also a strong demand for the Pakistani state to do something about the issue. Much of the discontent is directed toward the Pakistani Taliban, the extremist group that has claimed responsibility for the shooting and declared it has vowed to kill Malala if she recovers from her injuries. Also, it has issued fresh threats to another girl Hina Khan of Islamabad who is also known for her female rights activism and pro education stance.

This threat comes two weeks after the Taliban shot Malala. Hina is originally from the Swat valley but was forced to move with her family to Islamabad in 2006 after she publically criticised the Taliban’s atrocities. The Malala incident has renewed the attention on the plight of women in Afghanistan. Twenty one year old Afghan activist Noorjahan Akbar, who has been leading a fight for women’s rights in Afghanistan, has articulated that Malala’s case will strengthen her and others fight for girl’s rights.

Cofounder of a non profit group called Young Women for Change; she has been instrumental in organising trailblazing efforts such as the first Afghan march against street harassment, radio campaigns about gender equality and street posters against child marriage and abuse. This year, her group opened a women’s Internet cafe in Kabul, providing a forum for women to gather and share ideas. Although women in Afghanistan are for the cause of Malala and support her fight but there are many other women activists like Akbar who are fighting for the same cause and not getting the support they deserve.

No doubt, Malala’s case is more horrifying as she is young and nobody would look at her as a threat as a 14-year old girl promoting education, no one has heard about Hanifa Safi women activist who was killed this summer. Fifteen girls had acid thrown on their face a couple of years ago but no public protest was held. More than 300 girls were poisoned in Afghan schools this summer specifically because they wanted to have access to education; unfortunately no one talks about it. Malala’s case has created a buzz which it deserves and the way its gaining popularity can help to highlight these cases which re otherwise completely ignored. The Civil Society Movements The Malala incident and eventually her cause got support from almost all parts of the World especially from the South Asian Countries where human rights activists, acedemicians, students and members of civil society took to streets to condemn the attack. From Madonna to Angelina Jolie to top Politicians like Hina Rabbani Khar and Rehman Malik, people from all walks and corners of the World are appreciating her courage and have vowed to support her mission to ensure education for girls in Pakistan.

The Pakistan government has offered to provide security to Malala when she will return to Pakistan and has promised to provide all necessary help. Even the Sunni clerics in Pakistan have issued a Fatwa against the Taliban, decrying an attack on a girl as un-Islamic, which speaks volumes about Malala and her cause and how people from diverse background are in the same boat for the cause. In a message of defiance to the Taliban, authorities in Swat have decided to rename a government college after Malala. The College offers high school and undergraduate education for 2,000 girl’s and young women.

Can this be sustained? Although the cause for women’s rights in Taliban affected areas has been supported by the developing countries and the western world, it has always been very hard to implement it at the grass root level. The women activists or others spreading education or fighting for women’s rights have to face the brunt of the Taliban. Malala’s cause has gained support from every corner, the blog she wrote for BBC with the pseudo name Gul Makai about the poor state of girls in Swat under the Taliban earned her innumerable sympathizers.

The International Children’s peace prize in October 2011 and Pakistani first National peace prize further gave recognition to her work and the documentaries made on her added to the popularity. The Taliban feared that she is being held as a hero by the World and thus shot her which only added to more support for her cause. Thus, considering all the above factors and the debate and support she has generated, it is not wrong to say that the momentum evoked by the Malala movement is likely to sustain for a longer period of time and even more so if she returns to Swat and take the battle to its logical end.

Sectarianism in Pakistan INTRODUCTION The decade of the 1990s witnessed a frightening upsurge in the Shia-Sunni sectarian violence in Pakistan, both in terms of scope and intensity. Recently, sectarian strife has engulfed even those areas, which were previously unaffected, largely because of the emergence of organized terrorist groups along sectarian lines. Besides target killings, these groups hit even ordinary members of each other’s sects. The problem, therefore, is no more of an occasional nature, or limited to isolated localities.

Rather, it has now become a national concern with serious implications for the state and society. The paper argues that though the Shia-Sunni conflict is not new to Pakistan or even to the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent, the ongoing phase is distinct in several ways: · Firstly, the level and intensity of violence is high because of easy access to weapons and training facilities in Afghanistan. · Secondly, certain Islamic states such as Iran and Saudi Arabia sponsor the activities of sectarian groups. This adds a regional dimension to the domestic sectarian conflict. Thirdly, the social base of the sectarian conflict has significantly expanded because of factors including: a) Use of print media, school textbooks, religious literature, posters and banners; b) Accessibility to means of electronic communication; c) Better transport services which increase mobility of sectarian activists. To argue thus this paper is divided into following three sections: 1) Sectarian Violence and its origins; 2) Causes of Sectarian Violence in Pakistan; and 3) Failure of State. SECTARIAN VIOLENCE AND ITS ORIGINS This section discusses the history of sectarian violence.

Sectarian violence and religious extremism is an unpredictable menace. History is replete with incidents of such sorts in various countries. The bigots and the evil minded selfish natured people are behind this abhorrent act relating to the security concerns of many nations. Unfortunate is the fact that usually the third world Muslim countries have been and are being constantly threatened by these evil acts. Sectarian Violence in Muslim History: Since the very beginning, the Shia-Sunni sectarian conflict has been one of the major characteristics of Muslim history.

Different factions in the respective Muslim societies have also closely interlinked it to the struggle for the acquisition of political power. Syed Amir Ali remarks: “Alas! That the religion of humanity and universal brotherhood should not have escaped the internecine strife and discord; that the faith which was to bring peace and rest to the distracted world should itself be torn to pieces by angry passions and the lust of power. “1 At the centre of sectarian strife has been the Shia-Sunni conflict.

Immediately after the passing away of the Prophet of Islam, a division emerged on the question of succession. “A small group believed that such a function must remain in the family of the Prophet and backed ‘Ali’, whom they believed to have been designated for this role by appointment and testament. They became known as his ‘partisans’ (shia) while the majority agreed on Abu Bakr on the assumption that the Prophet left no instruction on this matter; they gained the name ‘The People of Prophetic Tradition and consensus of opinion’ (ahl al-sunnah wa’l-jama‘ah). “

Besides the political dimension, there also existed a difference of opinion about the merits and functions of the successor to the Prophet. “Sunni Islam considered the Khalifah to be a guardian of the Sharia‘h in the community, while Shi‘ism saw in the ‘successor’ a spiritual function connected with the esoteric interpretation of the revelation and the inheritance to the Prophet’s esoteric teachings. ” In contrast to the Sunnis, the institution of Imamate is fundamental to the Shia Islam. “The Imam, 1 Syed Amir Ali, The Spirit of Islam (Karachi: Pakistan Publishing House, 1976), p100. esides being a descendant of the Prophet, must possess certain qualities—he must be Ma‘sum or sinless, bear the purest and most unsullied character, and must be distinguished above all other men for truth and purity. ” Whereas, the Sunnis believe that the “Imamate is not restricted to the family of Mohammad. The Imam need not be just, virtuous, or irreproachable (Ma ‘sum) in his life, nor need he be the most excellent or eminent being of his time; so long as he is free, adult, sane, and possessed of the capacity to attend to the ordinary affairs of State, he is qualified for election. 2 Later, both the Shia and Sunni schools further split into several sub-sects on different issues related to succession, interpretation of scriptures and political theory of Islam. Sectarian conflict in the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent: Fearing persecution by Ummayeds and later Abbasides, some of the Shias had moved to the distant parts of the Muslim Empire. Sizeable Shia communities had been established in Punjab and Sindh after their conquest by Muhammad bin Qasim.

Under the early Abbasides, the governor of Jhang, Umar bin Hafas, was a clandestine supporter of Fatimid’s movement and it was under him that the Batinya influence spread into the areas between Shorkot and Sindh. Later, one of the Shia branch, the Karamata, was able to set up its independent dynasty in Multan. The Karamata had established contacts with the Fatimides in Egypt and continued to rule Multan and 2 Syed Amir Ali, The Spirit of Islam (Karachi: Pakistan Publishing House, 1976), p103. urrounding areas, which included parts of Jhang, until Mahmud Ghaznavi defeated and destroyed their “heretical” dynasty. With this, the Karamata movement was wiped out in the Indo-Pakistan context, as it could not survive the loss of political power. However, it left a deep religious imprint on the local population. This is one of the reasons why even today southern Punjab inhabits a sizeable Shia population. In southern India, the Bahmani and Adil Shahi dynasties which ruled for quite some time and acted as a bulwark against Marhattas, professed Shia doctrines.

These dynasties were brought under the control of Mughals under Aurangzeb (d. 1707), which opened the way for the rise of Marhattas. Aurangzeb was allegedly hostile to the Shia dynasties, largely because he considered them heretical. As the Shia dynasties were receiving support from the Safavides of Iran, who were hostile to the Mughals, he had made an offer of alliance to Bukhara. The weakening and disintegration of the Mughal Empire, after the death of Aurangzeb Alamgir, paved the way for a qualitatively different era in the Muslim history of the Sub-continent.

The new era witnessed, on one hand, the onslaught of the British with both colonial and western agenda and, on the other, the rise of Marhattas and Sikhs. Meanwhile, the early successors of Aurangzeb had come under the influence of their Shia courtiers, the Sayyids of Barha. It was in response to these developments that Shah Waliullah (1703-1762) started his reform movement to reassert Islam. Another was the Wahabi movement of Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhab (1703-1787), which started in Saudi Arabia, but had a great impact on the religious scene of India.

Both these movements played a major role in the making of today’s religio-political scene of India and Pakistan. The Wahabi movement emphasised essentials, preached reverting back to the original sources of Quran and Sunnah, and rejected many of the innovations and cultural adaptations made over centuries in the Indian context. It was vehemently opposed to the Sufi tradition and other divergent schools of thought such as Shia‘ism. Essentially, this movement was exclusionist, and far less tolerant and accommodative of divergence, heterogeneity and variations in religious matters.

It lambasted the corruption and laxity of the Muslims’ attitudes and rejected the accommodations and cultural richness of the medieval empire. Its sole emphasis was on the classical law, which, in the view of its champions, was the sum and substance of the faith. It was, despite the fact that many leaders of the jihad movement were not blind followers of Muhammad Ibn, ‘Abd al Wahhab to warrant the term “Wahabi” for them. Given their extremist credentials, however, the term was widely accepted and is still used in Pakistan3 for the people with similar puritan views.

They are also called Ahl-i-Hadith. Shah Wali Ullah, however, started the most significant reform movement, in the 18th century. Like Wahabis, Shah Waliullah strongly condemned the corrupted Sufi customs and practices, but he was a Hanafi and his version of purified Islam was not completely rejectionist. He himself was a Sufi. He tried to postulate an interpretation of Islam that would coalesce into a purified Sufism with a purified Sunnah. The Shah Wali Ullah’s movement later crystallized into the Deoband movement, founded by 3

Qeyamuddin Ahmed, The Wahabi Movement in India (New Delhi: Manohar, 1994), p203. Maulana Qasim Nanotawi, in the then United Provinces of British India in 1867. In 1857, Maulana Nanotawi had actively taken part in the rebellion against the British. Through the Deoband movement, however, he and his colleagues sought to achieve their goals through peaceful resistance. The goal, under the circumstances, was nothing but cultural and religious freedom and political independence. In the following years, the Deoband movement adopted the attitude of peaceful resistance and non-co-operation towards the British.

They refused to learn the English language and modern knowledge, and emphasised Arabic and teachings of Islamic classics. In religious terms, the Deoband movement continued to largely profess Shah Waliullah’s teachings with puritan emphasis. Originally, the Deoband School had a policy of non-involvement into sectarian controversies, but later, especially under Maulana Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, the Hanafis became divided into rival groups. Among others, it was because Maulana Gangohi had condemned “the annual gatherings at the tombs of saints as well as the prevalent rites of fatihah and milad”.

These differences were a manifestation of dissatisfaction of the Deoband School with the things as they existed and its determination to improve them. The puritan emphasis of Wahabis and Deobandis generated tensions among Muslims. The followers of Sufi Islam did not accept the puritan emphasis which, in their view, amounted to renunciation of mystic conception of Islam. It was, however, Maulana Ahmad Raza Khan (1856-1921) who founded the Brelvi School4 by setting up a 4 Usha Sanyal, Devotional Islam and Politics in British India: Ahmad Riza Khan Barelwi and His Movement, 1870-1920 (Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1996), p44. adrasa at Breli in the United Provinces. Unlike the puritans, the Brelvi school expressed and sustained “the social and religious customs of a decadent people: the civilization, or lack of it, into which India fell after the feudal Mughal culture had succumbed and before a new culture arose under the imperial British penetration. ” Meanwhile, Lucknow had become the centre of Shia activism. The confrontation between these schools later spread to the whole of the Indo-Pakistan Sub-continent. In particular, it resulted in increased incidents of Shia-Sunni violence.

Later, however, the emergence of Amada movement, whose founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, claimed to be the prophet, prompted a unified reaction from all of the above mentioned schools. The Ahmadis, who are also called as Qadianis and Mirzais, were declared non-Muslims by all of the above groups. This declaration was formulated on the basis that they do not believe in the finality of the prophet hood of Muhammad. This controversy overshadowed the differences among the rest of the sectarian groups for decades until they were formally declared non-Muslims through a Constitutional Amendment in Pakistan in 1974.

The nature of Shia-Sunni violence under the British was radically different than it had been under the earlier Muslim empires or caliphates. Previously, it was always a conflict either between the established Sunni authorities and anti-status quo Shia denominations or between the Sunni and Shia dynasties or caliphates. Under the alien rule of the British, the conflict declined to the communities’ level, involving the general public and theologians alike in sectarian violence.

The role of the government was limited to that of arbiter, enforcer of law or manipulator, if so required, in the larger colonial interests. However, the state was secular and largely unrepresentative and, therefore, the use of sectarian idiom was limited to the purpose of selfidentification. The problem of sectarian conflict in the post-independence years can be analyzed both in terms of the continuation of old historical pattern with certain new characteristics and, as a direct consequence of crises of identity and governance in Pakistan.

It may be noted that the political discourse at macro level has revolved around the issues of Islamization vs. modernization, centralization vs. provincial autonomy, and democracy vs. authoritarianism in Pakistan since independence. The persistent ambivalence towards these issues has led the Pakistani State into a crisis of identity, causing frustration among almost all the sections of society including modernists, Islamists and various ethnic communities.

The frustration has become further intensified in view of the failure of successive governments on the performance front, especially in terms of giving due representation to the marginalized sections of society in the top state institutions. Sectarian Conflicts in Pakistan: There are numerous sectarian divisions in Pakistan. One source puts the total number of Muslim sects and sub sects at 72. 5 The Sunni population subdivides into four major streams–Deobandis, Barelvis, Ahl-e Hadith and Wahabis–and within these there are 5 Sectarian Division of Muslims” (Bureau Report), The Times, London, 28 Sept. 1998. reportedly dozens of subgroups6. Despite these divisions, the majority of Sunnis in Pakistan follow the Hanafi School of Islamic jurisprudence7 The Sunni population is estimated to be 74 per cent of Pakistan’s population. The three Shia streams in Pakistan are the Ismailis, the Ithna Ashariyya and the Bohras. 8 Estimates of the size of the Shia population vary widely, from a low of 5 per cent to a high of 25 percent; most sources put it at 15-20 per cent. During the Pakistan movement, the essentially secular leaders of the Muslim League had used the idiom of ‘Muslim identity’ to mobilize masses and to justify a separate homeland for them. Interestingly, almost all the major religious parties of that time had opposed the demand of Pakistan either on the grounds that the concept of separate nationhood was not tenable from the perspective of Islam, or that the secular leadership of Muslim League could not be trusted to sincerely fulfill the promise of the creation of an Islamic state.

Nonetheless, the Muslim League succeeded in creating Pakistan, despite the opposition of religious parties. As a result, the Islamic identity of the migrant communities, which settled mostly in the urban areas of Punjab and Sindh, was reinforced and they began to act as the major vehicle for the Islamization campaign in Pakistan. It was, in contrast to other ethnic groups such as Sindhis, Baluchis and Pakhtuns who, while de-emphasizing the ideological debate, championed the cause of decentralization and provincial autonomy. 6 7 The Sub-Sects of Muslims” (Report), The Economist, London, 28 Jan 1995. Daniel Pipes, Islam and Islamic Groups (Detroit: Gale Research, 1992), p184. 8 Ibid. p185. 9 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, “Sectarianism in Pakistan: The Radicalization of Shi‘i and Sunni Identities”, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 32, No. 3, July 1998. Gradually, groups emerged out of the existing religious parties, which started emphasizing the sectarian differences with the professed aim of persuading the state to accept their particular views into legislation and its policies.

In the following years, Punjab was to become the major victim of sectarian violence. Today sectarian violence has become widespread, particularly between Shi’a and Sunni militants in areas bordering Afghanistan, while dozens of tribal elders were murdered by militants in Waziristan. CAUSES OF SECTARIAN VIOLENCE IN PAKISTAN This section discusses the main reasons which led to sectarian violence in Pakistan. Pakistan, one of the largest Muslim countries the world, has seen serious Shia-Sunni sectarian violence. Almost 70% of Pakistan’s Muslim population is Sunni, and another 30% are Shia.

However, but this Shia minority forms the second largest Shia population of any country,10 larger than the Shia majority in Iraq. In the last two decades, as many as 4,000 people are estimated to have died in sectarian fighting in Pakistan, 300 in 2006. 11 Amongst the culprits blamed for the killing are Al Qaeda working “with local sectarian groups” to kill what they perceive as Shi’a apostates, and “foreign powers … trying to sow discord. “12 10 Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival (Newyork:Norton, 2006), p160. “Shiite-Sunni conflict rises in Pakistan,” by David Montero, February 02, 2007. 11 12 Shiite-Sunni conflict rises in Pakistan,” by David Montero, February 02, 2007. Since 2004, there has been intense violence in the FATA. What started in South Waziristan, slowly spread to North Waziristan in 2005 and then later to Bajaur and Mohamand Agency during 2006 and 2007. For the last two years, this violence has spread to the settled districts of the Khyber Pakhtoonkhawa including Bannu, DI Khan, Peshawar and Swat. Led by the Taliban and its local supporters in the FATA and Khyber Pakhtoonkhawa , this violence is posing a serious threat to the process of governance, challenging the writ of the State.

Referred to by media as Talibanization, these developments has been the subject of intense academic, media and policy interest. Many factors contributed to the growth of sectarian violence since the 1980s and 90s. While some were direct causes, others indirectly deepened the sectarian fault lines. Some of them are: Sectarian Politics: The following factors increased the sectarian divide, which was embedded in Pakistani society in the 1980s, especially in Punjab. First, the formation of Shia and Sunni militant organizations which were not representative of their respective communities although there was support from them.

The formation of the militant Sunni Sipah-i-Sahaba, Pakistan (SSP) and the Shia Sipah-i-Mohammad, Pakistan (SMP) was the main factor underlying the escalating conflict between the two communities. Apart from the Sipah-i-Sahaba, other Sunni organizations like Sunni Tehrik were formed in Sindh. Later some SSP activists led by Riaz Basra organized the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ), named after the founder of the SSP. The LJ was more militant and has been banned. These organizations widened the sectarian divide and both groups started using violence against each other. The strength of these militant sectarian organizations increased in the 1980s nd 90s, and they were only banned by General Musharraf in January 2002. Second, factionalism within the religious parties and militant organizations deepened the sectarian divide. The Jamiat-ul-Islam (JUI) got divided into two factions led by Fazl-ur-Rahman and Sami-ul-Haq and both factions attempted to build their foundations on anti-Shia tenets with each trying to be more virulently anti-Shia. Even the militant organizations on both sides (the SSP and the SMP) faced divisions, and these factions, devoid of effective leadership, were involved in arbitrary killings of the other community.

Religious parties like the JUI provided indirect support to militant organizations. It is essential to understand that sectarian violence is largely limited to Punjab, especially in the district of Jhang, where the mainstream religious parties never enjoyed popular support. Baluchistan had been free of sectarian violence and so was Sind, except for Karachi. The Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP), which enjoys support at the popular level in Punjab belongs to the Brehlvi faith and does not share the antagonism of the Deobandis and Wahabis towards the Shias.

In fact, unlike the latter two, the JUP considers them to be Muslims and a part of the Islamic world. Third, sectarian violence in Punjab was primarily due to Shia-Sunni economic, social and political relations. For example in Jhang, where sectarian violence is high, the Shia community forms the upper class, being landlords and enjoying political power; the majority Sunni community forms the lower stratum in the social, economic and political hierarchy. When the Sunni middle class grew, especially in the 1970s as a result of better education and remittances from the Gulf, they demanded their share of ocial and political status, which was resisted by the Shias. Maulana Nawaz Jhangvi, assassinated in 1990 by Shia militants, formed the Sipah-i-Sahaba in Jhang in1985, largely to fight the Shia landlords. Anti-Shia groups: Anti-Shia groups in Pakistan include the Lashkar i Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, offshoots of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI). The groups demand the expulsion of all Shias from Pakistan and have killed hundreds of Pakistani Shias between 1996 and 1999. 13 As in Iraq they “targeted Shia in their holy places and mosques, especially during times of communal prayer. “14

From January to May 1997, Sunni terror groups assassinated 75 Shia community leaders “in a systematic attempt to remove Shias from positions of authority. “15 Lashkar i Jhangvi has declared Shia to be `American agents` and the `near enemy` in global jihad. 16 Islamization policies of Zia: Islamic policies introduced by Zia-ul-Haq were also responsible for the growth of sectarian violence inside Pakistan. An in-depth analysis would reveal that these policies were cosmetic and peripheral, as they did not impinge 13 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Islam, oil and the new great game in central Asia (London: Tauris, 2000), p194. 14

Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival (Newyork:Norton, 2006), p166. Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival (Newyork:Norton, 2006), p167. Ibid. p168. 15 16 on the bureaucratic military oligarchy or the feudal structure of the society. In fact, these policies were aimed at gaining legitimacy within Pakistan and were not meant to challenge the existing social and economic institutions. However, the Islamization policies exerted a negative influence on the two communities. The Sunni religious parties led by JUI and JUP became active vis-a-vis the Shias, as they wanted the State to introduce the Sunnization of Pakistan, which the Shias feared.

This made the Shias defensive and they started supporting the PPP. In July 1980, 25,000 Shia portested the Islamization laws in the capital Islamabad. Besides, the changes made by Zia led to intense competition amongst the various Sunni groups, especially the Wahabis, Deobandis and Brehlvis, as they wanted the State to enforce their own version of Islam, especially the Islamic laws, though they were united in their opposition to Shias. However, the Islamic reforms introduced by Zia, especially relating to the legal field, alarmed the Shia community.

The Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-Fiqh-iJafriya (TNFJ) was formed in 1979 to enforce the Jafri fiqh; earlier in the same year Zia had declared that the Hanafi fiqh would be enforced. The formation of TNFJ was the political response of the Shia community. In its early years it fought to get concessions such as exempting the Shia community from paying zakat and ushr. Jihad in Afghanistan: Pakistan’s Afghan policy in the 1980s and 90s aggravated sectarian violence inside the country. Afghan resistance against the Soviet Union in the 1980s resulted in the proliferation and easy availability of small arms in Pakistan. 7 The emergence of and subsequent growth of the Taliban in the 1990s and 17 Michael Klare, “Redefining Security: The New Global Schisms”, Current History, Vol. 95, No. 604, 1996, p161. their support to Sunni organizations such as the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen impinged directly on sectarian violence. The Sipah-i-Sahaba cadres were trained in Afghanistan and most of them fought the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Shias inside Pakistan. Iran-Iraq War: The impact of the emergence of the Khomeini regime in 1979 in Iran and the subsequent Iran-Iraq war in the early 1980s on sectarian violence in Pakistan has generally been underestimated.

It is no coincidence that the TNFJ, the main Shiite party in Pakistan, was formed in 1979. When the Iran-Iraq war started, the Muslim world got divided into two camps and started funding their faith. As a result, enormous funds flowed, especially from Saudi Arabia and Iran, into Pakistan to support the various Sunni and Shia organizations and the madras as run by them respectively, which were directly responsible for the growth of organized opposition and violence. Iranian Funding: Exacerbating tensions is Iranian funding of Shia extremists in Pakistan, who not only exact revenge against Sunnis, but have also been used to violently uppress Iranian dissidents in the country who are critical of the Iranian regime. Shia formed student associations and a Shia party with the fundings from Iran, Sunni began to form sectarian militias recruited from Deobandi and Ahl-i Hadith madrasahs. Preaching against the Shia in Pakistan was radical cleric Israr Ahmed. Muhammad Manzour Numani, a senior Indian cleric with close ties to Saudi Arabia published a book entitled “Iranian Revolution: Imam Khomeini and Shiism”. The book, which became “the gospel of Deobandi militants” 18 in the 1980s, attacked Khomeini and argued the excesses of the 8 Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival (Newyork:Norton, 2006), p164. Islamic revolution were proof that Shiism was not the doctrine of misguided brothers, but beyond the Islamic pale. Pakistan is the only Sunni majority country where Shias have been elected to top offices and played an important part in the country’s history and nation building. The founder of Pakistan Muhammed Ali Jinnah, Muhammad Ali Bogra and the Bhutto family are Shia Muslims, as is Asif Ali Zardari, Abida Hussian, Faisal Saleh Hayat and several other top ranking Pakistani Politicians and Generals such as Yahya Khan,Musa Khan and

Iskander Mirza. Jihad in Kashmir: Pakistan’s support and involvement in Kashmir was also responsible for sectarian violence. While the Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Hizbul Mujahideen do not indulge in sectarian violence inside Pakistan, the same cannot be said about other jihadi groups, especially the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and, its later incarnation, the Jaish-eMohammad. Both these groups were trained in Afghanistan under the Taliban and were close to Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, the most violent Sunni organization. Before the Musharraf regime started its rackdown on sectarian organizations in 2001, these three were involved in collecting funds for jihad in Kashmir. The security agencies could not do much, as they could not differentiate which organization was involved. Tribal Conflict in the khyber Pakhtoonkhawa : Tribal clashes between Pashtun tribes in the Northwest Frontier Province have also taken on a sectarian nature, with the Shia Orakzai tribe often battling with their Sunni neighbors. These clashes are centered around the town of Bannu, and have often turned deadly.

However, the conflict is rooted in centuries’ old land disputes, and has only taken on a sectarian nature since the fanatic Taliban regime came into power in nearby Afghanistan in the 1990s. The Madrassas: Various madrassas, especially in Punjab and Karachi, accentuated existing sectarian cleavage. Each Sunni schism (Deobandi, Brehlvi, Wahabi) and Shias ran their own madrassas for providing basic education. The curriculum was decided by the madaris. As a result, when sectarian fault lines got pronounced, a hate campaign was introduced vis-a-vis the other sect.

Besides, the madrassas also provided manpower for these sectarian organizations, leading to sectarian engagements on the streets and dividing them further. About one-third of the 2,50019 registered madrassas in Punjab are known to impart military training to their students, and to be directly involved in sectarian attacks. The communities started defending their faith by protecting and supporting the offenders instead of condemning their violence. This support took the form of political, personal and financial patronage, which only accentuated the cycle of violence. 19

Iqbal Quadir, “Madrassa Culture in Pakistan”, HRCP Journal, Vol. 8, No. 3, Nov 1998. FAILURE OF STATE What has been clear since the beginning of this sectarian conflict in Pakistan is the complete failure of the State, from Zia’s period onwards. It was unfortunate that during Zia’s period in the 1980s the Turis of Kurram Agency became the pawns in Pakistan’s larger game in Afghanistan. The State failed to understand Turi fears and insecurity, and has failed to understand them ever since. The emergence of the Taliban and the growth of sectarian politics in the 1990s further aggravated the situation.

Given the sensitivities the State forces should have taken extra care in preventing the movement of battle hardened Sunni Taliban with their sectarian streak into sensitive places. Unfortunately, the State was never keen in enforcing its writ in the tribal agencies. The questions of State’s failure should be seen in the context of its wider historical lack of interest in maintaining its writ in the FATA. It allowed its writ to erode in the name of maintaining tribal customs and traditions. It even exploited the same customs and traditions to pursue its larger strategic interests in Afghanistan.

The Pakistani state has failed to understand that the situation has been dramatically changing over the last decade. A section within the FATA, especially amongst the younger generation, is highly influenced by the Taliban-al Qaeda brand of Islam, and prefers to adhere to their Islamic principles, rather than the age old secular tribal customs of the Pashtuns, referred to as Pashtunwali. Another section, within the young generation, exposed to modern education and democratic ideals, prefers the xpansion of State’s functions into tribal regions. Though both the above streams of youths are highly anti-American, they don’t agree with how they are being governed. While the Taliban supporters prefer to be governed under Shariah, the more modernminded others want the State expand its governance process. Thus, both sections want to repeal the archaic FCR, but for different reasons. More importantly, in the above two schools of thoughts, what is also gradually eroding is the influence of elders and jirga politics.

The jirga provides a prefect excuse for the State to keep away from the problems and provides an instrument to maintain law and order. Failure of governance also provided space for other groups to express the local sentiments. While in other parts of the FATA, this expression has taken a religious (orthodox Sunni version adopted by Taliban) course, in Orakzai and Kurram, it has also assumed a sectarian nature. The influence of these sectarian organizations can be fought by the State only by expanding the governance process inside these regions.

CONCLUSION Since the late 1980s, the Shia-Sunni sectarian violence has engulfed almost the entire province of Punjab and certain parts of the North-Western Frontier Province (Khyber pakhtoonkhawa ). Though sectarian conflict is not a new phenomenon, the scope, intensity and the continuity of the ongoing violent phase are unprecedented in the history of Pakistan. Jhang in Punjab province was the first district to fall prey to the increased and persistent nature of sectarian violence in the 1980s.

The Shia-Sunni sectarian conflict cannot be explained in religious and ideological terms alone; notwithstanding the fact that the religious and sectarian idiom is frequently used by religious leaders from the pulpit to encourage violence, mobilize their followers and achieve political goals. In the context of sectarian violence, the local contextual realities have been of critical significance. The external stimuli might have played some catalyst role in terms of triggering off and accelerating the process of shift from the dormant sectarian conflict to the violent one.

But what is important to note is that the potency of external stimuli and the nature of reaction they might provoke are determined at the local levels. The likelihood of a shift from dormant to violent conflict, however, increases if the institutional and legal structures in a given state fail to adjust and accommodate to the changing socio-economic realities and/or lack capacity to effectively respond and check the external stimuli. Shia-Sunni conflict is primarily a manifestation of the socio-economic changes at the grassroots level, which have given rise to political tensions among different classes of society.

Selected Bibliography Secondary Sources Books: Ahmad, Mumtaz. `Continuity and Change in the Traditional System of Islamic Education: The Case of Pakistan’. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000). Ahmed, Qeyamuddin. The Wahabi Movement in India (New Delhi: Manohar Press, 1994). Jafri, S. H. M. The Origins and Early Development of Shia Islam (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000). Kraan, J. D. Religious Education in Islam with Special Reference to Pakistan: An Introduction and Bibliography (Rawalpindi: Christian Study Centre, 1984).

Nasr, Vali. The Shia Revival (Newyork:Norton, 2006). Nasr, Vali. Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). Rashid, Ahmed. Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia (London: Taurus, 2000). Rashid, Ahmed. Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia (Lahore: Vanguard, 2002). Sanyal, Usha. Devotional Islam and Politics in British India: Ahmad Riza Khan Barelwi and His Movement, 1870-1920 (Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1996). Newspaper:

Ahmed, Khalid. `The Power of the Ahle Hadith’, The Friday Times, Lahore, 12-18 July 2002. Journal: Haqqani, Husain. `Islam’s Medieval Outposts’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 1, 2002, pp58-64. Klare, Michael. “Redefining Security: The New Global Schisms”, Current History, Vol. 95, No. 604, 1996, P161 Seminar paper Sectarianism in Pakistan Submitted to : Professor Dr Naseem Submitted by: Mati ullah Tareen IR 4th Department of International Relations Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad, Pakistan.

Corruption Outlines:

1. Corruption is social evil.
2. Pakistan is the special victim.
3.  Corruption is black mark.
4. Govt. is involved in corruption.
5.  People are ignorant.
6.  Govt. should be honest.
7. Media should show bad result of corruption.
8. Technical education is a good solution.

Corruption is an evil that is destroying our nation. At this time, corruption is the biggest problem of our Pakistan. Pakistan needs progress, but corruption is the biggest hurdle in the way of progress. Although, corruption is an international problem, but Pakistan is special victim.

Advanced countries have solved the evil of corruption, but Pakistan is facing dangers of corruption daily. Corruption is termite. This termite is eating the roots of our nation. Corruption is a black mark. In Pakistan, we face many different shapes of corruption. People are facing corruption daily. Corruption has made public life like hell. Corruption finished peace and rest of our nation. Corruption created many other social evils. Dearness is the special result of corruption. Our Govt. is famous for corruption. Our Govt. never gave any attention to corruption and its solution, but now the time is over.

Mostly, the Govt. is involved in corruption. Departments are busy in corruption daily. They are running a rat race in corruption. Some NGOs are spreading corruption. They get benefits, there is corruption in Pakistan; If, some leaders are fan of corruption. They are the ring leader of corruption. RAW is also spreading corruption, because India wants to make Pakistan weak. USA is also involved in corruption in Pakistan, because USA can control Pakistan. Illiteracy in Pakistan is the major cause of corruption. People are ignorant and they are enjoying corruption. Our rulers are lazy. They are in favour of corruption.

Media is ignoring corruption. T. V. is also neglecting corruption. There are many disadvantages of corruption. Our Pakistan is becoming weak. Governments are lazy. Media is sleeping. Maphia is controlling our system. We are passing dull life. People have no normal values. Governments are evil. Departments are looters. Scholars are sleeping. People are neglecting duties. Nation is in full tension. There are other social evils. Pakistan has no future. Corruption has become our culture. God’s torment is very near. We are at the last stage of corruption. Our nation is jumping into dark well.

Corruption should be finished. Governments should be active. Media should show bad results of corruption. Scholars should guide nation against corruption. Our rulers should make law against corruption. There should be strict punishment for corruption. Departments should never accept corruption. Our mothers should create awareness against corruption. We should pass simple life. We should get religious education, if we went to finish corruption. We should get technical education to finish corruption. There should be justice and prosperity in Pakistan. In this way, there will be no corruption.

Gwadar port , is a deep –sea warm water port ,being constructed in two phases with heavy investment from china . Gwadar has had huge geostrategic significance on my accounts. In 1993 ,Pakistan started technical and financial feasibilities for the development of Gwadar port . The Gwadar port project started on 22 March 2002a. The first phase has been completed but officials expect the port’s initial three berths to be operational in the later months of 2007 . Gawadar port was inaugurated on March 19,2007 . Gawadar port is Pakistan’s first deep port that has the capacity to serve virtually all sorts of cargo ships of any size.

Gwadar is located on the southwestern coast of Pakistan,close to on the persain Gulf. More than 13 million of oil pass through the strait . It is strategically located between three increasingly important regions : the oil –rich Middle East, heavily populated south Asia and the economically emerging and resource –loaded region of central Asia . The Gwadar port is expected to generate billions of dollars in revenues and create at least 2 million jobs. In 2007 the government of Pakistan handed over port operations to PSA Singapore for 25 years,and gave it the status of a Tax Free Port for the following 40 years . Historical Location :- The Makran region surrounding Gwadar by ancient Bronze age people which settled in the few oases . It later became the Gedrosia region of the Achaemenid Persian empire . It later became the Gedrosia region empire . It is believed to have been conquered by the founder of the Persian empire ,Cyrus the Great. During the home ward march of Alexander the great ,his admiral ,Nearchus,led a fleet along the modern –day Makran coast and recorded that the area was dry , mountainous, and inhabited by the Ichthyophagoi an Greek rendering of the Persian “Mahi Khoran ’’( which has itself become the modern word “ Makran” ).

After the collapse of Alexander’s empire the area was ruled by Seleucus Nicator ,one Of Alexander’s generals . The region then came under “ local rule ” around about 303 BC and the region remained on the sidelines of history for a millennium ,until the Arab – Muslim army of Muhammad bin Qasim captured the town of Gwadar in AD 711 and over the intervening amount of time the area was countested by various powers , including the Mughals the safavids.

Portugese explorers captured and sacked gwadar in the late 16th century and this was then followed by almost two centuries of local rule by the various Balochi tribes . In 1783 , the Khan of Kalat granted suzerainty over Gwadar to Taimur Sultan , the defeated ruler of Muscat . This governor was then ordered to control the nearby coastal town of chah Bahar ,where the Gwadar fort was built during Omani rule. In 1958 , the Gwadar farm was transferred to Pakistan . It was then made part of the Balochistan province in 2002 , the Gwadar project was begun in the town .

The government of Pakistan intends to develop the entire area in order to reduce its reliance in shipping on the port of Karachi . In addition to expanding port facilities , the projects aims to build industrial complexes in the area and to connect the town via a modern highway to the rest of Pakistan . By the end of 2004 the first phase had been completed . [2] Chapter # 1 Pakistan – China Relations on Gwadar Port :- Gwadar Port & Karakoram Highway scheduled to be inaugurated on 30th June 2006, . fter the Chinese agreed to provide $ 198 million of the $248 million required for phase 1 of the 26th project. Here is important to note that in the beginning china was not ready to hold this project but finally agreed to fund it provided that it had “ Sovereign guarantees to the port facilities” . Just 250 miles from the state of Hormuz ,through which nearly 40 % of the world’s oil supplies flow, the port is strategically located to serve as a key shipping point in the region .

It is of the great strategic value as it augments Pakistan’s imports in the region ,while allowing china to expand and secure its crude oil import routes and simultaneously gain approach to the Persian Gulf . According to MOU signed between China and Pakistan ,China is also to built a 90 km link connecting the Chinese side of Karakoram highway to the Russian built highway network that connects all the five Central Asian Republics . This regional highway network will directly Gwadar to Xinjiang and the landlocked Central Asian 28 Republics .

The Karakoram highway and the coastal highway will both serve as vital trade routes and considering that the existing Karakoram highway already connects Western China to Pakistan ,any further expansion of the line along with prospective linkages to Gwadar road would make it the shortest and most viable route connecting Gwadar 29 to western china . This shows china’s attempt to exert its influence far beyond its borders to sustain its security interest ,as well as merge its friendship with Pakistan through large scale joint projects. Through the construction of the Gwadar port ,Beijing also will gain considerable influence in the region . giving it a strategic entrance to the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, while allowing it to closely monitor US naval activity and US – Indian maritime cooperation . The doubtlessly is a cause for alarm and unease to both India and US as the port will enable China to monitor its energy shipments from the Persian Gulf. American suspicion of Chinese intentions at Gwadar is corroborated by an internal report prepared for the Pentagon entitled Energy futures in Asia Which states that Beijing has already has set up electronic eavesdropping posts at Gwadar which monitor ship traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and the 30 Arabian Sea .

In addition , the port and the other supporting infrastructure will help mix Pakistan in to the Chinese economy by out sourcing low tech ,basic production and manufacturing jobs , making it into a giant factory floor for China . Having invested $400 million in the project , the port will be available for Chinese imports and export through overland links that stretch across the Karakoram 31 Highway . For Pakistan as well ,the benefits are profound ,where to quote President Musharraf , “ as and when needed the Chinese navy could be in Gwadar to 32 give befitting replies to every one . This statement was further reinforced by Pakistan’s recent designation of the port area as “ a sensitive defense area” . Gwadar would inhibit India’s ability to blockade Pakistan , and permit China to supply Pakistan by land and sea during wartime . Essentially , Pakistan is interested in the project to gain strategic leverage so that it is less vulnerable to the dominant Indian navy . The construction of the port and the highway, by making Pakistan a regional trade –hub for commercial traffic ,will also boost domestic economic development ,and influence the geo – strategic environment of the region .

The port will enable the transfer of Central Asia’s vast energy resources to world markets , earning Pakistan significant profits in transits fees, as well as attract considerable investment into Balochistan . In addition , discussions are already underway to designate the Gwadar port as a free trade ,while some members of the Pakistani business community advocate the eventual designation of the Gwadar port as an export processing zone with special incentives extended to Chinese companies .

Moreover ,the opening of international trade through Gwadar can create new stakeholders in Afghanistan who will become beneficiaries of the transportation trade to Central Asia . Gwadar thus presents a good opportunity for fostering good neighborly relations between Pakistan and the region to its immediate northwest . However, the success of the port and ,in general ,the effectiveness of the agreements signed between the two nations will depend essentially on internal development in Pakistan. [3] Strategic co-operation:-

Gwadar is the height of Sino-Pakistani strategic cooperation . It is a modern port city that is supposed to link Central Asia, western china, and Pakistan with markets in Mildest and Africa . It’s supposed to have roads stretching all the way to China. Some reports in the American media , however , have accused Pakistan and China of building a naval base in the guise of a commercial seaport directly overlooking international oil shipping lanes . The Indians and some other regional actors are also not comfortable with this project because they see it as commercial competition.

What Mr. Bugti’s regional and international supporters never expected is Pakistan moving firmly and strongly to nip his rebellion in the bud. Even Mr . Bugti himself probably never expected the Pakistani state to react in the way it did to his betrayal of the homeland . He was killed in a military operation where scores of his armed force surrendered to Pakistan army soldiers . US intelligence and their Indian advisors could not cultivate an immediate replacement for Mr Bugti . So they moved to plan B.

They supported Abdullah Mehsud, a Pakistani Taliban fighter held for five years in Guantanamo Bay, and then handed over back to the Afghan government, only to return to his homeland, Pakistan, to kidnap two Chinese engineers working in Balochistan, one of whom was killed during rescue operations by the Pakistani government . Islamabad could not tolerate this vague figure , who was creating a following among ordinary Pakistanis camouflaged as a Taliban while in reality towing a vague agenda . He was rightly eliminated earlier this year by Pakistani security forces while secretly returning from Afghanistan after meeting his handlers there. 4] Economic Forecast :- The government declared port a “ Special zone” in the budget ,2003-2004 . All banks will open their branches ,five star hotels will be built ,offshore banking will be started ,factories, warehouses, and storage will be set up ,the tourism industry will be promoted in the area ,an export processing zone will be set up , making Pakistan a very attractive place for direct foreign investment ,and Gwadar port a regional hub of trade and investment activities. Chapter# 2 Geopolitical Importance: The Gwadar port is emerging as a place of great strategic value.

It is enhancing Pakistan’s importance in the whole region. It is extending from the Persian Gulf through the Indian Ocean to South Asia and the Far East. Gwadar is located on the Southwestern coast of Pakistan. It is very close to the important Straits of Hormuz, through which more than 13 million bbl of oil passes. It is strategically located between three increasingly important regions of the world: heavily populated South Asia, the oil rich Middle East and the economically emerging and resource rich Central Asia. The construction of The Gwadar deep sea port is just one part f a larger development plan which includes building a network of roads connecting Gwadar with the rest of Pakistan, such as the 650 km Coastal Highway to Karachi and The Gwadar-Turbat road(188 km). This network of roads connects Pakistan with China through the Indus Highway. China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan and Uzbekistan are developing extensive rail and road links from Central Asia and the Chinese province of Xinjiang to the Arabian Sea Coast. The Pakistani Government has initiated several projects with china’s technical and financial assistance.

These projects are inaugurated to develop Gwadar’s strategic location as a good transit and trade point. The primary project is the construction of deep sea port at Gwadar, which would enable high –volume cargo movement to and from the landlocked Central Asian States. The new port will also include conversion facilities to allow for the movement of natural gas as a part of plans for the termination point for the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan natural gas pipeline. The secondary project is coastal highway which is connecting Gwadar to Karachi.

Its cost, $200 million will be completely financed by Chinese. Gwadar will serve as a port of entry for gas and oil to be transported by land to Western regions of China. The significance of Gwadar port is great to both, Pakistan and China. In near future Pakistan will be able to make strong strategic plans because in past Indian navy made it very difficult for Pakistan navy base at southwest Karachi. China is going to be recipient of Gwadar’s most accessible international trade routes to the Central Asian republics and Xiajiang.

Beijing can receive cargo to and from Gwadar through shortest route, Karachi to Peshawar, by extending its East West Railway from the Chinese border city of Kashi to Peshawar in Pakistan’s North West. To supply oil from the Persian Gulf to Xiajiang, the rail network could also be. Internal rail network of Pakistan can also provide china with rail access to Iran. Rail access will however be hampered somewhat by difference in gauge: Pakistan-1676; Central Asia-1524mm; China and Iran-1435mm. Advantages of Gwadar Port:

Gwadar is located on the Gulf of Oman which is close to the entrance of Persian Gulf. It is about 460 km west of Karachi. Pakistan started feasibility studies for the development of a major deepwater sea port at Gwadar in 1993. The port project began on 22 March 2002. Its first phase completed in December 2005. The construction of the port has prompted other major infrastructure projects in area. This includes the 700 km Makran Coastal highway which is now complete. The road links Karachi with several ports along the coast including Pasni, Ormara and Gwadar.

It will be extended to Iranian border in future. The Highway has reduced travel time to Karachi from 48 hrs to only 7 hrs. Other road projects include the Gwadar-Quette-Chaman road which is completed now, and a road link to the town of Khuzdar in Eastern Balochistan. There are plans for a terminal for passenger ships. The Civil Aviation Authority of Pakistan has embarked 3000 acres of land for Gwadar International Airport . It will be built 26 km away to the northeast of existing airport towards Pasni. Its cost approximation is between $200-250 million.

The new airport would be given International status. It will operate under open sky policy. There are also plans to improve facilities at the existing airport. Railways: In 2005, Minister of Railway said,” The government is focusing on laying the Havelin-Kashghar (China) and Quetta-Kandahar (Afghanistan) railway tracks”. In 2006. Minister of railway announced that Gwadar will be connected to Pakistan Railway network at an expected cost of $1. 25 billion (Rs. 75 billion)[5] Chapter# 3 China’s Involvement in the Gwadar port: Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao inaugurated the Gwadar deep sea port.

Through which china would be able to take a Giant Leap Forward in gaining a foothold in the Persian Gulf region. It will advance what a recent Pentagon report describes as Beijing’s “String of Pearls” strategy that aims to protect China’s energy security at home and project Chinese power overseas. Gwadar is a fishing village on the Arabian Sea Coast in Pakistani province of Balochistan. Balochistan shares border with Iran and Afghanistan to the west. Gwadar is just 72km from Iranian border. The important thing is Gwadar’s closeness to the Persian Gulf.

It is situated near the entrance of this strategic body of water, and about 400 km from the Strait of Hormaz, a major channel for global oil supplies. Pakistan identified Gwadar as a port site in 1964. But significant steps toward making the proposal a reality were taken in 2001, when China agreed to participate I n the construction and development of Gwadar deep sea port. The arrival of United States in Afghanistan in 2001, at China’s doorstep encouraged Beijing to step up its involvement in the Gwadar project. Chinese vice premier Wu Bangguo laid the foundation for Gwadar port in March 2002.

China’s involvement in the project is immense. The total cost of the project is estimated US$1. 16 billion, of which China has contributed about $198 million for the first phase, almost four times the amount Pakistan has invested for this phase, which include of three multi-purpose ship berths. China has invested $200 million for building a highway, which connects Gwadar port with Pakistan’s largest city, Karachi (an other sea port on the Arabian Sea). The second phase which may include nine more berths, an approach channel and storage terminal, will also be financed by China.

Beside its financial help China has sent 450 engineers and provided technical expertise for the project. In recent year, bilateral trade has steadily increased between China and Pakistan. Both countries have highlighted the immense economic returns that development of Gwadar port holds out for them, as well as others in the region. China’s Gains:- Zia Haider, an analyst at the Washington-based Stimson Center, writes that Gwadar provides China “a transit terminal for crude-oil imports from Iran and Africa to China’s Xinjiang region”.

The network of road and rail connecting Pakistan with Afghanistan and Central Asian republics that is envisaged as part of the Gwadar project and to which China will have access would provide Beijing an opening into Central Asian markets and energy sources, in the process stimulating the economic development of China’s backward Xinjiang region”. [6] For China, Gwadar’s strategic value is because of its closeness to the Strait of Hormuz. About 60% of China’s energy supplies come from the Middle East.

China has been anxious that the US, due to its high presence in region, could stop these supplies. “Having no blue water navy to speak of, China feels defenseless in the Persian Gulf against any hostile action to choke off its energy supplies,” points out Tarique Niazi, a specialist in resource based conflicts, in the Jamestown Foundation’s China Brief. [7] A presence in Gwadar provides China with a “listening post” where it can monitor US naval activity in the Persian Gulf, Indian activity in the Arabian Sea.

A recent report titled “Energy Futures in Asia” produced by defense contractor Booz Allen Hamilton for the Pentagon notes that China has already setup electronic eavesdropping posts at Gwadar, which are monitoring maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and the Arabian Sea. Drawing attention to China’s “string of pearls” strategy, the reports point out that “China is building strategic relationships along the sea lanes from the Middle East to South China Sea in ways that suggest defensive and offensive positioning to protect China’s energy interests, but also to serve broad security objectives”. 8] The port and naval base in Gwadar is part of “string of pearls”. The other “pearls” in the string include facilities in Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia and South China Sea that Beijing has acquired access to by diligently building ties with governments in these countries. The Pentagon report sees China’s efforts to defend its interests along oil shipping sea lanes as “creating a climate of uncertainty” and threatening “the safety of all ships on the high seas”. This perception neglects the fact that China’s “string of pearls” strategy has been prompted by its sense of insecurity.

The United States irresistible presence in the Gulf and the control of its exercises over the Malacca Strait, through which 80% of China’s oil imports pass, has added enormously to Beijing’s fears that Washington could stop its oil supply, in the event of hostilities over Taiwan. China’s foothold in the Arabian Sea has set off alarm bells in India, Iran and US. For India, China-Pakistan collaboration at Gwadar and China’s presence in the Arabian sea intensifies its feeling of hold by China from all sides.

Iran sees the development of Gwadar port in its neighborhood as likely to grind down the significance of its ports, especially that India has helped to construct-to central Asia and Afghanistan. However, Iran’s good relations with Central Asian Republics and Afghanistan would help it to maintain its advantage Pakistan’s Gwadar port. Ultimately, the extents to which Pakistan and China are able to reap economic and strategic gains from Gwadar project depend on the challenges to it from within their borders.

Chapter# 4 Development Projects: Oman: Oman has offered $100 million aid for the development of social and infrastructure facilities in Balochistan. Out of $100 million, Oman has provided $7 million for extending of runway at Gwadar Airport, construction of jetties, up gradation of Gwadar Hospital and construction of power house. Oman is also financing construction of Gwadar Hoshab Road, water supply scheme in Gwadar area and construction of irrigation dams.

Pakistan and Oman have signed a number of agreements which include Avoidance of Double Taxation, Promotion and Protection of Investment, Cultural, Educational and Technical Co-operation, Agreement on cooperation between Oman Chamber of Commerce and Industry and FPCCI, Maritime Boundary Agreement and Agreement to establish Pak-Oman Joint Investment Company. The closeness to Oman is an advantage to Pakistan. Around 70,000 Pakistani citizens are participating in the development of Oman. Omani assistance for construction of Gwadar port is going a long way in promoting economic relations between Gwadar-Pakistan and Central Asian States. 9] Pakistan: Pakistan is linking Gwadar with Karachi through networking of roads. It’s also enabling Central Asian States in north, to use Gwadar as a port for their trade. Water supply is being improved, seven jetties are being constructed and local fishermen are being given motor engine run boats. The local hospital is also upgraded. A number of electric power generation projects are also being carried out in Gwadar and its surroundings. The Quetta Electric Supply Company (QESCO), a subsidiary of Wapda, has geared up the work for the building the power transmission line.

It is expected to be completed soon. Airport: Gwadar has a small airport which is basically meant for Fokker aircraft. But the need is to expand this airport and enlarge its runway to facilitate the landing of wide body aero-planes. CAA has upgraded the Gwadar Airport for the landing of Airbuses. Gwadar airport is open air and after its inauguration the jet planes are also landing at it. A sum of 2. 3 million dollars is being utilized from Omani grant. The Pakistan government and the Civil Aviation Authority are also contributing Rs563. 35 million for this purpose.

Dry Port: China wants to set up a dry port near the Pakistan-China border, so that Western China could also benefit from Gwadar seaport. It will create the ribbons of economic activity and hundreds of new jobs along proposed highway linking Gwadar with the Karakoram highway in the north. Construction: Dubai ports World, announced on June 1, 2006 that it will spend $10 billion to develop transport infrastructure and real estate in Pakistan. Dubai port World is also discussing the possibility of the company taking over operational management of Gwadar port in Balochistan.

Emaar Prosperities, announced on May 31, 2006 there real estate developments in the cities of Islamabad and Karachi in Pakistan. The projects, with a total investment of $2. 4 billions, will include a series of master planned communities that will set new benchmarks in commercial, residential and retail property within Pakistan. In addition the conglomerate signed a exceptional $43 billion deal to develop two island resorts, Bundal Island and Buddo Island, over the next decade. Port Operations:

Port of Singapore took over the management of Gwadar port by the end of January 2007. Port of Singapore was the highest bidder for the Gwadar port after Dubai Ports world backed out of the bidding process. Originally, the chairman of DP world, Sultan Ahmad bin Sulayem, who met President Pervez Musharraf on May 5th 2006, expressed a strong hope for the management of facilities at the strategic Gwadar deep-sea port and development of infrastructure in the southern port city everywhere in Pakistan. But a decision was taken not to bid, when India’s Security Council voiced concerns bout DP World’s projects in India, alongside its plan in Pakistan, and Sultan Ahmad bin Sulayem assured the Indians their pull out was well considered and Indian need not have any security concerns. The port will now be in competition with Dubai. Conclusion: The project of Gwadar port which was commenced on 22 March 2002, by China will enhance co-operation between Pakistan and China in the field of engeering and technology. The significance of this project is great for both countries. Gwadar is located on the Gulf of Oman close to the entrance of Persian Gulf.

China is going to be the beneficiary of Gwadar’s most accessible international trade routes to Central Asian Republics and Xinjiang. Pakistan’s rail network can also provide China with rail access to Iran. For Pakistan, the economic returns from Gwadar port stem from its location near the Strait of Hormuz, through which 40% of the world oil passes. Gwadar could emerge as a key shipping point, bringing Pakistan desirable income, and when combined with the surrounding areas could become a trade hub, once rail and road links connect it to the rest of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia.

The so-called Kashmir problem came into being almost with the independence of the country. Through 50 years have passed, the problem still remain unsolved. Kashmir still remains the most important source of friction between India and Pakistan. The British withdrew from India on 15th august, 1947. The princely Indian states were given the option either to (a) accede to India; (b) accede to Pakistan (c) become independent. No serious difficulties arose in the case of the other states. But the position of the Kashmir is unique.

It is contiguous both with India and Pakistan, so it could accede to either of them. Both desired it, for the state is not only a ‘heaven upon earth’, it is so far reaching significance from the military point of view. While it was ruled by a Hindu Maharaja, its population was predominantly Muslim. In this fact, lay the real problem, Pakistan claimed it as its own, for it has a predominantly Muslim population. The Hindu Maharaja was still hesitating whether to join India or Pakistan, when Pakistan encouraged her-war like tribes to enter the state.

They were supported by regular Pakistan army. Having no other option left to him, the Maharaja acceded to India and urgently requested for help. The accession was endorsed by the popularly elected constituent Assembly of Kashmir. Indian armies were flown over to Srinagar immediately, and the invaders were pushed out of the Kashmir valley. They could not be thrown out of the rest of the state territory, for to do so would have meant bombing of military bases in Pakistan. As India wanted to avoid an all out war, it complained to the Security Council against Pakistan.

A cease-fire was declared immediately, as a result of which Pakistan remained and still remains, in illegal possession of a part of the state which is called “Azad Kashmir” by Pakistan. The U. N. O. then made various efforts to settle the dispute peacefully. The true facts thus came to light, and Pakistan was accepted by both the countries. The resolution provided that (1) Pakistan would withdraw all its forces from the state. (2) That the Azad Kashmir government and its forces would be disbanded, and (3) when conditions permit, India too, would gradually withdraw her forces.

Time passed, but Pakistan did not withdraw her forces nor did it disband the Azad Kashmir Government. Every year it complained to the U. N. O. that was India was oppressing the Kashmir Muslims and the Islam was in danger. On countries occasions, she was guilty of violations of the cease-fire line. Power polities of the big powers also came in the way of a just solution of this dispute. The rules of Pakistan took to the war path. When the U. S. A. did not encourage them in their war-like actions, they turned to China for help. Encouraged by China, they sent infiltrators into Kashmir in Sep. 1965.

This led to an all out war between India and Pakistan. The Pakistan army was badly defeated and its armory destroyed. However, late Mr. Shastri’s statesmanship enables the two countries agreed not to use force, but to solve the Kashmir problem by peaceful means. The position at the present is that the armies of the two countries still confront each other along the cease-fire line. While Pakistan continues to demand Kashmir, India declares that the only problem is that the aggressor should be asked to vacate. Both countries are spending huge amount over their armies in Kashmir.

No solution of the problem seems to be in sight in the near future. The relations of the two countries continue to be bitter and hostile. Even the crushing defeat suffered by Pakistan in the Indo-Pakistan war of Dec. 1971, has fail to make that country see reason. Efforts were made through the Shimla Agreement to normalize relation with Pakistan, but not too much avail. In more recent times, there has been considerable deterioration in the situation in Kashmir. The Pakistan trained subversives have infiltrated into the valley in large numbers.

One slogan, “Independent Kashmir” has been used to misguide the people. Pakistan has tried its best to politicize the problem and win international support for its point of view. It seems that the two countries were on the very brink of war. However, good sense prevailed and the danger of war receded. But violence still continues, life in the state is still insecure and thousands have migrated from the valley into Jammu, Delhi and other parts of the country. Kashmir problem is the most serious problem that India faces today.