Safety

Driving has become a part of everyday life. From kids to adults everyone has come to depend on a motorized vehicles. With such a rapid increase of new drivers in the 21 century accident’s and fatalities have been also on the rise with the tendencies of young teens being in the mist of it all. Many of these problems have not been nothing new but with such high mortality rate this has caused awareness in a old but newly transformed problem.

In last few years to prevent these problems from continuing to incline some states have put restrictions on newly licensed drivers making it more difficult for young teen to obtain a license but study has shown that in these restrictions have actually back fired as quoted from Dr.Masten “In fact, 75 percent of the fatal crashes we thought we were saving actually just occurred two years later. It’s shocking”. The matter of the fact is that restrictions on newly road drivers have no worked at all it has just delay the inevitable.

Restrictions on young drivers seem to work but when looking at the bigger picture it has failed. Teens alone are not just the problem along with technology and to drugs etc. all of these things being a big contributor to teen accidents not only have these things raised the possibility of fatalities but our awareness, on how dangerous these things can be when driving. Knowing just how much it can increase the chances of an accident.

How can we prevent these things from happening well experts say that these restrictions do work but ounce these restriction have expired people go back to driving more and more recklessly because teens start to feel over confident with their ability to avoid these back fires I think we should create a system where newly licensed drivers have to report back the dmv every six months and take a safety test to assure that they know the risks and consequences of risky driving. Aside from having precautions with teen drivers I think every one should have to renew their licensee every 2 years instead of an extensive 5 years.

Having and adding more restrictions to everyone not just teens is best because what has been shown through various study’s is that most people don’t learn because many people try to avoid these extra regulations and thus missing these vital and important skills. So to avoid people going through loop holes we should as country tighten up on restrictions.

Transportation of goods over the world can be done by four modes which are railway, road, air and sea. Sea transportation is the one of the oldest transportation mode for many centuries. The number of ships and types increased rapidly in the last two centuries. For instance, the number of passenger fleets was 106 in 1972 but it is reached to 226 in 1998 (Alderton, 2004). This growth leads sea traffic busy with various types of ships carrying million tons of cargoes and passengers. As a consequence of this, unexpected accidents started to come out with fatal casualties.

Some safety regulations must be taken both onshore or offshore to state the responsibilities and safety measures for the marine industry. Regarding to this, countries needed to establish an organization to promote Marine safety. IMO is the first international maritime organization and was established in 1948 (IMO, 20/10/2005). It was first entered into force in 1958 and its aim is to ensure safety, to prevent human injury or loss of life and to avoid damage to the environment (IMO, 1992). This essay will explore the IMO conventions and the effectiveness of IMO to the marine industry.

IMO is concerned with the three important points: safety, prevention and control. In order to be effective in these areas, rules and regulations must be applied within the conventions. IMO has adopted various conventions but most significant are

• SOLAS (Safety of Life at Sea),
• ISM (International Safety Management),
• COLREG (Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea),
• MARPOL (International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships),
• STCW (International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers)
• ILLC (International Convention on Load Lines).

Adoptions of these conventions need to follow some procedures and long time to become valid. Six main bodies are involved within IMO to design, decide and offer the conventions and followed by a government acceptance to put into force. In addition to this, due to the rapid changes in shipping industry, conventions must be keeping updated to satisfy the conditions.

SOLAS

The main objective of the SOLAS Convention is to specify minimum standards for the construction, equipment and operation of ships (SOLAS, 2001). It was adopted in 1974 and was entered into force in 1980. It was divided into 12 chapters, all requirements and certificates are controlled by the flag states. It is highly focused on

• construction; stability, subdivision, fire protection and detection of vessels
• life-saving appliances and arrangements; lifeboats and liferats
• radiotelegraphy and radiotelephony
• safety of navigation; radars, navigational aids, routeing of ships
• safety management of ships operations which is ISM Code
• Carriage of goods.

ISM CODE

It is known as the one of the most significant IMO invention which is a management system that controls work processes from the top level to lower, to stimulate safety organization both ashore and onboard. It is applied with quality management techniques to determine the responsibilities and principles of each action. System must provide safe working environment, to overcome against identified risks and continuous improvement of management and personal skills ashore and aboard (ISM, 2002).

COLREG

It was adopted in 1972 and entered into force in 1977. COLREG determines vessels speed, risks and conducts of vessels operating in or near traffic separation schemes. The vessels which are navigating on the high seas or going to connect to the high seas must obey these rules. The other important areas of COLREG are; visibility of vessels, lights and shapes, sound and lights.

STCW

It was adopted in 1977 and entered into force in 1984. Examination of the past accidents reports state that the majority of the accidents are caused by watchkeeping officers. This convention is concerned with the basic requirements on training, certification and watchkeeping. It is divided into six chapters which are; general provisions, navigational watch keeping, keeping an engineering watch, radio department, special requirements for tankers and proficiency in survival craft (IMO,20/10/2005).

ILLC

It was adopted in 1966 and entered into force in 1968. Its aim is to reserve buoyancy, freeboard stability and avoid excess stress on the ship’s hull (IMO, 20/10/2005).

MARPOL

There was a tremendous increase in tanker production after Second World War II. These tankers were really complex to built and operate. According to this, some accidents occurred with thousands tons of oil split into water and damaged marine environment. MARPOL was established to prevent the marine pollution from oil splits, sewages, chemicals and other dangerous products. It introduces some measures, for instance;

In addition to these improvements, there is a reasonable reduction of oil spill to the environment. According to the IMO, total oil spill in 2004 was 15000 tons comparison to the year 1975 was 2.13 million tons.

Comparison to the 1950’s, by the help of improvements, marine industry becomes safer but needs continuous improvement. Everybody who involves in this industry must always seek for zero defects. Although IMO has made great effort and reduced the rate of accidents in marine industry, casualties and pollution can still happen and remain constant. The reasons for these are

Implementation of IMO Rules

In order to put the IMO rules into force effectively, all parties such as governments, shipping companies, flag states and port states have to make a reasonable effort. The mentioned parties have different responsibilities according to their positions while adapting and controlling these rules. These parties must have continuous collaboration and communication with each other but generally they can not. Lack of collaboration leads to misunderstandings and difficulties to put these rules into practice.

Continuous Revision of Rules and Regulations:

The rules and regulations are updated periodically to keep up with the modern conditions. Although some rules have convenient level of safety, changed several times and become more complicated. The more complexity means the more problems.

The Gap Between Developed and Developing Countries:

Developing countries have an important place in shipping industry. They own a reasonable percentage of world merchant fleet. Comparison to the developed countries, it is difficult to adapt the rules immediately because of their government procedures and financial situations. It is not just the IMO problem; it is one of the biggest problems in our world. Instead of offering temporary solutions such as loans; investments, guidance and assistance will be more effective.

Human Side

To manage marine safety, there must be an excellent co-operation between the people who are on board and ashore. Continuous improvement is needed for both management level and crew. Training and certification must be compulsory under the quality procedures. As mentioned before, ISM Code and STCW are established for this purpose but in the last hundred years, owners decided to flag out and wanted to work with low cost crew to get more profits. As a result of this, accidents appeared because of untalented crew. For this particular purpose, maritime training centres are highly important for safety.

Application Costs of Regulations

It is not easy to implement the rules and regulations because they need powerful financial situation. In addition to this, the average age of world vessel fleet is going old. Instead of investing money to these old vessels, owners prefer doing small improvements to the existing systems. Low cost high profit concept leads danger in this industry. At this point, new buildings come out and take an important part. Owners are now investing more money on technological improvements under construction phase with the societies control for safer life. Newly designed ships includes easily operated navigation techniques such as AIS, GPS and radars, stability calculations, tank cleaning systems, fire systems and etc. .

In conclusion, mentioned conventions within IMO concept reached to a reasonable success in marine industry. On the other hand, continuous improvement by taking advantage of technology, collaboration and communication of involved parties are still needed to achieve zero accident targets and clean seas.

The aim of this project is to describe the incident which took place in Feyzin, south of France, on Tuesday January 4th 1966. This project describes the history of the refinery, a description of the LPG manufacture processes, the cause of the accident, details of the accident, inquires and safety measures, conclusion and personal recommendations.

A focus group for the project was the first approach on research to explore people’s ideas and attitudes to the accident. There were several weekly group meetings excluding the weekly tutor meetings putting forward ideas discussing whether the accident could have been for seen and reasonable measures were in place. Each member of the group was assigned a particular area in which they were to collect information. The required information was gathered from various highly reliable sources such as a HSE investigation.

History And Background Information

Feyzin is situated in the suburbs of Lyon in the southern part of France. The France national petroleum was located in Feyzin.

The refinery at Feyzin had started operating in 1964. The main objective of this processing plant was to produce 1.7 million tonnes a year of LPG (liquefied petroleum gas). LPG is a by-product of the distillation of oil from crude oil. When the distillate is put under pressure its physical state changes into a liquid. It is in this form that LPG is transported around in cylinder tanks.

Because of the relatively short life p of the site prior to the incident, the cascade of events may be relatively short and that major issues will have risen during both the design and construction of the site. We can assume now that the plant was between its 1st and 2nd year of operation.

LPG is a combination of Propane and Butane. The LPG is used as an alternative to petrol.

The LPG is important because it is widely used as a fuel for vehicles and as cooking gas since its manufacture. They are also used as Industrial fuel and heating oils which are vital for many process plants.

LPG is employed for starting up solid-fuel and oil-fired boilers supplying turbo generators. It is potential stand by for gas turbine generating equipment run on interruptible gas supplies. Its use for peak-load turbines will be economical to some circumstances.

Cascade events

The causes of the deadly incident which took place at Feyzin

There were quite a few reasons reported which were believed to be the causes of the explosion.

Cause of the leakage

Three operators opened 2-inch valves which were mounted in series at a bottom of a 1200m3 propane spherical tank. The valves did not close at a LPG tank which contained 1200kl propane, which led to the leakage of LPG gas, a major cause of the explosion.

For LPG that is Propane gas, when the pressure is lowered to atmospheric one the temp drops to -40. At this temperature moisture in air is frozen, but also the moisture reacts with LPG forming a solid hydrate. So either the downstream valve did not close tightly because of hydrate formation or the valve handle was stuck by the frozen moisture. This accident was believed to be caused as the upstream valve was not opened fully and the pressure at the outlet of the first valve was near the atmospheric pressure, the pressure difference cooled. It is very wrong to operate the valve system like that. Therefore, the cause of the explosion is either the operator’s human mistake or a mistake on the management not to inform the proper execution of the operation.

Cause of the ignition

The leaked LPG is presumed to be travelled for a distance and spread along the ground. A car driving down a local road might have sparked the ignition which is maybe due to the driver’s cigarette or the car engine’s hot temperature. Note that the layout of the plant was restricted to the landscape; a highway was constructed just 50m away from the large LPG tanks which exploded during the incident. Moreover there was no dike around the tanks which exploded, when large amount of LPG leaked, the vapour flew along the ground to the highway. The main cause of the ignition is that there was no dike around the LPG tanks and the distance regulation insufficient.

Secondly, the legs of the spherical tank were made of iron which weren’t fire proof. Thirdly, is that the distance between the adjacent tanks was really close, The actual distance between the centre of the tanks was just 27m according to the facility information provided. This proves that the adjacent tanks were affected so easily from the explosion of the first tank.

Event

A BLEVE (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion) was the disaster that occurred at Feyzin. It is an explosion phenomenon caused by the rapid phase change (vaporization) of a liquid.

At 6:30am three operators started the water draining operation of a tank. Two valves were opened in series on the bottom of the sphere. When the operation was nearly complete, the upper valve was closed and then cracked open again. No flow came out of the cracked valve, so it was opened further. The blockage, assumed to be ice or hydrate, cleared and propane gushed out. The operator was unable to close the upper valve and by the time he attempted to close the lower valve this was also frozen open. The LPG leak started here because that valve was not closed completely. After a few minutes the operators were covered in propane vapour. The leaking LPG spread in the direction of the highway, with partially vaporizing. The alarm rang in the control room at this time.

At around 7:05am; the alarm rang and it is not clear if it rang throughout the Feyzin districts or just the Feyzin refinery. The first fire truck of the factory turned out immediately. After this the traffic on the highway next to the refinery was stopped. The fire brigade of Lyon arrived at 7:20.

Just after 7:30am, a car came and stopped on the local road where the traffic had not been stopped. The explosion apparently occurred after the car had stopped. The fire increased in power, spread along the leaking LPG, and the tank was overcome with flames immediately.

By 8:40am the first tank at the refinery exploded by the BLEVE. The second and third spherical tanks exploded five minutes later. Two more spherical tanks and many oil tanks burned continuously. The next day in the morning the fire was extinguished.

As a result of this it was reported that 18-81 persons died and about 80-130 persons got injured included members of the fire fighting team. The physical damage included five LPG tanks, many atmospheric tanks containing crude oil and jet fuel, and so on. The Feyzin Refinery suffered extensive damage.

The LPG tank farm where the sphere was located consisted of four 1200 m3 propane and four 2000 m3 butane spheres. The fire brigade arrived on site, but were not experienced in dealing in refinery fires, and it appears they did not attempt to cool the burning sphere. They concentrated their hoses on cooling the remaining spheres. About 90 minutes after the initial leakage, the sphere ruptured, killing the men nearby. A wave of liquid propane flowed over the compound wall and fragments of the ruptured sphere cut through the legs of the next sphere which toppled over. The relief valve on this tank began to emit liquid.

What is believed to have happened on the day of the accident is: the upstream valve was not opened fully and the pressure at the outlet of the first valve was near atmospheric pressure, hence the upstream valve was cooled by the pressure difference.

It is absolutely prohibited to operate valves in such manner. Therefore, the cause of the accident is either the operator’s human error or a mistake on management side in not explaining the proper operation protocols.

Another contributing factor to the accident is that the operator did not close the downstream valve. There is insufficient information available to why this valve was not closed. It is assumed that either ice is generated in the downstream valve like in the upstream valve or a rapid large LPG leak occurred, the operator may have panicked when they could not close the upstream valve and therefore may have not remembered to close the downstream valve. Basically they had to decrease the downstream valve opening when the LPG began to appear in the drain water. Then the valve had to be closed at the end of the drain work. Either they forgot to carry out this procedure or they could not close the second valve because it had also become stuck by freezing.

1. Valve A is closed
2. Valve A cracks open
3. Valve A becomes blocked due to freezing
4. No flow through valve A
5. Valve A is opened
6. Ice block in valve A becomes dislodged
7. Valve A freezes in open position
8. Unable to close valve A
9. Valve B freezes in open position
10. Unable to close valve B
11. Pressure sphere fluid leaks through open valves
12. Fluid level in pressure vessel drops decreasing internal pressure
13. Liquid propane begins to boil due to pressure drop
14. Pressure in vessel increases due to liberated gaseous propane
15. Fluid flow through valves A and B increases due to increase in pressure
16. Vessel pressure continues to increase
17. Pressure vessel ruptures
18. Gaseous propane escapes vessel

Recommendations and summary

• Geographical location and details
• History of Feyzin, including cascade events
• Incident timeline and possible description of why it happened
• Geographical effects of the incident
• Results of the inquiry and official recommendations
• Personal recommendations not covered by the enquiry

Geographical location and details

In order to get a better understanding of the scale of the Feyzin incident, it is important to note the location of the site in regards to the local area in which the site was and still is positioned. This will give an indication to understanding the safety procedures that were in place at the time of the incident and how emergency procedures were carried out at the time.

It has proven very difficult to obtain a clear picture of the geographical location either prior to or following the incident of the site and so it will be assumed that the current location of the site, circa 2009, is the same location at the time of the incident. Close examination of this map may also indicate the most likely positioning of the epicentre of the primary detonation.

Sandwiched between the A7 Expressway to the east of the site and the ‘Le grand large’ river to the west, on close examination, it appears that some form of storage containers are located just west of the top E15 label in the image. This may lead us to assume that the storage containers were in the same location prior to the 1966 incident.

On a broader scale it may also be seen that this location is approximately 10 km south of the major city of Lyon. Research suggests that at the time of the incident, the site lacked any serious on site systems in case of a major crisis, relying more on the local public services to resolve anything arising such as the incident in question.

Again on close inspection of the map, it can be seen that the site is placed within a fairly urbanised area. Again we must assume a similar layout at the time of the incident though populations will be quite different from the 1966 incident and the 2009 map. This will assist in understanding the cause of the incident overall and the scale of the overall effect in this area.

Apart from just repeating the timeline for the actual incident, it is important to try and understand why the incident took place, outside of the events leading up to and after what happened.

The sequence of events surrounding the cracking and freezing of the ‘upper’ valve, and the subsequent rupture of the pressure vessel need to be understood, in order to get a better understanding of how such a crises may be avoided in the future. These events may only have taken place over a very short time frame but they are essential to understanding the crises.

One of the critical questions that should be asked is why following the closure of valve A and the subsequent cracking and freezing up of the valve, was the valve then opened. Thus allowing the ice block to become dislodged and the rest of the above sequence to take place.

The reasons for this particular action, in opening valve A may be described in four ways. The first possibility may be a simple case of curiosity. The valve was closed and froze, and so to check that the valve was still properly operational was then opened.

The second possibility is that the correct procedure for such an event was not properly followed. That the correct procedure would have stated that in such an event, the valve should have been kept closed and the problem be properly reported to maintenance. Therefore the valve operator was responsible for the incident that took place.

The third possibility is that no official procedure or training had been formulated for such an event. Therefore panic may have ensued resulting in the opening of the valve as a panic decision which can therefore be described as human error.

The fourth possibility is that the official procedure was followed properly and that the procedure was critically floored. So the issue of a misunderstanding of such an event or even ignorance of such was present at the time of this crisis.

The third possibility seems likely case based on the immediate actions of the individual as he made the decision not to use a phone close to the pressure tank and instead ran approximately 800 meters to the next nearest phone in the fear of causing a detonation of the released vapour cloud. The fourth possibility may also have some bearing in the crisis as prior to this event, the term BLEVE had still not been discovered or at least recorded prior to this.

The rest of the sequence should be covered in the full breakdown of the crisis.

An important issue to be considered is the overall control displayed by both the emergency and municipal authorities during the crisis. Even though the A7 expressway was closed following the leak, the authorities failed to close the local roads to all traffic, which resulted in a car being within 160 meters of the leaking pressure tank and causing the point of ignition.

The failings in the emergency service appear to be more in association with a lack of sufficient training in the order of dealing with industrial crises as it was primarily there to deal with public situations. This resulted in a fatal misunderstanding of how to control such a situation as a leaking pressure tank and resulting fire, due to a lack of prior knowledge which is strengthened in the term BLEVE only being created some 4 to 5 years later

Results of the enquiry and official recommendations

The official investigation was not fully resolved until 1971 by the Grenoble court case. This may have been due to political reasons or due to the enquiry investigating why the crisis had occurred in the first place. On the principal that such events have happened since the Feyzin disaster, it cannot be assumed that the enquiry was successful in bringing about sufficient change in the safety of pressurised fluid containment.

Personal recommendations not covered by the enquiry

The first recommendations are for the design and construction of all current and future proposed plants dealing with pressurised fluid containment. The second recommendations are in association with work practices involved on chemical plants in general.

Third valve (reserve)

A third valve should be installed for the purpose of maintenance and crisis control. To be kept open at all times so as not to induce unnecessary wear and tear on the valve. When maintenance is required to be carried out on the two principal valves, the reserve can be shut to allow for maintenance to be carried out safely. In the event of a crisis similar to that of Feyzin, this valve can be shut as an emergency back up system in minimising fluid leakage from the pressure vessel.

‘Cold’ pipe lagging

In order to prevent freezing of any pipes or valves dealing with potentially ‘cold’ fluids, lagging should be fitted to all appropriate pipe work and fittings in order to minimise any potential freezing of these systems. Systems not dealing with ‘cold’ fluids must be scrutinised independent of this point.

Rubber sealed pressure box

High pressure boxes should be installed around all vital valves dealing with pressurised fluids. They should be big enough to allow for ease of working but not to big as to incur any additional hazard to plant running. They should be designed with an environmental rubberised seal so that if a valve begins to leak, the box can but locked shut with an emergency key. Thus minimising any excessive leakage until the situation can be bought under control. See: A third valve (reserve)

Deluge system – Control box and master switch

If geographically located near to a natural water source as in the case of the Feyzin site, a deluge system should be installed. It must have pipe work leading to all critical locations around the entirety of the plant. This system must be regularly checked so as to remain in good working order. Each piece of equipment covered by this system must be fitted with a local switch, so in the event of either a leak or a fire, the operator can activate the system in order to prevent escalation of the situation.

A central control post should be equipped with a control panel covering all local deluge systems via an override system and also be installed with a master switch that can activate all systems at once. This will allow for the main operator to activate systems in a sequence or all at once should a major sit6uation occur. Communication is vital for this system to work properly, so an emergency phone network should be installed in order to insure proper working of the system. This will only be part of the solution and fire brigades properly trained with dealing with such an event will ensure that the crisis is resolved effectively.

Completion of site before going online

It is important that a site should be safe to operate before going online. In the case of Feyzin, the site was still under construction when the accident occurred. Even though construction work may not have been the cause of the incident, neither can the incompletion of the site be assumed to have helped in the scale of the incident itself. So before a plant can go online, all safety systems must be installed.

This is not to be confused with site maintenance which is an ongoing process throughout the plants lifetime.

Inclusion of full earthworks around site

Only effective if any vapour or fluid is heavier than atmospheric air. May also be affected by environmental conditions, however if all other systems are overwhelmed, then this system is designed to delay the spread of any possible leak. Earth works should be built around all containment vessels and if possible the entire site. So in case of an emergency, any leaking vapour may be contained within the confines of either the leaking vessel or the plant.

Preventions

To prevent valves from freezing redundant sampling valves and drain valves are installed in series. In the tank involved in this accident, the double valve was already installed. In the LPG tank, the doubling of the valve is a minimum requirement as in the case of a single valve, there is a strong possibility that the valves main body will be cooled, damaging the closing function of the valve by freezing of the moisture in the air. The distance between the two valves must be sufficient to prevent the low temperature of the second valve affecting it. The size of the second valve must be approximately 10mm or less. It is recommended that a distance of 1m or more to be allowed between valve 1 and 2.

Countermeasures in other facilities around the world

• Dike installation: – LPG spreads along the ground as it is heavier than the air. A dike is effective for prevention the spread of LPG.
• As a precaution against the BLEVE phenomenon, the tank wall must be cooled by placing water showering facilities above the tank.
• The Tank legs must be fire proofed. If the legs are made from iron they can be damaged by fire.
• The distance between tanks is kept to prevent the spread of fires. The minimum distance is generally the diameter of the larger tank, however if possible greater distance between tanks is recommended.
• Gas detectors are installed within the facility.

Conclusions

The Feyzin accident was a cause by human error and unsafe conditions. The accident could have been prevented if correct procedures were followed and if the plant was designed with appropriate fail safe systems such as a dike and LPG detectors.

This accident lead to a greater understanding of the BLEVE phenomenon and has given future LPG companies the knowledge of its existence which has led to further research into this occurrence.

Explosion of LPG tanks cause devastating damage. The companies that store and handle large volumes of LPG must consult with the local government to ensure they can communicate with the local government, inform local inhabitants and relay instructions for how to restrict traffic in case of an LPG leak.

It has now become clear that the location for which the plant is located must be thoroughly studied, to ensure there is enough distance between the plant and built up areas. Without doubt future companies designing LPG refinery plants can benefit from the findings of this accident report.

Glossary

• BLEVE – Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion
• LPG – Liquefied Petroleum Gas

I have indentified a need that there is nominally a high rising “accident” rate which involves forklift trucks, with injuries and fatalities occurring to other workers and members of public who are in the area of the forklift truck whilst in use. I have chosen to design a product that could be fitted, to a forklift truck, which will improve safety and reduce “accidents” whilst a forklift truck is in use.

Resulting in taking all of the above into account my single phrase function statement being “prevent accidents” however, theirs already methods, procedures and regulations in place to try and prevent “accidents” such as regulated speed limits, sufficient training in using a forklift truck and warning fixtures such as a drivers horn, hazard light. If an accident was to occur in most cases it will be blamed as an operators fault even if the safety scheme was in place.

Employer areas of using forklift trucks, which are also known, to cause accidents.

> Lack of training or improper training of employees who operate forklift trucks.

> Time factors, having little time to carry out the job in hand causing stress and speeding.

> Lack of proper attachments and accessories.

> Wrongly tasked job of forklift truck or operators. – Not qualified, using the forklift incorrectly to do the wrong things.

> Poor maintenance of forklift trucks

Operational areas of using forklift trucks, which are prone, too cause accidents.

> Incorrect reversing techniques.

> Incorrect turning, use of space

> Incorrect use – over loading & over reaching

> Incorrect warnings to others about a forklift in use nearby, no signage or alarms/hazard lighting

> Poor contact throughout joint jobs, or in shared spaces, could this result in the need of a banks man.

> Giving rides on the forklift truck or load – also comes back to incorrect use.

> Playing games, not taking the job in hand seriously resulting in stunt driving, erratically driven

Having had a quick look at forklift trucks and the ways that they are used I have come to the decision that it would be very rare for a forklift to be involved in an “accident” due to malfunctions of the forklift truck itself but would result in the incorrect use due to operator error or areas which haven’t been covered or have been vaguely thought about by the employee.

“There are reputed to be over 8,000 reported accidents involving the use of forklift trucks in the UK each year and some of these result in fatalities. The majority of these accidents are caused by the lack of sufficient training of the operator, operator error, a lack of knowledge about the equipment and the working environment, bad truck maintenance, poor lighting conditions, inadequate gangways and unsuitable premises in which forklift trucks are used. In fact, slightly more pedestrians are injured as the result of a forklift accident than the operators themselves.”

The above statement is taken from

http://www.workplacesafetyadvice.co.uk/forklift-truck-safety.html

This statement stands by and proves what I have pointed out regarding forklift truck accidents.

Having carried out some brief research I can now focus my thoughts onto exactly what I want to be able to achieve for example demands would be things that I would need the final product to have, the principle ideas if you will. wishes, would be the additions, which we don’t exactly need but would be an added bonus.

Demands

Wishes

To prevent accidents!

Compact

Easy to install alongside existing accessories

Cheap to produce

Universal fitting

Works well alongside other accessories

Robustness

Looks nice

Reliable

Looks original against existing product

Pedestrian safety improved

Improved driver visibility

Just from carrying out a simple task of listing demands and wishes explores areas, which are possibly endangering humans and infrastructures for example if the product we design does succeed with its demands, then the product its self with reduce risks and risk of accidents, therefore this would result in less employee time off work, less accidents and a lower risk of the health and safety executive getting involved resulting in a fine. All of these problems/potential incidents can be prevented by carrying out the correct procedures and using efficient products and accessories to do so… for example an add on product/accessories that is built and engineered to these exact demands!

Outline Specification

An outline specification specialises in exact specifications during the early stages of a design process, this being the designing of an accessory to improve the safety whilst forklifts trucks are being used. The specification is to include the need of the particular product, which can then be quantified, by converting each demand into a specific broken down form.

Functionality.

The functionality would be to try and improve the driver’s visibility, increase safety & awareness for pedestrians.

User interaction.

User Interaction would be visual for example – VDU Monitors so the forklift truck driver can closely examine what is going on with the truck in blind spot areas. Alarms & sensors could be also fitted so as these sound the operator will interact up on hearing these alarms and respond efficiently knowing that something or someone is potentially at risk

Physical Form.

The physical form of the product should improve the forklifts lifting capabilities and working in tight spaces.

Robustness & Operating Environment.

The product will have to be robust I,E it is going to be used in different climates, both hot, cold, wet and dusty. If electrical or electronic components are to be used these should be waterproofed in some kind of way, designing a casing that can with stand these conditions could do this. It would need to be made out of a heavy duty material due to the kind of environment being used in, to do this you could design the casing out of a heavy duty plastic or some kind of metal.

Signals.

Signals of the particular unit or accessory dependant on whether it is electrical/electronic based, it should be ensured that fast response times between display & alarm units are as close to real time as possible. Having Latency type effects will delay the operators response therefore could have already caused an “accident”

Power Supply.

Depending on the type of unit a separate battery source (12VDC) could be used, charging the unit off of the existing battery package, it would charge the unit whilst in use. However this may not be very efficient, with solar powered technology becoming more and more common, a little solar panel could be fitted therefore creating its own power supply and charging its own battery source.

Safety.

The final product designed would need to reach the EU standards and be CE certified, it would need to be proven that the product is safe, and is capable of carrying out the specified task

Product Failure.

If the product were to fail, it would have to be self-notifying i.e. and integrated alarm with in the unit to notify the operator that it is not working. If the product was to fail and not give any notification of doing so then the operator would still be relying on a piece of accident prevention equipment which could in fact cause an “accident”

Maintenance.

The Product should be easy to maintain, be located in a place where it is to do so, maintaining the product would mean checking that the product is working correctly and the connections are all in order. However the product will be designed to last in excess of 5 years under normal operating conditions before it should be due a “service”

Costs.

The Estimated development cost of producing this extraordinary accessory would be: �50k+ with the forklift truck product retailing at around: �350 with a DIY fitting package. However an installation and service/maintenance contract could be agreed resulting in extra income.

Schedules.

The schedule from designing the specified product to developing it would be roughly around 6 – 12 months. Development schedule would depend on

Function Solution Matrix:

Function

Solution Principle

Driver Visibility

Cameras – Improving the view of driver, integrated VDU unit 1

Mirrors – Improve the drivers view

2

Maneuverability

5 Second reverse delay – Giving the driver a good chance to look round 2

Restricted speeds for built up area – Reducing the risk of accidents/crashes1

Pedestrian Visibility

High-Visibility color’s – Another way of enforcing the forklift trucks visibility 1

High intensity lights & Alarms – making people aware of the use of a forklift truck 2

Cordoned off areas/hot spots – reduces the risk of accidents to humans

Object sensors

Laser Sensors – limit speed of forklift truck depending on how close an object is to the truck, alerting driver

Infra Red sensors – limit speed of forklift truck depending on how close an object is to the truck, alerting driver

Solution one is rather complex when compared to solution two because it contains more electronic components This means that it may be of a higher potential to fail as there is more that could go wrong. However it would ensure that forklifts trucks that would be lifting more abnormal heavy loads the operator would be easily informed

In comparison to solution one, the second solution is much more simple approach to satisfying the specification set. With this would bring better reliability however the product wouldn’t be original. The use standardized alarms and hazard lights should be set as a standard, the more complex clever device is the 5-second reverse delay unit. This would delay the operation from putting the forklift truck into reverse giving the operator enough time to check and look around, investigating at this point in time the best route to take and look for instructions The unit would be an all in one manufactured unit in 1 part except the hazard lights.

I have chosen to design and build a 5 second reverse power delay (Solution 2) with alarms to indicate a forklift truck is in presence. The 5-second delay gives the operator plenty of opportunity to look around to plan the route to be taken, and there are no objects/people in the way.

Picture Taken from

http://www.esoftbank.net.cn/images/product_b/10004921/forklift_truck.jpg

Standard alarm alerting people of forklift truck operation

Hazard light visibility increased for blind/loss of sight people are notified of a forklift trucks operation

When the main board detects the forklift truck is put into reverse there is a 5 second delay with restricted power/speed

Finally a power source overseeing the whole operation ensuring there is power to all components in order for them to work

Therefore, it is committed to Improve Its service to customers through the effective management of Its ISO system. The department carries out enforcement activities on industries governed by the three legislations which are Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) 1994, Factories and Machinery Act 1967; and Petroleum Act (Safety Measure) 1984. The National Occupational Safety and Health Excellence Award, which is the highest appreciation by the government of Malaysia, is aimed at giving credit and recognition to organizations which have a good record of achievements for occupational safety and health management at the workplace through the safety and health program audit.

Audit Is used as a tool for benchmarking a firm’s safety and health efforts against accepted standards which outlined in the MS 1722:Part 1 :2005 SSH MS (Occupational Safety and Health Management Systems – Requirements). This standard was developed by Department of Standards Malaysia and with other agencies collaboration. It provides a means of measuring both documentation and implementation of the safety and health program. The Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) 1994 – Act 415 provides the legislative framework to promote, stimulate and encourage high standards of safety and health at work. The aim is to promote safety and health awareness, and establish effective safety organization and performance through self-regulation schemes designed to suit the particular Industry or organization.

The long-term goal of the Act Is to create a healthy and safe working culture among all Malaysian employees and employers. OSHA 1994 defines the general duties of employers, employees, the self-employed, designers, manufacturers, importers and suppliers of plant or substances. Although these duties are of a general character, they carry a wide ranging set of responsibilities. The Act provides a comprehensive and integrated system of law to 1 OFF the public where they may be affected by the activities of people at work. The general duties of employers, employees, the self-employed, designers, manufacturers, importers and suppliers of plant or substances are clearly defined under OSHA 1994.

Employers must safeguard so far as is practicable, the health, after and welfare of the people who work for them. This applies in particular to the provision and maintenance of a safe plant and system of work. Arrangements must also be made to ensure safety and health in the use, handling, storage and transport of plant and substances. Under OSHA 1994, definition of ‘plant’ includes any machinery, equipment, appliance, tool and component, whilst ‘substance’ means any natural or artificial substance whether in solid, liquid, gas, vapor or combination thereof, form. Risks to health from the use, storage or transportation of substances must be minimized.

To meet these aims, all practicable precautions must be taken in the proper use and handling of any substance likely to cause a risk to health. It is the duty of employers to provide the necessary information, instruction, training and supervision in safe practices, including information on the legal requirements. Employers need to consider the specific training needs of their organizations with particular reference to processes with special hazards. An employer employing 40 or more persons must establish a safety and health committee at the workplace. The committee’s main function is to keep under review he measures taken to ensure the safety and health of persons at the workplace and investigate any related matters arising.

An employer must notify the nearest occupational safety and health office of any accident, dangerous occurrence, occupational poisoning or disease which has occurred or is likely to occur at the workplace. Some operation, installation, maintenance and dismantling of equipment and process need competent persons. Thus, during the installation of machinery and equipment such as cranes, lifts and local exhaust ventilation systems, competent persons are compulsory to ensure safe erection, whilst a boilermaker and a steam engineer are required to operate high risk equipment such as boilers. Processes that use hazardous chemicals require competent persons to conduct the air quality and personal monitoring, and a safety and health officer and an occupational health doctor are required to ensure the proper surveillance of the workplace.

Describe how health and safety legislation, policies and procedures promote of individuals in a health or social care setting Health, Safety and security issues are extremely important in care settings in order to protect staff and children, and their families. Legislations and regulations ensure that guidelines are followed to enforce safety and security within an organisation. Legislation is law which has been created by a governing body.

Before a piece of legislation becomes law it may be known as a bill, and may be broadly referred to as legislation while it remains under consideration to distinguish it from other business. Policies ensure that everyone must work within the law and meet the minimum care standards set out by the legislation. Finally, procedures are the steps that are needed to be followed to ensure everyone’s safety within the workplace.

Control of Substances Hazardous to Health (COSHH, 2002), for example, requires employers to control substances that are hazardous to health such as toxic, corrosive or irritant chemicals like cleaning products or even bodily fluids. In a setting such as a Nursery, hazardous substances that are not stored properly and are easily accessible to children may cause consummation further poisoning or spilling on themselves. This hazard could be minimised by storing these substances in a high, possibly locked, area so that children are not likely to get a hold of them and harm themselves.

Also, the incorrect disposal of soiled nappies etc. can cause germs to spread and could cause infection or cross contaminations within the Nursery. This can be avoided by having a specific bin solely for the disposal of soiled nappies to ensure that harm cannot result from this. Ensure that all staff are trained on how to deal with an incident and giving them full information of the regulation because it helps them act quickly enough if there was to be an incident. The Food Safety Regulation Act (1995) makes sure there is a food hygiene standard in place in all businesses.

Illnesses and infections can be easily cause by someone, be it a child or member of staff, not washing their hands before eating or preparing food. This could be after changing a nappy, going to the toilet or playing outside. This risk can be minimised by making sure everyone washes their hands before eating and before, during and after preparing meals. Also, ensure that all equipment is clean and in good condition as this can also cause contamination if dealing with raw and cooked foods.

The Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulation (1995) requires employers to report injuries and dangerous occurrences as soon as they happen. In a nursery, broken furniture, broken toys and small objects can lead to injury or possibly death. Broken furniture can cause children to cut or graze themselves on the sharp break offs. Whereas with broken or unsuitable toys, children can swallow the object causing choking or death. This risk can be avoided by carrying out regular checks of the furniture and toys, making sure they are suitable for use with children. If not, then they should be disposed of efficiently.

With the Data Protection Act (1998), the nursery has to control and protect the handling of the personal information of children and parents. Recklessness and naivety can cause personal information being let out into the public eye. Staff writing down children’s or their parent’s personal details or opinions can end up open to public view. This can be minimised by making sure all data is kept secure on an internal wall, in a locked cupboard. Also, ensuring that all staff are trained to correctly deal with information and are aware of the consequences of recklessness can help lower the risk. www. hse. gov. uk www. foodstandards. gov

Ethics Paper MGT/498 Professor: The primary purpose of ethics and social responsibility is imperative to the way we do business and live amongst society. Ethics most commonly know as the rights and wrongs are principles and standards that establish what is know as acceptable conduct within an organization. Organizations have moral and legal duties to implement ethics when developing a strategic plan while considering stakeholders and consumers, they do not want to be lied to or cheated into buying a false product.

Unethical companies will use aggressive sales tactics and mischievous ways, of doing usiness to sell, promote and profit from vulnerable consumers. Unethical organizations believe in these tactics not realizing that ethical and honest companies tend to be more profitable, reputable and operate amongst less stress from employees to managerial position. Social responsibilities are Just as important as ethics but pertain to a greater scale; it’s an organizations obligation to make a positive impact rather than a negative one on society and the environment.

An example of a company that overstepped ethical and social responsibility boundaries s the oil and gas company BP p. l. c. In 2010, a massive oil spill broke out in the Gulf of Mexico that was caused by oil drilling conducted by this Company and its key contractors. This oil spill caused the death of eleven individuals and cost the company and its partners tens of billions of dollars in order to contain a blowout of the well, mitigate the damages caused and compensate all the individuals and businesses impacted by the spill. The Telegraph). As a result of this oil spill, the US Government established an Oil Spill Commission hich was put in place to investigate the reasons for this disaster. The report concluded that a number of separate factors contributed to the spill which included oversights and outright mistakes from BP and its contractors, Halliburton and Transocean, however that the underlying reason was a failure from management (National Commission).

Management, in an effort to minimize the loss of returns, made concessions for a series of cost-cutting measures that included the quality of the materials used, short cuts in testing processes and the reliance on fewer esources which ultimately contributed to the oil spill. The Commission also concluded that the overall industry nad deficiencies in its internal controls; decision making protocols, training and corporate culture.

As a result, the short falls in this disaster were a combination of oversights and negligence from multiple parties thus extending the ethical and social responsibility among internal and external stakeholders (National Commission). As part of the remedy process for the disaster, BP was required to take actions to urther enhance the safety of its drilling operations in the Gulf of Mexico.

These actions included improved risk management processes such as auditing and verification from third-parties, improved training for its employees, and the implementation of more efficient and safer equipment for well drilling (BP, Investigations and Legal Proceedings). Additionally, the company’s sustainability report for 2012 includes a letter from the Group’s Chief Executive which states that the Organization’s strategy going forward is to create value for its shareholders and upply energy throughout the globe in a safe and responsible manner.

The statement goes on to use other key phrases such as becoming a safety leader in the industry, a responsible corporate citizen and a good employer. The strategy also emphasizes the need to enhance safety and risk management and earn back the trust and value of the Organization (BP, Sustainability Review 2012). All indications are that the Company’s behavior pre oil spill was irresponsible and negligent and was potentially driven primarily by a focus to provide strong returns on heir investments while compromising the integrity and internal controls of the operations.

Post oil spill, the Company has had to learn from the consequences of a very costly disaster in order to stay in business and thrive. The Organization appears to understand now the need for effective communication, transparency and detailed due-diligence in all their efforts. In collusion ethics and social responsibilities’ within an organization take on an imperative role to the success of a corporation or company. Society must also be ware and educate themselves from scams, aggressive business tactics and do their part to prevent these unethical organizations from preying on vulnerable consumers.